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Abstract 
For decades, Virginia Woolf's narrative experiments in the service of a more 
`realistic' presentation of life and being, along with her engagement with the 
Bloomsbury group, produced an extensive body of scholarly work expressing 
fascination with the issues of individual (especially female) `subjectivity' and 
`sexuality. ' Woolf was searching for an aesthetic form that might express the peculiar 
contingencies of living in a rapidly developing modern world, but also in order to 
develop her own more truthful and fundamental understanding of Being. The present 
thesis contends that the forms of life-narrative which Woolf developed and which 
have largely been understood through feminist and psychoanalytic conceptualisations 
of androgyny, may also be approached through the work of second generation 
cognitive scientists, such as Antonio Damasio. His work presents a model of an 
`embodied mind' which offers a scientific understanding of consciousness as rooted 
in the physical and affective body. This contemporary research provides a very 
suggestive and fruitful way of approaching Woolf's understanding of and 
experiments with consciousness and time. So, in emphasising `Moments of Being, ' 
Woolf can be seen to address the transient nature of the `self. ' Or perhaps `selves. ' 
For what Damasio's work has most emphatically demonstrated is that the core self is 
but a conglomeration of momentary feelings of being in existence. 
Incorporating analysis of her familial and social background, this thesis 
suggests that Woolf, who was much influenced by the philosophical discourses of 
Cambridge epistemology and British empiricism, launched her aesthetic pursuit of a 
true life-narrative from a re-configuration of the mind/body dualism by `embodying' 
the mind and suggesting, as in the words of Damasio, "no body never mind. " The 
thesis further ventures to propose that it is out of such a fundamental understanding 
of the co-relation and interaction of sense and sensibility in Being, that Woolf built 
her temporal narrative of being-in-the-world and her feminist conception of self and 
society. Furthermore, it is arguable that her poetic experiments prefigured later 
post-structuralist scepticism about the ontological status of the Logos and the 
inauthentic closures of teleological histories and narratives. 
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Introduction 
A Modernist Prospect of Subject Writing: The Creating of Real Characters 
The problems of the subject and subjective identity in Virginia Woolf's works 
have been explored and discussed from various theoretical positions: feminism, 
structuralism, post-structuralism and, of course, psychoanalytic theory. Still, the 
problem remains elusive, almost as though what has been captured within Woolf's 
narrative resists further re-presentation. Presumably, the failure to address the problem 
fully results from a mis-recognition of Woolf's fundamental aspiration to depict a 
translucent consciousness which partakes of both being and existence: partakes, 
therefore, of the metaphysical and the existential, as well as including her feminist 
polemic concerning the constraints on women's intellectual capacities within a 
gendered society. There is no doubt that Woolf was concerned with the social status of 
women, the fluidity of subjectivity and, most of all, the uncanny sense of what it feels 
like to live a life, and the capacity of literary representation to capture this. Yet, these 
are issues that arise out of her quintessential enterprise: to portray the nature of being 
and the subjective knowing of being in the becoming of the `I, ' and to depict the 
struggle of subjective beings to achieve conscious existence within a particular 
socio-cultural context. 
The problem of the subject-the `I' and the subjective apprehension of the self 
and its existence (namely Being as being-in-the-world in the terms of Martin 
Heidegger)'-was one of Virginia Woolf's primary concerns in writing: "I should like 
to write a very subtle work on the proper writing of lives. What it is that you can 
write-and what writing is, " as Woolf wrote to her brother-in-law, Clive Bell, in 1908 
(L 1: 325). 2 Musing on how to represent and write, truthfully, about lives (lives of 
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Malden: 
Blackwell, 1962). 
2 Date 15 April 1908. See also Julia Briggs "'The Proper Writing of Lives': Biography versus Fiction 
in Woolf's Early Work, " Reading Virginia Woolf (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2006) 25-41 
coývýý 
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others, lives of women, lives hidden and unknown and, most important of all, lives as 
they are lived in contrast to lives as they seem to be), Woolf entangled herself in the 
mid-stream of one of the most fundamental problems in philosophy: the mind-body 
relation and, with it, the ongoing subject/object debate. For how to convey the 
subjective apprehension of `being' in an objective language so that it is possible to 
arouse, in the terms of T. S. Eliot, an appropriate or "objective correlative" response 
from each recipient of the words in and out of the story ?3 Even before Wittgenstein's 
deliberations on the public nature of language, Friedrich Nietzsche famously pondered 
how even something as factual as a `leaf' is a construction of human culture and not 
just more obviously value-laden notions such as that of `honesty'? He wrote: "We 
obtain the concept, as we do the form, by overlooking what is individual and actual; 
whereas nature is acquainted with no forms and no concepts and likewise with no 
species, but only with an X which remains inaccessible and [in]definable for us" 
(117). In other words, how far will the adoption of the language and concepts of a 4 
particular society lead to a betrayal of the experiences and perceptions of the 
individual subject? Language communicates, but seems also to insinuate the 
demarcation into subject and object. To write means to adopt the rationality of the 
objective language-the abstraction of symbolism-yet to write about the subject and 
its subjective existence is also to assimilate into something more general the 
individual qualities of the subjective body and mind (the X) that seem to defy 
objective representation or objectified analysis. 5 Do the qualities of the sense-object 
perceived by the subject exist in themselves? Or, are they always and simply the result 
of the recipient's subjective apprehension? How could one possibly write about and 
' T. S. Eliot "Hamlet, " Elizabethan Essays (1920; New York: Haskell House, 1964): "The only way of 
expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an `objective correlative"' (61). 
Friedrich Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Normoral Sense" (1873). 
As written by A. N. Whitehead in Science and the Modern World (1933): "The occurrences of nature 
are in some way apprehended by minds, which are associated with living bodies. Primarily, the mental 
apprehension is aroused by the occurrences in certain parts of the correlated body, the occurrences in 
the brain, for instance. But the mind in apprehending also experiences sensations which, properly 
speaking, are qualities of the mind alone. These sensations are projected by the mind so as to clothe 




transmit this feeling and emotion of the subjective body in its relation with the 
external world? 
In close contact with most of the eminent figures of her day (in diverse fields, 
from scientific philosophers like Bertrand Russell, CL E. Moore, to novelists such as 
Henry James and E. M. Forster, and modernist painters and art critics like Clive Bell 
and Roger Fry), Woolf's modernist claim to epistemological insight exposes her close 
acquaintance with many of the scientific as well as aesthetic discourse of her time. 
Although academic disciplines became increasingly self-contained and specialised, 
with a greater emphasis on professionalism from the late nineteenth century, the 
so-called Bloomsbury group, on the other hand, brought the enclosed male world of 
Cambridge intellectual and specialist discussion into a more general London public 
and domestic realm. The Bloomsbury group, as Carolyn G. Heilbrun has suggested, 
embodied the most androgynous spirit of the age, with its free discussion and 
expression of thoughts and ideas: nothing was forbidden, even discourses around 
sexuality. 6 "The fusion within the Bloomsbury group, perhaps for the first time, of 
`masculinity' and `femininity' made possible the ascendancy of reason which excludes 
violence but not passion" (Heilbrun 126). Artists, scientists, many of the most 
eminent Cambridge intellectuals, all came together to debate their different 
approaches to the `Real' and `Truth'- either by objective reasoning and scientific 
analysis or through instinctual and subjective apprehension. By relating arts that deal 
with feelings and emotions to sciences that demand a complete abolition of the 
personal and subjective, the Bloomsbury group's androgyny was not just a reflection 
of their ambiguous, indeterminate, sexual orientation. Instead, the formation of 
6 Carolyn G. Heilburn, Toward a Recognition of Androgyny (1973; New York: Harper & Row, 1974). 
7 The term, The Bloomsbury group, ' is said to have been coined by Molly MacCarthy in 1910. It is a 
group of friends, originally formed by the Stephen siblings and Thoby Stephen's Cambridge friends 
such as Leonard Woolf, Lytton Strachey, Saxon Sydney Turner, and Clive Bell. Herminone Lee has 
noted in her Woolf's biography: "Leonard Woolf, in the 1960s, listed `Old Bloomsbury' as Vanessa and 
Clive Bell, Virginia and Leonard Woolf, Adrian and Karin Stephen, Lytton Strachey, Maynard Keynes, 
Duncan Grant, Morgan Forster, Saxon Sydney Turner, Roger Fry, Desmond and Molly 
MacCarthy... "(263). And as several of them, such as Leonard Woolf and Lytton Strachey were also 
members of the Cambridge Apostles, they became acquainted with G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell 
who were also later introduced to the group. See also L 5: 36. 
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Bloomsbury facilitated a potential reconciliation of the severed notions of the 
so-called `objective' masculine and `subjective' feminine qualities. 
When academic discourse started to split axiomatically into diverse paths 
between the sciences and the humanities with the increasing professionalising of 
science from the mid-nineteenth century, the Bloomsbury group, contrarily, nurtured 
an intermediate ground where art might closely interact with science. Truth and reality 
are not only sought through logic and science, but more importantly through the 
`insight' of feelings and emotions. As on the canvas of Roger Fry, they sought an 
amalgamation of vision with design. Within the Bloomsbury group, aesthetic ideals 
were measured and explored through logic and mathematical means, while logical 
prospective was mediated and substantiated through the aesthetic forms of literary and 
visual arts. The Bloomsbury group brought into practice the ideal of putting oneself 
into a physical world capable of being examined objectively, but without negating 
one's subjective position. (It is an ideal later made explicit in the contemporary 
American philosopher Thomas Nagel's influential work The View from Nowhere 
(1986), as we shall see). Fascinated by scientific advances (the new Cambridge realist 
epistemology and the new development in physics, biology and psychology) Woolf's 
interest in nature incorporated rather than resisted a scientific understanding. But still, 
in her works, and as her imagination was expanded by the scientific rhetoric of her day, 
she clearly endeavoured to display the perplexing nature of life as in the end 
unavailable to and finally beyond the pure expression of science. 
As Woolf pondered the possible future direction for modern fiction and how 
novelists of the twentieth century might possibly distinguish themselves from their 
realist or `materialist' predecessors, she saw that, in creating `real' characters, it is 
more important to capture and regenerate that flow of life from within rather than 
mirroring the solid material world without. 8 For her, it is the inner subjective 
sensations and perceptions that might plausibly capture a life as it is lived and 
' Virginia \\'oolf, "Modern Fiction, " The Common Reader, vol. 1 (1925; London: Vintage, 1984) 146. 
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accordingly engender the sense of being which (notwithstanding its inexpressibility) is 
shared communally among all human beings. Although life appears to be solidly 
grounded (as in the image of an oak tree in Orlando), its inner subjective reality, 
subject to temporality, is as evasive and transient as the fleeting kingfisher that resists 
human grasp at the end of this novel. The `materialist' writers, such as Mr. Wells, dir. 
Bennett, and Mr. Galsworthy, by their strenuous effort to paint and construct the most 
detailed and clear-cut portrait of the material reality within which life is supposed to 
be lived, seem to have actually missed the target. 9 These `materialist' novelists, by 
emphasising the objective aspect of life, construct the frame of life as it seems to be, 
rather than life itself as it is lived, felt, and known. As Woolf expounded in her essay 
"Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" (1924), these Edwardian novelists may be sitting in a 
train compartment opposite Mrs. Brown, who represents "the thing in itself' and is a 
prototype of all characters, without shedding eyes on her: "They have looked very 
powerfully, searchingly, and sympathetically out of the window; at factories, at 
Utopias, even at the decoration and upholstery of the carriage; but never at her [Mrs. 
Brown], never at life, never at human nature" (CE 1: 330). 
Ironically, Mr. Arnold Bennett also asserted that "the foundation of good fiction 
is character-creating, and nothing else" and, in his opinion, novelists of the younger 
generation fail to create "real, " "true" and "convincing" characters (CE 1: 319). But 
what exactly endows one's characters with the breath of life, inquired Woolf? How to 
create a full rounded and `real' character? Did Mr. Bennett provide his readers with a 
`real' character who they can believe to be pulsing with life by giving all the details of 
their dwelling, the social contexts around them, but never the voice of the characters 
themselves? Has he finally captured that spirit who continues to whisper into 
novelists' ears, "catch me if you can" (CE 1: 319)? The `Edwardian Materialist' might 
have constructed a concrete habitat, but as often as not "this, the essential thing 
Woolf used the term `materialist' to describe novelists such as H. G. Wells (1866-1946), Arnold 
Bennett (1867-1931), and John Galsworthy (1867-1933) in her essay, "Modern Fiction" (1919). 
Lin 6 
[whether we call it life or spirit, truth or reality], has moved off, or on, and refuses to 
be contained any longer in such ill-fitting vestments as we provide" (CR 1: 149). Is it 
the solid presentation of material reality, or, rather, the trivialities, flitting and tingling 
in one's mind as one interacts with the world, that provides a more pertinent 
manifestation of `life' as `the thing itself' and of the semi-translucent knowing of 
`being-there'(Dasein)? 10 To depict this life, this being within the subjective 
consciousness of being in its transient yet persistent nature, prompted Woolf towards 
her life long experiment with narrative techniques. 
Life is a continuous process of feeling and interacting with the world around one. 
Life could not possibly be possessed in one all-encompassing grasp. Its totality could 
only be inferred since it is a process of living and feeling continuously through minute 
changes, moment by moment. Yet, in parallel with her recognition of the ephemeral 
nature of life, Woolf retains a constant belief, as she put it in "Sketch of the Past, " that 
"behind the cotton wool is hidden a pattern; that we-I mean all human beings-are 
connected with this. . . 
Hamlet or a Beethoven quartet is the truth about this vast mass 
that we call the world" (MB 85). However, what exactly does Hamlet or a Beethoven 
quartet reflect? Is it not the ticking of life one carries within, for "we are the words; 
we are the music; we are the thing itself' (MB 85). If Shakespeare stands out as a 
master in presenting to his audiences vital characters, then one must wonder how little 
one knows about the material reality that surrounds Hamlet in comparison to the 
knowledge of his mental condition as revealed through the soliloquies, his 
questionings and his inner reflections on the external world. However, one becomes so 
acquainted with Hamlet that one feels his inner turmoil, his anger and remorse. 
Beginning with the question: "Who is there? ", this tragedy of Shakespeare plays out 
the inner quest for the unknown hidden drive that propels the narrative of life into 
being. 11 
10 Heidegger: "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being. Dasein is 
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological" (Being 32). 
11 Antonio Damasio, Looking for Spinoza (London: Vintage, 2003) 224-5. 
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Rachel Bowlby takes Woolf's essay "Mr. Bennett and Mrs. Brown" as "a kind of 
literary Clapham Junction for the crossing and potential collision of questions of 
representation, history and sexual difference" (2). By placing Mrs. Brown as a 
character met in a train compartment, Woolf liberated her from a hypothetical material 
background and the constraints of materialist conventions. What Mrs. Brown would 
represent is a trans-historical and trans-social character with whom readers from 
differing socio-cultural backgrounds might associate. She would be first seen and 
treated as an individual and appreciated subjectively. It is through her eyes, 
expressions, or gestures that one construes the untold stories behind her tears and 
worried countenance. In this essay, Woolf declares her intention of stepping out of the 
English novel convention which "is inclined ... to scrutiny of society rather than 
understanding of individuals themselves, " and which is much suffocated by the 
pressure to conform to order (CR 1: 180). 12 Not that Woolf entirely deserted the 
English fictional conventions designated in the essay for, as she wrote in her diary, 
stating a provisional goal for her new novel The Hours, (renamed later as Mrs. 
Dalloway(1925)): "I want to criticise the social system, and to show it at work, at its 
most intense" (WD 56). 13 Instead, she sought to forge similar soul-like characters 
(who are capable of transmitting their sensations, perceptions and apperceptions to 
their readers) as those of Russian writers, but within the framework of the English 
novel. It is through the subjective struggle within the soul that the narrative comes to 
address the larger world which has compelled, crippled and moulded the soul. As if, in 
reflecting what Heidegger wrote (approximately around the same time that Woolf 
commenced her experimental writing of life), "Dasein has already been disclosed to 
itself as Being-in-the world, and the entities within-the-world have been discovered 
along with it" (Bein 461). 14 By mocking the materialists' novels as a literary `British 
2 "The Russian Point of View". 
13 Diary entry 19 June 1923. 
14 Jacob's Room is published in 1922, followed by Mrs. Dalloway (1925), To the Lighthouse (1927), 
Orlando (1928), while Being and Time is composed through out the years of early 20s and first 
published in 1927. 
Iin 
Museum, ' crammed with magnificent collections of cultural relics and fossils that are 
so removed from real life, Woolf had the cultural-historical heritage carried into 
real-life living. 15 It is in the characters, in life, that the cultural-historical backgrounds 
are disclosed. 
To endow her characters with soul and autonomy does not necessarily mean a 
total rejection of material reality, but rather, as she looked at life and human nature, it 
became possible for her to depict a persistent nature of being and its elastic ability to 
take up protean forms and guises in accordance with varying external circumstances. 
Woolf shifted the focus to the characters' feelings, emotions and thoughts and through 
them, the reader catches a glimpse of both the temporary social context as well as a 
universal sense of life. The social framework is never thoroughly abandoned by Woolf; 
instead her narrative portrays lives that struggle between being constrained by, and 
seeking transcendence of, the social framework. Woolf's novels, with their emphasis 
placed on consciousness and mental phenomena, are also embedded solidly within a 
bodily social-historical context, since a mind could hardly survive apart from bodily 
matter and the public sphere. 
Mrs. Brown's past, as much as her future, is a mystery to anyone who happens to 
come across her in the train compartment. She is a character without social profile or 
at least unknown to those she encounters. She is supposed to transcend temporal and 
spatial contexts. She is both a distinct individual as well as a represented prototype of 
human beings, representing both the intra- and the inter-subjectivity of life. Mrs. 
Brown, without much material reference, is the character Woolf believed that the 
novelist of the future must try to catch, "for she is, of course, the spirit we live by, life 
itself' (CE 1: 337). In other words, no matter how differently Mrs. Brown would be 
treated by various novelists, she should be able to suggest a sense of life to her readers 
no matter what their backgrounds. The subjective `I' might then be conglomerated into 
a communal `they' or the `we' of the common sitting room. For Woolf, then, the 
15 Diary entry 4 July 1926. D 3: 94. 
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solidity painted by the realists or the materialists inhibits the actual flow of life. 
Instead of engendering life, it might have accidentally driven life out by its fixities and 
concreteness and therefore missed out life completely. As the `materialists' try to build 
up concrete walls, they never actually touch the fringe of life itself: "There is not so 
much as a draught between the frames of the windows, or a crack in the boards. And 
yet-if life should refuse to live there? " (CR 1: 147). What are the constituents of real 
life? How could a novelist en-capture and substantiate Mrs. Brown, someone, who the 
narrator knows no better than does the reader? This must be the task of the novelist in 
the modern world. 
Personal Aspiration to Mind/Body Correlations 
However, writing and creating were not activities that women might take up 
unproblematically, even in the 1920s. The power to beget life and breathe the spirit 
into a subject is a supreme power originally belonging to a patriarchal God. The power 
of the word in designating meaning and spirit, in Lacanian terms, is the masculine 
power of the Father. Therefore, as a woman writer, self-conscious of her own 
`otherness, ' and attempting to break into what was still a predominantly male world of 
literary publication, Woolf brought forth the idea of a creative androgyny that would 
justify herself as a female writer legitimated to enter the symbolic order so as to 
narrate her life-experience as a woman born and brought up in a Victorian patriarchal 
family. She would tell the stories of women's lives which seemed to her almost 
completely absent from biographical literature. But she also sought to sketch that 
subtle interrelation between body and mind; between, as traditionally demarcated, the 
`feminine' emotional body and the `masculine' rational mind; between feelings and 
logical thinking. Throughout her writings, she continued to fight against the 
conventional notion of women as `the weaker vessel': submissive to primal sensations 
Lin 10 
such as bodily desire; prone to hysteria. 16 For she saw that while men are traditionally 
perceived as more rational and more advanced in evolution, women are generally 
perceived as explicable entirely in terms of the body and emotions and incapable of 
abstract reasoning. But what is the relation between the mind and its body, Woolf 
continued to ask? ' 7 
All her life, Woolf struggled to accommodate the rapid and often volatile 
changes of her mental and bodily condition. Indeed, the myriad impressions that the 
mind received, the innumerable atoms that shower incessantly, these feelings would 
have been even more intense for Woolf owing to what is now recognised as the 
bipolar disorder from which she suffered. Anyone experiencing so intensively such 
recurrent and minute changes in body temperature and emotion would be 
hypersensitive to the shifting stream of feeling and bodily sensation within, in contrast 
to what might appear externally as physical immobility. In "On Being Ill" (1930), she 
reflects extensively on how one's mental vision is often shaped by one's bodily 
condition. The traditional notion that "the body is a sheet of plain glass through which 
the soul looks straight and clear, and, save for one of two passions such as desire and 
greed, is null, and negligible and non-existent. On the contrary, the very opposite is 
true. All day, all night the body intervenes ... 
The creature within can only gaze 
through the pane-smudged or rosy" (M 9-10). It is always through the tainted glass 
of the body, as Woolf had experienced, that one apprehends the world. How she 
resents that the mind could merely take in what has been placed before it so that only 
when "the body smashes itself to smithereens" could the soul finally escape (M 10). 
Swinging constantly between two extreme emotions, mania and depression, Woolf 
must have experienced the nature of life with an unsettling and flickering intensity; 
yet being unable to escape from this perpetual torment of bodily discomfort, she must 
16 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malady: Women, Madness, and English Culture 1830-1980 (1985; 
London: Virago-Random House, 1987). 
" Virginia Woolf, "On Being Ill, " The Moment and Other Essays (San Diego: A Harvest-HBJ Book, 
1948) 9-24. 
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also have felt strongly the helplessness and dependency of the self trapped within and 
shaped and expressed by the soma. Throughout her works, Woolf explores 
continuously a technique, a method, a structure, that might convey a sense of being 
simultaneously momentary and transitory, yet being pressed and nailed down eternally: 
"Now is life very solid or very shifting? I am haunted by the two contradictions. This 
has gone on for ever; will last for ever; goes down to the bottom of the world-this 
moment I stand on. Also it is transitory, flying, diaphanous. I shall pass like a cloud on 
the waves" (WD 138). 18 
Woolf's works are a continual experimental struggle to transcribe subjective 
experiences as an objective understanding of the natural order of a life. Recent studies 
of consciousness have shown that the stream of thought is carried out, not only by 
words, or linguistic system, but that core consciousness is grounded in a flow of 
images and feelings associated with those shadowy forms from which verbal 
articulation emerges (and, even more fundamentally, core consciousness as a series of 
nonverbal narratives carries on simply as a `background' sense of feelings and 
emotions-an elemental form of knowing in existence). 19 Similarly, Heidegger stated: 
"knowing is grounded beforehand in a Being-already-alongside-the-world, which is 
essentially constitutive for Dasein's Being" (Being 88). The mind thinks by and 
through its body first and foremost. Reason and rationality are fully underpinned by 
feelings and emotion as the registration of sensation and the ongoing adjustment of the 
body to changing circumstances and flows. In the words of Damasio, "the 
neurological evidence simply suggests that selective absence of emotion is a problem. 
Well-targeted and well-deployed emotion seems to be a support system without which 
the edifice of reason cannot operate properly" (Feeling 42). Emotions and feelings are 
elemental factors in rational behaviour and thinking. William James first raised this 
view of the relation between mind and body, writing in The Principles of Psychology 
18 Diary entry 4 January 1929. 
19 Antonio Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (London: Random, 1999). 
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(1890) that "Mental phenomena are not only conditioned a parte ante by bodily 
processes; but they lead to them aparte post" (1: 5). Already, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, James had come to recognise that "a certain amount of 
brain-physiology must be presupposed or included in Psychology" (1: 5). Henri 
Bergson (who was also a reader of William James and later became a good friend) 
also proposed in Matter and Memory (1896) that it is through the memory of the body 
that the working of the mind and the matter/mind dichotomy could possibly be further 
elucidated. Mind and body are correlative. No mental conception is thoroughly free 
from the interposing of the body. 
The role of feelings and emotions in mental processes had been largely neglected 
in the past century and almost eliminated from the discourse of the matter of mind, 
and this despite the profound influence of Charles Darwin, William James and Freud, 
each of whom had attempted to stress the importance of bodily emotions and feelings 
for mental development and mental status. 20 Nevertheless, Woolf's novels adhere 
closely to her belief that "the `book itself' is not form which you see, but emotion 
which you feel" (M 160). 21 Woolf's narrative is traditionally deemed a narrative of 
stream of consciousness, yet the consciousness shown through her words flows along 
with what G. H. Lewes terms a "general stream of Sensation which constitutes [one's] 
feeling of existence-the consciousness of himself as a sensitive being" (qtd. in 
Rylance 11). 22 Symbolising the nonverbal murky feelings of the mental stream, Woolf 
had come to show not only the process of consciousness that emerges from the 
nonverbal narrative of the mind and works toward abstract reasoning undertaken by 
language, but also how reflexive ideas are founded on direct emotional responses and 
obscure feelings, as subjectivity is shaped and reshaped through "an incessant shower 
20 Damasio, Feeling 38. 
21 "On Re reading Novels". See also Harvena Richter, Virginia Woolf: The Inward Voyage (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1970) 203. 
22 G. H. Lewes, The Physiology of Common Life. Rick Rylance also noted that in addition to William 
James, Lewes also used the images of stream and the coinage is introduced before James or Lewes. The 
metaphor was commonly applied in psychological circle at the turn of the century. 
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of innumerable atoms" of external stimuli (CR 1: 150). Taking advantage of the 
freedom of a creative writer, Woolf, with her incisive reflection on perceptual 
phenomena, came to depict the "facticity" of life as it is lived, and to provide a more 
rounded portrait of human psychology (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology N'10.23 In 
creative writing, Woolf explored the possibilities of life as what Martha Nussbaum has 
termed `the narrative play' that provides a `potential space' to contextualise and 
symbolise the subjective, emotional, life. 24 Unlike Freudian fictions or even the 
works of Freud himself (that offer the reader actual case studies), Woolf provided her 
readers with the feel of life in the experienced of represented flows of bodily feeling. 
As Patricia Ondek Laurence puts it, "In exploring interiority, Woolf, as a novelist, is 
not interested in presenting clinical mental states but in finding narrative methods to 
represent thought and feeling, both conscious and unconscious. But the unconscious, 
by definition, is devoid of language" (19). Thus, Woolf continued to challenge the 
propriety of public language and to use poetic and narrative resources to gesture 
towards the inexpressible. 
Darwin, Freud, and the Blooming of `Soul Discourses' 
The conspicuous deployment of Darwinian discourses and an interest in a primal 
pre-historical link between human and animal, can be observed in Woolf's fiction 
from The Voyage Out (1915) to Between the Acts (1941). As Gillian Beer has stated: 
"The idea of origins and the idea of development are problematically connected in that 
of prehistory. And in the twentieth century the unconscious has often been presented 
in the guise of the primeval" (6). According to Freud in a 1917 essay, Charles 
Darwin's ground-breaking evolutionary theory in the mid nineteenth century had for a 
second time de-centred humans from their presupposed central position in the world 
23 Maurice Merleau-Ponty's own preface to Phenomenology of Perception. 
24 Martha C Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge 
UP, 2001) 236-48. 
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after Nicolaus Copernicus (1473-1543) who had struck the first blow to the human 
ego. Sigmund Freud went on to state: "But human megalomania will have suffered its 
third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of the present time 
which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must 
content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind" 
(1: 326). 25 The aftermath of the discovery of the origin of the species had led to a 
series of investigations into the connections as well as the differences between men 
and animals and therefore to the problem of mind and consciousness where 
differences are usually regarded to be man's departure from the primates. The ongoing 
debate on the spirituality of the mind or the soul and the materiality of the brain and 
the body thus became even more urgent and incandescent. Reassurance was 
desperately sought that there is a clear distinction between human and animal. 
"The word psychology is derived from the Greek for `soul discourse"' (Rylance 
22). Within the long Christian doctrine (which has been much influenced by the 
Grecian idea of soul/body distinction), the soul is what distinguishes humans from 
animals, and the soul is pure spiritual being that is free from any material bondage. 
However, with the advance in physiology and then neurology, the nature of soul and 
mental processes seem to be inseparable from the material substances of the body. 
Such discoveries have therefore thrust the original distinction into question. 
Nevertheless, the traditional discourse of the soul even now continues to occupy a 
pre-eminent position within both academic disciplines and popular discourses. With 
the split between the science and the humanities, the further development of and 
25 Sigmund Freud, "Fixation to Traumas-The Unconscious" (1917) Introductory Lectures on 
Psychoanalysis, trans James Strachey (London: Penguin, 1973): "In the course of centuries the nave 
self-love of men has had to submit to two major blows at the hands of science. The first was when they 
learnt that our earth was not the centre of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of 
scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus, though 
something similar had already been asserted by Alexandrian science. The second blow fell when 
biological research destroyed man's supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent 
from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This revaluation has been accomplished in 
our own days by Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors, though not without the most violent 
contemporary opposition" (1: 326). Freud restated again in "The Resistances to Psychoanalysis" 
(1925). 
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approach towards soul discourses comes to take quite diverse courses (much reLretted 
by the anthropologist Clifford Geertz). 26 In science, psychological researches have 
focussed for much of the twentieth century (from behaviourism to cognitive sciences 
such as connectionism and neural networks) on the organic and physiological sources 
of human functioning and flourishing, while psychoanalytical research in the 
humanities has effectively found ways to perpetuate a discourse of the soul (albeit 
often under the guise of a materialist approach). Either way, the influential legacy of 
Descartes, Locke and Kant (as the American pragmatist Richard Rorty has concluded) 
underlies the problems which modern philosophy and psychology have encountered in 
dealing with an orthodox western tradition of thought (going back to Plato) with its 
insistence on dualism. However, contemporary evolutionary theories in neurology and 
physiology have now come to question that very conception of dualism. 27 And as the 
mind becomes approachable through the investigation (with modern instruments) into 
various parts of the brain and its specific functions, the separate integrity of the soul 
and the totality of the mind is no longer a priori. 
Rick Rylance's insightful study of Victorian psychology (from 1850 to 1880) in 
its multiplicity, examines how, in the Victorian era, faculty psychology, by 
distinguishing mental faculties into higher (reason, faith, love, spiritual apprehension) 
and lower faculties (sensations, feelings, appetite, desire, etc. ), attached a sense of 
hierarchical value to these faculties. Faculty psychology displayed a clear notion of 
mind-body separation and moreover discriminated the higher mind from the lower 
mind, men from women, civilised from primitive. Imitating the great Christian 
doctrine that distinctly separated God, angel, human, and animal on a hierarchical 
scale, faculty psychology exposed the fundamental fear of human animalisation and 
species-digression that had been aroused by Darwin's theory of evolution and was 
confronted in the work of Freud. Lower faculties were not overlooked, but they were 
26 Rylance, Rick, Victorian Psychology and British Culture 1850-1880 (Oxford: OUP, 2000) 8-9. 
27 Lyons. NN"illiam. Matters of the Mind (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2001) 238. 
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generally regarded as the cause of mental disturbance in the study of mind and 
consciousness. Even in Freud's famous exploration of the unconscious, human 
behaviours were seen to be dominated by these lower faculties of feelings and 
emotions-the primitive id. It is only by the rational strength of the `ego' and the 
surveillance of the socio-cultural constructed `superego' that the primitive `id' is 
checked and subdued. Yet, even in recognising the emotional ground of human 
behaviours, Freud, in tune with Plato, is simply restating rationality as an achievable 
ideal through a human effort to constrain its emotional drives and the capacity to 
exercise good. The stream of thought is seen to be made possible by language and, 
insofar as language is viewed as an embodiment of reason and rationality, so the 
acquisition of linguistic ability and the entry into the symbolic order is assumed to 
initiate a passage beyond the maternal, Dionysian, domain of feelings and emotions, 
and an entry into and assumption of Apollonian rationality with its emphasis on 
structures and forms and the capacity for abstract reasoning. Yet, modern cognitive 
science and philosophy have now begun a reconfiguration of "the intelligence of 
emotions"-an idea which is already embedded within Charles S. Sherrington's The 
Integrative Action of the Nervous S sy tem(1906). 
Modem neuroscientists such as Antonio Damasio, with recent advances in 
technology, have set out to explore the mind/body relation in terms of a more 
reciprocal and mutual response. Instead of seeing lower faculties thoroughly as a mere 
disturbance to the rational mind, Damasio proclaims that higher faculties are firmly 
grounded on the well-functioning of lower faculties. Although an over-abundance of 
emotion and feeling might hinder rational thought and result in irrational behaviour, 
the lack of emotions and feelings (as observed by Damasio through cases of neural 
disorders) may have equally disruptive consequences. The body provides a ground 
from which the brain might operate and on which the mind might speculate. With the 
advance of modem medical science, many cases of mental disorders such as 
schizophrenia or exceptional behaviours such as autism are now being 
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re-conceptualised not as resulting from the patient's initial interaction ww ith his/her 
parents and the world, or forgotten traumatic experience of the past or repressed 
anxiety (as a Freudian psychiatrist would suggest), but rather from an original defect 
or subsequent impairment of the brain, or the body's chemical or hormonal 
messengers interacting with complex feedback mechanisms in a specific environment. 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, waves of diverse `soul discourses' 
swayed by different beliefs in the mind/body relation, entered medical as well as 
public discourses. However, instead of following Spinoza's idea of one substance but 
two qualities, the problem of the soul remained deeply imbricated within Cartesian 
dualism. Freud and Josef Breuer published their first work on psychoanalysis, Studies 
On Hysteri a (1895) five years later than James's The Principles of Psychology (1890), 
and one year later than C. Lloyd Morgan's An Introduction to Comparative 
Psychology(1894) which, as it introduces the idea of `trial and error learning, ' greatly 
influenced the development of experimental psychology and Behaviourism. Although 
Woolf's attitude towards Freudian psychoanalysis had always been ambivalent and 
she had resisted psychoanalytic treatments, she would have long been acquainted with 
his ideas through her husband, Leonard Woolf, and other members of the Bloomsbury 
group. 28 Yet for the most part psychoanalysis shied away from the philosophical 
problems of the mind-body problem. Although there were a number of other `soul 
discourses' flourishing simultaneously at the time, they were gradually being eclipsed 
by psychoanalysis. In close contact with Henry James, and through Leonard Woolf 
and Bertrand Russell, the ideas of William James and Henri Bergson would not be 
totally unknown to Woolf, although Woolf professed that she had never read 
Bergson. 29 In fact, her presentation of the characters' psychological states shows great 
28 ., Woolf's aversion to writing about psychoanalysis is matched by her resistance to reading about it. 
She claims to have avoided reading Freud until 1939, a deferral that must have acquired some effort, 
since from 1924, " the Hogarth Press took over and started publishing every English translation of Freud 
(Abel 14). See also George M. Johnson, Dynamic Psychology in Modernist British Fiction (New York: 
grave 
Macmillan, 2006). Pali, 
29 Letter to Harmon H. Goldstone, a Harvard Student, dated 16 August 1932. L 5: 91 
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affinity with James's ideas in The Principles of Psychology. It may be advisable to 
take these other soul discourses into consideration when approaching Woolf's 
narrative of stream of consciousness, among them, especially, the work of William 
James, interestingly now being revived and re justified by modern investigation in 
neuro-psychology because of his interest in the role of the body and of emotion in 
rational thought. 
While Freud was more concerned about dreams and the mechanism of the 
unconscious (which perhaps one could say is fully of the realm of the extended 
consciousness contextualised within a cultural as well as personal history) '30 
James 
delineated the individual's experience of consciousness and the constitution of 
conscious experience by means of perceptions and sensations but without neglecting 
socio-cultural influences. Similar to the modern neurological investigation into the 
nervous system and the organic brain, James also launched his argument about 
psychological phenomenon via a discussion of brain activity and the basic function of 
the brain. And therefore, what James tried to explain is not just the contriving of the 
personal, perceptive, messages in the extended consciousness, but his psychology 
covered the entire dimension of the mind (in terms of Damasio's speculation) from the 
nascent consciousness, the birth of the subject, to cognitive creativity. In answer to 
what James also indicated with "the assumption that our mental states are composite 
in structure, made up of smaller states conjoined, " modem neurology also suggests 
that consciousness is a multi-layered mapping conjoining different neural intakes 
(1: 145). 
Just as Freudian psychoanalysis largely ignored the relations between the 
material brain and nervous system and mind and mental process, behaviourism, with 
its over-emphasis on scientific and objective research (third person observation and 
the denial of the validity of introspection) has thoroughly denied the subjective aspects 
30 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920; London: Hogarth, 1922): "Consciousness arises in the 
place of the memory-trace" (28). 
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of the mind. Yet, as specified by James, the baffling problem in the understanding of 
consciousness is this discontinuity between a common law of the molecular motions 
and the feelings it comes to generate (an idea taken up by Bertrand Russell who also 
proposed that it is a matter of conceptualisation rather than a wholly disjoined 
constitution that had set the mind inaccessibly beyond scientific inquest). In the words 
of James, "`A motion (of atomistic mental transactions) became a feeling! '-no phrase 
that our lips can frame is so devoid of apprehensible meaning" (1: 146). Thus, by 
retracing the existence of the sub-conscious mental state in search of an underlying 
continuity of nature, James attempted to ratify the link from the primordial form of 
life in the body to advanced mental intelligence. On tackling the problem of the soul, 
James also professed that the mind is nevertheless evolved from matter, namely the 
body and the brain. In what turns out to be compatible with the spirit of Damasio's 
propositions in Descartes' Error, James had also surmised that only by rejecting `the 
mind' (or `soul') as a form of unitary wholeness and only by breaking the mental-stuff 
into its elementary components, could the relativity and continuity between matter and 
the mind be conceivable. 
The relation between mind and matter not only fascinated psychologists like 
William James, but also philosophical thinkers like Henri Bergson and Bertrand 
Russell. One evident similarity observable in their separate discussions is that they 
simultaneously started from an epistemological inquiry into knowledge and the nature 
of reality. All approach the problem of mind from their intention to resolve the binary 
opposition between idealism and realism. And they all placed their emphasis on the 
depiction of `time' and the perception of `time' in delineating mental processes. 
Recent critics such as Ann Banfield have demonstrated Woolf's close friendships and 
interactions within the Bloomsbury group and suggested that Woolf was as much 
concerned with Russell's infinite sequence of still points as with Henri Bergson's time 
theory of duree (itself also derived from a concern with the mind, especially of how 
time is experienced by the mind and how the experience of time shapes one's 
Im '(' 
perceptions of the world). 31 The close affinity between Woolf's aesthetic approach 
and Cambridge epistemology is self-evident as both try to reach beyond and reflect 
upon subjective experiences, but logically and scientifically. 
In Analysis of Mind (1921), Bertrand Russell brings forth his idea of neutral 
monism that proposes a neutral yet primal substance which is neither mental nor 
physical but capable of both aspects (resembling Spinoza's idea). To know what and 
how one comes to know as in the quest of epistemology, one inevitably needs to resort 
to the fundamental question of the mind-body problem (as V. S. Ramachandran, a 
contemporary neuroscientist, has more recently asserted with his proposal of a concept 
of `experimental epistemology'). For the body always interposes itself when it comes 
to the subject's cognition of an objective world. Bergson's argument of the confusion 
between quantity and quality, multiplicity and intensity, spatiality and temporality, 
exposes the fundamental phenomenon that the mind conceives the world and pursues 
abstract reasoning via the sensations and feelings of its body. Bergson's Time and Free 
Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1889) and Matter and 
Memory(1896) as well as Russell's The Analysis of Mind (which seeks "to reconcile 
James' neutral monism and Watson's behaviourism" and almost comes close to 
suggesting that there is no consciousness at all) are all attempts at interpreting and 
mapping the working of mind in relation to its bodily presence through a logical, 
scientific, discourse (Baldwin ix). 32 
In the early twentieth century, in spite of the effort of philosophers such as James 
and Bergson, psychology, leaving behind its foundation in mind-body philosophy, 
becomes rigidly mapped out into diverse schools, with each retaining its own 
presuppositions in regard of mind-body relations without providing further inquest or 
definition (whether it is a Cartesian dualism that sees mind and body as distinct 
31Ann Banfield, The Phantom Table: Woolf, Fry, Russell and the Epistemology of Modernism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000) 119; see also, Jean Guiguet, Virginia Woolf and Her Works, trans. 
Jean Stewart (1965; New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976) 31-34. 
32 Thomas Baldwin, introduction, The Analysis of Mind, by Bertrand Russell (London: Routledge, 
199) vn-xvii. 
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separate substances or a reductive functionalism that argues there is no mind at all but 
simply reflective behaviours, or the Freudian psychoanalysis of subjective 
introspection into the unconscious). Woolf, on the other hand, as the daughter of 
Leslie Stephen (editor of the Dictionary of National Biography and author of History 
of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century) and sister, friend and wife to various 
members of the Cambridge Apostles, followed up the tradition of philosophy in quest 
of the mind-body problem through literary forms and presentations. Instead of 
numbers, tables, equations of mathematical logics, Woolf provided us with imagery, 
metaphors, narratives and narrative structures that not only tell the stories of the 
characters, but also depict the philosophical quest to understand the mind-body 
relation. As personal sensations, feelings and emotions are structured and embodied 
through the text, Woolf, through the textuality of her novels, delineates a vivid image 
of the nature of consciousness and of how consciousness works toward a unified 
subjectivity intermediating between its objective and subjective property. In response 
to Roger Fry's aesthetic ideal of an integral presentation of objective and subjective 
reality, Woolf sought for `design, ' `rhythm' and `texture' that give form and structure 
to an apprehension of being-in-the-world through her narrative. The misty dimness of 
`English literariness' is now being given a solid form like the `phantom kitchen table' 
that upholds the `impalpable' and `intangible' nature and reality of `Being. ' 33 
Literature, as many neuroscientists have come to acknowledge (and Freud too in his 
time), has always been capable of revealing the subtlety of mental phenomena and 
psychological states that are now being explained with the help of modern technical 
instruments. "[T]he histories of psychology and literature, " as Rylance noted, "can 
sometimes be as close as a hallway apart" (13). 
Woolf's texts have been much explored from the perspective of Freudian 
33 See Virginia Woolf, Roger Fry 164 and also Julia Briggs, "The Search for Form (i): Fry, Formalism 
and Fiction, " Reading Virginia Woolf 96: "It was the English passion for morality, he supposed, and 
also the English climate. The light, he pointed out, was full of vapour. Nothing «was clear. There was no 
structure in the hills, no meaning in the lines of the landscape; all was smug, pretty and small. Of course 
the English were incurably literary. They liked the associations of things, not things in themselves. " 
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psychoanalytic theory. All introspective psychologies in fact seek to objectify and 
theorise subjective feelings in order to form a systematic scientific explanation of 
personal psychological states as they delve into the inner world of the individual. Yet 
the objectivity of science still fails to transcribe the subjectivity of life, of what it feels 
like to be this person living at this particular moment. Freud, nevertheless, launched 
his psychoanalytic studies from the science of neurology. Yet, psychoanalysis, though 
never thoroughly overlooking the effect of bodily sensations, whether conscious or 
unconscious, is almost entirely preoccupied with repressed primal desires (namely 
sexual desires and sexual obsessions) or historical traumas. 34 It depicts an inner 
psychical state which is subject to continuous conflict within itself between the 
unconscious id, the conscious ego, and the conscientious of a socio-culturally 
instituted superego. Freud, though he saw himself as a `doctor of the nerves, ' did not 
sufficiently credit that what is in the mind is often located in and triggered by the body, 
especially the present state of brain and its associative nervous system. Freud's 
argument is entirely based upon an interpretation of the mechanism of the 
autobiographical memory and self. Freud had constantly neglected the physiological 
and neurological mechanism of the mind and how psychological states depend on the 
integrity of the material substances of the brain. As a result, Freudian psychoanalytic 
theory turns away from its psychological and medical bases and towards a foundation 
in cultural inheritance, social taboos and the wilful power of the mind in deceiving 
itself about the factual state of its body and bodily feelings. Ramachandran, although 
acknowledging that Freud did shed light on the nature of the mind in its capacity for 
shutting out contradictory information that threatens its integrity (as in neurosis and 
psychosis), constantly ridicules interpretations given by Freudian psychiatrists for 
phenomena such as phantom limbs, learned paralysis, and the imagined visual images 
of Charles Bonnet syndrome which are deeply linked to the functions of the organic 
'a A thematic narration of psychological trauma in Woolf's novel is fully examined in a currently 
published collection-Virginia Woolf and Trauma: Embodied Texts ed. Suzette Henke and David 
Eberle (New York: Pace UP, 2007). 
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brain and our mental capacity in manipulating deceptive imagery by a default of the 
sensory nerves. 35 
Despite the cultural root of psychoanalysis, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz 
still criticised the psychoanalytic approach for its over-emphasis on private personal 
feelings and for overlooking the impact of the cultural and social context in shaping 
minds. 36 One might argue from this, as Geertz has, that the main shortcoming of 
modernist writers is their narrative turn inward into characters' psychical states-a 
state encapsulated by a primal emotion of fear, desire, or hatred, engendered from the 
despondency of an insecure subjective state. Geertz laments that the split between 
experimental psychology and introspective psychoanalysis has served to widen the 
gap between the two cultures of the sciences and the humanities, while Ramachandran, 
with his investigation into the nerve systems and the function of the brain, suggests in 
his 2003 Reith Lecture, that a study of `neuroaesthetics' would come to bridge the gulf 
between the two cultures. 37 For now perhaps, there might be a means to account for 
subjective aspirations toward beauty and aesthetics. Modernist writers clearly probed 
into characters' inner lives, assuming that society and culture are always represented 
as the most important contributory factors to the formation of the characters' mental 
states. The derangement of Septimus Smith in Woolf's Mrs. Dalloway is more of a 
social and cultural consequence than the rebound of a repressed primitive sexual drive. 
The subjective conflict and struggle of Rachel Vinrace in The Voyage Out is a literary 
35 In Phantoms in the Brain, Ramachandran ventures to suggest that the foot fetish is highly plausible 
as a result of the way that nerves are mapped in the brain, rather than phallus worship as the Freudian 
Vsychiatrist would have suggested. 
Freud writes in a postscript (1935) to An Autobiographical Study: "My interest, after making a 
lifelong detour through the natural sciences, medicine and psychotherapy, returned to the cultural 
problems which had fascinated me long before, when I was a youth scarcely old enough for thinking.. .1 
perceived ever more clearly that the events of human history, the interactions between human nature, 
cultural development and the precipitates of primeval experiences are no more than a reflection of the 
dynamic conflict between the ego, the id and the super-ego, which psycho-analysis studies in the 
individual-are the very same processes repeated upon a wider stage" (15: 257). 
37 The Emerging Mind (a book publication of the Reith lecture): "The solution to the problem of 
aesthetics, I believe, lies in a more thorough understanding of the connections between the thirty visual 
centres in the brain and the emotional limbic structures (and of the internal logic and evolutionary 
rationale that drives them). Once we have achieved a clear understanding of these connections, we xN ill 
come closer to bridging the huge gulf that separates C. P. Snow's two cultures-science on the one 
hand, and arts, philosophy and humanities on the other" (68-9). 
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outcry against the socio-cultural bondage of women and her final self-abjection and 
desire to be carried further away in her delirium can also be read as refusal of the 
prevailing patriarchal ordering of women's bodies and subjectivities. 
Freud inaugurated a mainstream interest in and discussion of the phenomena of 
the unconscious in the late nineteenth century, depicting a soul entangled with an 
internal conflict between its instinctual tendencies and social institutions. Damasio 
reinterprets the Freudian unconscious at the level of extended consciousness as it is 
fully bound up with memory-the memory of the body and its feelings and emotions 
which are generally suppressed by the ego in its attempt to defend the integrity of the 
mind. Psychoanalysis, in Damasio words, is an attempt to untangle the web of 
psychological connections and restore the materials and records of the 
autobiographical memories that have withdrawn into the background, distorted, stored 
away, eventually to become, though nonconscious, still effective in shaping the 
behaviour of the organism. 38 Woolf's writing career has often been depicted as an 
inward voyage into the subjective self. Her narrative swarms with sensational imagery 
of both past and present. Based upon these vague feelings, hazy reveries and 
half-memorised images, the reality of her subjects are embodied. In conjoining the 
memories of the past with the bodily present (by restoring the body to its central 
position among mental perceptions), she has incorporated the non-substantial, 
subjective `soul' in a `bodily' text. 
Modern Depiction of Consciousness and Subject Formation 
Antonio Damasio is a contemporary neuroscientist who pursues a scientific 
understanding of consciousness and the forming of self by means of emotions and 
feelings; of the mechanism behind consciousness that generates the subject's knowing 
and feeling of these emotions and feelings; and of the integral role of emotions and 
38Damasio, Feelin 22S. 
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feelings in supporting rational decisions and constructing subjectivity. 39 Damasio 
presupposes that consciousness is a development which helps to secure the well-being 
of the organism: a monitory system of the living condition of the organism is firmly 
"rooted in the representation of the body, " and therefore grounded on the 
bioregulatory device of emotions and feelings that controls and modifies the 
homeostasis of the organism's internal milieu (Feeling 36-7). Basically, emotions and 
feelings are the fundamental guidance before the emergence of consciousness and 
ensure the survival of the organism as it tries to avoid certain emotions such as fear 
and sadness while pursuing others such as joy and happiness. Yet, to place a full 
reliance on emotions and feelings might not be sufficient, as involuntary preferences 
and automatic regulation systems could actually be fatal under certain 
circumstances. 40 Therefore, the ability of an organism to `know' its own present status 
and its relation to the objects and the surroundings with which it interacts in 
comparison to its past experiences, helps to provide an overall judgement and a 
scrutinised decision. 41 
According to Damasio, a state of emotion and a state of feeling are not 
necessarily experienced consciously by the organism. Beyond such a non-conscious 
state of the bodily emotions and feelings is a state of feeling being made conscious to 
the organism. Before an organism is capable of knowing its emotions and feelings, 
there must be a sense of self and the sense of self is grounded on the integrity and 
stability of the organism's biological state which is delineated by a definite boundary 
that separates the organism from things other than itself. However, even as a 
conscious being, not every perception and sensation of the organism is passed into 
39 The affinity between Woolf's narration of the mechanism of memory and the construction of identity 
and Antonio Damasio's depiction of consciousness is also recognised by Patricia Moran in her notes to 
the article, "Gunpowder Plots: Sexuality and Censorship in Woolf's Later Works, " collected in Virginia 
Woolf and Trauma: Embodied Text. 
40 See also C. S. Sherrington, The Integrative Action of the Nervous System (New Haven: Yale UP, 
1906). 
41 "complex organisms placed in complex environments require large repertoires of knowledge.... the 
ability to construct novel combinations of response, and the ability to plan ahead so as to avoid 
disadvantageous situations and instead propitiate favourable ones" (Damasio, Feeling 139). 
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`self-aware' consciousness. "The brain [and perhaps the body on the whole] knows 
more than the conscious mind, " claims Damasio (Feeling 42). Nevertheless, the 
non-conscious background knowledge of the organism's being-in-the-world-formed 
out of the continual process of the brain in receiving external stimuli and generating 
new drafts and interpretations on account of these inputs-is crucial in sustaining a 
fundamental core consciousness. A great deal of human behaviour is steered by 
unconscious or non-conscious feelings and emotions (or, as suggested by Damasio, 
emotions and feelings which might not necessarily be consciously experienced by the 
organism). 
With the idea that "consciousness is not a monolith, " Damasio comes to 
distinguish various levels of consciousness (different levels of knowing) and through 
such distinctions, consciousness and the problem of self and subjectivity have become 
much more approachable (Feeling 16). 42 At the base of the diagram drawn by 
Damasio there is a prevailing proto-self of which one is not conscious, but which is 
crucial in forming one's core consciousness and core self. "The proto-self is a 
coherent collection of neural patterns which map, moment by moment, the state of the 
physical structure of the organism in its many dimensions" (Damasio, Feeling 154). A 
step beyond the proto-self, as the mind regenerates a second layer of mapping 
(re-representing the neural patterns of the proto-self and its relation to the object that 
provides the initial stimuli), comes the sense of knowing. A sense of core 
consciousness thus becomes available. With the registration of the sensory input and 
the feelings it engendered, the subject becomes conscious of itself and its relation to 
the world around it. However, core self or core consciousness lives, moment by 
moment, without any reference to its past or anticipated future unless aided by 
memory devices. As suggested by Damasio, however, given intact and diverse 
4' Henri Bergson also construed there are different planes of consciousness. See Matter and Memory 
239. Whilst William James also \%Tites: "The 'entire brain-process' is not a physical fact at all. It is the 
appearance to an onlooking mind of a multitude of physical facts ... 
Their[the molecules'] aggregation 
into a 'brain; is a fiction of popular speech" (1: 178). 
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memory devices (some to register new input information, some to retrieve old stored 
information), an autobiographical self is capable of restoring experiences and 
information about its history more efficiently. Through this process, an extended 
consciousness is formed. 
The sense of extended consciousness provides a more complete compass of the 
organism and the knowledge it needs to secure its survival. Yet, even at this stage no 
linguistic ability is needed. Damasio insists throughout his argument that though it is 
presumed that the mind, along with its incoming stimuli, is forever weaving a 
narrative that sustains the subject and its sense of self, just as the self is also woven 
into and sustained by the narrative itself. Yet the narrative of the mind is not 
necessarily a verbal or linguistic narrative of signifiers-it is rather an endless process 
of "wordless storytelling" (Feeling 188). Verbal meditation comes much later in the 
construction of consciousness. The neurological foregrounding of a nonverbal 
consciousness does not, however, dismiss the importance of language and linguistic 
ability. It only asserts that before abstract signification, there must come, first, 
something to be signified. Language, though important in translating nonverbal 
images, feelings, and emotions ('qualia') into abstract ideas capable of being 
transferred and communicated in a more objective manner, is not the most basic 
element of consciousness. A loss of consciousness, in fact, seems most closely to 
correspond to an absence of emotions (as observed through various cases of brain 
lesion and nervous impairment). 43 
A sense of self must be present before the application of the word `I, ' and such a 
sense of self is grounded on an endless process of numerous and synchronous neural 
patterns that generate emotions, feelings, perceptions and sensations of the organism. 
As a mind thinking confers the presence of an `I, ' it also confirms bodily being. For 
the `I' could only carry out its task of thinking and reasoning on the basis of a 
43 "when consciousness is suspended, from core consciousness on up, emotion is usually suspended as 
well, suggesting that although emotion and consciousness are different phenomena, their underpinnings 
may be connected" (Feeling 37-8). 
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persistent flow of emotions and feelings that denotes bodily presence. 
At the bottom of consciousness is the organism's ability to feel what happens, 
suggests Damasio. As summed up by Nussbaum, "Damasio's research confirms the 
work of Lazarus, Ortony, and Oatley: emotions provide the animal (in this case human) 
with a sense of how the world relates to its own set of goals and projects. Without that 
sense, decision making and action are derailed" (117). In contrast to Damasio, 
Nussbaum argues that feelings and emotions are not solely biological and related to 
the organic functioning of the brain alone, but they are also socio-culturally 
constructed and susceptible to the influence of the institution of cultural languages. 
Feelings and emotions are refined and labelled through the subject's interaction with 
the objective world and constituted in verbal languages which give shape to what is 
felt and how it is felt. Critics have long insisted on the importance of the body and 
emotion in Woolf's representation of her characters' psychological state that is beyond 
the articulation of literal language, but neuroscience now seems to be developing 
similar insights justified by scientific and technological modes of exploration and 
verification. 
Androgynous Mind: Feelings, Language, and the project of `I' 
As a female writer in search of a language, or rather, a form of representation, 
that is capable of communicating what she had felt, perceived, and thought, Woolf set 
off on her life-long experiment with language, words and syntax, hoping to achieve 
the ideal of "[writing] as a woman, but as a woman who has forgotten that she is a 
woman" (ARO 92). She aimed at writing life in its very essence. Yet, writing a life 
that is fully bound up with feelings and emotions, especially the heretofore private 
qualia of a female body, Woolf was more than conscious of being regarded as 
'sentimental. ' However, a distinction must be made between `female' sentimental 
writing (that indulges in surplus emotional surges of love, anger and sorrow) and 
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Woolf's narration of the body. Woolf's writing is rather a narrative and effectively, 
philosophical examination of the feelings and emotions in their relation to mental 
properties. The writing process is intended to capture or perhaps forge the elusive soul 
within in a state of flux as she sketches the subtle interrelations between the mind and 
the body as "an ordinary mind on an ordinary day" in which material stimuli 
contribute to the consciousness of her characters: "The mind receives a myriad 
impressions- trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel" 
(CR 1: 149; 150). While she writes to transmit subjective perceptions and experiences, 
she also embodies through the text a structure that enables an objective examination of 
these subjective views. 
As Woolf had fought for a domain for women artists and writers, she had 
envisioned a fundamental resolution between the masculine and feminine forces 
which Lily Briscoe metaphorically achieves at the end of To the Lighthouse. 
Presumably, the vision that Lily has finally achieved is the recognition of the 
individual condition of androgyny, the quality of woman-manly and man-womanly 
within one person. The stroke down the middle is the abstract presentation of a 
nonverbal intuitive feeling -a thorough integration of emotion and reason, of the 
subjective and the objective. Thus, one could assume the vision which Lily has 
achieved is a vision of "the unity of the mind" which could "think back through its 
fathers or through its mothers" alternately-a unity of the mind which does not seek to 
reason `over' its emotions but rather to reason `with' its emotions (ARO 87-8). 
Woolf's idea of androgyny, as Makiko Minow-Pinkney has noted, spurs critics 
onto diverse interpretations of her modernist and feminist standpoint. 44 The idea of 
androgyny does free Woolf from the conventional segregation of the feminine and 
masculine qualities and upholds her position as a female writer capable of presenting 
objectively the subjective quality of life. Only a skewed feminist opinion could surely 
read the idea of androgyny against Woolf's own beliefs. In contrast to Elaine 
44 Makiko Minow-Pinkney, Virginia Woolf and the Problem of the Subject (Brighton: Harvester, 1987). 
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Showalter's contestation, androgyny is Woolf's acknoý, ý ledgement and embrace of her 
femininity; it is certainly not its denial. 45 Androgyny is not a betrayal of feminism but, 
on the contrary, it is a most powerful and sustainable buttress for it. For with the idea 
of androgyny, Woolf subverted the traditional distinction and values placed on the 
qualities of masculinity and femininity. In so doing, she also conceived of and 
approached consciousness and subjectivity through an understanding of mind-body 
interactions fascinatingly similar to those of modern neuroscientists who may never 
have read a word of her. 
Taking a poststructuralist point of view, Toril Moi argues in Sexual/Textual 
Politics (1985) that Woolf's evasiveness and her intentional avoidance of a definite, 
fixed, meaning might be the authentic representation of a feminine writing. By 
adopting the idea of the French feminist philosopher Julia Kristeva, Toril Moi suggests 
that Woolf's narrative could also be taken as a "`revolutionary' form of writing" that 
"with its abrupt shifts, ellipses, breaks and apparent lack of logical construction is a 
kind of writing in which the rhythms of the body and the unconscious have managed 
to break through the strict rational defences of conventional social meaning" (11). 
Minow-Pinkney also remarks that "For Woolf, ... aesthetic 
innovation and feminist 
conviction are deeply interlinked, and her notion of androgyny mediates between the 
two" (8). Woolf's modernist revolt against the realism (or maybe social realism) of her 
Victorian and Edwardian literary forebears is taken by Minow-Pinkney as a challenge 
to phallocentricism. In talking about women and writing, Minow-Pinkney has argued, 
Woolf never attempted to answer the essentialist question of what is a woman. 
"Woman is a project, not a given; femininity is a representation and cultural 
construction, not an eternal essence" (Minow-Pinkney 11). And yet, one might further 
venture that neither women nor the question of `what a woman is' is Woolf's sole 
project, but the very essence of being and of being in a process of creation. How does 
45 Elaine Showalter, 
.A 
Literature of Their Own: From Charlotte Bronte to Doris Lessing (London: 
Virgo-Time Warner. 1999). 
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one, the `I, ' and the `self, ' come to be? What makes me `me'? For the sense of self 
formed out of continual environmental inputs is subject to a series of reformulations, 
and though coherent and even persisting, the self is never definite or absolute. 46 
Probing into the `narrativity' of subject-formation as well as self-creation, a 
series of unfinished narratives or biographical works occur in Woolf's various writings: 
Mrs. Hilbery's biography of her distinguished father in Night and Day(1919), 
Bernard's life stories in The Waves (1931), or Terence Hewet's novel of silence in The 
Voyage Out. A number of characters evade the narrative expression and fade out in the 
course of narration: Rachel Vinrace of The Voyage Out, Jacob Flanders in Jacob's 
Room(1922), Mrs. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse (1927) and Rhoda in The Waves. 
Woolf even wrote in response to the public commentaries on The Waves: "odd, that 
they (The Tieres) should praise my characters when I meant to have none" (WD 
170). 47 As Woolf wrote about lives, she was conscious of the temporal elusiveness of 
the present and of the present apprehension of a subjective state. As the sense of self 
and personal meaning is subject to time, the characters or the personified ideas are 
therefore bound to become evasive and partial from the perspective of a narrative 
present. Just as consciousness, the sense of self and self-knowing, is, by nature, 
forever late in time. What one comes to see and know consciously is never the exact 
synchronised present but a present-past regenerated as past-present. 
The stream of consciousness (a phrase adopted to describe a major technical 
characteristic of modernist writings) is a record and reflection of the conscious self's 
interaction with its environment in its social and cultural context. In `The Narrow 
Bridge of Art' (1927), Woolf envisioned a departure of the novel from its realist and 
`materialist' predecessors. Although "it [the novel to come] will express the feelings 
46 Even for multiple personality disorder (or as it is termed recently, dissociate personality disorder), as 
its name suggests, there are diverse personalities or senses of self within one body, so the self alters in 
turns. However, with the mind's tendency to manipulate incongruous information into a coherent 
context, it is only possible for one self to be consciously present at one time. See Ian Hacking. 
Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: Princeton UR 1995). 
47 Diary entry 5 October 1931. 
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and ideas of the characters closely and vividly" it will not be "limit[ed] ... to the 
psychology of personal intercourse, " it will provide us something more impersonal 
(GR 18-9). The novel of the future should be able to satisfy "hat one has longed for in 
ideas, dreams, imaginations, and poetry: a communal tie between each individual. 
"The poet is always able to transcend the particularity ... and to give us 
his 
questioning not of his own personal lot alone but of the state and being of all human 
life" (GR 19). That is the stance that Woolf tried to attain through her works-to 
generalise through classification, to characterise through abstract symbols and to 
design what is personal and subjective (reflecting the two main concepts and means of 
scientific inquest into the hidden order of nature). 48 
The consciousness drawn by Woolf through her narrative does not limit itself to 
the extended consciousness of personal biographical memory, but it also shows the 
general phenomena of consciousness experienced and shared by all conscious human 
beings. For Woolf, the novel is the most flexible literary form, capable of distilling the 
most intense subjective feelings as well as the most detached critical point of view. "It 
is the gift of style, arrangement, construction, to put us at a distance from the special 
life and to obliterate its features; while it is the gift of the novel to bring us into close 
touch with life. The two powers fight if they are brought into combination. The most 
complete novelist must be the novelist who can balance the two powers so that the one 
enhances the other" (GR 143-4). Woolf's experimental narrative is her effort to 
resolve the eternal conflict between the subjective experience of sense-data and the 
objective existence of sensibilia, a conflict that has troubled scientists and 
philosophers for centuries. Throughout her works, Woolf strived to balance a 
subjective penetration into the feelings engendered by the living body and an objective 
reflection of each individual emotion. She attempted to bring together an internal and 
external view of life and the world, one that might both reflect and alleviate the 
'A A. N. Whitehead, Science and the Modem World: "Accordingly, Aristotle by his Logic throws the 
emphasis on classification... Classification is a half-way house between the immediate concreteness of 
the individual thing and the complete abstraction of mathematical notions" (37). 
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anxiety and discomfort resulting from the incalculable quality of life. 
Thomas Nagel whose book title for his inquiry into the problem of integration 
between subjective and objective perspectives, The View from Nowhere, echoes 
Bernard's question, "but how describe the world seen without a self' (\V 221)? Nagcl, 
with his argument of "What it is like to be a Bat? ", situates the problem of 
consciousness right at the centre of the mind-body contention. 49 Along with his idea 
of the unique consciousness of an organism as it feels and senses what it is like to be 
itself in its body, Nagel contends that "it is this very subjectivity of the qualia of 
consciousness that creates all the problems" among the mind-body relation (Lyons 
185). The very subjective qualia of consciousness affirm the significance of the body 
to its subjective mind. How to employ an objective, scientific study of such intrinsic 
qualities (to extract the confluent body image from mental apprehension and achieve 
pure perception), as Nagel concludes, is the insoluble dilemma of the modern sciences 
of the brain and consciousness. Nevertheless, despite the fundamental subjective 
aspect of the mind, Nagel still holds onto the prospect that a more objective 
understanding of the phenomena of the mind is possible. This has been borne out in 
modem neurology studies, and as Ramachandran asserts, what we lack is simply the 
right medium in which to transpose and communicate these scientific discoveries. 50 
Perhaps Woolf, with her experimental writing, has stumbled across a possible 
aesthetic resolution of the problem of how to reconcile the private subjective sphere of 
the mind and the public, objective world of matter. 
Within the opposition between subject and object, a multi-layered consciousness 
is drawn by Woolf throughout her narratives. As one more objective apprehension 
reflects upon another more subjective qualia, the narrative reflects the nerve system in 
the brain that provides different levels of remapping and that always weave into its 
49 "What is it like to be a Bat? " is the title of an essay by Thomas Nagel published in 1974. 
50 Ramachandran: "I submit that we are dealing here with two mutually unintelligible languages. One 
is the language of nerve impulses-the spatial and temporal patterns of neuronal activity ... 
The second 
language, the one that allows us to communicate what we are seeing to others, is a natural spoken 
tongue like English" (Phantom 231). 
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pattern the previous self and subjective feelings. Woolf's narrative of consciousness 
has a close similarity to the diagram of consciousness drawn by Damasio as proto-self, 
core self, and autobiographical self, building upon one another and generating. one 
beyond another, core consciousness, extended consciousness, and on the eminent 
top-conscience (empathy with others feelings and emotions) which enables one to 
surpass one's personal boundary and sympathise with others, attaining a communal 
unity. Under Woolf's description, there is a primal sense of the self which could not be 
fully apprehended through consciousness, residing alongside a vague sense of an 
integral `I. ' The self within one, as seen by Bernard in The Waves, is most `disparate, ' 
yet most `integrated' as well. Although the self is forever mixing itself with other 
qualities surrounding it, a distinct notion of the `I' or `me' or the ego is still 
perceivable. Being greatly influenced by Russell's distinction between sense-data and 
sensibilia, Woolf depicts a consciousness that not only looks both outward into the 
world and inward into itself, but also attempts to detach itself from itself in order to 
envision and contemplate those that are insensible to the subject and to reason how the 
self comes to be what it is. 
Woolf's narrative is the mind's narrative of the bodily emotions and feelings and, 
through such narrative, she aimed to substantiate a sense of the elusive, protean, `self' 
which lurks consistently beneath one's consciousness, but always seeming to escape 
verbal comprehension. It is a narrative that would objectify her subjective feelings as 
the mind feels the body and reflects upon such feelings-a narrative of the "logic of 
sensation" that attempts to structuralise the personal experience as well as to 
impersonalise private experience (Fry 72). 51 It is the narrative of the self speaking to 
the self, an interlocution between the self as subject and as object, and in juxtaposing 
these separated voices within, it captures a more integrated mind which one might call 
51 Roger Fry, Vision and Design: "From the merest rudiments of pure sensation up to the highest efforts 
of design each point in the process of art is inevitably accompanied by pleasure; it cannot proceed 
without it. If, %wwe describe the process of art as a logic of sensation, wie must remember that the premises 
are sensations, and that the conclusion can only be drawn from them by one who is in an emotional 
state with regard to them" (72). 
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a `self. ' Woolf had adopted a scientific approach to subjective experience as it deals 
with the particulars that "mark `the sharp point, in language, of the essential privacy of 
each individual's experience"' (qtd. in Banfield 296). Beneath the apparent narration 
of the transient nature of the rainbow-like personality, the protean self, there is always 
a granite-hard truth that would uphold the narrative and grounded the self . 
52 The 
matter of `subject and object and the nature of reality' is not just the epistemological 
quest of Mr. Ramsay, but also the fundamental matter with which Woolf had been 
experimenting throughout her narratives. 53 
Contemplating the difference between intellectual activity in the arts and the 
sciences, Roger Fry asserts in "Art and Science" (1919) that the involvement of the 
emotional state in the process of art creation and appreciating. In contrast to `seeing, ' 
`feeling' constitutes a major catalyst for aesthetic achievement and appreciation: "an 
aesthetic harmony simply does not exist without the emotional state. The harmony is 
not true unless it is felt with emotion" (Fry 73). 54 And as Bertrand Russell noted in 
Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), a diverse emphasis on the scientific 
(Ionians) and the mystic (Sicilians) could be perceived among Ancient Greek 
philosophy. In a mathematician like Pythagoras, there is a curious combination of both 
scientific attitude and mystic insights. 55 Scientific `insights' and aesthetic `aspiration' 
are often achieved through the sponsoring of an undercurrent of feeling which is 
usually beyond intelligibility. 
Woolf's novels are not just in themselves works of art, they also explore the very 
process of the creation of aesthetic works-how they are conceived, reflected upon 
and formulated either through a musical scale or on a canvas or even through a much 
more dynamic form (as manifest by Mrs. Dalloway) of parties and occasions. Woolf's 
protagonists are always artists of some sort in pursuit of an artistic end in life-to 
52 Virginia Woolf, "The New Biography, " Granite and Rainbow (London: Hogarth, 1958). 
53 TL 28 
54 Roger Fry, Vision and Design (London: Pelican, 1937) 69-74. 
ss Bertrand Russell, Our Knowledge of the External World 1914 (London: George Allen & Un% in, 
1922) 29. 
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mould the essence of life in its rhythm. As if only by moulding the minute triviality of 
life into a substantial artistic form could life be held and protected from being washed 
out by time. Both creative processes and aesthetic apprehensions are inter-related to 
consciousness. The creative process is a process of translating what is subjective and 
personal into an objective experience as the self feels its senses, detaches itself from 
its senses to reflect on them, and finally achieves an apparently impersonalised 
objective understanding. Thus, it is a process of both the self finding itself and then 
losing itself (to be able to negate oneself, or in other words, to endow oneself with all 
the flexibility of fluid identity) or what John Keats has termed `negative capability. '56 
It is well-recognised that Woolf's narrative is always an inquest into the Real. 
The theme of individuality and communal mergence strains through all of her works 
as she continues to pursuit a `reality' that is sustainable through both subjective and 
objective points of view. This thesis will argue that the concern with `subject and 
object and the nature of reality' in life is the core foundation of all her writings and 
ideas. Woolf's life-long experiment with narrative forms (to bring forth a more 
truthful illustration of lives and of realities) has turned out to be an advanced depiction 
of the nature of consciousness. If as it is said that "British philosophy is always 
turning into psychology, and psychology into physiology" (Russo 90), Woolf, in the 
early decades of the twentieth century, with her engagement in an environment 
overfilled with discourses of epistemology, philosophy, and psychoanalysis, has come 
to picture a relation between the mind and the body that is now affirmed by 
neuroscientists. 
Chapter Divisions 
In this thesis, I will approach Woolf's writing as an exploration and illustration 
of the subjective consciousness of `being' and the process of subject-formation. 
Instead of taking the more traditional stance of psychoanalytic theory and criticism 
56 John Keats, letter to his brother, 28 December 1817. 
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(though I still reflect constantly upon them and using a variety of established 
psychoanalytic concept to support my argument), I will examine her works in relation 
to the mindibody problem that has preoccupied scientists and philosophers for 
centuries. By resorting to recent accounts of brain scientists and neurologists on 
consciousness, my aim is to describe how Woolf, under the influence of the diverse 
`soul' discourses of her time, had drawn out a consciousness that is now gradually 
being reasserted by new scientific evidence. Woolf's narrative is fundamentally a 
narrative of life, of being-in-the-world. 
The thesis will be divided into two main parts as the focus of my argument shifts 
slightly from discussing Woolf's depiction of the natural state of being and how that 
knowing of being is grounded upon a bodily and emotional base, to addressing her 
representation of the temporality of `being' and, through the conception of time, the 
continual changing and swerving between `objective' and `subjective' consciousness 
in life. Following Martin Heidegger's proclaimed argument in Being and Time(1927), 
in talking about `being, ' it would be difficult to exclude temporal elements of being as 
all being is temporal. 57 And as argued by A. N. Whitehead in Science and the Modern 
World (1933), "In being aware of the bodily experience, we must thereby be aware of 
aspects of the whole spatio-temporal world as mirrored within the bodily life" (113). 
The body lives in the temporality of time, while the timing apparatus of the brain 
contributes to the integral experience of the subject. Through time, a subject learns 
and embroiders its subjectivity and in time, it wedges itself, forming a continuous 
self-identity. As the problem of the subject and subject-formation is fundamentally 
linked with the building and retrieving of memory, one could not exempt the problem 
of time from Woolf's concern with life-writing and subject-creation. The shifting, 
adjusting, recounting of the past and present, are crucial to the interpretation of life in 
57 David Farrell Krell has noted the possible influence of Henri Bergson on Heidegger in his 
introduction to Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings: "Not only Nietzsche but other sources as well 
brought together for Heidegger the issues of Being and time. Henri Bergson had been lecturing on time 
the past several years in Paris"(8). 
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the process of being. `Being' is only carried out in time. Without time and its 
temporality, there is only the permanent stasis of death. 
Thus, I begin by talking about how `being' must assume a unification of mind 
and body. The forming of the subject and the making of personal meaning is 
fundamentally based upon the feelings and emotions felt by the subjective, organic, 
body. Moreover, with the suggestion claimed by modern neuroscientists, rationality is 
not achieved by obliterating emotional elements. Instead, only with an intact sensorial 
system can logical reasoning and rational social behaviour be made possible. In the 
first chapter, "The Waves as a Narrative of Consciousness, " I will focus on The Waves 
and argue that as Woolf's experimental writings culminate in The Waves, it becomes 
an explicit example of Woolf's aesthetic ideal-a truthful presentation of lives and the 
nature and process of life through the narrative. As the novel opens with a dawning 
similar to the emergence of a conscious self that starts to delineate its boundary and 
reflect on its experience, the life journey of its characters is also embarked upon. 
I will argue that The Waves, as a narrative of consciousness, is not simply about 
the stream of consciousness of its characters. As a dramatised soliloquy of life stories 
delivered by six different characters, the narrative design, account, or acts, all seem to 
reflect the emergence of consciousness and the contriving of subjective identity. In a 
style of poetic prose and a fictional dramatisation of consciousness, The Waves 
portrays the surges and continuous flows of feelings and emotions as they are 
experienced from infancy onwards. In narrative, The Waves plays out the 
configuration of a self from the initial state of feeling the feelings and knowing the 
others to adopting verbal language in order to narrate and analyse feelings in an 
attempt to reach a summation of one self among various narratives. And with the help 
of the theory formulated by Jacques Lacan and other, object-relation, theorists, I 
venture to suggest that the insecurity and uncertainty of the subject arises from the 
fundamental fact that as life is a continual ongoing process, the personal meaning of 
the subject remains in an indeterminate editorial state, though the initial contact with 
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the world in infancy largely shapes one's view of the world, self and life. 
In chapter two, I will explore the first two novels of Woolf, The Voyage Out and 
Night and Day, which in their traditional melodramatic forms and conventional 
themes of love and marriage, demonstrated early on Woolf's preoccupation with the 
mind/body relation and how this relation shapes socio-cultural gender differences. 
These two novels are Woolf's first attempt to expose traditional biases in the 
representation of the problem of mind/body: the rational masculine mind in contrast to 
the emotional feminine body. And by subverting the divided mind/body distinction 
and undermining the hierarchy between the higher and lower mental faculties (as set 
out in faculty psychology), Woolf founded her feminist claims. In both novels, the 
heroines are situated in a world that values rationality (with its utmost concern in 
abstract yet logical correct thinking) and denounces sentiments (of its `abstract' 
confusions and disorientations). Ironically, whether it is reason or unreason, their 
`abstractness' from the actual material world results in a dreamily, unsubstantial, 
frame of mind. As Rachel Vinrace is torn between the music of sincere feelings and 
emotions and the unbending yet disingenuous social codes of patriarchal English 
society, Katharine Hilbery also struggles against the social conventions of a London 
drawing-room, trying to attain her own self-fulfilment. Katharine deliberately 
renounces any interest in literature because of its ambiguity and uncertainty; instead, 
she secretly pursuits an `unwomanly' interest in mathematics which is solid and 
definite. Whether it is mathematics or music (of which two A. N. Whitehead saw a 
close affinity in their abstractness), both Rachel and Katharine, by means of abstract 
presentation, are searching for a fundamental `reality' which underlies the artificial 
world of the respective societies. 58 The conventional division between night and day, 
dream and reality, seems to crumble, reflecting a world of belief in substance shattered 
as well as liberated by the ideas of Einstein's relativity and wave-particle dualism. 
Although in Gillian Beer's opinion that, with the advances of modern physics, "the 
58 Science and the Modern NN"orld. 
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ego is etherialised, snatched away from a single base, " Woolf is still seeking the basic 
notes that compose and play the music of who one is (117). With both novels Woolf 
spells out the modem contradiction between striving "to get outside [the] body. 
beyond [the] house by means of thought, Einstein, speculation, mathematics, the 
Mendelian theory" and a desire to go beyond one's self-conscious ego by 
relinquishing consciousness in resonance with the body (MD 30). And yet, as Woolf 
shows through both novels, bodily feelings and emotions could not be denied or 
suppressed. Only a healthy coordination between the body and the mind sustains one's 
sanity. Woolf, writing within the conventions of her time, launched her life long 
inquiry into truth and fact, real and unreal, but above all for a true means of 
communications as words and verbal language fail. Thus, from the beginning, Woolf 
started to search for a more suitable means to represent a reality of `being' which is 
not altogether substantial, but is instead "ondes fictives" as described by de Broglie, a 
French physicist (qtd. in Beer 115). 
With Chapter 3,1 try to support and sum up my previous arguments with an 
exploration of the idea of androgyny which Woolf expounds fully in A Room of One's 
Own (1929) and characterised by Orlando (1928). In both works, Woolf sought to 
state the absurdity and the fictive nature of the patriarchal discourse on `rational facts' 
and gender properties. The light-heartedness of these works satirises not only the male 
anger against his gender counterpart, but also the esteemed sobriety of masculine 
`rationality' that seems to be obscured by men's own aggressiveness in claiming its 
superiority. With the idea of androgyny, Woolf illustrated that a rational mind is fully 
bound up with its organic source-the body. The deficiency of materiality, especially 
in the nurturing of the body, eventually leads towards an insufficiency of creative 
mind. Presumably, one could not deny the fact that body and mind display quite 
different qualities, yet it would be wrong to dissociate them. Here, I would also 
venture to defend Woolf from Elaine Showalter's infamous argument concerning 
Woolf's so-called evasive feminist stand, and state that it is with androgyny that Woolf 
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strikes unswervingly at the matrix of gender bias and its inequalities. 
Starting from Chapter 4, I take a detour to expound the time-scheme adopted by 
Woolf in illustrating the impact of time upon objective knowing and subjective being. 
Here, with a discussion of Mrs. Dalloway and its time element, I try to delineate the 
influence on Woolf of the idea of time depicted by both Bergson and Russell. N1rs. 
Dalloway, an epitome of a traumatic text, illustrates, with its multilayering of time, the 
subjective struggle to form and enter combat with a formless centre and the seeming 
meaninglessness of life. Whilst asserting an effort to live, there is a secret 
understanding that it is in nothingness that the self might fully embrace itself. In Mrs. 
Dalloway, time is perceived differently from the perspective of sanity and insanity. 
Disorientation is derived from a failure to perceive and sense the coordination 
between the social time without and the mental time within. By discussing Mrs. 
Dalloway, I will deal with the contrast between Russell's moment of being and 
Bergson's duree in terms of Damasio's core consciousness and extended 
consciousness. With the speculation on temporal deployment in memory and its 
contribution to shaping and sustaining a biographical self that might engender 
subjectivity, this chapter also attempts to examine that ultimate dilemma between 
subjective and objective points of view resolved perhaps through sympathy and 
conscience. These two represented the most evolved mechanism of consciousness as it 
is made capable of speculation which assimilates and recognises other's experiences 
and feelings-and therefore attains a communal integration which transcends personal 
temporality. 
In Chapter 5, I focus on To the Lighthouse which exemplifies the idea that 
aesthetic achievement is only plausible by resolving the culturally constructed 
opposition of the masculine and feminine qualities. With its structure, the novel also 
brings forth a perceived time that consists of continuous flow and of moments of stasis. 
Reaching out to the memory of her parents, Woolf, like Lily Briscoe, seeks to break 
through into their subjective world-to learn their thoughts and feel their feelings. A 
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fine integration of `sense and sensibility' makes the envisioning of the final stroke 
possible as it completes the painting by bestowing on it a form and eventually a 
meaning. With a close examine of "Time Passes" which forms as the central unifier of 
the novel that gives form through delineation, the chapter tries to argue that with 
"Time Passes" the ambiguity of objective and subjective temporal being is revealed. 
As The Waves pursues its theme of (and through) the art of words, writing and 
theatrical effects, To the Lighthouse, with Lily as a painter, employs visual art as the 
motif through which to transmit subjective vision through objectified detachment, to 
explore that fundamental question: "how describe the world seen without a self' (W 
221). With its narrative structure and its account of narrative, To the Lighthouse shows 
how final vision is achieved through an endless shuffling between a first-hand 
subjective experience and a more detached objective apprehension. 
With Chapter Six, I continue to examine the depiction of the deployment of time 
in relation to subject formation in The Years. The Years is an artistic presentation of 
`being' in a social-historical world. History, biographical as well as socio-cultural, is 
an essential theme for Woolf. As if reflecting the advance of modem technology and 
the impact of a modem war, in The Years, time is chopped into segments of reflection, 
memory, and sudden apprehensions, and history is learnt and represented, not by facts, 
but rather through a reflection on personal feelings and emotions. Thus, with The 
Years, a family saga is painted to characterise a history not of the facts recorded in 
newspapers, but of `real' living in time that conveys both the sense of duree 
experienced within consciousness and of separated individual moments as a higher 
consciousness stands outside or without, contemplating the passage of time. And 
through this embodiment of private sensations, history is enlivened. To en-capture life, 
Woolf had to defy time and its corruption, yet to depict a life in living would be 
impossible if temporal elements were eliminated. Thus, by resorting to ideas of art 
which Martin Heidegger had explored in "The Origin of the Work of Art" and also 
with the help of Roger Fry's interpretation of French impressionist aesthetics, I 
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attempt to expound Woolf's experimental deployment of literary forms which adhere 
closely to modernist aesthetics where "the visual meets the invisible and abstract" (qtd. 
in Banfield, Phantom 26). With literary cubism, both the subjective duration and the 
objectified passage of time could be suggested and made known to the reader. 
With a discussion of Woolf's last novel, Between the Acts, I conclude my thesis, 
claiming that Woolf's experimental writing has been an enterprise in transcribing 
`being' in time through the minute interactions between feelings and thought. Instead 
of plot, her aim is to sketch the life, the soul, and the thing in itself which is porous, 
formless and intangible. The twofold quality of granite and rainbow that thread 
throughout her works reflects a subjectivity, a personal meaning, which is woven out 
of a narrative of bodily senses and feelings. However, in Between the Acts and as in 
any other writings of Woolf, personal subjectivity and objectified, impersonal, human 
nature go hand in hand. In one day of life, an entire history of the British Isles is 
presented. The past is always carried along into the present through memory and 
through the body. By such juxtaposition, Woolf is writing the perennial nature of life 
as well as depicting individual lives in their special temporal-spatial positions. The 
common nature of the generation of consciousness, and also the subjective reality of 
the most private qualia are therefore appreciated and portrayed. By resorting to Nature, 
Woolf thereby achieves the objective of a depiction of lives in relation to other lives as 
well as a depiction of life in relation to the reality of 'being. ' 59 
59 ARO 102 
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The Waves as the Narrative of Consciousness 
A mind thinking. They might be islands of 
light-islands in the stream that I am trying to 
convey; life itself going on. A Writer's Diary, 
28 May 1929 
The Waves opens with the description of an obscure early da« n when things are 
dimly perceived as if it is also the dawning of consciousness-a stage of amniotic 
fluidity before the self knows of its own existence. The opening line of the novel, 
"The sun had not yet risen. The sea was indistinguishable from the sky, " descriptively 
presents a self-sufficient world, a Golden Age before the birth of any self and where 
no boundary has yet been drawn separating subject and object (W 3). 1 A 
pre-consciousness simply exists without being aware of its own existence. Yet, as the 
subject is gradually torn out of the maternal womb, it enters a world where its central 
and omnipotent mastery is no longer effective and where a system of surveillance 
must develop to ensure survival-animal consciousness. 2 
Coming into consciousness, "as if the arm of a woman couched beneath the 
horizon had raised a lamp and flat bars of white, green and yellow spread across the 
sky like the blades of a fan, " there comes a flamboyant display of lights that blazes 
without lucidity (W 3). The blazing light seems to exemplify that sudden thrust "into 
the shore of light" from darkness, as the self, ripped from the self-enclosure of a world 
of being one with the mother, comes to feel and know subconsciously its own being 
and existence apart from the world (qtd. in Nussbaum 189). Instead of a traditional 
Apollonian image of sun, a female figure stands as a substitute and as the bearer of 
' Martha Nussbaunm, Upheavals of Thought: "The people of the Golden Age were, as Hesiod puts it, 
nepioi-infantile, lacking speech and reason.. . 
It was all right for the people of the Golden Age to be 
emotionless, since that condition was suited to the world in which they lived. But in our world emotions 
are needed to provide the developing child with a map of the world. The child's emotions are 
recognitions of where important good and bad things are to be found" (206). 
2 Freud, 12: 2s4. 
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light, hinting that, in this world at least, the essence of consciousness is associated 
with the more (conventionally deemed) `feminine' qualities of feeling and fluidity. 3 
This is the dawning of a sense of self as waves of bodily feelings and emotions come 
to be registered unconsciously (that is to say pre-reflectively) by the organism. For the 
proto-self becomes conscious of its own existence by distinguishing and separating 
itself from the world around it as it becomes "clothed in this changing, this feeling 
garment of flesh" (W 93). The dawning of consciousness prompts the primal 
differentiation between `being' and `non-being' as well as between a proto-self and 
other, still the `Self' is "not yet quite born" (James 1: 148). The glaring light of the 
daybreak serves as an analogy for the bewilderment and perplexed sensational 
experience of early infancy. 
The crumpled sea beneath and the light blue sky become separated by "an arc of 
fire burnt on the rim of the horizon" as the lamp of light is raised higher, signifying an 
internal enlightenment as the organism comes to feel its satisfaction and frustration as 
the "sources [of life, namely the breast of the mother] evade him from time to time" 
(W 3; Freud, 12: 254). Prompted by this newly inflicted sense of unpleasantness, the 
incipient subject, in securing its own welfare and survival state, starts to formulate an 
internal world of self and begins also to differentiate this from an outward world of the 
other. ` Thus, immediately, readers are introduced to the characters through their own 
self-description of their sensations. Each image or sound described is a direct 
narration of self-feeling and perceptions that, in delineating the special subjective 
relationship with the world, becomes a pronouncement of a subjective entity. The 
subject, now forming a self-reflexive consciousness, not only perceives the mother as 
an other but also, like the sun shining upon the rippling sea, objectifies its own body 
Gillian Beer, Virginia Woolf: The Common Ground (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 1996) 86. 
In psychoanalytic terms, the child perceives itself, at first, being fully unified with the mother. Being 
born into the world and torn away from the secure womb, the child does not come to realise his/her 
separation from the maternal body until his/her desire is frustrated and unattended to. Furthermore, the 
separation provokes anxiety about losing the mother. Therefore, as one becomes a separated being, one 
is eternally shuffling between a desire to substantiate oneself (from which arise the fears of castration 
and devouring) and a desire to re-unify with the mother through the dissolution of oneself. 
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and bodily conditions which, though sponsoring its sense of selfhood, are not under its 
full command. With the awareness of differentiation between self and others, the 
proto-self acquires emotions (before it could understand them intelligibly) in 
regarding the fulfilment of its need for survival in a world which is beyond its control. 
Such feelings and emotions, deriving from the instinct for survival, are the biological 
mechanism that maps out the subject's survival interest. 
As the organism comes to feel its being through the vibrancy of its bodily needs 
and satisfactions, it is set up as an independent organic body separated from others. 
However, such knowledge of the self as an independent being in the world is an 
internal knowing (in contrast to an objective reflection that recognises the self-object 
relationship which comes later) of a present subjective state. Accordingly, the 
characters need endlessly to re-state their subjective perceptions not only as 
identifications of their own subjectivity, but as a means to further sharpen their 
boundaries and attain self-definition through reflexive self-understanding. The 
subtlety of different levels of consciousness has long been ignored because of its 
conventional presentation as a compacted unity. 5 In its totality, the subjective aspect 
of consciousness had been dismissed by philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and the 
Behaviourists. For, as shown in The Analysis of Mind, the `consciousness' which 
Russell attempted to explain through scientific inquiry is limited to the higher level of 
self-reflexive consciousness, or what Damasio calls the `autobiographical 
consciousness. ' Woolf's novel begins with an emergent consciousness rooted in the 
body, sensation, and dim feelings of parturition and partition. The invocation of 
selfhood always corresponds to stimuli received in the body. Thus, the shock of the 
kiss for Louis or the showering waters for Bernard is, in truth, the shock of the self 
finding and recognising its existence and separation through the sensations aroused in 
the body. Thus, `Rhoda bangs her hand against some hard door to recall herself back 
' Angela Richards notes the difference of passive and active connotation between the German words, 
'bewusst' and 'unbewvusst, ' and the English translation of 'conscious' and 'unconscious. ' See Freud 11: 
165. 
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to the body. '6 Her intangible selfhood is rather presented through an unsubstantial 
body. It is in the body that, with a smell, a threat, a gaze received, "It steals in through 
some crack in the structure-one's identity" (W 86). 
The images of the sun and the waves in each preceding interlude seem to 
function as an analogy of the correlativity of as well as of the separateness between 
bodily feeling and consciousness. Each subjective consciousness of the dramatised 
soliloquies cannot do without the continuous waves of inner feeling, "moving, one 
after another, beneath the surface, following each other, pursuing each other, 
perpetually" (W 3). As a narrative of consciousness, The Waves is in fact fully 
grounded on bodily images of blood and veins and rhythms of the heart and breath. It 
is a narrative that seeks how "membranes, webs of nerve that lay white and limp, have 
filled and spread themselves and float round us like filaments, making air tangible and 
catching in them far-away sounds un-heard before" (W 101). Through the body, "Rich 
and heavy sensations form on the roof of [the reader's] mind" (W 18). 
Consciousness dawns upon the self (like the lamp that rises and enlightens the 
fringes and frames of all objects) as one comes to `feel' the interminable flux of 
feelings and emotions and "[bring] the system of life regulation... to bear on the 
processing of the images which represent the things and events which exist inside and 
outside the organism" (Damasio, Feeling 24). Thereby, a sense of knowing forms out 
of a conjecture of information communicated through various, parallel, pathways of 
the nervous system. From such mapping and remapping of the organism's state of 
being springs forth a pre-verbal consciousness of the proto-self's being in existence 
which produces the ground from which a self-reflexive awareness of its own 
subjectivity emerges. 7 In the voice of a chorus, a voice without a self, the interlude of 
The Waves sings out the subjective common ground of coming to feel and know one's 
being-the emergence of consciousness and the forming of subjectivity. Whilst the 
W 31. 
I)amasio, Feeling 25-6. 
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dramatised `playpoem, ' with its six distinct voices that gradually merge into one, 
enacts a multi-faceted and multidimensional consciousness that is continually 
integrating the past into the present and weaving out new narratives of the self through 
the body. 
In their early childhood, the characters are bemused by not just the world around 
them, but also by their own inability to know how to interpret their perceptions or 
assimilate their sensations. Initially the characters address feelings that seem to rise 
for no reason. Stimuli that come from without are also internalised as if they outgrow 
from within. Therefore, Susan who sees "a slab of pale yellow" also bears "the yellow 
warmth" inside herself (W 3; 9). And all the while the stamping of the chained beast is 
simultaneously alluded to as a sound assimilated and internalised from the external 
world of the waves thudding at the beach. Feelings and emotions pour into them 
before they can comprehend their meanings and significances. They seem to be one 
with the world as they flow along with its flux as each description of the external 
world is as much a narration of the internal state. The children are blended into the 
natural and `semi-protective' world of the nursery as they crouch beneath the current 
hedges, `inhabiting the underworld. '8 But, seemingly, they are also separated from the 
`outside' world with their own distinct intrinsic nature (which is in turn projected back 
onto the world) as one sees through their unique description of their own perspectival 
world. In the nursery, the characters are overwhelmed by the internal fluctuation of 
emotions that respond to external stimulations, spontaneously swayed and submerged 
by unknown forces. The world is very much carried along within them as it is without. 
With the internalisation of the outer world, the waves continue to sound and surge 
within them throughout their lives. As it is said, "It is widely acknowledged that 
young infants have a less distinct sense of their own separateness, and that their 
relationship to the surrounding world may even verge at times on a sense of union, a 
quasi-mystical feeling that what exists is a single unified flux" (Sass 59). Whilst the 
NN, IS. 
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ending of the nursery years and the starting of grammar school is, as termed by 
Bernard, "A second severance from the body of our mother" (Wt' 93). 
At this primal stage of the nursery years, with a blurred distinction between the 
subject and object, the impelling force that seems to coerce the movement or 
fluctuation of the subject remains unclear. It is not even determined as being either 
intrinsic or external. As soon as the characters are brought into being in The Waves, 
they display distinctive and characteristic perspectives as they start to employ words 
to symbolise and articulate their relations to their internal and external world. With 
their own self-narratives, their own identities as selves and their subjective inner 
realities are thereby being formulated. Although each of their perceptions is peculiarly 
owned by him/her alone, it is nevertheless an undeniable reality to its percipient in 
spite of its being unavailable to the others. As the inner reality is only real to the 
recipient alone, it is by symbolising these internal realities in the communal language 
of the social world that enables the characters to begin to embody their own 
differences by stating the reality of their own unique subjectivity. Subjective 
perceptions and apprehensions can only become an objective real through the 
employment of the social symbolic order. However, the feebleness of the signifiers 
often subtracts from the sense of the real that resists being retained in ordinary words, 
speech, or any so-called objective means of communication. Therefore in dramatising 
the working of consciousness, The Waves also fully enfolds the intriguing paradox of 
a subjectivity that is deeply entangled yet never fully contained within the 
socio-historical context of the community-an intrinsic, `unnameable' core always 
evading symbolic representation and betraying any possible definition or meaning that 
might threaten the subject itself For this is how Bernard perceives Louis and Rhoda, 
who are forever outside the definition of the socio-symbolic order, as "the authentics. " 
as though in their `nothingness' within this social world, they achieve themselves most 
fully (W 87). The subject is continually building a fortress of definition, through 
bodily sensations, around the inner void, for fear of losing grip of the self. With its six 
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characters, The Waves provides a prismatic degree of inner anxiety about the 
ontological nature of being which is founded upon a void of fluidity. Each of them 
continues to attach themselves to the initial symbol that is to become an emblem of 
their intrinsic self, functioning like the mask of Commedia Dell'Arte wt hich, on the 
one hand, captures the essentiality of the character that has been further internalised 
and revivified by the body, and on the other hand, ironically `covers, ' `explicitly, ' the 
absence of the Real. 
Woolf's arrangement of her opening prologue for the life-drama of The Waves 
not only reflects Damasio's metaphor of "stepping into the light" for the dawning of 
consciousness, but also clearly illustrates the object-relations involved in the birth of 
the self (Feeling 3). As it is put by Damasio, either as an audience sitting in the dark 
waiting for the performers to step onto the lighted stage, or as a performer who is 
about to enter upon the stage, the crossing of the threshold that separates a secure and 
limited shelter from a capricious world beyond, full of others and unexpectedness, is 
similar to the birth of consciousness. Both signify an initial encounter with the other. 
Through such confrontation between the world of one's own and the world of others, 
individual consciousness and subjectivity are therefore made possible. According to 
Damasio, consciousness first emerges from a flow of continual neural transmission of 
the information of the organism's condition that provides a ground reference for the 
mind of its bodily status and therefore forms the proto-self. Then, a reflection that 
forms a "second order map of organism-object relationship" of this internal flux 
engenders a core consciousness, so that the self becomes conscious of itself feeling the 
feelings and its subjective relation with the objective world (Damasio, Feeling 310). 
Consciousness, sustained by the unceasing incoming stimuli, enables the organism to 
know its emotions and feelings as it feels, and possibly to speculate on what has 
provoked the internal flux: "Consciousness.. . 
is the unified mental pattern that brings 
together the object and the self, " mapping out their mutual relations (Damasio, Feelin 
11). The waves of feelings and emotions provide a ground reference in sustaining 
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consciousness, though the ground reference for the most part passes unconsciously as 
an unheard inner melody of the body. With the coming into existence of a core 
consciousness, it becomes possible for the self to acquire new knowledge (forming a 
contextual and referential whole as it weaves and registers together the past, the 
present and the future). Based upon a core consciousness, the subject begins to adopt 
language, articulating and affirming its subjective reality; and with articulation the 
subject sustains itself by making itself known by others. For, as it is put by Jacques 
Lacan in Ecrits, "Only a subject can understand a meaning; conversely, every meaning 
phenomenon implies a subject" (83). Thus, in words, one's own intrinsic subjective 
reality is substantiated through inter-subjectivity-subjective property is appropriated 
as a recognised objective data. Words do form as an essential ground for the self to 
locate and define what it comes to feel and know-to refine the self's boundary. Yet, 
in spite of this, language and words seem not to be the key necessities to the forming 
of a core consciousness. 
In the beginning, there were no words, but merely a dimly perceived sense of 
feeling, unintelligible but indispensable to the forming of self. The self is crystallised 
through compositing various feelings and knitting out a consistent interpretation. 
Furthermore, appropriate feelings and emotions (as illuminated through the cases of 
Capgras syndrome) are indispensable for a correct cognisance and recognition of the 
external world. Cognitive intelligences are nevertheless deeply connected with 
feelings and emotions. By the registration of the history of the proto-self's feelings 
and emotions, the subject is defined by wedging a consciousness of its feelings within 
its own temporary position among the narratives of autobiographical memory. 
Self-identity, though it cannot do without social language, is mainly moulded by the 
reminiscence of the feelings and emotions which forms "a chain whirling round, 
' Capgras delusion is resulted from a lesion in the fusiform gyrus where the process of identification 
takes place. As it is shown through the examples provided by Vilayanur Ramachandran in the Reith 
Lectures 2003, The lesion might have caused a disconnection between vision and emotion. For . without 
the generation of the appropriate feelings and emotions toward the behold object, the patient fails to 
recognise the object. 
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round, in a steel-blue circle beneath" (W 103). The feelings and emotions that 
constitute a pivotal ground around which personal meanings spin and grow bear both 
the qualities of passive and unconscious evaluation as well active and conscious 
appraisal. Therefore, feelings and emotions, though arising primarily from the subject 
as an organic being in a world over which it lacks personal control, are not excluded 
from the influence of socio-cultural institutions. In fact, the understanding of feelings 
and emotions are greatly subjected to socio-cultural symbolism and context (as 
Nussbaum has expounded in Upheavals of Thought). The social symbolic orders of 
words help to formulate and cultivate the unnameable emotions and feelings in all 
their complexity. In words, one concretises one's subjective feelings and emotions into 
objective symbolism. 
Although, with the insight of modem neurology, the innate dispositions as 
inherited through genes and the organic functions of the brain in conducting and 
sorting feelings and emotions should not be denied, the interaction with the 
environment also plays a crucial role in determining one's habitual beliefs and 
personality and shaping one's identity as Bernard asserts us that "We are creators. We 
too have made something that will join the innumerable congregations of past time" 
(W 110). 10 Therefore, the nature/nurture debate continues. In The Waves, Woolf 
provides a subtle depiction of the intricate processes of the interaction between nature 
and culture in the forming of the self in poetic terms which seem remarkably to 
embody Damasio's scientific vision and explanation of the emergence of 
consciousness. As soon as the six characters come to voice their feelings and 
perceptions, the depiction of the world perceived by each illuminates their individual 
being in revealing their intrinsic qualities. Still, each continues on to define and 
`characterise' themselves, until they have woven around themselves a more solid 
frame by which they can identify themselves but nonetheless can never encompass 
10 One of the main objections which Nussbaum holds against Damasio is his failure to take the 
socio-cultural context and therefore language into account in his depiction of the role of feelings and 
emotions as intrinsic judgments of the organism. 
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wholly who they are. Although their lives are gradually fixed and pinned down, 'like 
reeds held within a glass cover, ' or like pieces being `wedged into its place in the 
puzzle, ' the question of "what am I? " still persists. ' 1 The concrete outward forms of 
social identity could not possibly give meanings to the intrinsic void. The `I' still 
remains fluid and unnameable. Thus, to sum up who one is, there is no other 
alternative but through a re-narration of how one comes to be what one is now. The 
meaning of life is only momentarily and intrinsically felt by the subject as its meaning 
is drawn not simply by the moment itself but through the entire context of its own 
subjective history. No moment could be perceived and apprehended individually apart 
from its contextualisation within autobiographical memory. For each like and dislike, 
each perception, the meaning of each moment is deeply involved with personal 
memories, especially the body's memory of its feelings and sensations: 
The illusion is upon me that something adheres for a moment, has roundness, 
weight, depth, is completed. This, for the moment, seems to be my life. If it 
were possible, I would hand it you entire. I would break it off as one breaks 
off a bunch of grapes. I would say, "Take it. This is my life. " 
But unfortunately, what I see (this globe, full of figures) you do not see... 
But in order to make you understand, to give you my life, I must tell you a 
story. (W 183) 
Either from the point of view of Darwinian biology or from the enlightened 
perspective of modern neuro-science, the subject, though born into the world with a 
predisposed neuro-biological state, is also endowed with an adaptability toward the 
environment and the condition to which it is subjected. 12 The recursive narrative of 
The Waves is seemingly in accordance with the modern neuro-scientific 
11 W 147; 166. 
12 With the cases of Phantom limbs, Ramachandran specifies how the sensorial input could become 
'crosswiring' as new connections are formed after changes in physical circumstances. In contrast to 
what had previously been suggested, that "connections in the brain are laid down in the foetus or in 
early infancy, and that once they are laid down, there is nothing much that can be done to change these 
connections in an adult, " Ramachandran sees and suggests that "there is a tremendous amount of 
plasticity or malleability even in the adult brain" (Emerging 16). 
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comprehension of the working of consciousness as a continual mapping and 
remapping of the organism's temporal position in relation to its own history as ww ell as 
in relation to the world around itself. Daniel Dennett, a professor of philosophy who 
has written extensively on the mind-body problem, sees consciousness as a series of 
multi-layered ongoing editorial processes that interpret and re-interpret continually the 
bodily status of the organism-the multiple drafts model. 13 As an editorial process, 
consciousness, instead of being concurrent with the factual present, is always 
temporally behind the actual instance as the present moment "fled ere we could touch 
it, gone in the instant of becoming" (James 1: 608). The body always moves ahead and 
beyond the mapping of the mind. What is consciously apprehended is already a past 
position in time. Therefore the mind's narrative, like any other verbal narrative, 
encapsulates a time that is anything but the present moment. 
Bernard, like Woolf, a novelist, is also fascinated by "the moment" and 
engrossed with the possibility of seizing it through words. Yet, as time flows, there are 
things "that for ever interrupt the process upon which I am eternally engaged of 
finding some perfect phrase that fits this very moment exactly" (W 51). Nevertheless, 
the mind's narrative generates a fictionalised present by fabricating and 
conceptualising a past and a future-the present is apprehended through its 
embeddedness within the stream of time. As expounded by William James, "it is only 
as entering into the living and moving organisation of a much wider tract of time that 
the strict present is apprehended at all... [And therefore] [r]eflection leads us to the 
conclusion that [the present] must exist, but that it does exist can never be a fact of our 
immediate experience" (1: 608). As the present has fled before it could be experienced 
in its immediacy, the `I' formed out of an ongoing editorial narrating is not only 
elusive, but moreover could only come to a comprehension of itself through an 
I' "According to the Multiple Drafts model, all varieties of perception-indeed, all varieties of thought 
or mental activity-are accomplished in the brain by parallel, multitrack processes of interpretation and 
elaboration of sensory inputs. Information entering the nervous system is under continuous 'editorial 
revision'" (Dennett 111). 
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entwined narrative of past and future. 
In rejecting the idea of a homunculus, a central manipulator (or a Cartesian 
theatre), modern neurology now suggests that different senses are processed b\' 
different parts of the brain. Stimuli to different senses are processed and interpreted 
through different passages with different agents taking different temporal durations. 
"[T]here is no single brain centre for processing emotions but rather discrete systems 
related to separate emotional patterns" (Damasio, Feeling 62). How these various 
sensations orchestrate the continual incoming stimuli into a unified experience 
represented through a central selfhood is still much under debate. The music of the 
mind, like the songs of the birds in the interlude, "Now and again... [runs] together in 
swift scales like the interlacings of a mountain stream whose waters, meeting, foam 
and then mix, and hasten quicker and quicker down the same channel, brushing the 
same broad leaves. But there is a rock; they sever" (W 82). The logical and consistent 
picture that one experiences consciously stands only for a limited portion of the 
stimuli received as the mind automatically avoids and rules out conflicting messages 
in sorting out the incoming information. The mind tends to rationalise consciously as 
well as unconsciously the incoming information of what it sees, hears, so the 
authenticity of one's perceptual experience is always controversial and reality 
becomes impossible to reconstruct as each narrative (from nonverbal to verbal, from 
neural transmission to linguistic apprehension) takes a further detour from the factual 
and supposed `real' through innumerable translations. 
The Waves appears to be a close mimesis of such a process with each soliloquy 
bouncing off another, questioning the authenticity of each narrative in an attempt to 
work out the controversial, to determine what has actually happened or been felt, and 
finally seeking to integrate the various points of view into a perceptual whole. As each 
soliloquy (representing a specific stream of thought strained by the peculiar qualities 
of each character) converges into the general narrative of Bernard which `overcomes' 
all the differentiations and identities they so `feverishly cherish, ' to end the novel, it 
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fully recapitulates what the narrative tries to address and achieve, namely: "what am 
I? ". 14 One often fails to understand, as perceived by Bernard, that "I (emphasis added) 
have to effect different transitions; have to cover the entrances and exits of several 
different men who alternately act their parts as Bernard" (W 56). Instead of being `one 
and simple, ' `I' is a sum of `complex and many. ' 15 It is composed out of numerous 
grains which cannot be counted out, as Neville apprehended. 16 The `I, ' which is 
constantly forced to contract through the encounter of another body and the gazes of 
others and be simply what those others assume one to be, is merely one among 
numerous possibilities: "I am Bernard; I am Byron; I am this, that and the other... For 
I am more selves than Neville thinks. We are not simple as our friends would have us 
to meet their needs" (W 66). 
The Waves is a story of Genesis: the Genesis of consciousness and subjectivity. 
It is a story fabricated through individual soliloquy where each character 
metareflectively assumes its own third person perspective within the confessional first 
person in order to reason with their own feelings and emotions as they struggle to 
understand themselves and each other. Each of them responds to life differently, yet 
each is nevertheless struggling to fortify an inner self (or in Lacanian terms an `I' that 
occupies the Innenwelt) as well as a social-identity. Therefore, each one of them 
displays a different degree of comfort and anxiety over the elusive `I, ' as they struggle 
with fortitude to consolidate themselves. With an effort to substantiate a subjective `I, ' 
the subjective point of view of a character always seeks to counteract the `objective' 
gazes of others (which continuously peck, like the birds, mercilessly, through the 
self-protective shells of the snails), asserting its intrinsic differences as well as 
resisting being thoroughly engulfed within a mass identity. 17 
As each character continuously returns to the symbolic feelings of their early 
14 W 222. 
is W 56. 
16 "I do not know myself sometimes, or how to measure and name and count out the grains that make 
me what I am" (W 61). 
17 `\7 . 
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childhood, readdressing their subjective meaning, the repetitive narrative structure 
articulates a cyclical rather than linear passage of time. The Waves, by the structure of 
its narrative form, portrays the repetitive nature of the human psyche, as Sigmund 
Freud unfolds in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920). Here the psyche is driven by a 
desire toward understanding and controlling the fortuitous life-a desire to bring the 
dynamic forces of life into permanent stasis. Although the narrative wanders in 
cyclical repetition, it is nevertheless threaded through with an aim to fabricate, striving 
to signify, a sustainable conceptualised selfhood-the idealised imago (in Lacanian 
terms) which is conceived by the mind but frustrated by the bodily experience. Under 
such a pre-text, the six characters thrive and develop from being to non-being, 
balanced paradoxically between a death-drive towards the stasis of self-dissolution 
and an egoistic life-drive forging a resolute `I. ' Although in seeking for a sustainable 
selfhood, "None had the courage to be one thing rather than another" (W 156). And 
yet, "What dissolution of the soul [life] demanded in order to get through one day, 
what lies, bowings, scrapings, fluency and servility" (W 156). Rhoda recognises that 
to fix onto one moment of being that might define oneself is also a betrayal as well as 
a denial of all those "white spaces that lie between hour and hour" which is mostly 
one's life (W 156). 
As J. Hillis Miller has expounded the affinity between narrative and history, the 
narrative of The Waves is also one which attempts to realise a personal history and 
aims to formalise a self-identity through constantly weaving and reweaving what one 
comes to know and what one comes to believe. 18 The narrative, whether it is the 
mind's narrative of the brain's neuro-transmission, or the verbal narrative of the 
character in depicting its experience, is, by nature, a creative act, fabricating a context, 
in search of a unity and totality which are otherwise non-existent. Yet, this act of 
construction is constantly frustrated by the internal dynamic fluidity of what Lacan 
calls the semiotic, so that "The system tends magically to weave itself in a new form 
18 J Hillis Miller, "Narrative and History, " ELH 41.3 (1974): 455-473. 
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even when it has been deliberately abolished... like Penelope's web spun anew each 
morning after its nightly destruction" (Miller, "Narrative" 461-2). 19 As the narrative 
of The Waves struggles forward against the two forces of construction and negation, it 
reflects what Julia Kristeva regards as "an impossible dialectic [between the symbolic 
and the semiotic]: a permanent alternation: never one without the other" (qtd. in 
Minow-Pinkney 121). 
The subversion of the linear-temporal history is not itself the first and foremost 
purpose of The Waves, as Makiko Minow-Pinkney has suggested, but rather its aim is 
to transcribe that perpetual struggle against the fluidity of the nature of the human 
subject in the building of a personal history as well as the solidification of one's 
subjective identity through the larger social-historic context. 20 It is thus that linear 
patriarchal history is naturally subverted. The Waves addresses the modernist paradox 
where the self vacillates between attuning itself to a social identity defined by social 
position, while at the same time rejecting the full authority of the impulse to pin the 
self down and purportedly close down its possibilities. With Bernard winding up the 
narrative, one could almost presume that the entire narrative of The Waves is in fact a 
life story in the form of the numerous bubbles which Bernard attempts to collect and 
tell, though the bubbles always evaporate and the narrative always tails off unfinished. 
"There is no stability in this world, " but then "there is... a world immune from 
change" (W 88; 80). Just as the waves collect and fall repeatedly underneath the 
definite passage of the sun above, or, as Woolf has noted in her diary, "the moths 
flying along; the flower upright in the centre; a perpetual crumbling and renewing of 
the plant, " the narrative continues in its persisting process of forming and renewing 
19 Miller: "The assumptions about history which have been transferred to the traditional conception of 
the form of fiction may be identified. They include the notions of origin and end ('archeology' and 
'teleology'); of unity and totality or 'totalisation'; of underlying 'reason' or 'ground'; of selfhood, 
consciousness, or 'human nature'; of the homogeneity, linearity, and continuity of time; of necessary 
progress; of 'fate, ' 'destiny, ' or 'Providence'; of causality; of gradually emerging 'meaning'; of 
representation and truth" ("Narrative" 459). 
20 Minow-Pinkney 164. 
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selfness from birth to death (WD 140). 21 It is the possibility of conveying the very 
nature of "this varying, this unknown and uncircumscribed spirit" of life. "whatever 
aberration or complexity it may display, " that Woolf and her novelist character, 
Bernard, seek through their narrative (CR 1: 150). 22 Thus, one might suggest that it is 
rather with the aim of pursuing `humane life' (for Woolf two words which pinpoint all 
that a writer looks at) in its very nature that Woolf's modernist ideas and feminist 
proclamations are founded. 23 As Sue Roe has also recognised: 
Woolf used the process of writing as a way of shaping meaning: language 
did not immediately express but rather gave her access to the insights her 
work reflects. ... Because she worked 
in this way, her definitions of 
gender-which were always in flux, never static-function as an integral 
part of, and element within, the development of her aesthetic. It thus 
becomes possible to identify her feminism as issuing from her writing 
practice: forged by writing, rather than consolidated within it (emphasis 
added). (13) 
With the characters speaking into their own existence in The Waves, Kate Flint 
has claimed that "It is through such verbal accretion, Woolf suggests, that identity 
establishes itself' (xi). Minow-Pinkney, regarding The Waves as a depiction of "the 
emergence of subjectivity and the process of its consolidation, " also states from a 
Lacanian perspective that "Absorbing lexical and syntactic organisation, namely entry 
into the symbolic order, is also the beginning of subjectivity" (156; 157). Although 
both accounts rightly justify the theme of The Waves as subject-formation, they 
neglect the existence of an `unnameable' `I' felt by the subject before its entering into 
the symbolic and social world. The configuration of subjectivity and consciousness, as 
it is portrayed in The Waves, emerges firstly out of a `narrative' accretion of the 
wordless, nonverbal, narrative of the mind, reflecting the account of modern 
neurology. However, as a social being involved within a socio-cultural context, the 
2' Diary entry 28 May 1929. 
22 "Modern Fiction". 
23 "The Leaning Tower, " Collected Essays 2: 162-181. 
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self-image of the subject is continually moulded through the words and gazes of the 
socio-cultural background: one is often forced into being `oneself' as Bernard and 
Neville both realise. While verbal narrative sustains a social identity and a social self, 
the non-verbal narrative bolsters the bio-psychological sense of a self already, in 
existence. Linguistic narrative is only possible with the existence of a core self and a 
core consciousness formed through continuing incoming stimuli and with them the 
formation of various feelings and emotions that informs the subject of its existence. 24 
This is what would be inferred from the Lacanian concept that before speech signifies 
anything, it first signifies the existence of the subject. 25 
The subject's knowing of its existence should come before any adaptation of 
symbolic speech. Though not to deny the influential role of languages in subject- 
formation, still, even when linguistic narration is possible, the internal flux of the 
"inmates, those old half-articulate ghosts who keep up their hauntings by day and 
night; who turn over in their sleep, who utter their confused cries, who put out their 
phantom fingers and clutch at me as I try to escape-shadows of people one might 
have been; unborn selves" still resides (W 222). Language fails to relieve these inner 
ghosts as "words can never encompass" the nonverbal images and feelings that the 
mind perceived (Cohn 54). Therefore in writing life and depicting the essential state of 
being, writers, and perhaps female writers especially, are compelled to transcend the 
socio-symbolic order of the Logos and attend to the pure and intrinsic semiotic 
fluidity of the poetic in order to transcribe the "luminous halo, " the "semi-transparent 
envelope surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end" (CR 1: 150). 
As it is envisioned by Woolf in A Room of One's Own, it is an experimental search 
for the woman's sentence that would relieve her from the male gaze and men's 
`sentencing. ''6 
24 "The continuity of consciousness comes from the abundant flow of nonverbal narratives of core 
consciousness" (Damasio, Feeling 176). 
25 Mikkel Borch-Jcobsen, Lacan: The Absolute Master (Stanford: Stanford UP, 1991). 
26 Sandra M Gilbert, "Woman's Sentence, Man's Sentencing: Linguistic Fantasies in Woolf and Joyce, " 
Virginia Woolf and Bloomsbury: A Centenary Celebration, ed. Jane Marcus (London: Macmillan, 1987) 
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In words and speeches, the characters weave their being. The adaptation of 
language marks both the longing to be part of the social context as well as the desire 
to differentiate oneself from others. Language is an indispensable cognitive faculty. As 
it is said by Louis, "I know my cases and my genders; I could know everything in the 
world if I wished" (W 13). But with speech, Louis is driven from his dark, but 
protective, hidden place of the `underworld' and forced against his wish "to come to 
the top and live in the light of this great clock, yellow-faced, which ticks and ticks" 
(W 13). Louis has always been trying to hide himself within a collective genealogical 
context of the human race in order to avoid the necessary inter-subjective 
confrontations of society. Even then, camouflaged amid the trees and bushes, he is still 
sought by Jinny. Unlike the stalks he pretends to be, Jinny's kiss awakes in him the 
sensations of his body: "I am struck on the nape of the neck" (W 8). The kiss on the 
neck presses onto him with a subjective sensation that shatters the wholeness and 
differentiates himself from the world with which he seeks to merge. However, with the 
entry into the symbolic order, there could be no hiding in speech. Each 
pronouncement is a projection of the subject. With his Australian accent, Louis holds 
back from initial verbal articulation. He will wait and copy others, but driven to 
imitation, he feels further diminished in his individual subjectivity: "I will not 
conjugate the verb.. . until 
Bernard has said it... I will wait and copy Bernard. He is 
English" (W 13). Louis's over-consciousness of his own differences prompts him to 
resort constantly to images of a collective unconscious through mythological imagery. 
He, who is excluded from the ebb and flow of the present life, continuously perceives 
along with the present, an ancestral past in a time of Pharaohs, by the Nile, with 
"women passing with red pitchers to the river" (W 7). Seeing himself as a past Arab 
prince, an Elizabethan poet, a Duke of Louis the Fourteenth, Louis contrives his 




As articulation is meant to be heard and recognised, so the characters, in 
speaking their thoughts and emotions, struggle for a recognition which is only 
possible through differences that defy assimilation, since to recognise means both the 
acknowledgement of similarity as well as the identification of difference. Being 
unable to assimilate and conform, Louis and Rhoda both feel the threat of being 
excluded from the social circle. The foreign accent of Louis makes him stand out from 
the rest of his company. Rhoda, who is without all forms, can barely relate to herself 
within the language system and therefore remains eternally outside the loop. So Rhoda 
also seeks to assimilate by imitation. Although she has felt "some check in the flow of 
[her] being, " without the capacity to embody it through the abstract means of Logos as 
"some knot in the centre resists, " she gives herself to the full flood of her inner 
sensations: "Now my body thaws; I am unsealed, I am incandescent. Nov the stream 
pours in a deep tide fertilising, opening the shut, forcing the tight-folded, flooding 
free" (W 41-2). As a consequence, she remains within a poetic fluidity that resists the 
conventional forms of the symbolic order. 
In contrast to Rhoda and to Louis's discomfort over the designation of 
socio-cultural context, the gazes of others and their inability to substantiate a 
social-identifiable selfhood, the subjective reality of Bernard and especially Percival 
(who does not even need a voice to sustain his subjectivity) is self-contained and 
self-sustainable. Buttressed by their capacity to be recognised by others, they enjoy 
flexibility in their sense of self without the fear of plunging into the depths of 
nothingness. Thus, Percival, without a protruding selfhood, has become an enormous 
mirror that reflects each character's self-projection. 28 Yet, in the eyes of others, his 
subjectivity is impenetrable. Resembling Mrs. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse, Percival, 
without seeking identification with and recognition from others, is fully `in-himself' 
and `for-himself. ' His reserved subjectivity enables him to absorb and reflect all 
projections of others without being negated nor altered by external gazes. Bernard, in 
28 Harvena Richter, Virginia Woolf: The Inward Voyage (Princeton: Princeton UP, 19,0) 110. 
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pursuit of a genuine apprehension of life in itself, yields himself altogether to the flux 
of life. He seeks to merge with the entire stream of all life and to achieve a communal 
unity. Like Mrs. Ramsay, he "ha[s] been traversing the sunless territory of 
non-identity" (W 87). And, as he himself observes, he needs "eyes on [him] to draw 
out... frills and furbelows, " to attain any possible identity (W 87). For without the 
continuing impetus to sustain self-identity, Bernard has passed beyond the symbolic 
order and reached towards a poetic appreciation of life. He continues to make little 
phrases "in which [he will] run together whatever happens, so that instead of 
incoherence there is perceived a wandering thread, lightly joining one thing to 
another" (W 36). But he gives up striving for plot. 
While Louis and Rhoda are constantly clutching onto something external that 
might stabilise and substantiate themselves, Bernard and Percival move towards a 
position free of restrictions and orders. They sip and taste whatever life offers. 
Whether it is the triumph of death or dangling in triviality, formlessness or forever 
mixing one with the other, no one can threaten their substantiality, though they remain 
in a `semi-transparent' state where the "who am I? " is left undefined. Words, for them, 
are merely words that neither subjugate nor elevate their sense of self. Bernard and 
Percival embody their own evasiveness rather than denying it. In contrast, Louis and 
Rhoda, who reside always on the edge of or even outside the symbolic order, represent 
the conflict between self-dissemination and self-consolidation in extrem is. Percival 
and Bernard are both safe-guarded from total dissolution by their well recognised 
identity within the society, yet neither of them can be intrinsically fully captured. 
Although Percival is presented nearly as a phantom figure devoid of substantial 
existence in the novel, without him, "there is no solidity. [The rest of the characters] 
are silhouettes, hollow phantoms moving mistily without a background" (W 91). By 
passim into death, Percival is therefore established as that central void which upholds 
unification despite its being beyond the signification of verbal language. Percival 
strings together the six voices, six different facets of life, forming "A single flower... a 
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seven-sided flower, many-petalled, red, puce, purple-shaded, stiff with silver-tinted 
leaves-a whole flower to which every eye brings its own contribution" (W 95). 
As Bernard is fascinated by the fluidity and playfulness of the language, Neville 
perceives and admires its precision and the order it creates. 29 In phrases, Bernard 
seeks fluctuation as the truth of life, while Neville attempts through language `a 
completion' of the moment that would `triumph over chaos, ' bestowing upon the 
absurdity of life a sense of sublimity. 30 Therefore, in the stream of life, he would pick 
out one person, one moment, and abstract it into a permanent stance of life .31 
By 
adopting various kinds of linguistic ability, the characters organise their senses and 
project, in turn, their own subjective reality into the external world. Initially, linguistic 
cognition and adaptation are already involved with personal disposition. Susan is 
always definitive and substantial with her clear-cut love and hate and she thus reflects 
the belief in an innate disposition of the human race towards family and civilisation. 32 
Susan appreciates words through a concrete, earthly-grounded, association of white 
stones and yellow soil. Jinny, though not fluid like the watery nymph Rhoda, flutters 
like a butterfly in all her passions. Bound into her body and the texture of sensation, 
she is always searching for her own distinctive imagery. She sees that both Susan's set 
face and Rhoda's vacant expression possess a sense of wholeness. Yet, located in 
bodily sensations, she needs a full picture of head and body to provide her with a 
sense of completion. For Jinny, who learns the words through the vibration of the body, 
"Those are yellow words, those are fiery words" (W 14). Neville, with the tautness 
and decisiveness of an epic poet, in some way reflects Susan's vehemence in her 
relation to the passions of definitive love and hate. Bernard, who is loose and dangling, 
indulgently follows his feelings and emotions on the spur of the moment. He shudders 
at the fixation of life as "time taper[s] to a point" and life turns into a mere habit (W 
29 W 14. 
30NN37 
31 W 210. 
2 Freud 12: 2SS-302 
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141). Like Jinny, Bernard is also forever dancing to and leaping with the present 
moment. 33 
Parallel with the chorus of the interlude, the children start to draw the boundary 
and identify differentiations just as the sunlight sheds itself upon objects and brings 
forth into focus the fringe and edge of objects, distinguishing them from one another. 
Each of the six main characters starts off from `I, ' from the very word that seeks to 
claim their subjectivity-to distinguish one from other. `I' is a word that seems to 
designate in its speaker a sense of existence as well as a sense of subjectivity. Each of 
these six characters, unlike Percival, is introduced not through narrative description 
(of a third-personal observation), but rather through direct discourses of their own 
self-expression. They appear to have been granted the autonomy to create and present 
themselves from the beginning. Paradoxically, though, `I' is an indexical shifter, 
awaiting situated embodiment, not a name that addresses and defines the uniqueness 
of one's subjectivity. It is a common pronoun that could be adopted by anyone and 
could refer to anyone. Therefore, the fundamental grammatical designation that 
promises one a solid and robust sense of self is simply an empty form. As all 
discourses are presented in direct first personal narration, though they display six 
distinct characteristics, they are nevertheless fully merged into one. They are indeed, 
as Bernard has suggested, one and plural. They "melt into each other with phrases" 
(W 10). And years later, as Bernard tries to sum up his life, he describes all these 
childhood experiences and even personal sensations of each character as if he has 
experienced all of them subjectively. As physical beings, they drift apart, yet from 
dawn to dawn as Bernard has come to realise, fundamentally they have fused into one: 
"I do not altogether know who I am-Jinny, Susan, Neville, Rhoda, or Louis: or how 
to distinguish my life from theirs" (W 212). 
Living in communion, they seem to experience not just their own sensations and 
perceptions, but also those of others. As these six characters grow and learn their way 
33 \V 30. 
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together in the world, each of their own unique perceptions and subjective 
appreciations is intermixed and assimilated with those of others. For without a definite 
`self, ' a different facet of the self could be triggered and come to rise through a 
reception of different external stimuli. When entering into a larger social order of the 
university, Bernard observes that "The complexity of things becomes more 
close. . . 
Every hour something new is unburied in the great bran pie" (W 56). 
Bewildered by the complexity and fluidity of himself, Bernard continues to question 
"what am I? ". Yet, as he has confided, there is a "you, my self, who always comes at a 
call (that would be a harrowing experience to call and for no one to come; that would 
make the midnight hollow), " acknowledging an existence of a core self who 
substantiates him, a kernel upon whose ground he is able to flow, to change and mix 
up with the outer world (W 57). And all the while, the kernel continues to elude the 
grasp of language. Therefore, only through the poetic tropes of waves falling and 
collecting, of the fluid waters, of `unfurling' oneself to the world and of `rooting' 
down into the earth, that appeal to substantial bodily rhythms, senses and actions, 
could the narrative of the subject be possibly `embodied. ' 
Through verbal narrative, the self voices its desire to be recognised by 
expressing itself, but is continuously frustrated by the final impossibility of 
communicating a core self. For Melanie Klein, such frustration gives rise to the 
"epistemophilic impulse" which is a strong drive to acquire language and knowledge 
in order to know the world and therefore make the self known by the world (69). 
However, in the course of time, one still questions, like Bernard: "Who is to say what 
meaning there is in anything? Who is to foretell the flight of a word? It is a balloon 
that sails over tree-tops. To speak of knowledge is futile" (W 88). In the beginning 
there is not the word, but the shadowy feeling of what happens. The modem 
neuro-psychological understanding of the self rectifies the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
idea that there is no natural unitary subject, no cogito, since the self is an on-going 
biological process that is constantly revising and reforming. The Lacanian concept is 
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also undermined by the affirmation (in modern neurological evidence) of a sustainable 
proto-self and core self, with no history or identity (a pure existence of an undefined, 
unintelligible and yet inexhaustible `I') but on which the autobiographical self is 
founded. Bernard's statement that "Underneath, and, at the moment when I am most 
disparate, I am most integrated" perfectly sums up the paradox (W 57). Adopting a 
Lacanian perspective, on the other hand, Minow-Pinkney asserts that "subjectivity is 
achieved with the acceptance of the third term (the Name-of-the-Father), namely, the 
comprehension of mediation, the separation of word from the thing itself' (158). Yet, 
from a neuroscientific perspective, the self that comes before the adaptation of 
linguistic ability cannot in fact ever be comprehended through verbal descriptions. 
The Waves, in demonstrating the architecture of human consciousness at work, 
portrays both the nonverbal narrative of the mind that continues to map its bodily state 
as well as the articulated narrative of the subject, attempting to pin down the slippery 
`selfness' which s/he feels but is unable to grasp. Alluding to the words of Bernard, the 
narrative of The Waves manifests "a double capacity to feel, to reason, " a full 
incorporation of both `lower' and `higher' psychological faculties (57). In its totality, 
(from the more basic level of a proto-self to the elaborate social image of an 
autobiographical self), The Waves depicts the subtle interchange (or an interlocution) 
between an inner consciousness of the subject's own selfness and a consciousness that 
reflects as well as projects the gaze of the other. The self, as both Neville and Bernard 
observed through their interaction, is forever mixing and changing, consolidating and 
dissolving, through social interaction with the other: "How curiously one is changed 
by the addition, even at a distance, of a friend.... Yet, how painful to be recalled, to be 
mitigated, to have one's self adulterated, mixed up, become part of another" (W 61). 
Though through the mirror, the subject is first acquainted with a unified self image. 
the mirror reflection also brings threats to the substantiality of the subject. For a 
self-awareness of the other accompanies the mirror reflection and as a consequence, 
one is prompted to question whether the unified `I' is an intrinsic value or a given 
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attribute. 
With a deep understanding of the nature of subjectivity, The Waves questions the 
integrity of the `I' and the autonomy of selfhood. The image of a woman vA riting 
within that forbidden garden in which Bernard and Susan accidentally trespass, haunts 
Bernard: 
Down below, through the depths of the leaves, the gardeners swept the 
lawns with great brooms. The lady sat writing. Transfixed, stopped dead, I 
thought, "I cannot interfere with a single stroke of those brooms. They 
sweep and they sweep. Nor with the fixity of that woman writing. " (185) 
Is she the procreator-the unknown narrator in whose words the characters spring into 
being? Have the characters been deceived into believing that they are exercising 
autonomy in the act of their soliloquies, while, in fact, they are merely scripted 
characters, voicing the words of a supreme author? In its ambiguity, the narrative of 
The Waves seems to question likewise "Who's there? ", a question that is posed at the 
very beginning of Hamlet. Who's there behind the scene? Who's there manipulating 
life, pulling the strings of the puppet? Who is that ghost of the father; the procreator of 
one's being? From where comes that inevitable, unquenchable, yet unintelligible force 
forging one's life? 34 The Waves disproves the Lacanian view of the sole authority of 
language in constituting self and subjectivity; the arbitrary supremacy of the Logos in 
Lacan is a misrecognition as a non-self of a constantly transforming and renewing 
pre-verbal self, since it eludes representation in language. On the surface, one 
constructs an integrated `I' through the accumulation of verbal narrative, yet down 
beneath is a continuous flow, pulsing, an `I' which is so intimately felt, but 
nevertheless eludes the intelligence of verbal narrative. (Indeed, the French Nouveau 
Roman writer Nathalie Sarraute would later borrow Woolf's understanding of 
consciousness as the source of her experiments with producing novels which capture 
" Damasio, Looking 224. 
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the pulsations of an embodied consciousness. ). 
The question of the state of being and the autonomy of being is constantly 
reinforced throughout The Waves. As a story of creation, it questions `who creates 
who'? Seeing the preoccupation with ontology among twentieth century novels, Doris 
Shoukri remarks that "being is the process of creating as well as the status of being 
created" (321). Damasio, working from the neurological point of view, quotes T. S. 
Eliot's Four Quartets: "you are the music while the music lasts" to illustrate that 
continuous mutually dependent process of consciousness between feeling and being. 35 
The `I' is the symphony constructed out of a variety of instruments in play. The `I' is 
itself the ongoing music which it comes to hear within it. Yet, the music seems to play 
on by itself as if no conscious intervention is applicable. As there are levels of 
consciousness and multiple ongoing narratives that constitute what one comes to know, 
inevitably the self, though seeming to enjoy every possibility of free will, still feels 
itself drifting along a mysterious path that either guides or dominates and eventually 
coerces it into whatever being it has come to be. For the music must exist and be in 
advance before the self is aware of its tune, whilst the melody is only recognised 
through a retrospective glance into the time traversed. Bernard is constantly reminded 
of the lady who he and Susan have accidentally come across, writing in Elvedon 
(perhaps symbolising that psychological underworld which Freud saw as undermining 
our assertions of mastery over our own selves). Who is this lady? Is she Woolf herself, 
the ultimate creator and author of The Waves? 
Bernard, as an apprentice novelist, is conscious of the process of creation, but 
has he been a creation or is he a creator? Is he to be like the lady writing who has 
come to create himself, or is he simply a character under her pen? The characters seem 
to speak into their own being, yet perhaps they are merely the actors of a scripted play. 
Critics have often stressed the close resemblance between The Waves and Luigi 
Pirandello's Six Characters in Search of An Author in which the subject's autonomy is 
35 Damasio, Feelin 172. Eliot, Poems 136. 
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portrayed through a muti-layered creative process (of author, director, actors and 
finally the characters themselves) that bounces from one to another. 36 The WaN es. 
with its six characters struggling, with a sense of imperfect autonomy, toward their 
own existence, does bear a close resemblance to Pirandello's play. Both have six 
characters, though strictly constrained by the profile given to them, and they assume a 
life of their own re-presenting themselves. But, where could `the real thing' be sought? 
As the characters enact themselves, however, the question of self-autonomous creation 
becomes even more intriguing: have they finally escaped the author's God-like 
authority and attained a free will in self-creation or have they simply performed their 
designated part in a play and a given profile? `One is the music while the music lasts, ' 
yet from whence and by whom does the music of self arise? 
As the novel expands itself through recounting the impressions of early 
childhood, it demonstrates a life that is bound up with a primordial disposition, but 
more importantly, it is also wrapped up in the emotions and feelings of the early stage 
of life. Damasio takes an evolutionary view of this process: "autobiographical 
memory develops and matures under the looming shadow of an inherited biology" 
(Feeling 229). Since core consciousness and the core self seem to be under strong 
gene control, "the genome puts in place the appropriate body-brain linkages, both 
neural and humoral; lays down the requisite circuits, and, with help from the 
environment, allows the machinery to perform in reliable fashion for an entire 
lifetime" (Feeling 229). As the title The Waves suggests, the fluidity of life continues 
on. But still the characters seem unable to fill the inner void and make plenitudinous a 
substantial sense of self. Though the possibility of life might be closing down within a 
concrete social identity, still the `I' is vaguely known. The socially known `I' is but 
"the cinders and refuse of something once splendid" and complete (W 95). The self 
felt by the subject remains elusive, incapable of being transfigured in linguistic terms 
36 Julia Briggs, Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life (London: Penguin, 2006) 496; Also Woolf's letter to 
Janet Case dated 23 June 1925, L 3: 191. 
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nor literal images: "I am merely `Neville' to you... But to myself I am immeasurable; a 
net whose fibres pass imperceptibly beneath the world" (W 164). As Lacan has 
observed, "the I formation is symbolised in dreams by a fortified camp, or even a 
stadium, " but nonetheless within this there is a remote and self-enclosed inner castle 
(78). This perhaps symbolises the Freudian id or the unaccountable consciousness of 
the proto-self to which the self-conscious subject endeavours to obtain further access. 
It is an inner castle that buttresses one's sense of the `I' and is therefore beyond the 
comprehension of the `I. ' 
As the self desires certainties, it is also afraid of fixations. And The Waves 
cleverly brings forth such existential anxiety about the eternal fluctuation between 
these two polarised yearnings towards life and death. The Waves is as much about 
one's life in the physical world as it is about the inner life of the forming and growing 
of that self. 37 It is a story of how the self comes to be through the interaction with the 
world around it, depicting both aspects of interpersonal and intrapersonal 
confrontation. As Julie Vandivere has said, subject-formation has always been one of 
the main themes in Woolf's writings. 38 And in fact The Waves enquires not just into 
the question "what am I, " but also how I come to be who I am. From each character's 
narration of his/her sensation, each character displays right from the very beginning a 
trace of the characteristic out of which his or her self will form latter in life. Despite 
this fact, impressions of early infancy and childhood spun around its innate disposition 
gradually form as a pivot by which personal meaning and self-identity establish 
themselves. 
Childhood impressions and memories are imprinted on the mind and are that 
upon which the life-narrative anchors itself. Thus, for each character there are 
unforgettable fragmented memories which are impassable. Startling sensations that the 
37 Minow-Pinkney: as a subject, the characters "undergo a permanent alternation between the 
formation and dissemination of the self' (186). 
38 In her article "Waves and Fragments: Linguistic Construction as Subject Formation in Virginia 
Woolf, " Julie Vandivere identifies Woolf's use of the image, the waves, to indicate the flux of subject 
construction. 
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character experiences as a child leave their eternal mark upon that character and 
"From those close-unfurled balls of string [they] draw now every filament" (W 93). 39 
The piercing sensational shock that shoots through Bernard's body as the water is 
poured down his spine leaves its eternal mark in his life. The vision of death that 
deprives the continuity of the life-flow and freezes it into a sudden stillness forms an 
eternal obstacle for Neville. Although these impressions are vaguely understood, the 
characters continue to return to them as fundamental reference points from which to 
define and understand life whenever they come across similar sensations which they 
are unable to interpret. The sensations of the past are also revisited when the 
characters are about to start off onto another stage of life. In a scene when they have 
finished their secondary school and are travelling on a train returning home for the 
holiday, Louis feels that he is hung suspended without attachments. He has no firm 
ground to which he will return. Standing at the crossroad of life, he reaches back into 
the past, both cultural and personal. As he says, this is the meeting point of past and 
present. Within the moment he senses not only the ancestral past of mankind that 
started on the banks of the Nile, but also his own childhood past. "I dash and sprinkle 
myself with the bright waters of childhood. Its thin veil quivers. But the chained beast 
stamps and stamps on the shore" (49). 
These sensations are never simply approached or understood individually and 
directly; contrarily, they are explained, like signifiers in the language, through their 
relations and similarity with each other. The news of Percival's death brings back to 
Neville all the horror of the "immitigable tree" which he cannot pass when he first 
came across the shock of death alone in the nursery (W 17). Standing among the busy 
streets with women shuffling past with shopping bags, he has returned to that boy who 
could not lift his foot to climb the stair. As Neville "revisit[s] [his] past life, scene by 
39 Jacqueline Rose, The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children Fiction: "childhood is 
something in which we continue to be implicated and which is never simply left behind. Childhood 
persists... It persists as something which Ne endlessly rework in our attempt to build an image of our 
own history" (12). 
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scene[, ] there is an elm tree, and there lies Percival" (W 136). Images stored within 
one are evoked by a remembered sensation again and again throughout one's life. 
With the feelings of the body, images leave their indelible mark. They continue to 
return either "by some flick of a scent or a sound on a nerve, " as Bernard experiences 
while he sits, as an old man, along the bank, waiting for his train. There returns the old 
image of the gardener sweeping as the lady sits writing in Elvedon (W 206). 
As one incomprehensible sensation is built upon another unapproachable one, it 
is questionable whether one could ever achieve an understanding of them and how 
they make up one's life. May it be possible for one to reach the essential core-the 
pivot around which one's personal meaning is spun? Or, in truth, such a core might 
never be a substantial one. Thus, one attempts to form it, to embody its hollowness, 
through narrative. Besides, if it is through such kernel imagery that one conceptualises 
who one is, then the stability of one's identity is greatly in question. The childhood 
section forms the core around which the narrative weaves and flourishes and yet 
ironically the core takes its form (and could only be understood) through the narrative 
it generates. The core, childhood, remains as the most incomprehensible and 
unapproachable void, but nevertheless it is what grounds the most intrinsic self in its 
inborn nature. However, as this self could never be expressed and understood unless 
through language, one's knowledge of the self is therefore bound by the language 
which paradoxically could not fully depict the nature of the self. 
Each character continues to return to early impressions to describe and approach 
the later experiences that they encounter as time passes. As if in these impressions 
alone lies the fundamental truth of the unnameable essence within each of them. 
Childhood impressions which are dimly perceived and understood will eventually 
become the recurring theme throughout the lifetime of each character and in the end 
they come to realise that these impressions form the very core of their selfness. It is 
through these early childhood impressions that one comes to learn how to define one's 
self. Towards the end, Bernard has come to apprehend an inner hollowness that has 
Lin 74 
been concealed under a conjectural of personal identity and perspective without which 
one is left in the full darkness of unconsciousness "like the eclipse when the sun went 
out and left the earth, flourishing in full summer foliage, withered, brittle, false" (W 
218). "A man without a self, I said ... 
A dead man. With dispassionate despair, with 
entire disillusionment" (W 219). 
The Waves, as it tries to tell the story of the beginning, is a conjectural 
retrospective narrative that attempts to recount and recapture the past as well as the 
present that constantly passes into the past before one can fully apprehend it. It is a 
past upon which the forever shaping of a present `I' is grounded, and yet a past that 
the `I' can never be conscious enough of to account for when living within that 
moment. In spite of all, the self is hardly free from the historical context of time, as 
Woolf has reflected in "The Moment: Summer's Night"; past and future are like 
pieces of thin glass through which the present is apprehended. 4° Not only the 
ancestral heritage seems to have been inscribed into the private moment of the present, 
but also one's own biological and psychological memory of the past. Each moment 
seems to be a nutshell of a full history. The moment, now and here, has its origin and 
background as Louis brings out: that by this moment, he "seem(s) to have lived many 
thousand years" (W 48). Time is precarious and deceptive and "human history is 
defrauded of a moment's vision" (W 49). Carried within a moment is the immense 
record of the entirety of human history. Like the forever wavering waves that collect 
and break recurrently, one could hardly discern where exactly is the starting point of a 
self and the history by which it ends. 
The narrative becomes a continuous circle that repeats itself endlessly without 
distinct beginning and end, though Neville designates the beginning by the adoption 
of language and the learning of order. For it is through language that one first comes 
to define the world as well as one's self And one's self-definition is fully bound up 
with the terminology that shapes one's world. The circular narrative of The Waves 
40 \l 3. 
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expands its narrative from the very starting point of its characters life-course-infancy 
and early childhood. In contrast to most of Woolf's novels that begin in inedias res 
from adulthood or adolescent, The Waves stretches from a metaphorical birth to a 
suggestive death. In Frank Kermode's terms, men are born into the state of in medias 
res. However, driven by a sense of totality, men contrive to make sense of the meaning 
of life and of their own being by wedging that self along a historic line, between a past 
and a future. 41 Thus, both the beginning and the end are merely envisioned, as Woolf 
cleverly placed a descriptive dawn and dusk to signify what could have been the 
beginning and the end of her life narrative, although another day of living continues to 
break into any possible end. 
A clear distinction is made as the novel is dramatised in the form of soliloquies 
with narrated intervals that serve as stage directions or chorus. As the soliloquy 
implies a direct report that is not mediated by any narrator, it therefore assumes a 
rather peculiar effect as if it is not a narration of an intermediate narrator, but rather a 
confluence of speech acts in the act of their immediacy. Each character is addressing 
and communicating by means of first personal reports as opposed to narrated 
monologues that presume an intermediate narrator. 42 And therefore each voice is 
representing a personal point of view self-enclosed within the particular character. 
Each character is enacting its conscious thoughts rhetorically as the reader reads along. 
Before The Waves was fully conceived, Woolf was pondering a form of writing which 
would be a dramatic novel, yet not a play. "It would be read, not acted" (GR 18). It 
would be poetic, yet written in prose. 43 As a result, The Waves turns out to be a fully 
dramatised novel: the plot develops through a series of soliloquies that tend to respond 
4' Frank Kermode, The Sense of An Ending: Studies in The Theory of Fiction (Oxford: Oxford UP, 
1966). 
'2 Seymour Chatman defines in Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film: 
"soliloquy is perhaps best used as a term to refer to nonnaturalistic or `expressionistic' narratives in 
which the only informational source is that of characters formally presenting, explaining, and 
commenting upon things. These are formal declamations-not speech or thought in the ordinary sense 
but a stylised merging of the two. As with dramatic monologue and dialogue, the convention is that they 
have been `heard' by someone and transformed into a written text" (181). 
Virginia Woolf, "The Narrow Bridge of Art" (1927) Granite and Rainbow 11-23. 
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to each other as if in dialogue. The narrator has withdrawn behind the scene and its 
voice can merely be discerned through the interludes that function as stage directions. 
Instead of free indirect discourse which seamlessly combines the narrator's voice 
and those of the characters, interlinking the subjective and objective points of view (as 
used in most of Woolf's novels), The Waves, however, is presented through a series of 
direct discourses where the narrative voice is completely taken over by the characters. 
The presence of an omnipresent narrator who unifies the tone of the narrative and 
provides an overall objective view is no longer observable. The entire narrative of The 
Waves is composed of distinct segments of the six main characters' outspoken internal 
monologues, portraying the life as it is lived from within. Each character narrates in 
turns their feelings, sensations and perceptions founded upon his or her primeval 
emotions. The Waves is entirely built upon soliloquies of "self-presentations and 
self-justifications, rather than acts of communication" (Flint xi). Could not it be 
possible that the entire narrative is the narrative of the thoughts and memories of 
Bernard, given that his thought winds up the narrative, making a complete circle 
without discernible beginning or ending? In featuring six characters, each narrating its 
own feelings and emotions while summing up with one distinct narrative voice of 
Bernard, The Waves suggests, paradoxically, that different personalities and 
characteristics are formed along with different narrative lines, as suggested in medical 
accounts of cases of dissociative disorders. '' Therefore, The Waves reflects in its 
narrative deployment some ambiguities about whether these six characters are inner 
features of one disparate self or six unique persons; though Bernard affirms, in 
parenthesis, "we are not single, we are one" (W 50). 
The deliberate ambiguity of the narrative (between The Waves as a 
chronological development of a life narrative and as a reconstructed narrative of 
memory) turns out to be an even closer depiction of consciousness. For as 
as Ian Hacking, Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality And the Sciences of Memory (Princeton: 
Princeton UP, 1995). 
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consciousness emerges out of different plains of narrative, each comes to enclose its 
former layer as it recursively re-depicts itself, like a Russian doll. In other words, the 
narrative of consciousness is always and already a reworking of the immediate present. 
Consciousness, in neurological terms, is forever late in time. By rendering The Waves 
as soliloquies within a written text, Woolf has achieved the delineation of different 
layers of consciousness. This depicts not just the subject in the act of knowing as it 
articulates its thoughts, but also the weaving of the extended consciousness (as the 
subject reflects upon its own speculation and achieves an understanding through its 
memory and experience) and the conscientious empathy of surmising the 
consciousness of others. It exemplifies the existence of a core self that continually 
wraps itself with layers of narrative in its extended consciousness. This consciousness 
wanders back and forth, constructing an autobiographical memory as well as an 
autobiographical self (as the core self wedged into the texture of personal history and 
therefore generated from the continuous stream of history an identity). It also 
demonstrates how the mind regulates and integrates numerous strands of thoughts and 
various stimuli into a focused main stream. Nevertheless, one never knows the forces 
that carry the speech along, pushing the characters to think as they speak, generating 
various kinds of sensation they feel. In the form of soliloquy, the process of reasoning 
and re-reasoning within the characters' mind (as thoughts are expressed in formal 
speech) is presented in its immediacy and enacts the tendency of consciousness to feel 
as well as to reason and interweave. 
The narrative in this co-responding soliloquy also portrays the empathetic 
projections of the other's consciousness. As the novel continues in sections of 
individual soliloquy, so one consciousness anticipates another: prognosticating, each 
soliloquy seems to respond to another, forming a dialogue between individual minds 
(or even dialogues between the selves within a mind). In Transparent Minds, Dorrit 
Cohn argues that "interior monologue is described as associative, illogical, 
spontaneous; the soliloquy as rhetorical, rational, deliberate" (12). Nevertheless, in all 
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its rationality and deliberateness, soliloquy displays the inner conflict between a 
subjective self absorbed with its own subjective feelings and emotions, and a self 
capable of objective reflection as it attempts to rationalise and reach beyond its own 
subjective understanding. Cohn comes to place The Waves in his study of narrative 
modes in the presentation of consciousness as "in extremis" as the interior 
monologue-soliloquy distinction blurs (165). Most novels that are described as 
stream-of-consciousness attempt to represent the flow of consciousness in terms of 
what Käte Hamburger has concluded as "where the I-originality (or subjectivity) of a 
third person qua third person can be portrayed" (qtd. in Cohn 7). The Waves, 
instead, dramatises a more or less detached first person's interior analysis of what he 
has come to know and feel as it is transcribed into a more objective rhetorical 
discourse. Other than presenting simply what the characters think, The Waves 
attempts to show the process of how: the very process of how the mind learns and 
defines itself and from such a foundation ventures to extrapolate "how another mind 
thinks, another body feels" (Cohn 5). The characters do not simply think 
absent-mindedly, but they are generally over-conscious of what they have come to 
think, since their thoughts are presented in soliloquies of speech rather than simply an 
inner thought-stream in words. In speech, they not only narrate their thoughts but also 
question from where those thoughts spring forth. In individual yet responsive 
soliloquies, the characters attempt to untangle their own inner psychological states and 
also to understand those of others as expressed through their speech. Within this form 
of presentation, The Waves enacts consciousness from its very basic level as 
"consciousness lets us recognise an irresistible urge to stay alive and develop a 
concern for the self, " to the most elaborate level as "consciousness helps us develop a 
concern for other selves and improve the art of life" (Damasio, Feeling 5). 
In a `dramatic soliloquy, ' The Waves is dramatised by means of exchanging and 
juxtaposing a series of soliloquies of each character (which could be seen as 
°` Quoted originally from Käte Hamburger's The Logic of Literature. 
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simultaneously a spoken speech of six individual characters or as the interior 
dialogues within the mind of a single character). With such an effect, the narrativ e 
brings a focus on what Woolf had always been attempting through her tunnelling 
process. The apparent separation of individuality and the communal unity that lies 
underneath are now simply two sides of the same coin. Each of them, as they respond 
to the soliloquies of the others, is conscious of another's inner thoughts. As they set 
out in diverse directions to pursue their goals, they suffer individually, but are 
empathised with communally. A mind seems to connect and encompass these six 
diverse characters. And as it is foreseen by Louis, "The time approaches when these 
soliloquies shall be shared" (W 28). Doris Shoukri also suggests that through The 
Waves Woolf has paralleled her idea of individual and communion, of moment and 
eternity, with the image of the sea and the wave. "The moment for her is experienced 
both individually and communally-each soul is in it and it is in each soul as the 
waves are in the sea and the sea is in the waves. One is therefore both separated and 
united with the underivded [sic] being which the sea suggests" (Shoukri 319-20). Julie 
Kane identifies in Woolf's novels various themes such as loss of self and merger with 
a greater unity in terms of mystical experience (a popular trend in Woolf's time). 46 
Woolf fervently resisted the insistence on her affinity with mysticism, though similar 
concepts such as the apprehension of numinousness, timelessness, transcendence, and 
intensified meaning, could easily also be misrecognised through mystic terms in her 
work. Maybe the central concern of reaching an understanding of the world beyond 
the self in epistemology has often being confused with the idea of mysticism. For, 
"Metaphysics, from the first, has been developed by the union or the conflict of these 
two attitudes"-namely the scientific and the mystical attitudes (Russell, Knowledge 
29). 
Real life is never as concentrated or as still as Neville would have wanted it, and 
"' Julie Kane, "Varieties of Mythical Experience in the Writings of Virginia Woolf, " Twentieth Century 
Literature 40.4 (1995): 328-349. 
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it is against such a reality that human beings strive after a meaning of life and are 
compelled to comply with others through the conformist pressures of civilisation as 
suggested by Freud in "The Future of an Illusion" (1927). 47 Neville's heroes are like 
Percival, who could hardly come to life or be truly embodied in physical form. Either 
the hero or the moment of sublimity relies fully upon narrative for its substantiality, 
while the true life story which Bernard is forever gathering and which he endeavours 
to narrate could hardly form a grand epic. "[A]11 are stories, " scattering hither and 
thither, "[b]ut which is the true story? " (W 167). Perhaps, true life is like bubbles. It is 
narrating and creating that provides it with a sense of substantiality, though it could 
never be fully represented. A non-expressible emptiness would eventually remain. 
Although Percival passes away, he remains the most solid and unified being for all the 
characters. Similarly, being the thing itself, Mrs. Ramsay in To the Lighthouse 
remains evasive. As Percival, she passes into "ghost, air, nothingness, " and it is her 
abstractness that sustains her stability as well as her essence (TL 194). The grandiosity 
and stillness which Neville has emphasised and projected onto Percival-the 
admirable heroic figure for all these children-is mocked by Percival's sudden and 
untimely death. Life always seems to take the turns that are quite unexpected. 
The narrative of The Waves, ironically implies the fictionality of all neatly 
planned life-narratives. As Bernard has come to realise from his final visit to Neville 
that to embody these stories one could only be like Neville who, "From the myriads of 
mankind and all time past ... 
[, ] had chosen one person, one moment in particular" (W 
210). However, real life is as dispersed and as dreamlike as it can be. Life is like 
Bernard, who would lose his ticket and simply wander off from the wrong stop 
unplanned. "Among the tortures and devastations of life is this then-our friends are 
not able to finish their stories"---one could hardly conclude who one is (W 28). That is 
what makes life so unbearable. One could never depend on life to provide one with a 
solid ground or a substantial reality that one could cling onto. Thus, Rhoda, who could 
Freud 12: 195. 
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not provide herself with a definite form because she fails to make use of the signifiers 
and be at rest with her own inner fluidity, is destined to be vulnerable. She, the 
nymph of the fountain always wet, obsessed with visions, dreaming" could not 
possibly withstand the heat of the sun (W 211). Without form, she is destined to be 
"blown for ever outside the loop of time, " for time could only be measured in 
distinguishable forms (W 15). When "The waves broke on the shore, " the narrative 
ends in death-the state of stasis which one has always yearned for is also a state of 
emptiness which is also all-encompassing in its nothingness (W 228). 
Being incapable of determining the fringes and edges of things at daybreak, 
owing to the weakness of the sunlight, objects in the world are unintelligible. As time 
leads on, the children learn a way to untangle the thread, to regulate the immense 
chaos around them, and to impose orders and delineate boundaries through language. 
Forms, sounds, and perceptions are being described: the rings, the slab of pale yellow, 
the globe, and the beast stamping. Nevertheless, the drawn boundaries and the 
imposed order are merely on the surface. Underneath, the fluctuation continues to 
swamp them with incomprehensible emotions that refuse to be made intelligible or 
available to rational understanding. The six characters start off searching for 
themselves and end by knowing not much more than what they have started with. 
Even later on they still betray an uncertainty that they cannot assert their own 
substantiality as well as their subjectivity. Until nearly the end of the novel, when they 
are already worn out by time and the torment of life (through the direct articulation of 
Bernard), still they are unable to delineate a central selfhood. 
In her questioning of `what is reality? ' and `what is life? ', Woolf sought to 
bypass the opposition between the realist and the idealist and to portray a life 
appreciative of and acknowledging a subjective reality without denying the existence 
and the realness of the objects beyond subjective apprehensions (which closely 
reflects Thomas Nagel's contention about the dual nature of consciousness). Instead, 
the search inward into a specific psychological state is not simply a self-preoccupied 
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obsession but also an attempt to arrive at a general understanding of life and the 
building of subjective life within a socio-cultural context. For it is through the 
socio-cultural context of the community that the self could possibly attach a name, an 
idea, an image, to formulate and understand itself The psychological inquest of `self' 
is in fact the nexus of our understanding of the external world. Thus, in his attempt to 
untangle the question "Can we know of the existence of any reality which is 
independent of ourselves? ", where does Bertrand Russell begin but by defining what 
is meant by `the Self' (Knowledge 81)? 
As neuroscience today tries to probe into the mind and provide objectified 
narrations and scientific explanations for the subjective qualia in terms that describe 
the functioning of the organic brain, philosophers and psychoanalysts continue to 
probe into psychical states in terms of personal and cultural history and especially of 
cultural formation through language (on the basis of autobiographical memory). 
However, as formerly discussed, consciousness involves both the processes of nature 
and nurture, of selfness or the `I' as an interweaving process of both instinct as well as 
cognition. Although a nonverbal core consciousness and a core self, based upon the 
feelings of the body, forms the cornerstone of consciousness and the sense of self, 
only through words could the meaning and identity of the self be possibly defined and 
therefore grasped. If the world and the `I' is nothing but thought, then as Sara once 
asked in The Years, where does thought begin? "And if one can neither think nor 
feel.. 
. where 
is one" (TL 210)? As The Waves has shown, thoughts begin with the 
feeling of the body and it is by these subjective feelings and emotions that the 
characters gradually contrive a narrative that might allow them to arrive at a definition 
of who they are and what they might be, distinct from others, when they are 
compounded and submerged within a communal narrative. The realness of my body 
and its feelings are not to be denied. And as the next chapter will expound, it is the 
denial of the body and its feeling that engenders unreason. 
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II 
Dreamlike Perceptions, Real Sensations: 
Woolf's Voyage Out as a Return to the Shakespearian Poetic World 
Intelligence and instinct now are one. 
George Meredith, Modern Love xxx 
From Plato's Republic, poets, because of their ability to stimulate untenable and 
preposterous emotions, are forever banished: for Plato, the human is by nature a being 
who might achieve the good only through the exercise of strictly rational faculties. 
Viewed as not only untrustworthy but also a potential disturbance to reason, emotions 
and feelings have long been condemned as an impediment to the rational mind. This 
traditional view of feelings and emotions could be glimpsed in the words of Sauvage: 
"The distraction of our mind is the result of our blind surrender to our desires, our 
incapacity to control or to moderate our passions" (qtd. in Foucault 85). Even 
Freudian psychology, with the acknowledgement of the instinctual drives and their 
relation to affects, aims at eradicating emotional upheaval in an effort to arrive at the 
elevated rationality of men as socio-cultural beings. 
For Plato, mind is axiomatically distinct from the body, just as the soul is 
entirely separated from its material substance within Christian doctrine (which has 
absorbed and adopted a soul/body concept from the Greeks) and Cartesian 
philosophy. ' But even for those theorists who accept an evolutionary view of the 
emergence of mind, once the mental apparatus is in place, it is often regarded as 
functionally separate from the body. A further aspect of this conventional thinking 
involves the view that the mind is not only no longer embodied within the body and 
unbound from its organic source but, it also retains a supreme domination over the 
body. Or, as Freud speaks in terms of a cultural-historical context, the belief in a 
1 In Old Testament and Jewish tradition, there consists no concept of a soul continuing on its own after 
the perishing of the body. 
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higher-ranking spiritual soul over the corruptible body is a cultural evolution which 
tries to resist the mystery and cruelty of nature, especially the inescapability of death 
that it imposes on all living creatures. 2 As the mind, which is still subjected to its 
original animal and bodily nature, is perceived as a higher development of mankind 
and a separated and discontinued entity from the body, mental disorder therefore 
becomes an emblem of the failure of the `independent' rational mind that has 
succumbed too easily to the primitive nature of human instincts. Within this scheme of 
dualism, the elevated soul and the sensual body are culturally absorbed into the 
binarism of male/female (masculinity/ femininity; self/other; civilised/primitive; the 
light of reason/the darkness of feelings and emotions). Although Freud conceded that 
conventionally "we too readily identify femaleness with passivity and maleness with 
activity, " he still insists upon the deficiency and inferiority of the female super-ego 
(Waugh, Feminine 52). 3 The female mind is viewed as underdeveloped and inferior to 
the masculine mind because more dependent on the body. Thus, men's mental advance 
simply seems to be self-evident, as comically depicted by George Eliot in 
Middlemarch (1871-2): "A man's mind-what there is of it-has always the 
advantage of being masculine-as the smallest birch tree is of a higher kind than the 
most soaring palm-and even his ignorance is of a sounder quality" (26). 
While order and law are viewed as masculine properties, unreason and madness, 
as a usurpation of the rational mind by the sensational body, acquire a 
feminine-gendered ideology and are described by Elaine Showalter as the female 
malady. Hysteria, in particular, is viewed as representing a "womanly" weakness. 
Shakespeare has Hamlet (in the `guise' of a `mad' dialectician) declare: "Frailty, thy 
name is woman" (1.2.146). For instead of taking the rein of their bodily feelings and 
emotions, women are assumed by medical and psychological discourses as liable to 
fail to achieve a self-reflexive consciousness of their feelings and emotions-a higher 
2 Sigmund Freud, "The Future of An Illusion" (1927). Freud 12: 198. 
3 Freud: "Their [Women's] superego is never so inexorable, so impersonal, so independent of its 
emotional origins as we require it to be in men" (qtd. in Waugh, Feminine 52). 
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level of impersonal detachment from bodily disturbances-and therefore prone to 
suffer from a failure of will in retaining their personal integrity. Women, according to 
the conventional medical ideology, more easily allow themselves to be swayed by 
feelings which do not conform to the dictates of law and order (embodied in the ideal 
super-ego in the terms of Freud) and remain self-enclosed amidst a churning 
turbulence within. 4 Ultimately, as women come to dwell deeper in their own 
subjective realm, they are uprooted from the common consensual ground of reality. 
Evolved from the body, the female mind, in this view, despite its detachment from its 
organic source, cannot fully renounce the bodily constraints on the autonomy of the 
`spiritual mind. ' However, the rationalist's abhorrence of bodily feeling and emotions 
can be seen as a paranoid fixation on the power of an unintelligible 'other'-the 
unregulated `Nature' of the world which an infant first experiences through the 
inconsistencies of the mother's body that sometimes nurtures but sometimes neglects. 
It is against this precarious Nature that humans seek consolation within the order of 
civilisation. As our consciousness hides away the body, the body now becomes an 
objectified other and potentially threatening to the subject's own integrity. 
In the aftermath of Darwinism, wrote Roger Fry, "The assumption that man is a 
mainly rational animal [emphasis added] has given place to the discovery that he is, 
like other animals, mainly instinctive. This modifies immensely the attitude of the 
rationalist... What seemed like the wilful follies of mad or wicked men to the earlier 
rationalists are now seen to be inevitable responses to fundamental instinctive needs" 
(21). 5 As evidence shows, however, rigorous reason and obstinate insistence on 
science and abstract reasoning also result in madness. Both The Voyage Out (1915) 
and Night and Day (1919) (through a full display of the paradoxical opposition as well 
as affinity between the abstract symbols and the physiological reality of the flesh) are 
4 Freud provides a rather controversial explanation for neurosis in Civilisation and Its Discontents 
(1930). He contends that "Neurosis was regarded as the outcome of a struggle between the interest of 
self-preservation and the demands of the libido, a struggle in which the ego had been victorious but at 
the price of severe sufferings and renunciations" (12: 309). 
5 Roger Fry "Art and Life" (1917), Vision and Design. 
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novels seeking for a harmony or co-relation between body and mind that might sustain 
sanity and healthy being. In both novels, the heroines are suspended between emotion 
and reason: for Rachel Vinrace, in The Voyage Out, music and feelings are more 
genuine, intense and meaningful than the words of Gibbon (which is, in the words of 
Rachel "strong, searching, unyielding in mind"), as for Katharine Hilbery, in Night 
and Da , the real 
is beheld through an even more depersonalised system of 
mathematic symbols in contrast to the more affectively and subjectively grounded 
language of poetry and literature (VO 185). Available ordinary language has failed 
their attempts to describe to themselves and others their states of mind. 6 Whilst 
Rachel, who constantly dwells in a `depersonalised' subjective world of her core 
consciousness, is apt to feel surges of bodily sensation in a verbal vacuum that no 
literal meaning can possibly encompass, Katharine aims at a world of stars and 
numbers that abolish the subjective self in pursuit of a thoroughly objective 
apprehension of the world beyond any influence of the autobiographical self. 
Nevertheless, though the first is preoccupied with unnameable, subjective feelings, 
and the second solely with an objective quest for a universal and Pythagorean 
symbolic Truth, both kinds of experience diverge from the factual, material, ground of 
reality which is contained within the socio-cultural context and structured by the 
socio-symbolic order. Both characters are searching, with diverse means, for a pure 
symbol, an impersonalised metalanguage, devoid of any possible social implications, 
which they might then adopt in order to express the inexpressible Truth of their own 
ontological being-in-the-world.? Both of them dwell constantly in a world of their 
own-a world of vision bound by feelings (of `instinctual insight' which is 
conventionally appropriated as a feminine quality) rather than socio-cultural facts. 
Fact or vision, real or dream, it is questionable whether any experience could be 
6 As noted by William James the lack of an appropriate and adequate language hinders tremendously 
our understanding of subjective facts. James 1: 195. 
Paul de Man noted that for Mallarme as well as for Levi-Strauss, "the language of music, as a 
language without speaker, comes closest to being the kind of metalanguage of which the linguists are 
dreaming" (12). 
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conceivable without a sensory body, for "knowledge's empirical foundation is 
subjective" (Banfield, Phantom 68). Practically, human beings are "active sentient 
beings" (Russell, Knowledge 26). To be sensible, one simply has to be capable of 
`sensing' the sensory input transfigured through the nervous system of the organic 
brain. Sanity is, in the end, sustained by sensibility. The Voyage Out as a voyage into 
the wilderness of the primitive and the unknown is a voyage questioning the 
correlation between the mind and the body (between `reason' and `unreason, ' real and 
dream) where the civilised is offset by the primitive. 8 The story of The Voyage Out 
serves almost as a fictional narrative that exemplifies Freud's dialectic argument in 
"The Future of An Illusion" (1927) of the human's need for culture, civilisation and 
order as a protection against his inscrutable nature. Socio-cultural contexts, though 
they may be artificial and provisional, provide a systematic order that protects human 
beings from direct confrontation with the unregulated, overwhelming contingency of 
Nature. Although it is the bodily illness acquired by Rachel in this primitive world that 
cuts her adrift from the `factual' world of English society, her initial inquiry and 
doubts about the possibility of her own social integration has already thrown her into a 
state of anxiety and into states of emotion for which she finds no name despite their 
intensity. The mental delirium which results from the disconnection between the mind 
(isolated within its own instinctive pursuit after the `Real') and the socio-physical 
present derides the conventional idealism of a soul unbound from its body. Rachel's 
insistence on the `Real' and the `Absolute' ironically thrusts her into a delusive 
vacuum with no firm ground. 
The Voyage Out is Woolf's version of a voyage into the darkness of the heart, a 
post-Darwinian immersion within the currents of neuronal transmissions between the 
body and the mind. 9 It is a voyage out of a rigid Cartesian rationality and the 
Foucault 95-107. 
Y Also noted by James Naremore in The World Without a Self, "In departing from the brightly-lit, busy 
streets of London and voyaging to a village with the exotic, watery name of Santa `farina, the 
characters of the novel enter a strange, passionate, half-obscured world which is analogous to the 
private self" (31). 
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communal ground of Edwardian civilisation to re-encounter the primitive, instinctual, 
and subjective state of being that is fully bound up with instincts and affects that seem 
to defy linguistic representation. 
Both The Voyage Out and Night and Day are filtered through a Shakespearian 
poetic lens. As The Voyage Out takes its characters and readers out of polite society 
and the drawing room novel of manners to re-encounter the splendour and grandness 
of a wild Elizabethan world, overwhelming in its vastness and incomprehensibility. 
Night and Day achieves a true comedic spirit of the Bard not by an encounter with the 
darkness, but rather through the delicate setting of a literary London drawing room 
tinged with a poetic air and endowed by a poet grandfather and Katharine's literary 
mother. Whereas The Voyage Out carries its characters to Santa Marina, symbolising a 
submersion into the sea without, as well as within, oneself, Night and Day takes the 
characters out of themselves and projects them onto a stage of make-believe. Yet, with 
its atmosphere of literariness, Night and Day recreates the ambience that stimulates 
feelings and invites emotional engagements which are regarded as distasteful and 
therefore prohibited in the polite society of The Voyage Out. Instead of polite 
exchanges and cultural phatic communications, feelings and emotions are intriguingly 
communicated through a poetic presentation of mathematical symbols and the flow of 
the music that liberate the characters from the constraints of polite social exchange. 
The make-believe staging of Night and Day functions to make the narrative itself a 
poetic (and also a Freudian dream-) world in which the characters as well as the reader 
are both participants as well as observers. The poetic world takes its participants out of 
themselves (as in the etymologies of e-mote and ecstasy), but in order to facilitate a 
more `objective' reflection upon their subjective states. The theatrical effects in Night 
and Day ultimately allow the characters to disentangle dream and reality, whereas 
Rachel, in The Voyage Out, drifts into a state of delirium which protects her from any 
final confrontation with the illusions and ideologies of romance and marriage. 
Night and Day achieves its tacit understanding through poetic symbols capable 
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of conveying profound and complex feeling and emotion. However, in The VoyaLc 
Out, without any available means to transcribe subjective reality into objective 
resonance, there is constantly an underlying frustration about the apartness and sense 
of separation between human beings (as Rachel has put it: "To feel anything strongly 
was to create an abyss between oneself and others who feel strongly perhaps but 
differently") (29). In Night and Day, reality is beheld through pure poetic symbolism: 
as Hewet has foreseen, reality, which defies translation, could only be revealed 
through silence. Yet, the novel of silence remains a non-achievable ideal in The 
Voyage Out. Rachel, who refuses the linguistic register of social bonding, remains 
confined within an internal world of her own, foreshadowing her final evasion of this 
incongruous world, since "self-attachment is the first sign of madness" (Foucault 26). 
Within the medical history on mental illness, particularly the discourses on 
degeneration prevalent in Woolf's time, madness has often been associated with an 
animal nature seen as a primal condition pre-existing the evolution of a more 
advanced brain. Thus, madmen/women are often portrayed as "wildman and a beast, 
as a child and a simpleton, as a waking dreamer, and as a prophet in the grip of 
demonic forces, " the said qualities depicted and examined throughout both The 
Voyage Out and Night and Day (Sass 1). "For classicism, " as Michel Foucault has 
speculated in his historic research, "madness in its ultimate form is man in immediate 
relation to his animality, without other reference, without any recourse" (74). Both the 
image and the idea of madness change in the course of time. Darwin's idea of the 
origin of species by natural selection and the survival of the fittest underpinned the 
late Victorian idea of madness as the embodiment of degeneration. The idea of 
madness as a degradation of man to his animal nature was strengthened by the 
biological argument from evolution. "Following Darwin's theories of inheritance, 
evolution, and degeneration, an emerging psychiatric Darwinism viewed insanity as 
the product of organic defect, poor heredity, and an evil environment" (Showalter, 
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Female 18). 10 Madness, which had once been a divine punishment, the wrath of God, 
gradually came to be perceived and treated as a lack of self-control (the lack of a 
`developed' rational mind) over one's animal nature-a failure of the mind to exert its 
will over the body. In an attempt to counter the forces of degeneration and in order to 
suppress the animality of the degenerate, Victorian society placed special emphasis on 
social etiquette and decorum, as if by manners and attire alone one could abolish or 
simply conceal one's animality. 
Throughout The Voyage Out, the connection between the animalisation of the 
human body and the physical necessities of its existence is continuously observed. 
Analogies between human and animal behaviour are constantly made, as in Hirst's 
animated description of the hotel inhabitants `devouring' their letters from home. The 
love-making scene between Arthur Yenning and Susan Warrington, in alluding to 
animal behaviours, is depicted as if devoid of human dignity. It is a primal scene 
which Rachel, as a child of innocence, accidentally stumbles on and is petrified by its 
sheer carnality. Human features are often described in comparison to those of animals, 
as if these Englishmen who are so keen on their civilised etiquette (which "matter so 
much more than what's generally supposed to matter" as Clarissa Dalloway comments) 
are revealed to be, by nature, no different from animals (VO 41). Cambridge 
intellectuals are derided for the vulgarity of their bodily appearance; for example, "Mr. 
Pepper as though he had suddenly loosened his clothes, and had become a vivacious 
and malicious old ape" (VO 10). Civilised achievements do not seem to have changed 
the world very much from an ancient habitat occupied by non-human creatures; the 
dark uncivilised past lurks throughout the narrative. The English ship may seem to be 
a much more civilised place to live than the villa in Santa Marina (as observed by Mrs. 
Chailey), yet to Clarissa Dalloway, the ship seems to exist as its own separate world as 
10 Showy alter continues to write that "seeing the lunatic as a degenerate person of feeble will and 
morbid predisposition, Darwinian therapists... redefined their role as that of psychiatric police, 
patrolling the boundaries between sanity and madness and protecting society from dangerous 
infiltration by those of tainted stock" (Female 18). 
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if "they'd never been on shore, or done ordinary things in their lives, " alluding 
perhaps to the `ship of fools' (VO 41). 11 The civilised `ordinary' world which people 
are so anxious to cling on to seems to be nothing but an illusion threatened by the 
randomness of nature and overshadowed by a devouring wilderness that it seeks to 
disguise and cover over. But even though the voyagers shun the properties of the body 
with their various preoccupations with mental activities such as reading, studying and 
talks, biological nature still silts through layers of social codes and etiquettes. 
Abhorring any identification with the animal, people reject whatever it is that is bodily 
and emotional and it is this which leads to the insincerity and concern to conceal 
feelings that Rachel finds so repulsive in society. Under such social restrictions, 
feelings become so detached within the protocols of civilised etiquette, that it is hard 
not to become remote from and unsure about the core of human affect and being. How 
to name feelings and in naming, know them, and in experiencing, therefore, the 
feeling of a feeling, to know that one exists? As Hewet asks, "How d'you know what 
you feel" (168)? 
By the eighteenth century, madness had already come to acquire a cultural link 
with the imagery of the female body and femininity. 12 Woolf, being herself a 
psychiatric patient and a victim of patriarchal psychiatric practices, embarked on her 
writing career by challenging the socio-cultural image of madness and subverting 
patriarchal definitions of rationality. Both her heroines in The Voyage Out and Night 
and Day (Rachel and Katharine) possess the air of waking dreamers whose minds tend 
to wander beyond their physical presence, though ironically (instead of an emptied 
mind preoccupied with its bodily needs and desires) both of them are meditating on 
the metaphysical questions (transcending their immediate physical present) that have 
preoccupied (male) poets, philosophers, and mathematicians: Truth, Being, Law and 
Justice and perhaps "subject and object and the nature of reality" (TL 28). 13 Persisting 
11 Foucault 7-9. 
12 Showalter, Female 8. 
13 Rachel is preoccupied with epistemological questions as she is constantly thinking of a world 
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in their own vision of reality, both heroines are disconnected from physical reality and 
alienated from their immediate material present. But Katharine's mother, Mrs. Hilbery, 
by assuming the role of Shakespearian fool (a typical guise of madness) is able to 
move between the worlds of illusion and actuality. In the words of her husband, Mfrs. 
Hilbery is like a goddess from heaven (a comedic deus ex machina) who can resolve 
all the conflicts between social criteria and individual interests and concerns with a 
wave of a wand. Both the allusion to the fool and the goddess who possesses an 
unintelligible power to `see' into an unpronounced nature seem to arise from the 
conventional imagery of madness. In her unregulated spontaneity, Mrs. Hilbery, like 
Bernard, fails to finish a linear, definitive, narrative, and therefore subverts altogether 
the Hegelian teleological history. As a Shakespearian fool, Mrs. Hilbery is raised 
beyond the original social texture. For her, there is no settled rule, but only an ongoing, 
rampant narrative that continues to formulate new circumstances. Unlike Rachel and 
Katharine, who innocently persist with the search for the metaphysical consolation of 
an `Absolute Reality, ' Mrs. Hilbery, in the mien of court jester, trifles with all the 
seemingly real and resolute proprieties. In her portrait of these female characters, 
Woolf deliberately draws on a cultural tradition which views madness through its 
female emblems while showing that profound metaphysical questions are posed by the 
female rather than male characters, and thereby challenging the idea of madness as a 
female malady and formal rationality as the triumph of the `masculine' mind. 
Insisting upon truth and seeking after the real, Rachel passes into delirium as a 
result of the conflict between feeling life and living it in a Victorian patriarchal society. 
In seeing life as it is, she comes to feel that life. Yet, subjected to a Victorian society, 
she is forced to renounce the reality of her feelings and emotions as a woman. Thus, 
existing beyond, though imperceptible to, her `self. She often expresses an unquenchable desire to 
pierce through the veil. Her accounts of "the world [as] composed entirely of vast blocks of matter, and 
that we're [human beings] nothing but patches of light" seems to echo what Hume has suggested, that 
the self is merely 'a bundle of perceptions' (276). As for Katharine, she believes in the firm ground 
offered by the numbers and symbols of physics and mathematics which seems capable of containing the 
forms and the formal irregularity of life. 
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the sickness she acquires enables her to detach herself from the physical present and 
thereby from the demands of the social world. In the wake of Rachel's death, Hirst 
(who enjoys solitude with books and who entertains himself with thoughts and ideas 
rather than ordinary social activities) realises the consolations offered by society in the 
guest lounge of the hotel where life is re-consolidated after Rachel's death through 
habitual custom and everyday life. As Freud has suggested, society, civilisation, for all 
its discontents, enables individuals to bear the unbearable in life. Social conversations 
may be mendacious and untruthful, yet it is by staging and protecting such an 
`illusive' reality rather than piercing through its veil, that the human self is protected 
from madness and delirium, since, in reality, the contradictory in life is often so great 
that the mind cannot otherwise accommodate itself to it. The novel is in this sense a 
feminine response to Conrad's own interrogation of a heart of darkness. Woolf, 
producing a tragedy and a comedy, begins her writing career questioning whether it is 
not the case that we have come to place so much emphasis upon reason and rationality 
(in fear of the animality lurking within our nature) that we neglect the importance of a 
"double capacity to feel, to reason" which Bernard has noted is a scarce virtue, barely 
achieved (W 57). It is with the regard of emotional reality that Mrs. Hilbery redeems 
her youngsters from the tragic conviction of patriarchal power and restores the 
possibility of genuine living. 
"Virginia Woolf is as much interested in the emotional context that gives rise to 
the ideas as in the ideas themselves. She is particularly interested in those states of 
consciousness where thought and emotion are inextricably mixed, " writes David 
Daiches (25). There is still a perceived distinction between the presentation of 
thoughts and mental activities and the sentimental expression of feelings and emotions 
residing within Daiches's opinion. However, it is certainly the integration of the two 
which Woolf sought to achieve. Woolf's epistemological quest for the `real' (the 
material reality of the social-physical world as well as the immaterial reality of the 
sensational life) was uniquely interwoven with her own sensory experience as a 
Lin 94 
woman suffering most likely from a bipolar disorder, now ironically, perhaps, 
understood as one of the psychiatric class of disorders of affect. The disturbance of the 
mind and the indispositions of the body must have raised questions for Woolf about 
the tangible reality of the world; she reflects such anxieties through the plight of 
Rachel in The Voyage Out. 
According to Daiches, `sentimental fallacy' is much more often employed in 
dramatic works that seek to evoke empathy and emotions in the audience, while 
novels and prose writings are seen as more connected to the over-cerebral or the 
`intellectual fallacy. ' 14 Dramatic works aim at reproducing sentimental feelings in the 
audience (a somewhat Platonic understanding), while novels and prose works seek to 
assign bodily feelings and emotions to an intelligible definition (here too, Daiches 
follows broadly the Platonic division of genres. ) Nevertheless, in Woolf's 
experimental writings, the real is most often glimpsed through those temporary 
moments when states of mind and bodily feelings are no longer separable-the flows 
of the mind embody the rhythm of the body and vice versa. And most often of all the 
moment is grasped not through verbal thoughts, but through a sense of feeling in the 
body. As she wrote in A Room of One's Own: 
What is meant by `reality'? It would seem to be something very erratic, 
very undependable-now to be found in a dusty road, now in a scrap of 
newspaper in the street, now in a daffodil in the sun... Sometimes, too, it 
seems to dwell in shapes too far away for us to discern what their nature is. 
But whatever it touches, it fixes and makes permanent. (ARO 99) 
The erratic unreliability of the `real' is not simply bound up with the self-enclosed 
monadic moment but also inextricably bound up with the emotions and feelings of 
that particular moment. It is the feelings of the body that have lit up the moment, 
" According to David Daiches, the intellectual fallacy is "where the most `real' facts about men and 
women are considered to be their states of mind, " whilst the sentimental fallacy considers "the interplay 
of human emotions as the most `real' aspect of human life" and "which puts emotional states highest on 
the stepladder of `real' facts about men and women" (27-8). Yet still, Daiches categorises Woolf's 
writing mainly in terms of the intellectual fallacy. 
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registered the `real, ' and made it stand permanently in the mind. One could venture to 
suggest that the real (which Woolf is seeking after) is felt by the body and something 
only experientially known rather than calculated. Yet, this sentimental reality can only 
be communicated through linguistic symbols: it is in words that reality is formulated. 
Henceforth, in metaphors and metonymy, Woolf sought to conjoin the subjective 
reality of the body to the objective reality of social symbols. Daiches also stresses the 
intricate relation between the objective and intellectual `real' world of science and the 
subjective and emotional reality of art, as a theme of Woolf's aesthetic quest. As he 
writes, "There is an essential subjectivity here, an interpretation of reality in terms of 
human reactions, which distinguishes art, one supposes, from science" (Daiches 36). 
In order to unify these two apparent oppositions of the subjective (sentimental) art and 
the objective (rational) science, Woolf launches her experiment as a new form of 
writing that is both intellectual and sentimental at the same time and which will enable 
its reader to feel the rhythm of the emotional narrative with the same detachment as 
observing an objectified form: to be simultaneously engaged and estranged; to be both 
the observing subject as well as the observed object; both the spectator and the 
character itself. And only thus could she possibly re-construct a `solid' reality as a 
combination of scientific facts as well as subjective apprehensions. 
Although excessive emotions and surplus feelings might result in irrational 
behaviours and `unreasonable' decisions, rationality depends on a proper healthy 
ground of feelings and emotions. How would life have become devoid of emotions 
and feelings as they-being the most fundamental regulation of life-signify the 
primary state of existence of an organism in receiving and responding to stimuli from 
the external world? The pulsing of the body is the basic `reality' of life and without 
which there is no being, let alone intelligence. Could there be a soul or rational mind 
deprived of a body and without interaction with the world? This is the question posed 
through the allegorical image of "the brain in a vat, " a metaphysical question resulting 
from the conventional dichotomy of mind/body. Is the soul merely incorporated in the 
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body as suggested by Rene Descartes' famous pronouncement, Cogito ergo sung, or 
maybe through the Neoplatonism encapsulated in "Pepys' motto from Cicero, Älens 
cujusque is est quisque (ones mind is who one is), " (Russo 16)? 15 Both accounts 
seem to recognise the `I' as being solely identified with the mind and its mental 
activity, disregarding the material ground of its body. Even if the mind could simply 
sustain itself through an intact nervous system of the spine and the brain, it is quite 
plausible that it would still configure a phantom bodily existence which prompts this 
feeling of a self. As explicitly put by William James, "its [the present thoughts] 
appropriations are therefore less to itself than to the most intimately felt part of its 
present Object, the body, and the central adjustments, which accompany the act of 
thinking, in the head. These are the real nucleus of our personal identity" [James's 
emphasis] (1: 341). 
In his pursuit of an `objective' depiction and understanding of the world, 
Descartes, eventually, came to view the mind (and its signifying `I') as capable of 
thinking and doubting `on its own' as the irresolvable foundation upon which all 
knowledge is grounded. 16 Thus, Descartes' objective science, which aims at 
eliminating any sensory illusion, is ironically founded on the most subjective basis of 
an incontestable `I' which is (as Descartes believed) indubitable in the sense that it 
surpasses any scientific measurement and representation. In the reconciliation of the 
mind and body, Descartes simply contended that the thinking `I' is non-matter and 
thereby he raised it above the doubt of science (though along with the advances of 
science, the indubitable soul and perhaps even God are dethroned from their supreme 
a priori state). 
The mathematical logic that seems to probe behind all material appearance and 
15 The motto is inscribed on an arch of the library gateway of Magdalene Cambridge. John Paul Russo, 
I. A. Richards: His Life and Work: "Pepys chose the motto for the suggestive links between 
Neoplatonist metaphysics, Ciceronian classicism, and St. Paul; [Pepys] entered [Magdalene] college in 
1651, 'when Cambridge and Magdalene had been full of very sensible and exciting Neo-Platonists" 
(16). 
"' See Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, section IV. Discourse on Method and the Meditations 
trans. F. E. Sutcliffe (London: Penguin, 1968) 53-60. 
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achieve the granite hard table of truth could not possibly circumscribe the thinking 
and reasoning `I' which is non-matter and thus escape the prescription of the 
neutralised governing laws of matter that have been discovered through science, 
mathematics and physics. (And as Freud, William James, and Henri Bergson also 
suggested, the mechanism of the psychical state should be approached and understood 
through psychological laws rather than the law of the Physics. ) Consequently, from 
the dubious nature of Cartesian dualism arose the duplicity of the real of the formal 
and insubstantial mathematical table, and the substantial yet delusive material 
reality-an impassable yet paradoxical gulf between the two fundamentally different 
realities held separately by the idealist and the materialist. '? For as the world of 
physics deals with matter, the real is not seen by the corporeal eye, but rather 
conceived by the insubstantial `mind' (the Cartesian mind or `I' is fully and entirely 
the self-reflexive conscious mind) through numbers and formulas. l8 As explained by 
Banfield, "Without sense-perception, there is no way out for the logician-philosopher; 
without logic, there is no knowledge beyond sensation" (Phantom 24). Yet, in pursuit 
of the absolute `Real, ' the idealist, such as Descartes himself, resorts to an 
understanding through an attempt to finalise the intrinsic laws of the material world, 
contemplated and achieved through the objective reflection of the human mind. 
Science, with its objectivity, enables us to see into the corporeal unseen (the hidden 
formulas and rules according to which the material appearance of the world is 
grounded). Nonetheless, one could not deny that this instinctive `insight' into the truth 
and real is firmly grounded on feelings and emotions. 
To pierce through the veil of material appearance and see the underlying 
structure is the ultimate task of mathematicians, physicians, philosophers and also of 
1' Bertrand Russell writes in The Analysis of Mind, "Those who maintain that mind is the reality and 
matter an evil dream are called `idealists'... Those who argue that matter is the reality and mind a mere 
property of protoplasm are called 'materialists ... (2). 
18 The Cartesian dichotomy between the mind and the body could be now understood as a failure to 
conceive the conscious mind as formed through various layers. Thus, from such dichotomy arose the 
entire matter of the problem of knowledge which "is the quest of getting to the lighthouse on its 'stark 
bare rock, ' its ground of granite, from which its `misty eye, ' its rainbow illumination of the world, 
stares out into the darkness of the surrounding sea" (Waugh, "Revising" 53). 
Lin 98 
Woolf who endeavoured to present through her narrative the perplexity of her own and 
everyone's relation to reality and the understanding of that reality. Following 
Cartesian dualism, reason and rationality seem to be the achievement in the end of a 
full renunciation of the subjective self. Yet, how is it possible to be deprived of the `I' 
completely in any understanding of the world: who is then to conduct the thinking? 
Just as modern science seeks to transcend any subjective impingement of the 
corporeal and sensory body on objective reasoning, one version of modernist 
aesthetics endeavoured to de-personalise subjectivity by displacing the subjective `I' 
with an emphasis on "formal distance" and "impersonality" as in T. S. Eliot, Joyce, 
and Wyndham Lewis. The `I' which modern science and art both seek to obviate is the 
higher self-reflexive mind that is still fully bound to its personal concerns-an `I' 
constructed from autobiographical memory which has outgrown the constant adjusting 
phase of the core self and has now adopted a rigidly formed temper that orientates 
one's relation to the external world. It is this autobiographical selfhood which art and 
science seek to reach beyond: either towards an ultimate objectivity (that is capable of 
perceiving its own subjective point of view as merely one among numerous others) or 
towards a preliminary subjectivity existing prior to the formation of selfhood and 
locating here the fundamental reality of being in existence. 
Although objective rationality is not possible without the pre-existence of a 
subjective `I, ' the objective consciousness that is the layer of reflexive consciousness 
has for long been the only layer that is recognised as definitive of the human mind. A 
value difference therefore evolves along with the division between the reflexive mind 
and the bodily-bounded mentality which is imbricated in the mindibody split. Woolf's 
attempt at impersonality and detachment is firmly rooted in a subjective base which 
corresponds to Damasio's understanding of the architecture of consciousness. As 
shown by James Naremore, instead of interposing distance between the self and other, 
Woolf tends to blur the boundaries between the self and other in order to achieve a 
communal effect; and as the individual `I' merges into a common current of `they, ' 
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distinct subjective apprehensions are blended into a universal objective feeling. The 
`rationality' of Woolf's novels is incorporated into her rhythmic narration that depicts 
the ebbs and flows of inner feelings, reflecting a universal rhythm of the body that 
(though a shared aspect of all being) generates individual perceptions. The subjective 
realm still baffles scientists to this day as it continues to resist objective presentation 
and the nearest it seems that one could possibly come to address and communicate the 
subjective realm is by "rendering" it through a mimesis of the feeling and emotion- 
engendering process, as in literary embodiment, instead of through direct literal 
depiction as in scientific description. 20 Involved in the literary is surely always some 
version of what T. S. Eliot has suggested in "Hamlet" as the theory of `objective 
correlative': by building up the circumstances and elements that induce feelings rather 
than addressing the feeling itself. 
According to Damasio, language and creativity are the steps towards 
conscience-an empathy that feels and knows the feeling of others by means of 
reflexive nerves. There is an urge to communicate, to transcribe both subjective as 
well as objective reality in order to accommodate and consolidate it. Yet, the 
deficiency of language often frustrates one's communication. Symbolic language, 
though "can never be anything but anthropocentric" and perhaps self-centric, has long 
been taken as a means toward impersonal and objective rationality (Beer 41). For 
symbolic language, resembling an upper level of the nervous mapping in the working 
of consciousness, maps out the self in relation to the world. All language is therefore 
self-reflexive. In the diagram drawn by Damasio, linguistic ability and creativity is 
placed beyond the extended consciousness representing a transition from a more 
subjective consciousness of `I' towards greater objectivity. The linguistic ability in 
deploying the symbolic order is a departure from the material ground of the bodily-a 
self-detached reflexive posture. Consequently, having a mind or not having a mind 
19 James Naremore, The World Without a Self (New Haven: Yale UP, 1973) 24-5. 
20 The idea of rendering (rendu) is expounded by Michel Chion in La toile trouee. See Slavoj Zi2ek. 
Looking Awry (1991, Cambridge Massachusetts: MIT P, 1992) 40. 
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becomes identified with one's rhetorical skill in communicating to the outer world 
one's feelings and thoughts. Yet despite Rachel's capacity to feel, St. John Hirst, the 
epitome of a Cambridge intellectual in The Voyage Out, still questions whether 
women have a mind or not, for he assumes their incapacity to appreciate the delicacy 
of words and with that their inability to reason and judge in sensible verbal 
articulation. The tendency of Hewet and Rachel to adopt vague figures of speech in 
expressing complex states of mind is often sneered at by Hirst. He calls Hewet "a 
singularly untidy mind" that lacks continuity and draws no conclusions (VO 96). Ho«w 
Hirst values reason and rhetorical ability! How he praises Gibbon's `immaculate' 
style-"Every sentence is practically perfect" (VO 184)! 
Although Rachel Vinrace sets out to `see' life in The Voyage Out ironically 
through life, she encounters death. In Naremore's words, The Voyage Out is a voyage 
out of life. Perhaps with all the implications of the Cambridge Epistemology and the 
insistence on rationality, it is a voyage out of the body in seeking for a sublime ideal 
of the soul, for the unsubstantial `Real, ' and therefore paradoxically, out of the ground 
of life. As indicated by Foucault, "Madness begins where the relation of man to truth 
is disturbed and darkened" (104). Rachel's capacity to feel, instead of strengthening 
life, induces her instead to question the socio-symbolically constructed life which is 
embodied through the superficiality of social languages in all their insincerity. An 
unmitigated disparity seems to exist between what is felt and the words that seek to 
signify and represent feelings. Rachel's feeling can only be expressed through the 
abstraction of music. But, without the capacity to adopt words, she also fails to 
achieve a more consolidated understanding of her turbulent feelings and eventually 
she loses her grasp on reality. Rachel's bodily illness has driven her away from 
material reality: "She was completely cut off, and unable to communicate with the rest 
of the world, isolated alone with her body"-a body of feeling which she cannot 
communicate to the outer world (VO 312). The general obsession with the distinction 
between dream and real, instead of enabling Rachel and other characters to attain the 
Lin 101 
`Real, ' rather overturns the ground of reality as the characters drift further away from 
the factual into a visionary, dreamlike, world of the mind. 
Mind and body, masculinity and femininity, tend to be in immediate opposition 
to one another throughout The Voyage Out. Woolf is exploring and attempting to 
suggest an answer to Hirst's question of the role of `education' (the social institution) 
in the differences between men and women. Both Rachel and Hirst are in pursuit of 
the real, though they adopt entirely diverse methods and means: one through 
nonverbal feelings and emotions (exemplified through music), and the other through 
logic, rhetoric and symbols. Hirst (as a fellow of Cambridge and, in his own 
evaluation, one of the three most distinguished men in England, who places immense 
stress on mind and its capacity for abstract speculation) characterises the spirit of the 
age that disregards the discordance and intricacy of life in living it as if, through 
reasoning alone, everything could be understood in the fashion of an Aristotelian 
belief in logic and geometry. Thus, he concludes, "I see through everything- 
absolutely everything. Life has no more mysteries for me"; while, for the novelist 
Terence Hewet, life is full of untold, unintelligible, hidden stories (VO 155). "It [life] 
seems to [Hewet] tremendously complicated and confused. One can't come to any 
decision at all; one's less and less capable of making judgments" (VO 205-6). Truth of 
life is transient and capricious. It could not possibly be held and fully possessed. 
Hewet, as a novelist, seems to be a mediator between the definitive reason of 
Hirst and the hazy and woolly feelings of Rachel. Through him, the paradoxical 
relation between dream and reality is first revealed. To write a novel of silence, as he 
claims to do, is an attempt that seeks an alternative mode of communication that might 
transcend the present capacity of language to integrate what is personal into a 
communal mood and understanding. Although Hewet, as a novelist, seems to 
acknowledge the importance of feelings and emotions and is more inclined to learn 
and appreciate the lives of women, still he makes the comment that Rachel would 





he exclaimed; "because with all your virtues you don't, and you never will, care with 
every fibre of your being for the pursuit of truth! You've no respect for facts, Rachel; 
you're essentially feminine" (VO 278). Paradoxically, Rachel's antagonism to Hirst is 
itself an inquiry after the Truth veiled behind the flamboyant words and `obscured' by 
the apparently logical and correct rhetoric. 
Sailing into the Amazonian wilderness, Hirst observes how queer it is that the 
wild landscape gets on one's nerves: "it's all so crazy. God's undoubtedly mad. What 
sane person could have conceived a wilderness like this, and peopled it with apes and 
alligators? I should go mad if I lived here-raving mad" (VO 260). The wild 
landscape seems to reflect what the self has always tried to repress-the vast 
inconceivable darkness of the id concealed beneath the conscious ego which is 
socio-symbolically structured by civilisation (as defined in Freudian terms). The 
immense wilderness within and without, mirroring each other, disturb all sense of 
`proportion' and confuse dream and reality. "Dreams and realities" is repeatedly 
questioned; for as subjective and objective points of view offset one another, the 
ground of reality and dream becomes no longer discernible (VO 172). Direct 
confrontation with the external wilderness makes it also impossible to shun the dark 
reality of the unintelligible feelings within. The image of the self as a ship sailing 
solitarily upon the sea, surrounded with a bluish veil, without any shore to connect it 
with the rest of the world, runs throughout the narrative. The image of the sea is a 
conventional image and symbol of madness. As Rachel has lamented: "What's so 
detestable in this country... is the blue-always blue sky and blue sea. It's like a 
curtain-all the things one wants are on the other side of that. I want to know what's 
going on behind it. I hate these divisions... One person all in the dark about another 
person.. . 
Just by going on a ship we cut ourselves off entirely from the rest of the 
world" (285). The English society which Rachel encounters and becomes involved 
with in this primitive landscape of Santa Marina seems to represent the flimsy 
interface between consciousness and unconsciousness, between the mind and the body. 
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where boundaries are blurred. 
Harvena Richter also takes The Voyage Out as a voyage inward. 21 She 
conjectures that, in The Voyage Out, to feel is not a passive product but rather an 
active reaching out. In pursuing life and the knowledge of life, Rachel is not simply 
waiting for feelings to arise passively, but she approaches feelings actively in seeking 
for their causes as well as meanings. "Thus Mrs. Woolf's emotional moment may be 
said to be not passive cerebration but the activity which we know as life" (Richter 32). 
Contrary to Richter's account, Woolf is portraying feelings on two levels, both their 
spontaneous generation (forming a reference ground for the core self and core 
consciousness) and as they are known and actively interpreted by the subject (in 
autobiographical consciousness, by referring to the historical context of the subject's 
memory). It is, in fact, simultaneously a passive as well as an active process-a 
non-conscious intake as well as a conscious reflection-as the novel addresses both 
the feelings that arise without the knowledge of the subject and also those that are felt 
and known by the subject. In the passage where Rachel wanders around the hotel 
strained by mysterious agitation, one grasps clearly her subjective interaction with an 
overwhelming emotion with which she cannot possibly come to terms. Rachel 
nonetheless notes the difference between having a feeling passively and feeling a 
feeling actively. 22 In the course of the novel, characters, especially Rachel and Hewet, 
who are more apt to feel, are often struck with unintelligible feelings and emotions-a 
sudden plunge into sadness or a strain of anxiety springs forth from nowhere-and 
they are driven to make sense of this in order to bring it under control. But, words and 
language fail them. Without words to pinpoint or offer a clear framework, these 
emotions and feelings remain unapproachable: without form, rationalised reflection on 
them is unattainable. 
The Voyage Out, as a voyage inward into the inner self exploring subjective 
21 Virginia Woolf: The Inward Voyage. 
22 Damasio Feeling 279-80. 
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feelings and emotions, is also a voyage out into a sea without a centre, without a 
pretext-a battle-ground where the confrontation between objective and subjective 
perceptions is fully played out. Richter has noted that "The title of the French 
translation comes closer to expressing the essence of her work [The Voyage Out]: La 
Traversee des Apparences-the crossing of outward appearance into reality" (26), 
coinciding with what Hewet concludes that he and Rachel are seeking: "to find out 
what's behind things [... ] Things I feel come to me like lights.. .1 want to combine 
them" (VO 207). 23 The Voyage Out, aims to pierce through the veil and approach the 
hidden question at its very heart: what is the true reality and what is simply 
appearance. Both the characters and the text struggle with the impossibility of a pure 
transcendental objectivity. Rachel steps upon the journey to `see life' in order to 
understand the internal churning of feelings and emotions that she has been unable to 
name, yet what she encounters is a whirling sea where all ideas, beliefs, and 
perspectives are kept afloat without possible anchors as "atoms flying in the void, " 
swirling along with the tempest (VO 63). Rachel sets out to know the world and its 
reality, as symbolised by the ship the Euphrosyne itself, who "infinitely more 
mysterious, moving by her own power and sustained by her own resources" sails 
towards the unknown which "might give her death or some unexampled joy" (VO 25). 
As it aims at a thorough disclosure of the absolute `Real, ' the narrative of The Voyage 
Out probes into the heart of darkness that unravels itself most fully when 
socio-cultural constraints are no longer adaptable. 
The world seems to vary along with the shifting of feelings and, as the world is 
perceived through the mist of emotion, it seems often unreal. Does Helen's black 
volume of philosophy on "the Reality of Matter, or the Nature of Good" reveal more 
reality than the half-felt, half-known feelings that Rachel finds hard to voice (VO 25)? 
Rachel has always been prompted by a desire to probe behind that which is considered 
23 Christy L. Burns notes in her article, "Re-Dressing Feminist Identities: Tensions between Essential 
and Constructed Selves in Virginia Woolf's Orlando, " that "Virginia Woolf plays on a twentieth century 
conception of Truth, derived from the Greek notion alethea, unveiling" (343). 
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to be factual, but she is constantly baffled by the social code that prevents her from 
stating genuinely what she feels: "It appeared that nobody ever said a thing they meant, 
or ever talked of a feeling they felt" (VO 29). Social discourses are utterly disjointed 
from true feelings and emotions and, being inexpressible under this pressure of social 
constraint, are generally repressed. But, even if Rachel and Hewet seek to be candid 
about what they actually feel, the socio-cultural context frustrates them with its lack of 
appropriate words and means. Since "the simplest of wishes cannot express itself 
without hiding behind a screen of language that constitutes a world of intricate 
intersubjective relationships, all of them potentially inauthentic" (De Man 12). As a 
result, even though full of the rattling sounds of social conversation, an even more 
profound silence prevails throughout The Voyage Out. The inadequacy of verbal 
language to communicate true feelings makes the "relations between different 
people... so unsatisfactory, so fragmentary, so hazardous, and words so dangerous that 
the instinct to sympathise with another human being was an instinct to be examined 
carefully and probably crushed" (VO 178). Yet the social life which Rachel takes as 
insincere to the extent of seeming unreal is for Helen a temporary relief (which Hirst 
also comes to apprehend in the end). The `fictional' reality of social-symbolic 
conventions serves as a safety zone that protects one from an external reality that 
could be ironically detached and rendered as unreal. Even if it is "a moment's 
make-believe, " the apparent social reality secures her as the "profound and reasonless 
law [of nature] asserted itself, moulding them all to its liking, making and destroying" 
(VO 249). 
Both Hirst and Helen, in the Western cultural tradition of ocular-centrism, are 
apt to `see' (to speculate) through the mind's eyes, whereas Rachel and Hewet are 
more prey to emotion, inclining to feel the agony of living and wanting. Both of them 
lament that people are so dishonest about their feelings, feigning to feel what is not 
felt as they fail to understand the content and meaning of their feelings. Nonetheless, 
as one resorts to novels of silence and the other to music, they acknowledge that the 
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true presentation of feelings could not be approached through the available 
symbolically coded languages and words. Either by music or by silence, they seek to 
achieve an "objective correlative" which is to provide the elements and construct the 
situations that stimulate the feelings rather than their direct or literal depiction. 24 
Hewet, as a young apprentice novelist, envisions a novel of silence about things 
which people don't say. Apprehending the essential objective of founding a neutral 
means of communication in silence, Rachel advises him that he ought to write music 
instead of novels since "music goes straight for things. It says all there is to say at 
once" (VO 195). Although the narrative betrays its underlying scepticism about the 
insufficiency of Logos, still, as one can see in The Voyage Out, ideas are addressed 
straightforwardly and explicitly thematised, rather than carried indirectly through the 
narrative form as they would be in Woolf's later novels. Perhaps in music and silence, 
there is a liberation from the practical social context. However, there is also the peril 
of chaos. Much of both Hewet's and Rachel's unregulated perceptions are articulated 
literally in The Voyage Out when they are trying to make known to the other the ideas 
which each dwells on. A muddle of semi-transparent yet indiscernible and 
unapproachable sensations frustrates Terence and Rachel as they both struggle to 
understand the unformed ideas within themselves. There are more dialogues than 
internal monologues or presentations of thoughts in The Voyage out (voices of 
Rachel's internal thoughts are scarcely rendered in indirect discourse), yet 
paradoxically the novel falls further back into a greater silence surmounted with 
inarticulate feelings and thoughts. In seeking obscure ideals that they can hardly 
envisage, they attempt to capture them through words, through direct narration, yet as 
logos and signifier continue in an endless process of deferral, no finalised meaning 
can possibly be formed. Failing to make any form out of her intimated visions, Rachel 
falls into an incommunicative silence as she resists further engagement in the social 
narrative and so she fades out of the narrative of life. 
24 1'. S. Eliot, "Hamlet" 61. 
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Reading the silence in Woolf's narrative, Patricia Ondek Laurence suggests that 
silences, the unspoken, the blanks, are left in the narrative as a means for Woolf to 
suggest what lies beyond the representation of language and to invite her readers to 
engage in the creative process as they explore the crevasse of silence in the narrative. 
Laurence sees the silence formed as a foreground for the communion between the 
novelist and her readers. The silence is intended to be heard and attended to. The 
novel of silence which Hewet or Woolf has in mind is a novel that presents the 
unspoken and embodies the indescribable. The silence is the absence of a dogmatic 
judgement imposed by the narrator. Yet, the silence is not an unregulated chaotic 
silence, but a silence that corresponds to the hidden nature of life. The silence which 
Woolf and Hewet attempt is a silence that mediates between objective and subjective 
experiences of the characters and of the readers. It is rather like Rachel's music, a 
communication of feeling without words through `pure symbols, ' a thoroughly neutral 
ground (like the drawings or the mathematical equations that reflect and communicate 
Ralph and Katharine's subjective feelings to each other in Night and Day). 
The maladroitness of Hewet and Rachel in appropriating languages and words to 
their needs seems to reflect a lack of narrative skill in their novitiate creator. "Terence 
is Virginia Woolf, too, the dedicated yet still immature artist, who attempts to give 
order to perceptions of reality (for Terence it is easy to conceive incidents, but difficult 
to put them into shape)" (McDowell 77). However, Woolf does succeed in suggesting 
that feelings and the thoughts prompted by feelings come before the forming and the 
application of words. In further development, Woolf's narrative technique gradually 
reaches a maturity by which she is able to show her readers how her characters would 
be able to communicate, to connect, not through articulated words, but through 
mutually responsive streams of thought. Each character, whether acquainted with any 
of the others or not, seems capable of transcending his or her personal boundary, 
reaching over to the other, inferring others' consciousness. 25 The hidden pattern of 
2s Freud 11: 167-173: "The Unconscious" (1915). 
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life in communicating with reality is therefore drawn and substantiated by the 
narrative. The silence prevailing in the narrative of Woolf's later novels is the 
wellspring of the free life-flow like the mysterious passenger in the car, or the 
skywriting in Mrs. Dalloway, that propels a flow of common humanity and links up 
temporal and spatial separations. 26 In literature as in life, says Woolf, a novelist 
should resemble a hostess who engenders conversations that would bridge the gulf 
between individuals. What would be more appropriate than engaging her readers to 
experience the psycho-physical sensations and perceptions of the character? 27 The 
subjective realm is unknown and impenetrable; furthermore, it leaves its spectators in 
awe with its sense of profundity. 
As early as the 1970s, critics such as Richter had come to realise that Woolf's 
moments of being and the meaning of life are anchored in her sensitivity toward the 
subtle and minute flows of feeling and emotions. The body is central to Woolf's 
narrative. It is a texture of the body which Woolf is composing. Richter observes how 
perceptions, words, and emotions interact and weave into one another in Woolf's 
narrative: "Visual impressions coalesce to form an emotion which begins a flight of 
thought, an instantaneous flash of daydream. Words `explode' with their associative 
meanings which in turn affect the body. . . 
The myriad atoms of impression combine 
and recombine to produce emotion that `shoots through the moment"' (29). With The 
Voyage Out, Woolf and her narrative set forth in quest of the meaning of words. The 
narrative examines the applicability and exposes the possibility of words in expressing 
feelings and thoughts: what is `love'; what is being in love; is this what one means by 
`love, ' her characters ask constantly? How is one able to conceive of love if, for 
Rachel, one has never been in love before? Words, as embedded within cultural 
contexts with connotations of their own, most often fail to transcribe subjective 
feelings that are deeply bound up with personal and autobiographical memory. "It 
26 Patricia Ondek Laurence, The Reading of Silence: Virginia Woolf in the English Tradition (Stanford: 
Stanford UP, 1991). 
27 CE 1: 330. 
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seemed to [Rachel] that her sensations had no name" (VO 211). Paradoxically, it 
seems as if only by attaching the physical sensations to a name could one possibly 
comprehend the fast beating of the heart, the flushing in the face, and all other 
physical pains of the emotions and feelings? 28 Rachel tends to see in representative 
images rather than in terms of verbal delineation when she thinks about her 
relationship with Hewet. Feelings and thoughts continue to well forth incessantly 
within Rachel while she strives to mould them into musical rhythms if not in words. 
Tossing between the subjective and the objective, scientists, philosophers and 
artists are constantly strained between these two polar aspects of conscious being, 
between the camps of idealism and realism. The Romantic poets too, such as Samuel T. 
Coleridge, had also relied for their inspirations on bodily perceptions and sensations, 
though the romantic aesthetic aims at an "integration of opposites through a higher 
self-forgetfulness" (Sass 37). With their emphasis on emotions and feelings, the 
Romantics, though reacting against the rationalism of the eighteenth century, never 
actually depart from a transcendental belief that the mind is able to achieve a higher 
spiritual insight-"a direct sensuous intuition of reality" (qtd. in Sass 150). But as 
they also took into account the engagement of the body, Romantic writers also began 
to suggest new ways of thinking about the mediation between the mind and the body 
(challenging the legacy of Plato, Descartes and Kant). Although Louis A. Sass 
recognises many affiliations between twentieth-century Modernism and its Romantic 
forebears in the early nineteenth century, he contends that Modernism displays a more 
"hyperreflexive" self-awareness. He sees a refusal in Modernism of a possible 
integration between subject and object or a final correspondence between human 
being and nature, which the Romantics sought. "The modernists, " writes Sass, "have 
opted either for an extreme inwardness, an egoism or solipsism that would deny all 
28 In a passage where Hewet and Rachel come to an understanding and become engaged to be married, 
Rachel observed, "very gently and quietly, almost as if it were the blood singing in her veins, or the 
water of the stream running over stones, Rachel became conscious of a new feeling within her. She 
wondered for a moment what it was, and then said to herself, with a little surprise at recognising in her 
own person so famous a thing: 'This is happiness, I suppose"' (267). 
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reality and value to the external world, or else for a radical materialism or positivism 
in which not only nature but man himself is stripped of all human, and even of all 
organic, qualities" (37). 
Yet, in contrary to Sass's opinion, these are the two oppositional forces that 
Woolf endeavoured to resolve through her narrative. Although the inward focus on 
internal thoughts and consciousness is a well-recognised feature of modernist writings, 
nonetheless, the obsession with subjective points of view should not be taken as a 
denial but rather an attempt at unifying the subjective with the objective-a 
re-recognition of reality by integrating subjective feelings with objective reasoning, or 
rather an apprehension that subjective feelings are always woven into objective 
reasoning and objective rationality is often piloted by subjective instincts. What the 
modernists manifest through their fragmented multi-perspectival writing is a perpetual 
struggle between a consciousness that is "inevitably perspectival and concept-imbued 
[... one that] is always arranged, simplified, schematised, interpreted through and 
through" and a yearning for "`the unique and entirely individual original 
experience[s]' from which concepts ultimately derive" (Sass 150). 
For centuries, people have sought to transcend corporeal confinement and been 
defeated with a sense of humiliation "to find [as Richard Dalloway has realised in The 
Voyage Out] what a slave one is to one's body in this world" (VO 64). It is perceived 
in the Western philosophical context that the achievement of the mind could only be 
pursued by discarding whatever is of the body; the absurdity is reflected in the ridicule 
of the `beautiful soul' implied in the image of Hirst whose bodily ugliness is set 
against his self-evaluation of the cleverness of his mind. Nevertheless, with the 
advance of biology, psychology, and in the aftermath of war, philosophers began to 
reconsider not just the idea that the `mind' is incorporated within the body, but also to 
think about the importance of well-being in the body to a healthy, `reasonable, ' mind. 
Merleau-Ponty's expression of "the actual existence of my body is indispensable to 
that of my `consciousness"' and "it is essential to me not only to have a body, but to 
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have this body" (Phenomenology 501) agrees with what Thomas Nagel has recognised, 
that "What was unique to that part of an organism's psychological life, which \v e label 
as `conscious, ' he [Nagel] wrote, was its being the source of `there being something it 
is like to be that organism"' (qtd. in Lyons 181). 29 As scientists endeavour to cling 
onto the notion of a transcendental Ego that would enable them to see past worldly 
illusion and achieve an incontestable, universal law that strings together all the 
worldly phenomenon, poets continue to muse over that paradoxical consciousness of 
being-in-itself and being-for-itself, for, as Rachel has observed, "How, indeed, could 
[it be possible] to conceive anything far outside [one's] own experience" (VO 216). 
The Voyage Out, which launched Woolf's career as a writer, also led her to 
embark on the philosophical quest for naming and describing the perpetual co-relation 
of the subjective mind (that evolves from the feelings of the body but in return views 
its body as an object) and the objectified body. (Or, perhaps it is better put as the 
mind's subjective understanding of the body and the body's objective presentation of 
its status. ) The novel itself, its protagonist, Rachel, and also the ship, Euphrosyne, that 
transports them out of London into the wilderness of South America, all seem to 
converge into a single female persona who is about to discover real `life, ' life that has 
long hidden beneath the social convention of Victorian Englishness. Though Rachel is 
as excited as she could possibly be at the thought of `true living' which this journey 
toward emancipation seems to promise, her father's wish to make her a Tory hostess 
already endows the life to come with a doomed inevitability. For instead of being 
expected to become a conscious autonomous being, Rachel's life back in England will 
be, as foreshadowed, the death of the soul, if not of the body. 30 Rachel's death has 
always been anticipated by the undertone of the narrative. A `real' factual world which 
she seeks is nevertheless beyond her reach (and also beyond the reach of any other 
human being). Although Helen insists on leading Rachel to see real life and is eager to 
29 Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is first published in 1962, ten years before Thomas 
Na-al's essay, "What is it Like to be a Bat? ", published in Philosophical Review 1974. 
30 MI) 64. 
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show her the "facts of life.. . 
What really goes on, what people feel, although they 
generally try to hide it, " she nevertheless puts a premium on the virtue of the civil life 
that shields us from the frailty of life in all its insubstantial reality; this Rachel fails to 
recognise (150). Her social inflexibility prevents her from establishing any connection 
with her body that is both socially and personally acceptable. Inevitably, the 
incongruity between social demands and natural drives leads her from the world of 
material reality into a bewildered delirium. 
Rachel is rather like the fairy-tale princess, Sleeping Beauty, whose 
consciousness of being in this world is awakened by a kiss. The awakening brings to 
her "The vision of her own personality, of herself as a real everlasting thing, different 
from anything else, unmergeable, like the sea or the wind, flashed into Rachel's 
mind ... 
I can be m-m-myself ' (VO 75). Subjectivity or the consciousness of the self is 
ratified by the capacity to feel. But, as the question which is put forward to Hirst by 
Hewet, a character used as a contrast with Hirst, "[has one made] enough allowance 
for feelings" (VO 96)? Or, could one be allowed genuine feelings: to feel what one 
feels rather than to feel what society allows one to feel? Hewet, as a novelist, reflects 
how because people care nothing about the novel, and see it as a trivial form, that 
allows him the freedom of expression to depict "the way one's seen the thing, felt 
about it, made it stand in relation to other things" (VO 204). He is overcome with 
"The mysteries of life" and, just like Rachel, with "the unreality even of one's 
sensations" (VO 178). In this South American coastal city, Santa Marian (which 
reminds Mr. Pepper of the Elizabethan age which froze in its self-enclosed ancient 
state, disconnected from outer civilisation), Rachel is about to break from her 
Richmond upbringing and set forth to encounter life, to discover a "brave new world" 
within and without herself (Tmp. 5.1.183). 
Contemporary neuroscientists have started to affirm not only the contribution of 
feelings and emotions to rational behaviours, but also that consciousness is fully 
grounded on bodily emotions and feelings. Both Antonio Damasio and V. S. 
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Ramachandran (like Freud before them) use quotations from Shakespeare's works to 
illustrate their scientific works. Have these scientists also come to "[meet] life 
fortified by the words of the poets" (ND 125)? Poets, in their ability to convey the 
subtlety of subjective feelings, emotions, and thoughts, seem to have apprehended the 
intrinsic quality of `being' and its temporality by attending to the flickering of feelings 
and by appreciating the world through the bodily senses rather than simply by logical 
reason. Poets often engage their readers to experience, feel and relive those fleeting 
instants through which life or being reveal themselves to the conscious mind-those 
moments when consciousness becomes conscious of its own existence. Poets are 
capable of communicating the most subjective qualia and transcribing internal 
subjective realities and have achieved what modern day science and technology is still 
ineffectual in characterising. As also inferred by Woolf, art is a meeting-place where 
individuals conjoin to form a collective experience with each connecting through their 
own subjective ground. The philosophical dominance of dualism led Plato and later 
thinkers to mistake poets as simply those who veil the mind in illusive perceptions that 
conceal actual reality, the absolute Real independent of all substance, as well as of the 
mind. However, like Rachel, Socrates questions "How will you set about looking for 
that thing, the nature of which is totally unknown to you? " (qtd. in Merleau-Ponty, 
Phenomenology 431). The Real sought by the mind is conceived by the mind and its 
significance is a constituted sign of the mind reincorporated through linguistic 
symbols. Yet, the mind is formed and shaped through the organism's interactions (the 
actual `bodily' contact) with the world around it. 
As Umberto Eco has speculated, literature seems to teach us more about the 
phenomenology of the mind and its perceptions than neurology. 31 By depicting 
feelings and emotions, poets have touched upon a certain truth of `being' as it is, that 
reason and science could not fully realise even in the present age. It is poets and artists 
31 Umberto Eco, The Mysterious Flame of Queen Loana, trans. Geoffrey Brock (London: Vintage, 
2005). 
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rather than scientists who have given us a sense that one's body is "the nexus of living 
meaning" (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology 174). Although Hirst as a typical 
Cambridge idealist criticises Hewet for his novelist's tendency to show a "lack of 
continuity, " and an inadequacy in logical reasoning, it is Hewet who has come to 
perceive life as it is (VO 97). Hewet, who also drifts along with all his uncertainties 
and spur-of-the-moment responses, anticipates Bernard of The Waves. While Hirst 
groups people into types through deductive reasoning and sees life in rigid order, 
Hewet appreciates the triviality of life and the differences between individuals: "No 
two people are in the least the same" (VO 97). Like Bernard, Hewet sees lives and 
selves as numerous bubbles; though each is separated and enclosed upon itself, each 
also has the flexibility to be absorbed and intermixed with another: "The truth of it is 
that one never is alone, and one never is in company, " bringing out that constant 
paradox that rests within Woolf's idea of the tunnelling process (VO 98). 3` 
One is, inevitably, intermixed with the world. Poets, plausibly, through their 
pursuit of feelings, have realised that "The union of soul and body is not an 
amalgamation between two mutually external terms, subject and object, brought about 
by arbitrary decree. It is enacted at every instant in the movement of existence" 
(Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenglogyl02). And it is such an irresistible interaction 
between the self and the outer world connected by the body that forces Rachel further 
into a world of her own as "All sights were something of an effort, but the sight of 
Terence was the greatest effort, because he forced her to join mind to body in the 
desire to remember something. She did not wish to remember" (VO 328). Thus, in 
disowning her bodily and emotional response and yearning for a retreat from the 
disturbance of the world, she sinks deeper into delirium: "she wished to be alone. She 
wished for nothing else in the world" (VO 328). She has, theoretically, disowned her 
32 "Meaning? Oh, something about bubbles-auras-what d'you call `em? You can't see my bubble; I 
can't see yours; all we see of each other is a speck, like the wick in the middle of that flame. The Flame 
goes about with us everywhere; it's not ourselves exactly, but what we feel; the world is short, or people 
mainly; all kinds of people" says Hewet in answering Hirst's unyielding pursuit of the actual meaning 
of his figure of speech (VO 98). 
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body in rejecting its feelings and emotions, its influence, in order to attain to the dimly 
perceived Real; however, a Real that is only conceivable through the body. 
Instead of trying to dissociate the soul from the body which it inhabits, poets, as 
they feel rather than judge, articulate an integrated wholeness between body and mind, 
bringing together the segregated nightly dreams beheld by the mind and the sunlit 
realities felt by the body (or maybe, the hidden realness beheld through abstract 
contemplation and the illusion of corporeal perception). Night or day, dreams or 
perceptions, which is the absolute real and which is the quasi-reality? In all its 
ambiguity and disguise, realness and reality perpetually elude apprehension. 
In contrast to the horror of the confrontation with the real and reality in The 
Voyage Out, Woolf plays romantically with the eternal paradox of reality and 
appearance in Night and Day (with its constant allusions to Shakespearian comedy). 
Walking down the Strand, Katharine Hilbery, the heroine of Night and Day, in her 
usual absent-mindedness, keeps repeating to herself, "It's life that matters, nothing but 
life-the process of discovering-the everlasting and perpetual process" and yet she 
has not truly lived a moment or ever stopped to savour those uncertainties met through 
life's journey (ND 106). Her life, like the one which Rachel has led in Richmond, is a 
life built upon disguises. Through Katharine's life, one sees the contradictions of 
female stereotypes, the poetic enchantress versus the confined slave of the household 
(as further expounded by Woolf in A Room of One's Own). 33 Born into a family 
whose greatness centred on the achievement of her poet grandfather, Katharine fights 
deliberately against the family's literary tradition and secretly pursues a world-of 
stars and of mathematical correctness-cleansed of all obscure and distrustful human 
feelings and emotions. Ironically, in her enthusiasm for `the Real' and `the true 
reality, ' and through her insistence on "something that hasn't got to do with human 
beings, " she has drifted into a nightly world devoid of substantial sunlit reality (ND 
163). To confront the real by forswearing the unreality of bodily feelings and emotions 
33 ARO 40. 
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is to uproot oneself from any possible consolidated ground. The unnameable void of 
the Lacanian Real that eludes all symbolic representation is in fact the most 
substantiated power of nature located in the body. Being the immediate descendant of 
a great poet, could Katharine finally come to see what is beheld by her poet 
grandfather-"something lovely or miraculous vanishing or just rising upon the rim of 
the distance" (ND 271)? 
With The Voyage Out and Night and Day, Woolf subtly displays the adverse 
position of women within a society where there is a constant demand for reason and 
rationality, while women are forever deemed to be emotional and irrational beings. 
"[W]omen, within our dualistic systems of language and representation, are typically 
situated on the side of irrationality, silence, nature, and body, while men are situated 
on the side of reason, discourse, culture, and mind" (Showalter, Female 3-4). Both 
novels enquire into the opposition between what has been presumed and instituted as 
femininity and masculinity. Situating herself between science and art, between 
objective and subjective apprehensions of life, Woolf began in The Voyage Out with a 
pessimistic perspective on the future for women, torn between the traditional ideal of a 
chaste angel in the house (an object of men's desire) and the modern pursuit of a 
reflexive soul (a subjective entity of its own) that could plausibly be truly felt and 
lived. Although Rachel is urged to learn the `real' world, the real world as it hides its 
cruel reality in silence, could not deal with her frankness. Her music of feelings and 
emotions that play without verbal articulations could only be apprehended implicitly. 
To insist on attaining the real, would not only deepen the abyss between sign and 
meaning as well as between self and other. However, Woolf turned towards a much 
more optimistic anticipation in Night and Day in which all conflicts are resolved in a 
style of Shakespearian comedy and a mutual understanding of the other's state of 
mind is made possible. What has been taken merely as dream and delusion inevitably 
forces the heroes and heroines to acknowledge its reality. 
With the confrontation of different social classes within society and, beyond this, 
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the confrontation of civilisation and the primitive., the question of what is real and 
what is reality inevitably interposes itself. In The Voyage Out, a microcosm of various 
social circles is presented, from the academic scholars to the aristocratic descendents 
and, through them, a sundry world of disparate realities is revealed. Rachel, under the 
guidance of her aunt, Helen Ambrose, is incapable of accommodating what she 
actually feels to the social codes and cultural languages of the scholarly atmosphere 
that surrounds her (as characterised by the numerous Cambridge graduates: Mr. 
Ambrose, Mr. Pepper, and above all Hirst). The congregation of people with diverse 
backgrounds seems to subvert the possibility of achieving a common ground. Art, 
science and social reality: each take up their own reality and each is examined and 
measured through one another's stance; each is more or less held as incomprehensible, 
`outlandish, ' through the eyes of the other. The arrival of the Dalloways onto the ship 
gives a vehement shake-up to the original party. They represent a completely different 
world and reality. Through the introduction of this new couple on board, Rachel 
becomes acquainted with the reality of the diversity of the world and is prepared for 
the education in life which Helen has proposed. Being attended to as an individual 
rather than as a child by the Dalloways, Rachel is now given a chance to speak and to 
express herself. In articulating her feelings and emotions, she starts to take shape and 
become a person, a subject, rather than just a stock character. However, her subjective 
formation is cut short by the insufficiency of social language. 
Although class differences still persist in Night and Day, Katharine, in the dim 
twilight of reason and passion, of mathematical logics and poetry, is ultimately saved 
by a romantic belief represented by her mother, Mrs. Hilbery, a true and immediate 
descendant of the `poet. ' Katharine presents the combination of a fantasised heroine 
and an ordinary real life woman who pours tea, pays bills, and orders dinner. She is 
mythical, yet at the same time ordinarily down to earth. When Katharine refuses to 
believe in literature, to read poetry, and is obstinate in insisting on the abstract but iron 
hard truth revealed through mathematics and astronomy, Mrs. Hilbery, again and again, 
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implores her daughter to believe in love and to react spontaneously and truthfully to 
her true emotions. Love, though merely a state of mind, is to Mrs. Hilbery the most 
truthful thing in human life. Mrs. Hilbery, being a poet's daughter, inherits a true 
Shakespearian spirit, as is implied through her pilgrimage to the poet's tomb (though, 
like Woolf herself who is also uncomfortable with the paternal implication of 
`Shakespeare, ' Mrs. Hilbery is eager to redefine `Shakespeare' into the maternal figure 
of Anne Hathaway). As she says, she is most like the fools of Shakespeare's plays who, 
in their worldly silliness, are actually those who see past worldly appearances. 
Compare this with Helen's insistence on bringing Rachel out from her confined 
education and experience (which she has had, living most of her life in Richmond 
with her old aunts) to learn the world and its reality, but which leads Rachel to become 
more and more bewildered. The more she tries to know about reality, the more quasi- 
and dreamlike the world seems to be. There is nothing which Rachel could possibly 
hold onto as a `granite' truth, thus she lapses more and more into a world of her own 
and eventually into a state of delirium that is completely disconnected from the world 
shared by people around her. 
Whereas in The Voyage Out there seems to be an abhorrence of any exhibition 
of animal emotions and feelings unregulated by reason, Night and Day celebrates the 
spontaneity of human feeling and emotion in a Shakespearian style of fantasy where, 
as realities and dreams are interwoven, orders and decorum are subverted. The voyage 
out into the wilderness brings beliefs and senses of reality into direct confrontation, 
while the dramatised London drawing-room, in all its ceremonial social play-acts and 
customs, preserves the fantasy-space (in Lacanian terms) and continues to affirm its 
own reality. Within the fantasy-space, the distinction between the actuality of the day 
and the nightly dreams becomes transferential and identical. What is real can just as 
easily become make-believe, as Ralph Denham has said, "[Love is] only a story one 
makes up in one's mind about another person, and one knows all the time it isn't true" 
(ND 212). And nevertheless, Katharine represents to Ralph the only reality in the 
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world as indeed he confides to Katharine. The make-believe game that continues 
through Night and Day as characters struggle to attain consistent self-images and 
images of others who they pursue, eventually turns dreams and unrealities into 
substantial realities and ends in a happy resolution, as each of them is finally put in 
touch with their true feelings. Within the fantasy-space as in dreams, all is made 
possible beneath the protective screen of the dream without being absorbed into the 
conundrum of a chaotic void. Contrarily, The Voyage Out, in its insistence on learning 
worldly realities, inevitably falls into a state of desolation where any sense of belief is 
shattered and everyone is left deluded. 
When what has been disguised by the two couples starts to rise to the surface in 
Night and Day, the music of Mozart's The Magic Flute is performed by Cassandra. As 
the two couples try to attend to the decorum defended by society, Mrs. Hilbery 
expresses endless regret about this modern life, where people are connected with 
formality and with technological devices such as telephones, rather than with their 
true feelings. "How odious the triumphs of science are.. . 
They'll be linking us with the 
moon next, " comments Mrs. Hilbery, in a passage where Katharine keeps being 
summoned by the ring of the telephone (ND 261). The Magic Flute is played in order 
to cheer up Mrs. Hilbery who suddenly laments the death of poetry as "there wasn't 
some young writer with a touch of the great spirit-somebody who made you believe 
that life was beautiful" (ND 354). It is a lament for the death of poetry as well as a 
grieving for an age that no longer celebrates feelings and emotions. The motif of the 
split behind the night realm of `obscurantism' (represented by the Queen of the Night) 
and the enlightenment of the rational day (celebrated by the patriarchal order and 
wisdom of Sarastro, the priest) in The Magic Flute, echoes in the theme of Night and 
Day. 34 Yet, instead of coinciding with the thorough leaning toward rationality 
personified by Sarastro in The Magic Flute, Night and Day satirises Mr. Hilbery's 
34 Jane Marcus has also noted the resemblance between Night and Day and The Magic Flute. See 
"Enchanted Organ, Magic Bells: Night and Day as a Comic Opera" Virginia Woolf: and the Languages 
of Patriarchy (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1987) 18-35. 
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overreaction to his daughter's concealment of her broken engagement with William 
Rodney with a degenerate description of "the extravagant, inconsiderate, uncivilised 
male, outraged somehow and gone bellowing to his lair" (ND 426). In fact, Mr. 
Hilbery is seen as a `Hamlet' figure by Mrs. Hilbery. It is the Shakespearian fool, Mrs. 
Hilbery, whose `sensible' reaction to the dispositions of the young couples redeems 
the novel into a comedy. 
Katharine, similar to Pamina, is lured from the influence of her mother and also 
her matriarchal inheritance, captivated by the priest of reason and wisdom in the sense 
of her pursuit of mathematic and logical correctness. Ralph Denham, on the other 
hand, posing like Tamino, is possessed by the image of Katharine and sets out in 
pursuit of her in response to what he has felt. Ralph, as his sister Joan has foreseen, 
possesses that "peculiarity which sometimes seemed to make everything about him 
uncertain and perilous" (ND 102). Has Ralph been a prey to bodily emotions and 
feeling as a rationalist would assume? Like a herald of the queen of the night, Ralph 
indulges himself with illusions, reacts on impulse and dreams away his nights while 
trying to keep a sense that he is proud of himself "upon a life rigidly divided into the 
hours of work and those of dreams; the two lived side by side without harming each 
other"(ND 104). But, it is by taking steps to resolve these two distinct lives, between 
dream and reality, that offers him the possibility of retaining a sensible life. Similar to 
Tamino, Ralph also meets defiance from the paternal character, Mr. Hilbery, whose 
demand of "a complete abstinence from emotion" and a prohibition of interaction and 
communication between the lovers seems to correspond to the trail which Sarastro has 
put forward for Tamino (ND 399). Mr. Hilbery's trial, contrarily, does not lead the 
lovers to a union, but rather to a permanent cessation of communication. Instead of 
having Ralph take Mr. Hilbery's advice of abstinence, Woolf has Ralph seek to 
correspond with Katharine and reassure her of his love. And while he is composing 
this letter, Mrs. Hilbery appears in time to solve the deadlock set by patriarchal 
obstinacy. 
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Night and Day ends with a fairy-tale happy ending, ý ith the hero and heroine 
living happily ever after, subverting the original distinction of night and day and 
extolling the union of the emotional and rational as «'ell as of feminine and masculine 
qualities. 35 Unlike the final triumph of the rational over the dark power of night in 
The Magic Flute, Night and Day ends not by total subjugation to paternal rationality, 
but rather with the recognition of a perfect balance between feelings and reasons. 36 It 
is the return of Mrs. Hilbery who makes possible the union of the couple and resolves 
the obstacle created by social decorum: its conventions and class distinctions. When 
their relationship is finally sanctioned by Mrs. Hilbery, Ralph and Katharine read each 
other's manuscripts, each illustrating their states of mind. They meet at a midpoint of 
the emotional and the rational, either through the abstract mathematic equations which 
Katharine has been trying to work out secretly, or through the figures which Ralph has 
drawn on the blank space of the letter written to convey his feelings about their 
relationship and what they have achieved. As they read the script that embodies their 
most private emotions and feelings about each other, they come to behold and 
acknowledge a subjective world seen individually but nevertheless co-responsive to 
one another. The reconciliation between the emotional and the rational at the end of 
Night and Day is what saves the novel and its heroine from the tragic ending of The 
Voyage Out. 
Instead of poets, The Voyage Out is surrounded with a group of Cambridge 
intellectualists and scholars who strip the beauty of the world in search of the skeleton 
truth latent beneath-a kind of satire of the Platonic Republic under the guardianship 
of philosophers. Instead of celebrating human feelings and emotions, The Voyage Out 
displays a constant suppression of the body. Exposure of the bodily aspects of human 
35 Mrs. Hilbery with her faith in love and poetry seems to pose as the queen of the night who celebrates 
the mysterious quality of life that cannot be explained but simply felt. Nevertheless, it is she who has 
restored the order of life ruined by Mr. Hilbery's insistence on rightfulness and customs. 
36 It is said that The Magic Flute corresponds to Mozart's interest in Freemasonry. More interestingly, 
the symbol adopted by the Freemasonry in its square rulers and compasses denotes a kind of 
mathematical and logical accuracy. 
Lin 122 
nature is not simply indiscreet and unacceptable, but is even a form of degeneration. 
Nonetheless, Woolf ridicules these Cambridge academics, with an exaggerated 
emphasis often that is comic, over the incongruous over-development of their minds 
and their pathetic bodily presences and under-development of emotional intelligence. 
The discordance between the mind and the body is further accentuated by the 
personage of St. John Hirst who, describing himself as one of the three most 
distinguished young men in England, has the most deformed body: "When naked of 
all but his shirt, and bent over the basin, Mr. Hirst no longer impressed one with the 
majesty of his intellect, but with the pathos of his young, yet ugly body" (VO 96). In a 
curious parallel to the ideal of de-clothing the illusive appearance and attaining the 
absolute truth hidden behind, Woolf continuously acquaints us with images of these 
intellectuals' bodies being uncovered to display something more skin to animalisation 
than to the beauty or goodness beheld by the mind. 
Subjective emotions and feelings are conceived as an impediment to any attempt 
at abstract analysis and objective understanding of the world, and this justifies the 
desire to abolish their influence thoroughly from logical reasoning and most 
philosophical conceptions of the real. In The Voyage Out, as the readers first 
encounter Clarissa Dalloway, one hears her commenting on music: "I don't think 
music's altogether good for people" says Clarissa, "Too emotional, somehow. . . 
The 
people who really care about an art are always the least affected" (VO 39). Through 
Clarissa's words one detects a society which values the detachment of emotion even in 
the appreciation of arts such as music and even in the appreciation of Wagner's operas 
such as Tristan and Isolde. Nevertheless, what psychologists have called `the 
experience error' seems to be ineluctable; as Merleau-Ponty has asserted, "if we try to 
seize `sensation' within the perspective of the bodily phenomena which pave the way 
to it, we find not a psychic individual, a function of certain known variables, but a 
formation already bound up with a larger whole, already endowed with a meaning" 
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(Phenomenology 10). 37 Would the absolute reality be attainable through pure reason 
when "the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more allied to the emotions than to 
anything else" (James 2: 283)? If any intake of perception is primarily bonded with 
feelings and emotions, one must doubt whether any absolute objective judgement is 
achievable, let alone inevitable? In The Voyage Out and Night and Day, objective 
inquiries and reasoning are constantly bound up with subjective interests, and only 
with the recognition of one's true emotions and feelings could any reasoning possibly 
take a true course. 38 
In an extensive chapter on reasoning in The Principles of Psycholog , 
James 
devoted himself to explaining what are the characteristics of basic reasoning and what 
distinguishes the thinking and conceptions of a genius from an ordinary mind. He 
comes to identify the ability to see and associate similarity as the fundamental factor 
of reasoning. James differentiates reasoned thought into two stages: "one where 
similarity merely operates to call up cognate thoughts, and another farther stage, 
where the bond of identity between cognate thoughts is noticed" (2: 361). He further 
discerns the minds of genius as falling into two main sorts: "those who notice the 
bond and those who merely obey it. The first are the abstract reasoners, properly so 
called, the men of science, and philosophers-the analysts, in a word; the latter are the 
poets, the critics-the artists, in a word, the men of intuitions" (2: 361). James sees 
that whether in arts, literature or in science, the supreme success relies on the capacity 
for association by similarity. Although James thinks it is absurd to make an absolute 
statement that the analytic mind is indisputably superior to an intuitional one, he does 
see the analytic mind representing a higher stage as it not only knows and acts in 
accordance with what it knows, but it is capable of reflecting on how it comes to know. 
37 In Phenomenology oL f Perception, Merleau-Ponty defines `the experience error' as that "what we 
know to be in things themselves we immediately take as being in our consciousness of them"(5). He 
goes on to further state that "we do not succeed in extricating ourselves from it in order to achieve 
consciousness of the world. If we did we should see that the quality is never experience 
immediately"(5). 
38 James 2: 339. 
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An analytic mind is prominent for its ability to distinguish the linkage between the 
immediate substances hidden beneath and it therefore thinks in an abstract manner. 
However, an intuitional mind suggests through similes and metaphors that characterise 
the associations of similarity in simple yet allusive comparisons. However, analytic or 
intuitional, both are means of reasoning. 
Even in James, the engagement of the body and whatever is personal and 
subjective, are still discredited and therefore debarred from scientific inquiry and 
experiment in a tradition elevated by Kant's ideal perspective that pure objective 
knowledge might be attainable. Night and Day, in its style of conventional 
drawing-room comedy, addresses that ambiguity between the claim for rationality and 
the romantic spirituality of the eighteenth century which Woolf had once noted: "It is 
worth noticing that the craving for the supernatural in literature coincided in the 
eighteenth century with a period of rationalism in thought, as if the effect of damming 
the human instincts at one point causes them to overflow at another" (qtd. in Johnson 
184). 39 Whether a mere coincidence or perhaps Woolf inserted the symbolism 
deliberately, The Voyage Out, in all its allusions to Cambridge and Cambridge 
idealism, has Rachel Vinrace, as a `pianist' play Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, a series of 
eighteenth century composers who all display the transition from the refined decorum 
of Classicism to Romanticism and eventually to the operas of Richard Wagner whose 
music is claimed by Friedrich Nietzsche to be the Dionysian rebirth of European 
culture in opposition to Apollonian rationalism. 
Woolf launched her writing career by questioning the beliefs and attitudes of 
English empiricism and epistemology, questioning the ideal of obtaining a pure 
abstract knowledge of the world, questioning the nature of truth and the sense of the 
real. Her father, Leslie Stephen, had said that "literature is the highest imaginative 
embodiment of a period's philosophy" (qtd. in Johnson 179). Woolf's writing, in all its 
39 George M. Johnson, Dynamic Psychology in Modernist British Fiction. Originally adopted from 
Woolf's essay. "Across the Border"; both of the Mozart operas, Don Giovanni and The Magic Flute, 
alluded to in Night and Day, signifies the turning toward the Romantic era in musical arts. 
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concern with feelings, thoughts, and reality, reflects the modernist preoccupation with 
psychology, whether as the emerging science of the mind and self, or as an attempt to 
understand the inexplicable mystical experience of the unsubstantial soul. Her 
experimental modernist works are an inquest that probes into the ground of the `Real' 
that anchors one's `being, ' yet which had been thrust into doubt by modern science. 
But if `belief' is in-itself already a blend of emotions and feelings and scientific 
inquiry is supposed to obtain an objective reflection of one's belief, then surely one 
should also take account of the very belief in the effectiveness of science and 
mathematical logic? 40 
Thus, Woolf embarked on a voyage out of that Cartesian dualism prevailing in 
academic spheres after the age of reason and within which rationality culminates with 
a constant if latent fear of the ungovernable feelings and emotions of the body. She 
plunged herself into a philosophical whirlpool where real and reality, real and unreal, 
are set off against one another merely as states of mind, as "Each world whilst it is 
attended to is real after its own fashion; only the reality lapses with the attention" 
(James 2: 293). Real and unreal, belief and disbelief, are two faces of the same coin as 
seen by James that, "Disbelief is... an incidental complication to belief' (2: 284). It is 
by believing in one thing that makes one disbelieve in its contradiction. And therefore, 
according to James, the opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt. Have we, just like 
Katharine Hilbery in Night and Day, in our belief in absolute certainties promised by 
the concrete law of mathematics or the movement of the stars, come to "underrate the 
value of that emotion"-namely love, whose overwhelming power is exalted through 
the plays of Shakespeare (ND 307)? The thread of this Shakespearian theme runs 
throughout Night and Day, accompanied by the rationalism of Mozart's music echoing 
in the background. The Shakespearian theme pronounces not only the motif of love, 
but also (as Night and Day constantly alludes to As You Like It) how ideas, beliefs, 
and perceptions are subjected to change in accordance with one's feelings and 
40 James 2: 288. 
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emotions. As Woolf has come to recognise in A Room of One's Own, creative 
androgyny is what `the Bard' has bequeathed to his descendants and to the civilisation 
in whose heart he stands. The greatest creative mind at its incandescent point is a 
perfect integration of sense and sensibility and a full display of both feminine and 
masculine qualities. Shakespeare continues to haunt Woolf's writings though, as Julia 
Briggs has noted, Woolf never actually approached the great poet directly in her 
critical essays. 41 Yet, his words, his images, linger through her fictional works and 
resonate with her motifs in acknowledging the constant presence of a subjective 
integrity through the correlation of the mind and the body. 
" Julia Briggs, "Virginia Woolf Reads Shakespeare: or, Her Silence on Master William, " Reading- 




Androgyny as the True State of Being 
The mind is certainly a very mysterious organ, I 
reflected,... about which nothing whatever is known, 
though wie depend upon it so completely. Why do I 
feel that there are severances and oppositions in the 
mind, as there are strains from obvious causes on the 
body? What does one mean by `the unity of the mind'? 
A Room of One's Own 
Androgyny, a full embodiment of Woolf's aesthetic idea, is not just the epitome 
of her artistic pursuit of life-writing but also an apotheosis of her feminist claims. 
Through the metaphor of androgyny, Woolf construed a descriptive imagery of a more 
truthful state of being which has long been misrepresented and camouflaged beneath 
the prevailing concepts of Cartesian dualism and the Kantian Idealism of a 
Transcendental Ego. Androgyny represents Woolf's primal argument that real being 
and living is built upon an intact coordination of mind and body; reason and feeling. 
Every work of Woolf, as it strives to depict the formation of subjectivity and the 
emergence of self through the feeling of feelings, exemplifies and embodies a 
narrative of androgyny. Woolf's idea of androgyny is not simply that of a balance 
between equivalent and complementary characteristics of masculinity and femininity, 
but instead more an attempt to reify the harmonised orchestration of different tiers and 
states of consciousness in a healthy mind. 
The stream of thought or consciousness in the individual mind is initially 
brought together and directed by a feeling of self-a pressure or intensity felt within 
as suggested by William James-which is conceptualised as the core self in the more 
recent accounts of neurophysiologists such as Antonio Damasio. Underneath Woolf's 
narrative, "the nucleus of the `me' is always the bodily existence felt to be present at 
the time"; by the continuous depiction of feelings, the concealed body discloses its 
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presence (James 1: 400). 1 Grounded in feelings of each moment, subjectivity is 
nevertheless metamorphic and apt to vary continuously. Still, threaded by feelings, an 
intrinsic grounding in a core self sustains the continuity of a consistent selfhood.. 
manifold as well as a continuous self is therefore constitutive of the nature of being. 
Woolf's fictional narratives often provide a spectrum of all possible selves, displaying 
a variant degree of `masculinity' and `femininity' multiplied within one being (ranging 
from the definite `I' designated by the symbolic order of the Name-of-the-Father to a 
2 cluster of watery feelings of simply being-there). The duplicity of a multiplied but 
nevertheless congruous selfhood is most conspicuously demonstrated by The Waves 
where we have six distinct voices of different characters that gradually converge into 
one voice of Bernard, and also through Orlando's portrait of different transitions and 
developments within one self. 
Seemingly, Woolf was seeking in narrative an experiment to justify whether the 
manifold is actually within the mind, in thoughts, or in Reality. 
3 Perhaps, as Woolf 
implied, it is neither fully in one nor the other, but an intermingling result of the self's 
interactions with the world. A multiplied selfhood emerges out of the subjective 
feelings kindled by external objects, and yet a compound of variant perceptions of the 
external object is unified through the subject. Since to feel is to know, all perceptions 
and knowledge are nevertheless shaded with subjective feelings. Even in abstract 
symbols of numbers and words, the sense of reality is not imparted through the 
knowledge of the external world alone but intrinsically felt in the body. Woolf had 
contemplated what it means to write about people's relation to reality in A Room. 
People relate to the world and its reality differently, as shown through the discrepancy 
between Orlando's admiration of Nature's beauty and the Gypsies' apprehensiveness 
towards its cruelty. Or as in The Waves, each of the six individual characters adopts to 
1 James uses `me' in referring to the empirical self. James 1: 371. 
2 See also Beer 41 and Havelock Ellis's Studies in the Psychology of Sex (1905). Woolf noted 
in a 
1926 diary entry expressing her interest in reading Havelock Ellis. See WD 95. 
3 James 1: 363. 
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the real world in variant ways as they develop divergent perceptions and formulate 
reality through different vocabularies, enacting a "narrative play" that might help them 
to conceptualise the world as it appears to each of them. 4 Initial perspectival 
descriptions indicate for each a personal adaptation to the world. Bernard, as a 
novelist of little phrases, sees a form that engenders flexibility as well as possibility, 
resembling Woolf's `luminous halo': "I see a ring.. . 
hanging above me. It quivers and 
hangs in a loop of light" (W 5). Although, similarly, Neville, the poet and the classicist, 
sees "a globe... hanging down in a drop against the enormous flanks of some hill, " 
already he shows a tendency to perceive a human life reified in a grand and resolute 
epic stance (5). The slab of yellow and the purplish background conjure up a sense of 
an earthly terrain, betraying an innate maternal nature in Susan. Jinny, who turns out 
to be all-sensual and bodily, sees "a crimson tassel... twisted with gold thread" that 
immediately tantalises one's sensory nerves (5). Louis, who is preoccupied with 
genealogical inheritance, hears the stamping of the chained beast. Eventually, Rhoda, 
as a watery nymph who is unable to cling onto any form, hears simply the fluctuating 
sounds of "cheep, chirp; cheep, chirp; going up and down" (5). 
Like James, Woolf suggests that the flow of the `I, ' from fluid to solid, consists 
of different levels of neuro-psychological states that converge into a general flow of 
consciousness, sustaining the organism's subjectivity. Aiming at a full presentation of 
the character's subjective reality, the social and the objective world is painted with the 
variant feelings and emotions of its observers and percipients in Woolf's narrative. 
Different traits of the self (and Woolf often uses the image of fish to represent such 
movement) rise to the surface and assert themselves on different occasion. As in Mrs. 
Dalloway, Clarissa, walking across London to buy her flowers, is compelled to 
recognise the stirring of a `brutal monster' in her, as Miss Kilman's relation to 
Elizabeth is brought to mind by Clarissa's delight in window shopping, in the thought 
of gloves and shoes and then the thought of Miss Kilman's likely disapproval and 
' Nussbaum 23 8 
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social envy. The narrative genuinely portrays a manifold Clarissa who, with each turn 
of a corner (in both bodily situation as well as thoughts), unfolds different 
characteristics. With diverse streams of feeling, variant characteristics are conjured: 
these selves of which we are built up, one on top of another, as plates are 
piled on a waiter's hand, have attachments elsewhere, sympathies, little 
constitutions and rights of their own, call them what you will (and for many 
of these things there is no name) so that one will only come if it is raining, 
another in a room with green curtains,... and so on. (0 212-3) 
The manifold selves are facets of an unnameable yet protean, `Key self. ' The 
"multi-dimensional quality of self' is therefore fertilised through the narrative 
presentation that "the self is felt" and in and through feelings the self is sustained 
(Richter 113; James 1: 298). By portraying feeling as the essential executor of the 
selves within a singular subject entity, Woolf linked the `soul, ' the Cartesian `I, ' back 
to its substantial ground in the body, and therefore achieved an androgynous 
subjectivity that thinks concurrently with its bodily feelings. 
The idea of androgyny is a pertinent description of the most fundamental and 
natural state of being as the conscious, rational, mind (traditionally viewed as a 
masculine quality) evolves from and remains finally grounded in the organism of the 
body its feelings and emotions (traditionally associated with the feminine). Androgyny 
depicts metaphorically a state of being which integrates fully body with mind and 
thereby indicates rationality as thoroughly underpinned by feeling. It is the 
`unity-emotion' which Roger Fry regarded as what "supervenes upon a process of 
pure mechanical reasoning" in science and in art "a process of which emotion has all 
along been an essential concomitant" (73). 5 As scientists, logicians, and 
mathematicians seek in symbols a resolution which aims to liberate the soul from its 
body, they often forget that their thoughts and inspirations, as suggested by Fry, are 
governed by intuitions supported by feelings of unity and harmony beyond logical and 
Roger Fry, "Art and Science, " Vision and Design. 
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formal terms. 6 When Fry, in the light of aesthetic reception and appraisal, emphasises 
feeling rather than Cartesian `seeing, ' Damasio, with the modern insight into the brain 
also contends that the sensory body provides the essential ground reference for the 
mind: "Emotion, feeling, and biological regulation all play a role in human reason. 
The lowly orders of our organism are in the loop of high reason" (Descartes' xxiii). 
And it is this loop of both `lowly orders' and `high reason' to which the metaphor of 
androgyny alludes. In stressing and recognising the intuitive base of knowledge and 
the intelligence of emotions, androgyny does not defy the value of logical reasoning in 
`theoretical understanding of the world' which works towards "a certain liberation 
from the life of instinct, and even, at times, a certain aloofness from all mundane 
hopes and fears" (Russell, Knowledge 36). But androgyny does seek to accredit the 
sentient constituents of a rational mind which has been estranged from its organic 
base. 
Focussing on the narratives of the autobiographical memory, especially the 
mental property that directly contributes to our sense of self and identity, it seems 
inevitable, argues Martha Nussbaum, that we foreground the involvement of linguistic 
cognition in the formation of selfhood. However, the case of Phineas Gage, discussed 
by Damasio in Descartes' Error, suggestively subverts the importance of language in 
the existence of consciousness and the constitution of a consistent selfhood, since the 
change of Gage's character and behaviour did not involve any language impairment. 
7 
The intricate co-relation and mutual responses set up between the mechanism of the 
organic brain and the thoughts and feelings that build up the `self' makes it quite 
impossible to discern the state of consciousness before the involvement of language. 
Although Nussbaum uses signifiers to indicate the different attitude and emotional 
responses towards a relationship pronoun such as `mum' (especially with the inclusion 
of possessive case as `my mum') and a formal address as `Mrs., ' one might also 
Fry 69-74. See also Russell, Knowledge 29-36. 
Damasio, Descartes' 21-22. 
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argue against her that the attachment feelings for a `mum' are not simply in language, 
as suggested through the cases of Capgras syndrome where the patient fails to 
recognise intimate relations and acquaintances as a result of disconnection between 
visual, sensory and emotional responses. 8 The feelings of warmth for a mother must 
surely be there before the attachment of the word `mum. ' 
Perchance, the perplexity could be slightly unravelled by discerning the Freudian 
(linguistically structured) unconscious apart from the neurological subconscious. In 
the subconscious realm, the received stimuli are not immediately registered in 
linguistic form and the core self is simply vaguely known through a sense of feeling. It 
is undeniable that a pre-linguistic subjectivity is already formed through such waves 
of feelings. Nevertheless, it is through symbols and social languages that the mind 
conceptualises, appropriates and registers the ideas formed out of the new stimuli. 
Under its multi-layered construction, consciousness starts to develop its subjective 
autonomy and to conjecture a self-identity apart from its physical status, the organic 
source that it has hidden away. Despite Steven Pinker's contention that language plays 
a tremendous role in our conceptualisation of the world and of ideas, what 
substantiates and holds together the sense of selfhood are the feelings which are 
fundamentally "the `momentary view' of a part of that body landscape" (Damasio, 
Descartes' xxv). 9 In a comical caricature of the nature of the human subject, 
Nietzsche writes in his essay "On Truth and Lies in a Normoral Sense" in 1873 (years 
ahead of the psychoanalytical practice of Freud and Lacan): 
What does man actually know about himself? Is he, indeed, ever able to 
perceive himself completely, as if laid out in a lighted displayed case? 
Does nature not conceal most things from him-even concerning his own 
body-in order to confine and lock him within a proud, deceptive 
consciousness, aloof from the coils of the bowels, the rapid flow of the 
blood stream, and the intricate quivering of the fibres! She threw away the 
Ramachandran, Emerging 1-26. 




Already Nietzsche recognised the body which consciousness has hidden away as the 
`lost object' that the subject is continually searching for. 1° As the subjective centre 
remains in a void without a substantial core, symbols and language become its sole 
bulwark and therefore "the symbol's order can no longer be conceived of there as 
constituted by man but must rather be conceived of as constituting him" (Lacan 4). 
In the Logos, one has made a dwelling-place (as described by Rhoda by placing the 
square upon the oblong) to symbolise the missing substance and to embody life. "This 
is our triumph; this is our consolation, " as though what `seems' has become the only 
possibility of what there actual `is' (W 123). And if life lives in signs alone, which is 
probably what Rhoda has recognised through the death of Percival, she needs no 
longer fear bodily dispersal. 
The concealment of the body seems to allow the mind full autonomy to recreate 
itself and exercise itself in abstractions so that it re-conjugates its own reality and 
identity apart from the body. A split and a gap eventually remain in such a reality and 
identity that is unbounded from its body and formulated through the 
Name-of-the-Father. Cogito ergo sum-does the `I' come before the flow of the 
thought? Or, does it form out of the stream of thought? As Woolf and her characters 
constantly question, where does thought begin? Perhaps, as Sarah has suggested in 
The Years, the thought that constitutes or simply suggests the selfhood of `I' springs 
from the periphery of the sensory nerves of one's body-"In the feet? " (97). Since it is 
through feelings and thoughts that the existence of an I is conjectured, by naming it 
with a fixed identity, it comes into existence. The conjecture of a fixed selfhood, `I, ' 
could be related to the Lacanian concept that the Name-of-the-Father is founded upon 
an absent cogito and, therefore, it is with the imposing of the symbolic order that the 
10 Lacan refers in the "Seminar on `The Purloined Letter"' collected in 
Ecrits that the Freudian notion 
of "the `P system, a predecessor of the unconscious, manifests its originality therein, in that it is unable 
to satisfy itself except by refinding an object that has been fundamentally, lost [author's emphasis]" 
(34). 
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absent centre is signified and conceptualised. However, the presumably absent centre 
is not altogether a non-existence but rather a non-concentric diffusion that could not 
otherwise be fully comprehended and designated. l l And it is precisely this primordial 
condition of subjective existence which is fundamentally ungraspable yet undeniable 
that the idea of androgyny seeks to embrace: an absent presence or present absence. 
The body, though absent from conscious thought, nevertheless underpins and 
conducts its flow. With the re-acknowledgement of the body, the psychological 
estrangement and the inner split that pertains to the inconsistency between the imago 
of the mind and the real body might be finally expelled. Joanne A. Wood also 
construes an affinity between the idea of Neutral Monism, proposed by Bertrand 
Russell, and Woolf's concerns to re-integrate bodily experiences into the working of 
consciousness, and Woolf's narrative is thus understood as an attempt at `physical' 
rehabilitation. 12 Laura Doyle comments that Woolf's narrative is an attempt at a 
re-configuration through the body of the emptiness at the heart of life, an attempt to 
relocate abstract thoughts through material objects. 13 In short, the narrative 
re-attributes to the body what the body has already brought about in consciousness. 
The objective landscape drawn by Woolf's narrative is permeated with subjective 
feelings. As in The Years, the gloomy despair and the jollity of hope of the characters 
are mirrored in the description of the London ambience in the interludes. With "an 
uncertain spring, " the narrative of The Years immediately reflects the incertitude 
borne within the hearts of the characters as they wait around the deathbed of the 
mother (3). Seasonal descriptions are but projections of interior conditions. Therefore, 
a hot midsummer night reflects the dreamy complexity of Eleanor, whose life is just 
beginning. 
11 Judith Ryan, "The Vanishing Subject: Empirical Psychology and the Modernist Novel, " PMLA 95.5 
(1980): 863. 
12 Joanne A Wood, "Lighthouse Bodies: The Neutral Monism of Virginia Woolf and Bertrand Russell, " 
Journal of the History of Ideas 55.3 (1994): 482-502. 
13 Laura Doyle, "'These Emotions of the Body': Intercorporeal Narrative in To the Lighthouse, " 
Twentieth Century Literature 40.1 (1994): 42-71. 
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In Woolf's narrative, objects are imbued with the personal feelings and emotions 
of the characters. With Jacob's Room, immediately the reader is introduced to a world 
immersed in the tears and sorrows of Mrs. Flanders. The lighthouse and the bay are 
wobbling and quivering, distorted by the tears imposing themselves between the 
subjective mind and the external world. As the night begins to fall and the tide is 
coming in, Jacob, who wanders away alone, starts to feel petrified by a sense of being 
lost. A kind of mirage world is presented through his terrors as he is misled by such 
projections onto the outer world of his inner horror and his longings for security. Thus, 
a rock wrapped with seaweed is mis-recognised as `Nanny. ' Running towards the rock 
for security, a feeling of betrayal comes up in him as the reality of external objects 
reveals and reasserts itself. In despair, Jacob re-invests his dependency by projecting 
onto the skull-an object of solidity that offers the final security and being and 
protectiveness of non-existence. However, the projected subjective feelings are not 
always recognised by the characters themselves, since the symbolic-constructed `I' 
often fails to acknowledge its own body and feelings. 
Woolf's enquiry into `Reality' of both the internal and the external world is also 
a question about the arbitrary division between the objective and the subjective world. 
In her narrative, they are perfectly blended through the indirect discourse of a 
de-personalised narrator whose consciousness and voice, as J. Hillis Miller suggests, 
depend on those of the characters, positioning the narrator in the role of Echo (who 
without words of her own, still interposes her own judgemental value through the 
words of others). 14 Despite the inward turn into consciousness, Woolf's modernist 
experimentation does not negate the body and the body's experience as a physical 
being. 
The concept of androgyny should not be taken solely to mean a masculine and/or 
feminine orientation or sexual politics, but rather might be reconceived as a 
14 J. Hillis Miller, "Mrs. Dalloway: Repetition as the Raising of the Dead, " Fiction and Repetition: 
Seven English Novels (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) 176-202. 
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reconfiguration of the traditional mind/body (mind/matter; self/other) dualism. 
Androgyny, plausibly, is an attempt to reach beyond the Cartesian subject (beyond the 
imposition of the `I' which is symbolically transfixed) towards a bodily grounded 
being. It is an ideal which aims to restore the sense of being and of one's 
understanding of the process of life to its most essential form, in which the self is no 
longer a singular, consistent, and concentrated entity, but rather diffusive and 
translucent. The `I, ' the `uncircumscribed spirit, ' which Woolf had been pursuing, is 
intrinsic to the organism's process of feeling and knowing its existence in the world, 
as opposed to the projected self-images that are refracted through the image and gaze 
of others: the socially-conceptualised `I. ' Often Woolf's male characters display a 
masculine insistence upon a consistent, stabilised `I, ' while female figures achieve the 
`I' in its most inner and essential quality by simply feeling and being amongst the flux 
of time. 15 In spite of the fact that the self is naturally and essentially an impalpable 
entity, the act of resolutely holding onto the `I' emerges in her work as a construction 
of Western masculinity which is threatened by the elusiveness of `feminine' being in 
all its fluidity and formlessness. The essential state of being-in-itself that pre-exists a 
self-reflexive consciousness is constantly obscured and blocked by the `I' of the 
being- for-itself. 16 The Suffrage movement (perhaps all human rights movements) 
aroused anxiety about the nature of subjectivity, since the ego is fundamentally a 
socially constructed imago and is founded through the reflection of the image of the 
other. The self here is only to be known through the other. 
At the fin-de-siecle, the heated debates on sexual equality of the Suffrage 
movement provoked late Victorian society to become even more anxious to maintain 
the gender boundary that was seemingly on the verge of collapse. Society was 
15 "`Being' in novels by Proust, Faulkner, Joyce, and Woolf was elusive and contingent, never fixed 
and often fragmented, yet full and buoyant, because it was caught up in the phenomenological flux of 
time" (Doyle 44). 
16 "Sartre assumes the essential deadness of objects and focuses his philosophy on a distinction 
between being-for-itself (humans with consciousness) and being-in-itself (`mere' objects or animals), 
exhorting humans to denounce mere in-itself existences and forge meaning for-themselves. 
Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, explores the ways in which our in-itselfness in conjunction with the 
in-itselt'ness of the object world contains the means for constructing worlds for-ourselves" (Doyle 47). 
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vehemently against equality between the sexes and insisted on the continued 
polarisation of gender roles. "No age can ever have been as stridently sex-conscious as 
our own" (ARO 89). In Woolf's view, as women pleaded for equality, they also 
provoked a consciousness of sexual identity which fatally imperilled the spontaneity 
of creative writing by bringing sexual differences so into focus that a 
gender-conscious `I' inevitably prevailed: falling across the page in defence of its 
virility or (in the case of a feminist) shouting the virtues of femininity. Such practices 
potentially destroy those intrinsic parts of the self that exceed the demarcation of 
gender difference. For Woolf reckoned that the consciously incited awareness of 
sexual difference and inequality might gradually be submerged into a background and 
nonconscious state. However, conversely, such awareness might simply constitute 
"persisting conditions that are often unnoticed partly on account of their 
pervasiveness" and thereby the involvement of these emotional states in one's 
judgement is undeniable (Nussbaum 71). As Woolf has observed in A Room, female 
writing is often crippled by a rust in the heart at having constantly struggle with no 
outlet for a recognition of talents. Whilst in the egotistic writings of men, the anger of 
the male towards the female is everywhere to be seen. '? Identifying anger as a 
masculine aggressiveness, A Room makes an effort to avoid its own emotion of anger 
through its prevailing jocular tone. With the character Rose, in The Years, Woolf 
imparts her stance that the violence that rises out of anger and spite should be equally 
criticised in a woman as in a man, even in a supporter of the Suffrage movement who 
promotes the rights of women. "Force is always wrong" as Kitty repeatedly asserts (Y 
132). Literary works which incite or carry anger towards the other sex, as Woolf 
argues, lack suggestive power. They are unable to provoke communal recognition and 
fusion, for they are produced with the purpose of self-assertion. 
Just as the two polarised sexes are wrestling in the world, combating each other 
for social identity and position, the `masculine' and `feminine' parts of the mind are 
17 : \RO 92. 
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also driven by the social insistence on being rational and on competition for status and 
authority. The bipolar disorder (formerly known as manic-depressive disorder) from 
which Woolf suffered the torments of body and mind is often suggested by critics, 
such as Nancy Bazin, to be the embodiment of her personal strife in struggling not 
only against the egoism which she inherited from her father, but also a female, 
self-effacing, identity dominated by the image of her submissive mother. 18 Seeing 
herself as the "heiress to two very different and in fact opposed traditions, " Woolf was 
tormented mentally as well as bodily by "these two rival streams dashed together and 
flowed confused but not harmonised in her blood" (qtd. in Showalter, Literature 265). 
For as a writer, like Neville in The Waves, Woolf must be able to give form to, in 
order to `crystallise, ' the moment. Yet, to be creative she has to be, like Bernard the 
novelist, porous and boundless. Woolf's narrative sought to peer through the text 
blocked by her own egotistic `I, ' to attain a dispersive but not submissive subjectivity 
as a fundamental state of being. 
Both her parents and their respective values had haunted Woolf throughout her 
life, twisting her one way and another, until she came to write To the Lighthouse as a 
means of expiating these feelings. She had resented the demands of her father, yet 
seen herself, like her father, as wilful. She too, like Mr. Ramsay, yearned perpetually 
for maternal love and attention. In To the Lighthouse, Woolf has Mr. Ramsay drawing 
continuously the energy from the maternal body of Mrs. Ramsay. As Mr. Ramsay 
comes to his wife and son to seek sympathy and to draw from her a sense of vitality, 
James actually feels "all her [Mrs. Ramsay's] strength flaring up to be drunk and 
quenched by the beak of brass, the and scimitar of the male, which smote mercilessly, 
again and again, demanding sympathy" (43). Being comforted and reassured by his 
wife, Mr. Ramsay "drops off satisfied, " leaving his wife, who sits in complete 
exhaustion and attempts to "fold herself together, one petal closed in another" (44). 
The maternal body is described as a source of life that is offered passively and 
18 Nancy Topping Bazin. Virginia Woolf and the Androgynous Vision (New Jersey: Rutgers UP, 19,3). 
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unreservedly to the demands of men who will incorporate it into their own 
achievement of selfhood. As a female writer, Woolf had to seek within for that 
feminine source of life energy and to nurture her creative power in a dissolution of the 
self, whilst, at the same time, she had to contract, to cling onto the egoistic drive for 
self-assertion, in order to produce and write with an aim of being recognised. By 
revisiting her long-lost childhood and confronting the ambiguous feelings towards her 
parents, Woolf, like Lily Briscoe, could only pacify the ghosts haunting her mind by 
recognising a mid-point (not simply upon the canvas or amidst the narrative but also 
within herself) which both marked a distinction but also served as a connection and 
unifier between the presumptive masculine aspect of self-assertion and the feminine 
tendency to flow and dissolve. 
In A Room of One's Own, the female narrator, citing Samuel Taylor Coleridge, 
pronounces that "a great mind is androgynous" (88). In her opinion, what Coleridge 
means by `androgynous' is not simply sympathy with women's minds but rather a 
mind that has the capacity to absorb and express feelings and emotions freely and 
spontaneously: "He meant, perhaps, that the androgynous mind is resonant and porous; 
that it transmits emotion without impediment; that it is naturally creative, incandescent 
and undivided" (89). "The normal and comfortable state of being is that when the two 
live in harmony together, spiritually co-operating" (88). No struggle would there be in 
denying or suppressing one's feelings and emotions in order to sustain one's 
masculinity as a man or to abjure the conventional image of femininity; no personal 
spite, nor grudge against the social system of the world or the conventional gender 
assumptions of others, would persist to preoccupy one's mind. On the contrary, by 
recognising that being is naturally fluid and gender characteristics are socially 
instituted notions, one becomes capable of establishing a self which is fully at ease 
with its inborn fluidity and without need therefore for any constant assertion of the `I': 
a public pronouncement of the subject's existence, whether as a man or as a woman; a 
roaring plea for recognition. As illustrated in To the Lighthouse, Lily could not 
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possibly paint if the voice of Charles Tansley continued constantly to intrude, 
provoking her egoistic defences. Lily's final brush-stroke down the canvas is a line of 
unification and delimitation: the line cleaves in both sense of the word. 
In an attempt to write and create, Orlando construes, through the imagery of 
submersion into an unnameable infinity, the self-dissolution in a creative act which 
bears so much resemblance to Mrs. Ramsay's sinking into the wedge-shaped core of 
darkness within herself: 
Sunk for a long time in profound thoughts as to the value of obscurity, and 
the delight of having no name, but being like a wave which returns to the 
deep body of the sea; thinking how obscurity rids the mind of the irk of 
envy and spite; how it sets running in the veins the free waters of 
generosity and magnanimity; and allows giving and taking without thanks 
offered or praise given; which must have been the way of all great poets, 
he supposed ... 
for, he thought, Shakespeare must have written like that,... 
anonymously, needing no thanking or naming. (0 72) 
When Orlando mocks the superficial nature of conventional biography and the 
fictional invention of gender identity, it also questions the entire network of social and 
cultural values that seeks to attach a definite framework to one's self By bringing the 
entire socio-cultural system under question, Woolf deconstructed the very idea of an 
authority that defines and yet confines the self. But she also exposed the anxiety 
attached to being left floating amongst uncertainties as these original foundations are 
demolished. The gesture of decomposition of the original authority (the very basis 
upon which identity is built) is as perilous as self-annihilating. For though restriction, 
on the one hand, means limitation, on the other hand, it provides a definite boundary 
and upholstery for the definition and support of the self. Limitation protects one from 
the panic which arises as one is exposed to uncertainties. 
The wedge-shaped core of darkness with which Mrs. Ramsay feels at ease could 
hardly be appreciated and understood by the other characters. Mrs. Ramsay is a 
mystery to everyone. The wedge-shaped core into which she has sunk provides her 
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with an inexhaustible depth. By forsaking an insistence upon `I, ' she is fathomless, 
formless, and limitless. She has retained every possibility by simply being 
`herself'-an impersonal `self'-in the sense of being free from any social role. She is 
both intelligible and unapproachable for Lily Briscoe, because it would be impossible 
to achieve the intimacy which Lily longs for, unless she would first relinquish her 
insistence upon distinguishing herself as a female artist who is able to paint. Both 
Charles Tansley and Lily Briscoe are much fascinated by Mrs. Ramsay because, like 
Mr. Ramsay, they are both passionately concerned with how to locate themselves 
within the social domain and they fight fervently against any counterforce that seeks 
to diminish their external identity. As they both cling tightly to an `I, ' Lily feels that it 
is hard to get along with Charles Tansley, because his subjectivity is so much built 
upon the negation and exclusion of others. 
While the insistence of an egoistic `I' is often taken as a masculine mannerism, 
Showalter distinguishes self-annihilation as the hallmark of female aestheticism. 19 
For Showalter, the self-annihilation of `female' writing like Woolf's represents not the 
discovery of a `true' self, but a suicidal obliteration of selfhood. The immersion into 
the dark, psychological depths, and the feelings of dissolution experienced by Mrs. 
Ramsay and Mrs. Dalloway, are therefore taken by Showalter not as a female 
discovery of authentic identity but as a female renunciation of subjectivity under the 
pressure of an oppressive Victorian patriarchy. However, as carefully examined by 
Patricia Waugh, the wedge-shaped core of darkness "may be a form of liberation from 
the violences of a constructed and unified ego" (Practising 117). If one perceives 
consciousness and selfhood as a multilayered construction, then the dissolving of a 
socially imposed self-identity is not necessarily a self-annihilation but rather a further 
quest for an essential subjectivity beyond the instituted social identity that pre-exists 
the mind-body split. 
In his sketch of the building of consciousness, Damasio places creativity and 
19 Showalter, Sexual Anarchy (London: Virago-Little, Brown and Company, 1992) 250. 
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conscience above the construction of autobiographical selfhood, thereby echoing 
Woolf's idea of the honeycomb. Built upon autobiographical consciousness, creativity 
and conscience attain to an objectivity that incorporates the essential core 
consciousness that evolves out of a bodily context. The dissolution of the egotistic `I' 
is in fact the means of transcending the autobiographical self and liberating 
incandescent creativity. Only with the dissolution of the socially constructed `I, ' could 
one possibly reach an objective view of the very essence of selfhood concealed behind 
egotistic self-concerns. Mrs. Ramsay's immersion in the wedge-shaped core of 
darkness is both a "losing of personality" as well as "being oneself' (69-70). When 
one particular identity is assumed, other possibilities within the self are inevitably 
nullified. Therefore, only through the dissolution of the constructed social selfhood, 
could one regain the wholeness of oneself. For a woman, to assume a social identity, 
as a wife and a mother, compromises identity, forcing her to disown her feelings of the 
body. In such detachment, the body is reduced to nothingness and Clarissa is no longer 
Clarissa but `Mrs. Dalloway. '20 Clarissa's identity is therefore fixed by the social 
context, displacing and abolishing whatever innate self she has borne. She is forced to 
abdicate the reality of her own body. As the body becomes estranged from the 
heart-felt sensorium and becomes rather a symbol within the social context, Clarissa 
nevertheless feels herself to be a detached perceiver of herself, while ironically the 
detachment from the body subverts the being of the self as an objective perceiver. 
With the denial of the body, the `I' that has endlessly pursued a way out of its body 
could not possibly persist and eventually fades out into nothingness. Clarissa's own 
sense of subjective reality is negated through the abdication of the sensoriness of her 
female body. Instead of Clarissa, she assumes a social identity detached from her own 
bodily sense of self. 
Androgyny is also a metaphorical statement of a balance between a life-drive 
towards socially-identified selfhood and the death-drive towards self-dissolution and 
'0 M[) 11. 
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yet a fuller embrace of the self. One without the other would be death itself. Being 
discharged of her maternal obligation as the children are taken to bed and, finding 
herself alone, Mrs. Ramsay can finally gather her energies and be nothing more than 
simply herself. By sinking into the wedge-shaped core of darkness, "this self having 
shed its attachments was free for the strangest adventures" (TL 69). This shedding of 
social symbolism (which Mrs. Ramsay sees as her "apparitions") and sinking into the 
body, provides an inverse account to that of Clarissa's disclaiming of her female body 
(TL 69). Mrs. Ramsay sees that only as "a wedge of darkness" could one possibly find 
absolute tranquillity (69-70). However, in accompaniment to the renunciation of social 
identity, she becomes thoroughly `objectified' and `de-personalised. ' As she says, she 
has become "the thing she looked at-that light for example" (TL 70). By being 
herself, wrapping up her subjectivity fully within herself, ironically she ceases to be a 
recognised subject, but instead a mirroring object, without trace of perceivable 
subjectivity. She has negated her social subjectivity and with such thoroughgoing 
negation, "There appears to be no identity, no autonomous self' (Waugh, Practising 
117). The full immersion into the intrinsic flow of bodily feelings paradoxically 
`disembodies' her in relation to factual life. In the view of others, she becomes remote, 
aloof, and without life. As she sinks down into the darkness, she is fully herself, yet a 
self deprived of social, objective, reality. 
"The forgetting of Being is a part of the very essence of being, " says Martin 
Heidegger (qtd. in Doyle 45). To be fully oneself without self-conscious reflection on 
the world's opinion and the gaze of others is to be in a state of incandescence. It is 
what Mrs. Ramsay has come to achieve as she sinks into the wedge-shaped core 
feeling the `self' dissolving. The self is no longer defined by any social and gender 
roles nor through the reflection of others, but, though fluid and formless, a condition 
of selfhood is nevertheless felt, unswervingly and profoundly, as the pulsing of life 
and the stimulation of feeling. The self has now ceased to perceive itself from one, and 
only one, perspective (it has transcended its autobiographical self), and therefore feels 
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itself unbound from social definition to achieve infinite being. This infinite 
subjectivity, instead of being self-bound, is more adaptable to the objective world: "if 
I can perceive it simultaneously from more than one perspective, " "I can perceive 
something objectively" (McCleary xvii). 21 It is the `I' without the need of a 
definition-the `I' of the core consciousness before it is woven into the texture of 
autobiographical memory; yet it is also an `I' that is capable of standing outside itself, 
perceiving itself no longer simply through its own autobiographical memory. No 
concrete boundary is needed to secure this `I. ' Whether the `I' displays by nature what 
we come to designate (in the conventional terminology) as masculine or feminine 
features, it is not as a result of socio-cultural constraints. This is what Lily Briscoe has 
learnt through conjuring the `spirit' of Mrs. Ramsay and what enables her to finish her 
painting. She has been combating masculine demands, even her own `masculine' pride 
urging her to sustain her `self' as a painter and artist, and her self-consciousness of the 
socio-cultural `male gaze. ' First of all she must learn to feel freely and then she needs 
to be able to reflect on her feelings and to attend to an objective understanding of them 
as the self stands back from itself (the very process of artistic creation in Woolf's 
view). Through the image of Mrs. Ramsay, Lily's grip on the `I' is loosened. She must 
dissolve her `self' and its obsessions before she can re-connect with the deceased Mrs. 
Ramsay and only then can she empathise with the `otherness' of Mrs. Ramsay's 
grieving husband and begin the process of propinquity and detachment which might 
produce truly creative art. 
In A Literature of Their Own, Showalter (whose feminist insistence on a 
category of innate femaleness is still anchored in conventional sexual ideology) 
critically remarked that androgyny is an inhuman and unattainable utopia which Woolf 
adopted to evade her uneasiness about the sensations of her own female body. She 
wrote, after reviewing the works of Dorothy Richardson, "how much better it would 
`1 Richard C. McCleary, Preface, Signs, by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1960; Northwestern UP, 1964) 
xv, ii. Originally wording: "I can perceive something objectively only if I can perceive it simultaneously 
from more than one perspective. " 
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have been if [female artists] could have forgiven themselves, if they could have faced 
the anger instead of denying it, could have translated the consciousness of their own 
darkness into confrontation instead of struggling to transcend it" (Showalter, 
Literature 262). Yet, even after such a reflection, she continues to denounce Woolf's 
idea of androgyny without realising that her former conclusion is a literary kindred 
spirit to what Woolf is trying to illuminate in A Room. In Showalter's words, 
"Androgyny was the myth that helped [Woolf] evade confrontation with her own 
painful femaleness and enabled her to choke and repress her anger and ambition" 
(Literature 264). But Woolf did not deny her anger against injustice, she simply 
refused to comply with the violences of a patriarchal society. In comic spirit, Woolf 
sought to expel altogether the masculine property of anger and the capacity of the 
egoistic `I' to dominate her mind and her creativity. Instead of fighting with force, she 
ridiculed masculine megalomania as an expression of the immense insecurity within 
men (as in the character of Mr. Ramsay who is "venerable and laughable at one and 
the same time") (TL 51). Woolf did not judge, but instead assumed the pose of a 
detached analyst who simply reveals the absurdity of present realities and beliefs. 
In responding to Toril Moi's defence of Woolf and her androgyny idea, 
Showalter states that the aim of her study in A Literature of Their Own is not the 
textuality of women's writing, but the relationship between the dominant and the 
muted culture: how they are valued; how it is possible for the minor culture to develop 
a standard and tradition of its own. Such a concern seems to be in close parallel to 
what Woolf had advocated throughout A Room: the need to create a room where the 
private feminine self, instead of being beaten into conformity, would have a chance to 
grow and flourish (within an oppressive male culture) according to its own nature. 
According to Showalter, her criticism of Woolf and her opposition to the idea of 
androgyny should not be approached through philosophical or linguistic methods, as 
Toril Moi has suggested in her Sexual/Textual Politics (which argues against 
Showalter's criticism of Woolf through the Post-Structuralist ideas of Derrida and 
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Kristeva, rather than Showalter's standpoint in cultural anthropology and social 
history). Yet, Showalter ventures to suggest that Woolf has conformed to the 
traditional image of a "melancholy, guilt-ridden, suicidal" woman (Literature 264). 
Such an accusation betrays Showalter as embodying her own inheritance of the 
patriarchal ideology of the female malady. Although, in the end, Woolf still 
surrendered to death (fearing that her mental illness would eventually overwhelm her 
sanity), her suicidal act might be seen, like Septimus's, to be propelled by the 
patriarchal authority of medicine that threatened her sense of integrity. 22 Perhaps, like 
Septimus, her self-annihilation was an effort to preserve the precious treasure: the 
autonomous self free from the constraint of social authority. "Death was defiance, " 
defiance against the socio-cultural constraints on selfhood (MD 202). "Death was an 
attempt to communicate"; to reach the centre which seems to be unattainable in the 
socio-contextualised life (202). 
To write as a woman who has forgotten she is a woman is not a suppression of 
her femininity and her female experience. 23 Instead, to forget thoroughly, to reach 
beyond a consciousness split by the egotistic insistence on the `I' and to transcend the 
female plight, the woman artist must immerse herself in the darkness in order to feel 
deeply her own inner conflicts, to learn her troubling thoughts and then to dissolve her 
distress and anxiety along with a socially constructed subjectivity. To write as a 
woman is not necessarily to write with the white ink of milk: the female body need not 
(and should not! ) be solely identified as the body of motherhood. As a woman, Woolf 
might not have experienced the process of reproduction that all women of her time 
were expected to experience if they were to be regarded fully as `women, ' yet that 
does not make her claim to write as a woman less authentic. Woolf did not reject 
femininity. What she rejected was the feminine self governed by masculine values and 
22 Once, on the edge of a nervous breakdown, Woolf noted in her diary: "Thought of my own power of 
writing with veneration, as of something incredible, belonging to someone else; never to be enjoyed by 
me" (WD 94). 
23 ARO 92. 
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the ideology of her patriarchal society. It is not a natural inborn femininity, but rather a 
nurtured and instituted identity. Woolf did acknowledge the different qualities and 
traits of different sexes. What she repudiated was the dominant voice of an 
overmasculinised society which proscribed the gender role of women. 
Showalter's concise definition of androgyny-"full balance and command of an 
emotional range that includes male and female elements"-does not seem to 
encompass the full picture which Woolf tried to draw for the idea of androgyny 
(Literature 263). Androgyny is a figure of speech describing a state of mind. Curiously 
(or perhaps not so very curiously) it maps onto the neurological accounts of 
consciousness that posit both a ('masculine') socio-symbolic `I' (of extended 
consciousness fabricated along with autobiographical memory, consistent and capable 
of self-reflexive reasoning) as well as a (`feminine') core self which is impalpable and 
impregnable and accessed through a dim sense of bodily feelings and yet also 
intelligible as a "luminous halo" that surrounds one, providing a fundamental sense of 
Dasein (of an unformed `I' being-there). The mind exists as a perpetually ongoing 
editorial process of composing a consistent autobiographical selfhood (that one comes 
to identify as the `I') expressed through language, while a more basic and intrinsic self 
seems to subtend this autobiographical self: "the true self, and it is, they say, compact 
of all the selves we have it in us to be; commanded and locked up by the Captain self, 
the Key self' (0 214). It is an awareness immersed in feelings; and through its feeling 
of feelings, the `self' emerges and persists, sustaining continuity without being fixed. 
In James's view, "Resemblance among the parts of a continuum of feelings (especially 
bodily feelings) experienced along with things widely different in all other regards, 
thus constitutes the real and verifiable `personal identity' which we feel" (1: 336). 
`` It 
is an `I' that could never be fully defined by the social language within the present 
socio-cultural context, yet nevertheless, it subsists along with the existence of the 
body. 
In narrative, Woolf contrived to catch this `spirit' of life when it is off-guard. 
For 
24 Ryan 861. 
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James, Woolf and Damasio, this `spirit' of self is a conglomerated sum of all the 
half-felt feelings and half-formed thoughts that circulate within one and that the poetic 
writer might attempt to capture through a non-analytic and thoroughly `embodied' 
kind of language. 
Androgyny is a descriptive image of what Bernard describes as the double 
capacity to feel and to reason. As an example of an androgynous selfhood, Bernard, 
though conceiving of himself to be complex and many, is nonetheless fully himself. 
"[J]oined to the sensibility of a woman ... 
Bernard possessed the logical sobriety of a 
man" (W 56). Bernard's flexibility perhaps leaves him without a rigid and constant 
enclosed frame, but unlike Rhoda, he is not altogether formless. He has no need to 
hold himself to any framework. Neville, who is rigid and precise, is nevertheless 
constantly struck with an unintelligible, non-existential, stasis which he calls 
"stricture, " "rigidity, " "death among the apple tree" (W 17). It is a projection of an 
inner desire for order and the meaning of life against the precariousness and 
contingency of being-in-the-world (as further elucidated through the unworthy death 
of his personal epic hero-Percival). Instead of combating the essential fluidity and 
uncertainty of being, Bernard embraces life with all its possibilities and so achieves 
being in its entirety. He allows himself to feel the current and gush of the bodily 
emotions and feelings. As Bernard himself has perceived, "something remains floating, 
unattached" and with his little phrases and storytelling, he liberates himself as well as 
his listeners from the oppressive restriction of the social present and delivers them into 
a fantasy world of complete self-autonomy and self-creativity: "when he [Bernard] 
talks ... a 
lightness comes over one. One floats, too, as if one were that bubble; one is 
freed; I have escaped, one feels" (W 57; 27). The embrace of the self-obliterating 
inner darkness (as Mrs. Ramsay has observed) liberates him from the "fret, " "hurry" 
and "stir" of the treacherous life (TL 70). Being compared to Byron, Bernard seems to 
be a comical reflection of a Byronic hero whose obstinate disregard of any social 
decorum in the pursuit of selfhood and self-achievement, is in the end simply also a 
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desire to mingle and merge with others. Seeking life in all its possibilities, he 
concludes his life-narrative with the claim: "Against you I will fling myself, 
unvanquished and unyielding, 0 Death! " (W 228). 
Lacking an obstinate and secure sense of form, Bernard is hardly a successful 
novelist, for he fails to complete any of his stories. In Neville's opinion, Bernard is 
prevented from determinate actions or definite resolutions because of "his incorrigible 
moodiness" (W 35). "He is shaded with innumerable perplexities, " thinks Neville of 
Bernard (W 35). As Bernard also realises about himself, his absorption in concrete 
reality and his tendency to flow with bodily feelings leaves him unable to detach 
himself from the bodily present into the kind of abstraction that allows words to be 
finalised through "refrigeration" (W 50). Being always bodily and emotionally 
involved, his phrases and his novelistic insights are inevitably "dabbling always in 
warm soluble words" (W 50). His triviality seems to resemble Marcel Proust whose 
androgynous mind, in Woolf's opinion, possesses more of a feminine quality; and like 
Dorothy Richardson, he is forever constructing a continual story without an end, and 
thus contradicting the patriarchal linear history whose meaning lies in its 
culmination. 25 Bernard seems to symbolise the state of mind that flows freely and 
undividedly, unharmed by the strife of life and of the world, in perfect consort with 
itself. Paradoxically, it is this state of mind, with its integrity based upon a flexibility 
and fluidity, that Woolf has identified as the `backbone' of a writer. 26 For only under 
such a state of mind, could one receive the world and life fully and roundly as it is and 
in return generate through its writing the essence of being. 
Proposing the idea of androgyny, Woolf did not seek to abolish the different 
qualities of men and women, for as she wrote: "It would be a thousand pities if 
women wrote like men, or lived like men, or looked like men, for if two sexes are 
quite inadequate, considering the vastness and variety of the world, how should we 
25 Showalter, Sexual 240-62. 
26 ARO 66. 
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manage with one only. Ought not education to bring out and fortify the differences 
rather than the similarities? " (ARO 79). Contrarily, Woolf urged us to seek out our 
innate differences and to recognise such differences without attaching to them any 
definitive evaluation or measurement (especially the measurement of the prevailing 
masculine values of the patriarchal society), for what grounds could we provide for 
such an evaluation unless we could step out of gender altogether? Society and its 
cultural values might change and there might come a time when femininity and 
womanhood would be otherwise defined; a time when "[women] will take part in all 
the activities and exertions that were once denied them" (ARO 36). They might be in 
the laboratory doing experiments. They might be in parliament making laws. This 
time may be approaching, as the narrator reminds its female readers (listeners), for 
"most of the professions have been open to you for close on ten years now" (ARO 
101). The prospect of a new womanhood is similarly advocated in Mrs. Dalloway as 
Elizabeth Dalloway wanders through London in omnibuses, conceiving the 
opportunities she might have in the future. Even those jobs which are conventionally 
designated for women might also be valued differently. When women are struggling 
with their designated femininity and the social expectation of their womanhood and 
motherhood, men also are bound by their assumed masculinity. For, as observed in A 
Room, even when men seem to be in every way superior, they too are angry, judging 
from their expressed opinions about women. For, as they barely acknowledge but 
nevertheless emotionally intuit, their superiority might only be secured as long as 
women remain their inferiors: the master-slave relation is essentially fragile. 
Given the topic of women and fiction, the narrative `I' of A Room goes to the 
British Library in search of an answer for the true state of a woman in documented 
historical facts. In an ironical reflection on the topic `women and fiction, ' `the fictional 
facts' which men have gathered about women are disclosed through research and 
documentation catalogued as authoritative truth. But such documents rely on the facts 
of a female image distortedly drawn by men of power, honour and qualifications. 
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Either in the apparent fictive narrative of poets and novelists or the concealed fictional 
quality in the words of historians and biographers, women are portrayed through the 
gaze, imagination, and ideology of men. The narrator of A Room therefore concludes 
from her `factual' research that women would never be offered an equal chance to men, 
for "Women have served all these centuries as looking-glasses possessing the magic 
and delicious power of reflecting the figure of man at twice its natural size" (32). In A 
Room, by disguising its inquest in the form of a fiction, Woolf tries to reveal the 
general `fiction' of the facts written on women and fabricating a womanhood (caught 
between the virtues of Virgin Mary and the sin of Eve27) that must be protected by 
patriarchal society. "Anything may happen when womanhood has ceased to be a 
protected occupation" as the narrator of A Room looks forward into future 
possibilities (36). A Room begins by pondering the given topic of "women and 
fiction"; the narrative `I' by offering her idea that "a woman must have money and a 
room of her own if she is to write fiction, " starts with a consideration of the financial 
circumstances of women (3). Showalter has criticised Woolf for hiding behind a 
fictional framework and detaching herself through an unserious and facetious tone. 
Yet, it is through its own fictionality that A Room comes to reveal the fictionalised 
facts of women. 
A Room, written immediately after Orlando, possesses a similar spirit to Orlando. 
As the fictive biography enables Orlando to transcend time as well as sex and become 
the embodiment of androgyny, A Room carries the idea forward through its 
fictionalised discussion of women and fiction. Both alike are playful in tone, mocking 
the reality of `fictional' facts. Although Orlando was originally planned as a "jeu 
d'esprit, " a writer's holiday from her serious experiments, it is no less a criticism of 
social stereotypes, ideologies, and fictive realities as A Room. As the fictional 
27 Beth Rigel Daugherty, "`There she sat': The Power of the Feminist Imagination in To the 
Lighthouse, " Twentieth Century Literature 37.3 (1991): 289-308. Daugherty sees the mother-child 
image as an reinforcement of the venerable Mother who sacrifices `her self, ' while the story of the 
Fisherman and his wife resembles Eve's sin for knowledge and power. 
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counterpart of A Room, and underneath the fictional disguise, Woolf exhibits the 
absurdity and the fictitious nature of biography, history, and recorded facts: 
To give a truthful account of London society at that or indeed at any other 
time, is beyond the powers of the biographer or the historian. Only those 
who have little need of the truth, and no respect for it-the poets and the 
novelists-can be trusted to do it, for this is one of the cases where the truth 
does not exist. Nothing exists. The whole thing is a miasma-a mirage. (0 
135) 
Stretching across four centuries, Orlando makes the inconsistency between 
socio-cultural conventional demands more perceptible and ironical to its readers. 
Orlando is Woolf's most self-conscious contemplation of the art of biography: how 
should one write a biography; what should be the main concern of a biographer; how 
could a biographer capture more fully the characteristic of his subject? By raising the 
question of a substantial self and a fixed identity, Orlando has been seen as 
particularly important by post-structuralist critics for it does indeed, in exposing the 
fragile foundation of the signifier, also challenge conceptions of name and identity. 
By placing various value standards and diverse social contexts side by side, 
Woolf, in Orlando, displays the mirage-like nature of socio-cultural conventions 
through different ages. In each specific epoch, a peculiar zeitgeist is manifested which 
is also comically reflected through the depiction of the weather-a preoccupation of 
the English. Thus, in the passionate age of the Elizabethan, "The brilliant amorous day 
was divided as sheerly from the night as land from water... The rain fell vehemently, 
or not at all. The sun blazed or there was darkness" (0 19-20). With the ending of the 
Eighteenth century, cloud starts to gather over the sky of London and "damp now 
[begins] to make its way into every house-damp, which is the most insidious of all 
enemies" (0 157). In exaggerating the temperament of each age, Orlando flaunts the 
deceptive solemnity of traditions which are actually easily manoeuvred and apt to 
change. Orlando thus exposes the fictive nature of the `apparent facts' that are 
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recorded by historians and biographers. Even gender traits and propensities, instead of 
being an intrinsic nature, are liable to change according to the outfits and clothing 
adopted. Outfits not only shape the manners and deportments of Orlando, but they 
also prompt different gazes from others that further condition her behaviour. Therefore, 
she reflects, "there is much to support the view that it is clothes that wear us and not 
we them; we may make them take the mould of arm or breast, but they mould our 
hearts, our brains, our tongues to their liking" (0 132). Although pervaded by the 
comic spirit of Shakespearian transvestism, Orlando is a Nietzschean narrative 
experiment `on truth and lies in a nonmoral sense, ' peeling layer by layer the 
socio-cultural lies formulated by the convenience and urgency of social life, in an 
attempt to unveil the perpetual Truth of the human state of being. In a momentary 
apprehension, Orlando realises "At one and the same time, therefore, society is 
everything and society is nothing. Society is the most powerful concoction in the 
world and society has no existence whatsoever" (0 136). 
The idea of androgyny serves to rescue women from their present status as Echo 
who, without a voice of her own, could only resonate with the pompous narcissism of 
men. Superior though men are, still they need further confirmation of their superiority 
by debasing women (either devaluing their intellectual ability or seeing it as a dark, 
irrational, unintelligible, `feminine' force). As Woolf has stated, "The history of men's 
opposition to women's emancipation is more interesting perhaps than the story of that 
emancipation itself' (ARO 50). In both A Room and Three Guineas, Woolf witnesses 
how desperate men are in asserting women's gender role in society and imbuing them 
with the social expectations of their womanhood and daughterhood: coercing them to 
take up marriage as their one and only option of a `career. ' Even their unequal pay for 
work is a discouragement for them to be financially independent. 
28 The emancipation 
of women has brought, as Showalter has pointed out, not only a battle between the 
two sexes as men resent women's liberation from their conventional role, but also a 
Three Guineas 166-167. 
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battle within the idea of sexual identity itself. For, how does each sex conceptualise 
itself without a minoring counterpoint? "What was most alarming to the fin-de-siecle 
was that sexuality and sex roles might no longer be contained within the neat and 
permanent borderlines of gender categories" (Showalter, Sexual 9). 
The plight of female creative minds is self-evident through the metafictionalised 
voice of A Room: "it needs little skill in psychology to be sure that a highly gifted girl 
who had tried to use her gift for poetry would have been so thwarted and hindered by 
other people, so tortured and pulled asunder by her own contrary instincts, that she 
must have lost her health and sanity to a certainty" (45). The words seem to spell out 
the strain of Woolf as a female writer who seeks for a maternal tradition, yet who is 
also compelled to kill the selfless `angel in the house' that complies with patriarchy. 
Without a prominent maternal figure, similar to Mrs. Hilbery, Woolf pays homage to 
Shakespeare, who despite his incandescent and androgynous mind, might nevertheless 
be construed as a patriarchal figure. In A Room, Woolf endeavours to displace his 
parental authority onto a sibling relationship which addresses all hypothetical female 
writers as `Shakespeare's sister. ' 
A creative writer must transcend the socio-cultural gender ideologies, loosen the 
grip on the egoistic `I' and accept willingly that, more or less, there are so-called 
masculine and a feminine trait co-existing within oneself. A creative mind, writes 
Woolf, must be neither fully masculine nor feminine, but instead the writer has to 
forget whether s/he is a man or a woman as both masculine and feminine qualities 
within such a mind should be perfectly blended-a mind which is "man-womanly" or 
"woman-manly": "anything written with that conscious bias [of sex] is doomed to 
death. It ceases to be fertilised" (ARO 94). For such a mind would be endlessly 
distracted from whatever is required by the plot of the novel or, in Woolf's own terms, 
"[one would be] thinking of something other than the thing itself' (ARO 67). One 
would be writing in order to sustain one's selfhood, to prove and defend one's 
subjectivity. In short, one would be constructing a narrative of one's egoistic `I' rather 
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than writing about the story, the characters, or the truth of being. 
Androgyny thus adheres closely to the ideal of what John Keats would call 
`negative capability, ' an ability to create without an enforced self being impelled to 
defend its virility or to assert its social identity. It is a capacity to yield to the formless 
and yet formal void/plenitude of the nature of selfhood. In To the Lighthouse, Mr. 
Ramsay, comparing his personal achievement to that of Shakespeare, comes to 
recognise that he would never reach Z, the supreme destination, but rather he would 
be striving between P and Q, and probably would eventually reach an end at R, the 
initial of his name (suggested by Elizabeth Abel as the achievement of the egoistic 
`I'). 29 Perhaps this is because he is driven by the desire to establish himself (worrying 
as always about his social image and his posthumous reputation and the publicity of 
his name). He covets an acclaimed reputation, imagining how posterity will judge him. 
He is self-obsessed, constantly demanding attention and recognition and sympathy 
from others. He might simply end up achieving himself, but never moving beyond 
himself 
To attain the ultimate achievement of Z (which perhaps only Shakespeare has 
come to achieve), one must be able to transcend the egoistic `I' and look beyond. Such 
is the world that Bernard tries to envision-"a world seen without a self, " a 
transcendence of the egoistic selfhood and its consolatory projections and yet also a 
return to the bodily-bound feelings of being-in-the world from which the imaginative 
projections of that self might go forth (W 221). Instead of perceiving and interpreting 
the world through a self, the self is reflected and known through the world perceived. 
For the objective world is permeated with subjective feelings which are mainly 
unrecognised by subjects themselves. So, the evidence that not a trace of self has left 
its mark in Shakespeare's works (as in A Room) suggests that it is through its absence 
of the `I' that the full dimension of Shakespeare's mind could possibly be suggested. 
29 Elizabeth Abel, Virginia Woolf and the Fictions of Psychoanalysis (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1989) 
so-7. See also Rachel Bowlby, Virginia Woolf: Feminist Destination (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) 
63-79. 
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Woolf praises Shakespeare: if ever there was a mind that is incandescent, it must be 
Shakespeare's. 30 Both Woolf's and Keats' accounts acknowledge that a degree of 
flexibility and impersonality is essential to creativity. Both of their accounts indicate 
how the self-conscious `I' would hinder the flow of the mind and sterilise its fertility. 
Woolf has observed that it is inevitable for one to be "surprised by a sudden 
splitting off of consciousness" as the mind alters its perspectives, bestowing upon the 
self an ability to conceive itself as an insider as well as an outsider of circumstances 
(ARO 88). Such splitting of consciousness is the quality of an inner self seeking to 
glimpse beyond "the dominance of the letter `I' and the aridity, which, like the giant 
beech tree, it casts within its shade" (ARO 90). Only with the removal of the block `I, ' 
can a fuller apprehension of the essence of being and of a more objective reality be 
possible. An androgynous mind, in perfect consort with itself, creates an 
unself-conscious, forgetting, state of being. It is a state in which the `I, ' since its 
existence and integrity is no longer threatened, ceases to cloud over the mind. In 
contrast, writers, whether male or female, who are over-conscious of their gender 
position within society inevitably write with anger or agitation. Though the grudges 
against and the opinions of patriarchal society might still remain, an integral mind 
would not allow such prejudice to pervade all thoughts and diminish its own integrity. 
So Bernard who, though conscious of Neville's opinion of his untidiness, does not feel 
pressured to conform to or to resist the image or identity that his friend has imposed 
on him. He is sure that he could never be thoroughly defined or transfixed by his 
friends. What others see is only an apparition of oneself. The true inner state remains 
invisible and unlimited. 
With the advocacy of the necessity for a room and five hundred pounds for a 
woman to write, Woolf was not simply creating a new circumscribed ground for the 
future female artist (as she expressed in a letter that the room and the money should 
30 ARO 52. 
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not be interpreted literally). 31 She urged them to seek and create their own specialties, 
to forge their own means to express and create, to go beyond the boundary. Yet, for 
Showalter, "Woolf is the architect of female space, a space that is both sanctuary and 
prison; " while in the opinion of Peggy Kamuf, the room which Woolf has created is a 
transitory space of a feminine art yet nevertheless a space of interruption (Literature 
264). 32 The room, as Kamuf sees it, is the subjective space: "the room of the 
Cartesian subject, where Ego sum is struck as an emblem bearing a proper name, 
taking up space whose limits can be delineated and, perhaps most importantly, where 
the subject becomes one-both singular and whole" (13). Both Showalter and Kamuf 
see a walled room of limitations and restraints, while A Room is actually an unlimited 
and creative space of self-liberation. It is the wedge-shaped core of darkness of 
feminine creativity. It is an infinite space of fantasy, of dream, where the self is both 
absorbed in its own being, weaving and reweaving its own narrative and yet 
re-imagines future spaces for other female selves. Though interruptions will always 
occur, whether in the room of the mind or the material room in spatial reality, the 
room and the five hundred pounds is not a constraint which Woolf imposes on the 
female artist, but instead they are seen as means that enable women to disregard 
boundaries and discard an instituted female identity. The room and the five hundred 
pounds grant female writers a new and free territory within which to break the 
sentence, as well as the sequence, designated by a patriarchal society. Without 
economic independence, women cannot achieve intellectual and emotional 
independence: the creative mind rests on material foundations. 
Threading her way towards the final pronouncement of the androgynous ideal of 
the mind, Woolf begins with the most basic material facts: bodily needs. For, a natural 
androgynous mind is firmly rooted on a material base. The traditional categories of 
masculinity and femininity are irresolutely founded upon discrepancies of financial 
31 Letter, dated 16 August 1932, to Harmon H. Goldstone. L 5: 91. 
'' Peggy Kamuf, "Penelope at Work: Interruptions in A Room of One's Own. " NOVEL 16.1 (1982) 
5-18. 
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status and economic strength. As the narrative `I' in A Room wanders from college to 
college, from luncheon to dinner, what preoccupies her is how physical satisfaction 
could have aspired to great talk, ideas or simply a poetic thought. As she said, "The 
human frame being what it is, heart, body and brain all mixed together, and not 
contained in separate compartments..., a good dinner is of great importance to good 
talk. One cannot think well, love well, sleep well, if one has not dined well" (ARO 16). 
Although seemingly vulgar, material realities are nevertheless fundamental to 
intellectual freedom and creative spirit. The self within her, as the narrator has 
observed, is `rusted' by her poor economic state. She has been striving to earn her own 
living, forced to take up jobs which she does not wish to do. The talent, the poet, 
within her, is eroded away along with her self, her soul, under the strain of living. By 
chance when an aunt is dead and leaves her five hundred pounds a year, "and 
whenever [she changes] a ten-shilling note a little of that rust and corrosion is rubbed 
off; fear and bitterness go" (34). 
Various interpretations of the term `androgyny' have been proposed by critics. 
Whether Woolf applies androgyny as a complete annihilation of the distinction 
between masculine and feminine or as a balance between these two qualities could 
lead to quite controversial conclusions. Orlando is generally recognised as the work 
that carries forth most fully in novelistic terms her idea of androgyny. However, by 
neglecting the fact that the very idea of androgyny has run throughout most of her 
writing, the interpretation of her idea of androgyny often winds up with a conclusion 
that is far from Woolf's original intention. Her idea of androgyny is but a subtle 
reflection of her interest in the Cambridge theory of epistemology. The idea of 
androgyny therefore should not be taken merely as a declaration of female rights and 
equalities. It was an idea for Woolf inextricably bound up with the pursuit of a 
transcendental yet unsubstantial reality: it is a quest after the problem of "subject and 
object and the nature of reality" (TL 28). 
To understand androgyny and the incandescent state of mind it represents, one 
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must be able to imagine consciousness as multi-layered and multidimensional. There 
are different levels of subjective and objective consciousness. One tends to experience 
consciousness as a whole without sensing any division of its processes, and therefore 
the final conceptualisation of a self-reflexive consciousness in abstract symbols is 
made to stand for the entire process (from the in-take of the stimuli, to the 
interpretation of the stimuli and the subject position, to the subject's knowing of its 
position, and finally culminating in the form of conscious thoughts). The very idea of 
androgyny acknowledges more than anything what Merleau-Ponty has described as 
the carnal base of the immaterial mind. By androgyny, Woolf is saying that 
consciousness and mental properties are naturally orchestrated combinations of one's 
emotions, feelings and conscious reflections on such feelings and emotions that have 
come to be known as thinking and reasoning. Androgyny however, undermines the 
traditional demarcation of masculine and feminine gender roles and comes to be 
perceived as an idea of the genuine and undivided state of being that acknowledges 
the mutuality between the `feminine' and `emotional' body and the `masculine' and 
`rational' mind. Androgyny challenges an Apollonian civilisation that places utmost 
emphasis on incorporeal rationality and the absolute Real. The challenge is based on 
her recognition of the body and the feelings it feels and through which Woolf came to 
advocate the idea of androgyny as the most natural and creative state of the mind. 
Androgyny, instead of being a flight from her female body, is the conclusion to 
Woolf's inquest as a novelist into the nature of being, and the true relations between 
mind and body. 
Androgyny is a notion carrying the sense that in life to feel is to think and to be 
able to think rationally one has to have an intact mechanism of feeling. Androgyny is 
what Woolf has perceived as the natural healthy state of being (a reciprocal 
co-dependence of mind and body), while real madness is being either completely 
`masculine' or `feminine' when either feeling or reasoning entirely takes the rein and 
attempts repression of the other. It is also a metaphorical depiction of what James 
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argues "that personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective 
person, known by a passing subjective Thought and recognised as continuing in time" 
(1: 371). The advocacy of androgyny is more Woolf's direct confrontation with a 
stifling masculine rationality than the flight from her femaleness that Showalter 
asserts. For by undermining the drastic dichotomy between rationality and 
sensuousness, resorting to a pre-cultural nature of life and stressing the mutual 
dependence and co-existence between rational conception and carnal perception, 
Woolf has also come to subvert the cultural conception of gender differences (as well 
as the mindibody split) and therefore opened up a new vista, free from any 
social-cultural constraints, in understanding `women' and `femaleness. ' 
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IV 
Mrs. Dalloway: "Ode to Time; An Immortal Ode to Time" 
Ah, love, let us be true 
To one another! For the world, which seems 
To lie before us like a land of dreams, 
So various, so beautiful, so new, 
Hath really neither joy, nor love, nor light, 
Nor certitude, nor peace, nor help for pain; 
And we are here as on a darkling plain 
Swept with confused alarms of struggle and flight, 
Where ignorant armies clash by night. 
Matthew Arnold, Doi'cr Beach 
"Fear no more the heat o' th' sun/Nor the furious winter's rages" (Cym. 
4.2.259-60). The mournful words of the dirge of Cymbeline sing out the thematic 
mood of an apprehensive London society recovering from the horror of the Great War. 
Woven into the narrative of Mrs. Dalloway, the words that were once meant to 
appease the soul of the dead and to alleviate the minds of the living from their 
grieving for their lost loved ones, also and somewhat paradoxically, endow both an 
impulse to feel and taste life subjectively as well as an entreaty to detach oneself from 
living in order to obtain an objective, impassive view of life which protects one from 
the sorrow of contingent experience. The Shakespearian wording, "the heat o' th' 
sun, " expresses at once both the exultation of life and also its tribulation; whilst "fear 
no more" pacifies the mind by inducing apathetic indifference towards the pulsing of 
life, as well as signifying the stasis of death. An inner conflict between a yearning for 
and a fear of both life and death is therefore prominently illustrated. And betwixt these 
conflicting feelings there resides a convoluted consciousness of temporality that 
divulges both the process of successive development within each subjective world and 
a present temporal position which is being wedged into "their places in an ode to Time. 
an immortal ode to Time" (MD 76). 
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Mrs. Dalloway brings out this paradoxical apprehension of the precariousness 
of life in its monadic and contingent disparity placed against the definite 
conclusiveness of death as an atemporal condition. The narrative, wandering in and 
out of different characters' mental states, presents, in parallel to a constant awareness 
of time passing, a self-enclosed state of the core consciousness living fully within the 
very moment and inattentive to the progress of an external temporal reality. The 
narrative thus presents a reflexive consciousness wedged within a memory of the past 
and an expectation of what is to come in a recognised span of time. In the narrative of 
the characters' minds, a moment is prolonged beyond its measure. The time of 
narration taken up in the inner narrative of the characters largely exceeds the tempo 
paced by Big Ben. Therefore, in the reminiscent narrative of the past, the past recalled 
through a consciousness aware of the span of time is relived in a pure duration of the 
present. Sitting with Clarissa Dalloway sewing in her drawing room, or musing with 
Septimus Smith and Peter Walsh in St. James' Park, the reader is given a protracted 
sense of time-one minute of a particular state of the mind eclipses any alternate 
consciousness of the present and becomes an hour, a day, a whole episode of the 
past-until the chiming of Big Ben finds its way to recall attention to the present 
moment and reminds both the character as well as the reader of the actual time passed. 
The extended consciousness, in configuring an autobiographical narrative, 
induces an intensive awareness of temporality. Withdrawing beyond the present 
moment of its physical and mental state, the reflexive consciousness pictures its 
subjective present in context with other moments and therefore recognises the 
development of time. Time has been lost. And against the backdrop of the perennial 
world of Nature, sung through the immortal ode to Time, the subject apprehends its 
finite being. With the juxtaposition of these two layers of conscious states in their 
diverse features, the kinetic and static duality of being in time is therefore enacted and 
rendered through the narrative. What is further entailed, however, is a sense of the 
duplicitousness involved in the recognition of an external reality while one 
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experiences and embraces an innermost subjective quality. The world would certainly 
continue to exist without any one of the numerous subjective worlds. Its independent 
reality is indisputable. Nevertheless, with the loss of a subjective world, a segment of 
the world is likewise irretrievably lost forever. 
The self-awareness of the subject's spatio-temporal position in the world 
manifests the human capacity to attain a relatively objective comprehension of the 
world (which "is compatible with the essential subjectivity of the mental") through 
individual, subjective standpoint (Nagel 17). The soaring ambition of the human `soul' 
to get outside the body and beyond its own "house, by means of thought, " forms the 
backdrop of the narrative in Mrs. Dalloway and illuminates its theme of individual 
relations to both the objective and subjective reality of being (MD 30). The narrative, 
in drawing a general pattern of life through the conglomeration of individual voices 
(as each individual consciousness builds up the narrative consciousness of the novel), 
characterises a human subject continually shuffling between a qualitative subjective 
experience and a shared objective comprehension. In Mrs. Dalloway, the reader, like 
Clarissa, as she stands looking face-to-face with an elderly woman across from her 
window, is confronted with a seemingly disparate yet nonetheless co-responsive 
individual consciousness: "She parted the curtains; she looked. Oh, but how 
surprising! -in the room opposite the old lady stared straight at her! " (MD 203). The 
confrontation with the presence of another impenetrable subjective space is an 
abhorrent experience as the similarity of one and the other threatens one's subjectivity. 
But knowing that one is not alone also provides consolation. Trans-subjective empathy 
is suggested as Clarissa looks into the eyes of the old woman across from her and sees 
her self and her life, just as the existence of Septimus has impinged upon her 
consciousness. The subjective world of the woman and of Septimus would always be 
a mystery to her. Yet, the sense of the plausibility of transference between distinct 
subjective consciousnesses not only links Clarissa to Septimus (who she knows only 
by name yet for whom she feels a mysterious empathy) but also threads each personal 
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strand in life into a vocal tapestry of a collective narrative that postulates "a world that 
simply exists and has no perspectival centre, " crooned by a bodiless voice of no age 
(Nagel 27). 
By contrasting the chiming of Big Ben (that assigns an incontestable public 
and perhaps `objective' time) with the irregular `subjective' temporality within the 
mind (that swerves in various temporal modes of extension and contraction), Mrs. 
Dalloway provides a graphic illustration of the multifarious temporality of different 
conscious states. These nevertheless correspond to the body and its position in the 
world. "The most dramatic way of entering the character's consciousness is by the 
modes of time, " says Richter (149). The conjunction of a distinctive time mode (that 
distinguishes as well as connects individual subjective realms) provides the elemental 
effect of the tunnelling process which Woolf has contrived through writing Mrs. 
Dalloway. The arrangement of the characters' adaptation to the interior tempo of their 
own, and to the exterior temporality designated by Big Ben, stages an inquiry into the 
nature of reality-the relativity of subjective and objective reality. With the 
deployment of various temporal modes in Mrs. Dalloway, the narrative renders an 
autobiographical consciousness, shifting between a subjective and an objective point 
of view of itself in relation to the world. Although Mrs. Dalloway is traditionally 
deemed to be broadly a variation on the stream-of-consciousness technique, the stream 
of the thought presented through the free indirect discourse is in fact fully allocated in 
the pulsations and feelings of the body. The flow of the narrative coheres with and 
responds to a bodily rhythm in the exchange of intakes and exhalations of breath and 
to the gathering and dissolving waves of feeling. And the development of plot 
recounts a constant interchange between -opening up and closing down within each 
individual. According to William James's speculation in The Principles of Psychology, 
it is the lack of an adequate vocabulary (to describe the combination of feeling and 
thought in representing our mental flows) that hinders and obscures our understanding 
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of the states of consciousness. 1 By writing life as it is genuinely lived, Woolf has 
come to ascribe the emergence of consciousness to feeling: specially those feelings 
which have long been concealed behind the reflexive self-awareness of the subject's 
position in the world. 
Probing into the mind of its characters, Mrs. Dalloway is a narrative of an All 
Soul's Day, as described by J. Hillis Miller, that resurrects the dead into the present. 2 
But it is also a narrative of `soul discourse' (as the word, `soul, ' becomes an obsessive 
referent to all the thoughts of the characters) that sketches the mental processes 
involved in accommodating the subjective and psychological world of the self to an 
external world and reality that contains that subjective world as well as being 
contained within it. The narrative is working all along to delineate `the soul, ' its nature 
and its status, but above all how it configures its being through its temporal relations 
in this world. The narrative, with its continuous sense of agony about the deprivation 
of one's subjective world (the elimination of individuality through the coercion of 
social norms) strives to transcend the familiar oppositional claims of the realist and 
idealist about whether the world is out there by itself or simply exists within the mind. 
The existential reality of the subjective world is what the narrative implores the reader 
to recognise and to respect. The persecution of `the soul' by an insidious social 
compulsion towards measurement-proportion and conversion- appals both Clarissa 
and Septimus as they silently implore the world of polite society to grant some licence 
for subjective space. The abhorrence expressed in the text towards characters such as 
Peter (to some extent), Miss Kilman, Dr. Holmes, and Sir William Bradshaw, is that 
they force their values and judgement upon others and in doing so subdue, confiscate, 
and annul their subjectivities. Although each of them seemingly assumes a role of 
caring and protection, as professional men and women, they care not for the personal 
needs of an individual, but some utilitarian and abstract idea of the general good of 
James 1: 185-198. 
` J. Hillis Miller. "Mrs. Da1loway: Repetition as the Raising of the Dead" Fiction and Repetition: Seven 
English Novels (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982) 176-202. 
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society and civilisation. Perchance, what they truly aim at is their own prospering as 
they inflict on others their view of the world and therefore establish their professional 
authority: "Worshipping proportion, Sir William not only prospered himself but made 
England prosper, secluded her lunatics, forbade childbirth, penalised despair, made it 
impossible for the unfit to propagate their views until they, too, shared his sense of 
proportion" (MD 109). They become judges. Their opinions are irrefutable verdicts 
that carry no truth. 3 The profession of caring ironically becomes an institutional force 
that eradicates personal singularity. Such characteristics are part of the idea of human 
nature, as Septimus speculates: "Human nature, in short, was on him. . . 
Once you 
stumble... human nature is on you. Holmes is on you": individuality is subdued into 
the impersonality of a conformist mass (MD 101). There is always a tension among 
the individual subjectivities of the novel. Confrontations between subjective spaces 
are often abrasive and brusque: unsound tussles within the souls seeking to affirm 
their own realities and in so doing estranging themselves from their own inner core of 
subjectivity. Yet, the narrative, like its protagonist, Clarissa, advocates and upholds an 
acknowledgment of individual subjective space: 
Had she ever tried to convert any one herself? Did she not wish everybody 
merely to be themselves? And she watched out of the window the old lady 
opposite climbing upstairs. Let her climb upstairs if she wanted to ... 
Somehow one respected that-that old woman looking out of the window, 
quite unconscious that she was being watched. There was something 
solemn in it-but love and religion would destroy that, whatever it was, the 
privacy of the soul. (MD 138-9) 
The external world of Mrs. Dalloway is perceived and experienced through the 
body: "how things appear to us depends on the interaction of our bodies with the rest 
of the world" (Nagel 15). The tempo of the body and the feelings and emotions it 
provokes are eternally projected onto the world. `The soul, ' or simply the internal 
N1D 162. 
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subjective space, is mirrored and reflected by the external world: "People, objects, 
landscapes-all the world which forms the boundaries of that semi-transparent 
envelope of consciousness-become a series of mirrors reflecting the many aspects of 
the character[s] [themselves]" (Richter 99). Even the temporality of the mental pace of 
thought is perpetually projected onto the external world and interacts constantly with 
objective public time. Thus, the narrative of Mrs. Dalloway is as much a narrative of 
the mind as one of its correlative body. The multi-layered deployment of time has 
come to capture the twofold relativity in introspective discourse between the subject 
as observer and inspected object, observed by its reflexive consciousness that has 
taken a stand further removed from immediate subjective perception. Through the 
representation of co-responses between perceptive thoughts and sensory stimuli, 
Woolf ingeniously provides her readers with new perspectives on the understanding of 
`soul discourse. ' The body and its feeling are here re-situated as the focalisers for 
conducting rational thought and socially appropriate behaviour. As the narrative of the 
soul becomes thoroughly bound up with feelings and emotions, Mrs. Dallowa 
suggests that, although language has its primal position in characterising our 
psychological conception and preoccupations, it is the capacity to feel that designates 
a `soul. ' 
The opening of Mrs. Dalloway directly conveys to the reader an experience of 
the body and a consciousness founded upon the body and its feelings. It is through the 
sensory intakes of the body that the mind's narrative of the past is induced: 
What a lark! What a plunge! For so it had always seemed to her when, with 
a little squeak of the hinges, which she could hear now, she had burst open 
the French windows and plunged at Bourton into the open air... feeling as 
she did, standing there at the open window, that something awful was 
about to happen. (MD 3) 
The present feeling incites a similar experience memory imprinted on her through the 
sensory intensity of past experience. Through a similarly congenial physical state, 
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Clarissa's memory of Bourton is revived. The bodily position has brought the past, 
Peter Walsh, Sally, vividly back into a narrative of reminiscence which embodies and 
restores the past to the present. The notion that it is always the body that goes through 
the experience first is the intellectual and intuitive kernel that grounds the technical 
experimentation of the novel. Real living cannot exist apart from bodily feelings and 
emotions. Thus, the stifling of feelings and senses, resulting from the masculine 
training of the war, has left Septimus in a corpse-like existence without the possibility 
of feeling and anchoring his own subjective position in the world. The detachment 
from the body and the full denial of subjective reality have provided him with no 
possible resolution which might accommodate a `sensible' recognition of an integrated 
reality mitigating the destructive dualism of absolute subjectivity and rigorous 
objectivity. Thus, "real things-real things were too exciting" (MD 155). For they 
elicited a reality conjoined of both the subjective and objective and thereby 
incompatible with the centreless objectivity he has been forced to accept-a world 
devoid of personal feelings and emotions-and with the full subjective domain (into 
which he has submerged) that defies any intrusive information from the outer world. 
Split between objectivity and subjectivity, Septimus is immobilised. Although 
objectively he oversees his physical present, the moments of the war still preoccupy 
his subjective reality. Such an impassable discord between seeing and feeling prevents 
him from acting in the world. He sees himself weighted down, petrified among the 
crowd, yet he cannot possibly initiate a movement as his objective reflection has 
alienated him from any responsive movement of the body. Even a simple act such as 
opening the eye and perceiving the world is pre-figured through an objective 
reflection on the action and its possible consequence: "He began, very cautiously, to 
open his eyes, to see whether a gramophone was really there" (MD 155). In perceiving 
the gramophone and then the sideboard, the plate of bananas, the shifting of focus 
enables an engagement with the body. As the flows and acts of the body are no longer 
checked by a `judgemental, ' self-reflexive point of view that terrifies him and prevents 
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him from engaging in real living, a genuine being is therefore made possible. He has 
long prohibited the flow of his feelings for fear of insanity, yet, opening his eves, he 
finds himself reassured by the present: "But there was nothing terrible about it, he 
assured himself... Why then rage and prophesy? Why fly scourged and outcast? Wh} 
be made to tremble and sob by the clouds? Why seek truths and deliver 
messages... Miracles, revelations, agonies, loneliness, falling through the sea, down, 
down into the flames, all were burnt out, for he had a sense[emphasis added], as he 
watched Rezia trimming the straw hat for Mrs. Peters, of a coverlet of flowers" (MD 
156). The physical engagement prevents him from taking the pure, detached, objective 
stance, picturing his own interaction with the world. He is in transports of joy when 
the hat is actually finished: "It was wonderful. Never had he done anything which 
made him feel so proud" (MD 158). In contrast to the war, "It was so real, it was so 
substantial, Mrs. Peter's hat" (MD 158). 
Septimus's insanity resembles Rachel's (the heroine of The Voyage Out): 
derangement as dissociation between subjective and objective realities. Both of them 
suffer from an estrangement and denial of their sense of subjective reality as part of 
that reality. They are both screened and prevented from a full integration of the 
subjective and the objectively real. Though Septimus's condition accords with 
everything that has been written recently on the effects of war trauma, both Rachel 
and Septimus experience the enforced dualisms of the modern world as a kind of 
trauma. Rachel and Septimus, like Rhoda too, in The Waves, cannot incorporate their 
dreamlike senses of the body into any feeling of the real through social symbolic 
orders. Rachel, who dies of an actual bodily illness, a fever, provides an inverted 
perspective on Septimus's condition. In contrast to Septimus, her ability to feel, 
especially the present, instead of sustaining a sense of reality, becomes too 
overwhelming and incompatible with social propriety. In her pursuit of the real, her 
incapacity to accommodate a subjective reality within the objective one drives her into 
a delirious unreality disconnected from her body. Rachel, in her sickness, refuses to 
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recognise Hewet, whilst Septimus re-adepts momentarily to the real world by 
conjoining body and mind. The body interposes itself amongst the narrative, forcing 
recognition. The body remembers the exultation and the woe and wretchedness it has 
been through. Through the sensory narrative of the body and the subjective reality that 
it endows, sanity and insanity are therefore characterised. 
A suggestively wounded heart, symbolised by Clarissa's own illness, arrests the 
narrative as well as its reader in that state of suspension that Clarissa herself has often 
felt before the out-booming of Big Ben. Situated on a June day directly after the 
devastating war, the narrative begins with the presentation of the ebullient 
cosmopolitan spirit of London which has resumed its usual order, or so it seems, with 
Big Ben striking the hour and the flag flying on top of Buckingham Palace. Along 
with Clarissa, one feels the freshness, the excitement, of the day when some past joy is 
remembered: a party bringing together people who one has known from the past, a 
glamorous celebration of life in the present now, is expected that very evening. And 
yet, a sudden pistol shot in the street startles everyone and reinvokes a condition of 
alarm. Society is still much agitated. Oftentimes the narrative assumes a pacifying 
monotonous tempo (as if the waves collect and fall, collect and fall) when, all of a 
sudden, a rupture, an unexpectedness (as a pistol or a doorbell going off) that has been 
awaited, disrupts the hypnotising rhythm to shatter the peace and quiet that the 
narrative has been building toward. Against the precariousness of the present, 
characters are prompted to search back into an ancient past for a sense of security and 
certainty-to a pre-oedipal, matriarchal and pastoral world as depicted by Elizabeth 
Abel; a world delivered from time (a timeless utopia) as it is sung by the battered 
woman. 4 Despite Clarissa's exuberant assurance that this is what she loves, "life; 
London; this moment of June, " unavailingly, an anxious and mournful spirit has 
sprung out of some sense of indefiniteness and unpredictability that haunts the mind 
4 Elizabeth Abel, Virginia \Voolf and the Fictions of Psychoanalysis (Chicago: U Chicago P, 1989) 
31-2. 
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of Clarissa and of all the characters throughout the entire narrative (MD 4). "It [is] 
very, very dangerous to live even one day, " in Clarissa's opinion (MD 9). For to live is 
to commit oneself to precariousness and contingency in temporality. The happiness of 
the moment is that it is an enclosed certainty within which one no longer need fear for 
"the heat o'th' sun/nor the furious winter's rages" (Cym. 4.2.259-60). 
Seeing the internal conflict of the post-war British Society that wishes fervently 
to suppress the horrifying memory of the war, to re-establish its former order, and to 
return to the past, the refrain from Cymbeline (as Julia Briggs has observed) is an 
attempt to pacify the surviving society by believing at least that those who have 
sacrificed their lives, the war dead, have escaped life's miseries. 5 They have been 
delivered from time and the indefiniteness that it incites. By these words, the narrative 
mourns for the dead with the prospect of appeasing the mind of the living, rescuing 
them from the sorrow of the war and the suffering of life. And therefore, the words of 
Cymbeline no longer just denote the burden of life as the dead are finally delivered 
from it, but instead it encourages life and endurance. As if in answer to the falsehood 
of Imogen's disguised death (as she lies, living but without feeling) in Cymbeline, the 
words, re-contextualised in Mrs. Dalloway, endorse a sense of living as being capable 
of feeling and responding to that feeling-not being half-alive as Rezia sees the 
people in England; or as Septimus, whose feelings have been stagnated by the war; or 
by the desire to conform to the patriarchal doctrines of a masculine ideal which 
regards feeling as `effeminate. '6 The words of Cymbeline entreat an acceptance of the 
body and its subjective reality as part of Reality, as the play anticipates a reawakening 
of the senses and therefore the revival of Imogen. 
For as it has been said, Septimus' problem is not that he is feeling too much, 
but that he is feeling too little. His incapacity to feel, to connect himself to his bodily 
presence, has already turned him into merely "a piece of bone" (MD 17). "Emotional 
Briggs, Virginia 139. 
6 Irrogen is the heroine of Cymbeline. The elegy is attributed to her when she falls into a false death 
and is thought dead. 
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repression was an essential aspect of the British masculine ideal" (Showalter, 
Female169). ' The passions and feelings that were once lit up by Miss Isabel Pole and 
by her sharing of Shakespeare and Keats are put out by the `masculinity' which 
Septimus has been expected to acquire through the war. He was passionate once and 
was being compared to Keats, although Mr. Brewer, seeing the change which Miss 
Isabel Pole initiated in him, has advised football (which, as identified by Showalter, is 
also an exercise of British masculinity): "Generals wrote in all seriousness about the 
English military advantages of prior training in football, and it was considered plucky 
and spirited for platoons to kick a football through No Man's Land on the way to 
attacking an enemy trench" (Female 169). The war has brought to fruition the result of 
`manliness' in Septimus. Yet, the stifling of his capacity to feel has also destroyed 
Septimus's capacity to live. 
In order to protect an England consisting mainly of Shakespeare, and which, 
ironically, celebrates the sentiment of life (argued in Three Guineas), Septimus takes 
part in a war which has helped to strangle the feelings and emotions that once flowed 
with the words of Shakespeare. "[W]hen Evans was killed ... 
Septimus, far from 
showing any emotion or recognising that here was the end of a friendship, 
congratulated himself upon feeling very little and very reasonably [emphasis added]. 
The war had taught him. It was sublime" (MD 94-5). He seems to have unbound 
himself from corporeal confinement and achieved a transcendental sublime. Yet, 
emotion continues to mount under its unconscious suppression. In rejecting the 
subjective reality of his bodily state, a discontinuity is therefore created within 
Septimus. This discontinuity in feeling has cut Septimus adrift from the past and 
therefore from whom he was. Without this sense of continuity, the Septimus who was 
once embedded in a Shakespearian dream of England, is dead already. He affirms his 
own `pastness. ' 
Showalter further writes, "as Fussell notes in his glossary of the feudal vocabulary of the prewar 
English literature combat, "not to complain" is to be "manly" (Female 169). 
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There are not just miseries in life, but exquisite happinesses and ecstasies. Only 
by living, by staying alive, and above all by allowing oneself to feel, could one 
possibly experience these sensations through the unfolding of time. "It is living, not 
dying, that counts, " as it is once declared by Clarissa in her first appearance in The 
Voyage Out (50). However, when Clarissa returns in Mrs Dalloway as a woman of 
fifty years of age, she no longer resembles that high-spirited, pragmatic lady who 
discourages the sentiments of Shelley's "Adonais" with an enthusiasm for living and 
doing. On the contrary, Mrs. Dalloway embodies altogether what Clarissa has 
formerly ridiculed: "He has outsoared the shadow of our night; / Envy and calumny, 
and hate and pain, / And that unrest which men miscall delight, / Can touch him not and 
torture not again; / From the contagion of the world's slow stain/ He is secure, and now 
can never mourn/ A heart grown cold, a head grown grey in vain; /Nor, when the 
spirit's self has ceased to burn, / With sparkless ashes load an unlamented um- 
(40.325-360). 8 Having gone through the war, Clarissa, in her old age, seems to refer 
back to her juvenile spite over the cruelty of life and once again the aspiration to an 
abstinence from actual feeling and living. 
Clarissa too has failed to feel: "She could see what she lacked. It was not beauty; 
it was not mind. It was something central which permeated; something warm which 
broke up surfaces" (MD 34). From Peter Walsh, one learns that, deep underneath, 
remorse and bitterness against life is borne within Clarissa. For him, she is 
fundamentally cold. She is determined to defy the hazards of life with her `ladylike' 
dignity and the burial of passion: 
As we are a doomed race, chained to a sinking ship... as the whole thing is a 
bad joke, let us, at any rate, do our part; mitigate the sufferings of our 
fellow-prisoners (Huxley again); decorate the dungeon with flowers and 
air-cushions; be as decent as we possibly can. Those ruffians, the Gods, 
shan't have it all their own way-her notion being that the Gods, who never 
8 In The Voyage Out, Clarissa Dalloway quoted the above passage from P. B. Shelley's "Adonais" to 
ridicule her own as well as others' adolescent broodings and sentiments. 
Lin 174 
lost a chance of hurting, thwarting and spoiling human lives, were seriously 
put out if, all the same, you behaved like a lady. (MD 85) 
Clarissa's idea of holding oneself upright reflects the great legacy of emotional 
restraint acclaimed in a culture made of `ladies' and `gentlemen. ' Her lady-like 
graciousness is carried through with temperance of feeling and, as Peter Walsh 
declares, `the death of the soul' (MD 64). Clarissa, though professing her love for this 
moment in June, for life, retreats in cold detachment to the secluded room of her 
own-a room also connected with the past, but with a feeling of safety-as she sits up 
late at night reading the memoirs of the dead. In Peter's opinion, Clarissa, as a woman, 
lives more in the past than in the present. The room to which Clarissa withdraws from 
life and real living is a figurative tomb, pronouncing life's closure as it is only fully 
embodied in the past. For a woman's life is unequal to the life of a man such as Peter 
who continues to love and be loved, or even Richard Dalloway who still receives 
invitations to amusing luncheons: "It was all over for her. The sheet was stretched and 
the bed narrow. She had gone up into the tower alone and left them blackberrying in 
the sun" (MD 51). Like a nunnery (her room in the attic), the room wards off the 
worldly fervour and the ferment of life-its excitement as well as its disappointment. 
In this room, she encloses her heart and body in the past. The room enables her to 
remain detached and cool within her heart from the life she loves and from the 
unexpectedness of living she dreads. It is already a denial of genuine living, a 
withdrawal from life. 
Richter suggests that Clarissa shares with her alter ego, Septimus, the tendency 
of failure to feel. While Septimus fails Rezia's expectation of providing her with a 
child, Clarissa, in an undertone, also fails to "dispel a virginity preserved through 
childbirth which clung to her like a sheet" (MD 34). 9 With the attic room as her 
fortress against the fortuities of life where she could prepare herself by collecting 
herself into a point (wrapping herself up with an identity that is fully embedded in the 
9 Richter 118-119. 
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past), Clarissa is therefore capable of roaming through London, plunging herself into 
the open air, feeling the pulsing of life. There is always a room where she can recoil. 
The room has become symbolically her subjective space. It is a room that protects her 
from the overwhelming presence of life and yet a room that provides her with strength 
and security to plunge back into life, occasionally. In the narrative of Mrs. Dalloway, 
there is an urge to live and feel and a fear for the threat that life and living entail. In 
secluding herself, Clarissa has chosen Richard who promised stability, continuity, and 
separate identity. Under his protection, Clarissa is free to indulge herself within the 
security of a past narrative. And therefore, by choosing Richard, Clarissa has chosen a 
life in the past rather than an unresolved and still open life in the future. Clarissa is not 
simply fencing off life itself, but also the treacherousness of life. It is in the past itself 
that Clarissa lives her present, but actually her life is unravelled through living in the 
past as she only allows herself to feel and live in its safeguarded stillness. Thus, years 
after, she still finds herself arguing with Peter, yet it is all in the past and its 
definitiveness has been affirmed. Perhaps there is some resentment that she has not 
chosen Peter and lived an adventurous life with him, yet feeding on the past, she 
simultaneously experiences the pulsation of a passionate excitement recalled into the 
present as well as the fulfilment of a conclusive ending: 
Take me with you, Clarissa thought impulsively, as if he were starting 
directly upon some great voyage; and then, next moment, it was as if the 
five acts of a play that had been very exciting and moving were now over 
and she had lived a lifetime in them and had run away, had lived with Peter, 
and it was now over. (MD 51) 
lt is in death and in past terms that Clarissa ventures to live. The thought of dispersing 
herself among the world is sustained by a detachment from life itself. 
In contrast to Clarissa's ambivalence towards life and her restraint of the 
feeling that life endows, Septimus is driven to marry Rezia in a panic over his 
incapacity to feel and as an attempt to reassure himself that he is living: "he became 
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engaged one evening when the panic was on him-that he could not feel" (MD 95). 
Instead of death itself, Septimus panics over not being able to feel. He can read; he 
can reason; but, he could not feel; he could not possibly `live. ' 10 Bound to live in a 
state deprived of all feelings and sensations, Septimus thus concludes there is no 
death: 
But he himself remained high on his rock, like a drowned sailor on a rock. 
I leant over the edge of the boat and fell down, he thought. I "gent under the 
sea. I have been dead, and yet am now alive, but let me rest still, he 
begged... and the sleeper feels himself drawing to the shores of life, so he 
felt himself drawing towards life. (MD 75) 
Failing to feel, Septimus senses his own deadness while remaining alive. Before 
jumping off the window sill, Septimus reflects that he does not want to die, for life is 
good; the sun hot. His death is his defiance against Dr. Holmes, Sir William Bradshaw, 
the patriarchal authority they represent and whose proportion inhibits the free flow of 
feelings and suffocates the soul into a state of death. 
"Fear no more, says the heart" is an impulse driving toward life rather than death 
as it assuages the inner anxiety about uncertainty and impels one to feel with the heart 
and the body (MD 43). With these words, Clarissa prepares herself (after her 
momentary reflection on the news of Septimus' death and on the fulfilment of death) 
to assemble, to return to the party, to open herself up for another experience. With the 
same words, Septimus regains momentarily a sense of external reality and re-engages 
himself with the `real, ' social, world which he fears. Sanity is the capacity to negotiate 
dialectically a reality mediated between subjective apprehension and objective 
comprehension. Septimus opens his eyes to reassure himself that there actually is a 
gramophone-not simply in his mind but as an indisputable external `reality' through 
the connection with which he is re-incorporated into society. In conjoining himself to 
his present physical state, Septimus starts to enquire after Mrs. Filmer and her married 
daughter and to work alongside Rezia in the making of the hat. The only occasion in 
10 MD 96. 
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which Septimus appears to be sane, rational, and happy is also the only moment when 
he is susceptible to the stimuli of external reality and to the feelings which these 
stimuli have generated in his absorption in the practical and creative task of 
hat-making. It is a moment when the opposition between the subjective and objective 
reality has been resolved in a perfect mergence that enables him to dream and create 
fully in the present. However, Dr. Holmes intrudes to force a stringent discrepancy. To 
preserve his threatened sense of subjectivity, and in an ironical submission to the 
demands of patriarchal proportion, Septimus tragically tries to preserve his 
subjectivity through the moment of self-elimination: "he plunged holding his treasure" 
(MD 202). 
The words assimilated from the elegy sung in Cymbeline, become a solace 
allowing one to bear the feelings one is bound to feel whilst alive, through inculcating 
a sense of detachment and indifference. In echoing the patriarchal values of British 
society-to withhold feelings even in the face of death-the Shakespearian elegy also 
serves to criticise the inertia of masculine restraint and hyper-rationalism. One's sense 
of being and of sanity is sustained by consecutive bodily states and feelings. The 
stringent repudiation of bodily feelings and emotions advocated by the masculine 
ideal inevitably thrusts the individual into a thorough disconnection with the body: a 
kind of `reason not the need. ' For the body is the pivot of the psychological as well as 
physical existence of the self. In contrast to the conventional idea of madness, the 
insanity from which Septimus suffers has resulted from failing to feel rather than 
failing to reason: "He could reason; he could read, Dante for example, quite easily..., 
he could add up his bill; his brain was perfect; it must be the fault of the world 
then-that he could not feel [emphasis added]" (MD 96). Its incapacity to receive 
immediate and concurrent stimuli has thrown Septimus further into a world of his own, 
an inner world increasingly disconnected from the external one. Woolf reveals her 
closeness to the neuroscientist Damasio's insistence that "feeling [is] an integral 
component of the machinery of reason" (Descartes' Intro. xxii). As revealed in the 
Lin I-S 
cases of Capgras syndrome, we recognise the world and people around us not simply 
through visual images or audio perception but through the connection of feelings. 
In psychological discourses and in neurology, it is accepted that both the sense 
of `being' in the core consciousness or the continuous selfhood of extended 
consciousness are orchestrated and apprehended through a sense of temporal flow and 
connectedness. The sense of temporal sequence is vital to the sense of being in 
existence and also to a sense of being sane. Feeling himself dead, but miraculously 
returned among the living, Septimus has this obscure feeling of time as he dwells 
within a world paced with its own rhythm but which does not accord with the `real' 
social world around him. When Rezia tries to remind him of the `real' time accredited 
by Big Ben, the time of the social order which they are obliged to keep, "The word 
`time' split its husk; poured its riches over him; and from his lips fell like shells, like 
shavings from a plane, without his making them, hard, white, imperishable, words, 
and flew to attach themselves to their places in an ode to Time" (MD 76). The rigidity 
of the general public time is absurd and ludicrous and thereby the world that is 
regulated by it becomes inconceivable and irrelevant. For Septimus, temporality has 
ceased to be as he continues to live within that moment of death-a moment that will 
forever be-as his sensory nerves are fixed to it. New stimuli that are taken in reveal 
not a successive linear development of an ever renewable temporality, but rather they 
are further absorbed into the context of the moment within which Septimus is situated. 
There is no Time; every moment is simply a re-referencing of time past. Thus, the 
more genuine and incorruptible nature of Time reveals itself to him as if Time and 
temporality are merely states of the mind. The discordance between Septimus's 
internal non-temporal world and the temporality of the public world forms an 
unbridgeable gap, leaving Septimus secluded and self-enclosed within a subjective 
reality of his own which `society' endeavours to suppress and negate. Resembling 
Neville in The Waves, Septimus is held up within his moment of deathliness when his 
friend is killed and his own life is spared. 
Lin 179 
Clarissa's moments of retiring into an inner self are enacted through her actual 
retreat into a room of her own. Still, Clarissa's moments are constantly interrupted, by 
Peter, by Big Ben, by Time itself. Similar to Woolf's own frustrated resistance to 
temporality in making the moment permanent, Clarissa is also "suspended between 
life and death in an unfamiliar way" (WD 45). 11 As a London hostess, and wife of a 
Tory M. P., it is inevitable that Clarissa should conform to the social time of the public. 
As a patient-for she has been ill and is advised to take an hour of rest after 
luncheon-she is compelled to heed the proportions advocated by doctors and 
physicians. Her day is clearly dissected into discrete units to which she is instructed to 
adhere. However, as an upper-middle class London hostess, she is also given a little 
licence, a flexibility, to adjust a tempo of her own to the objective time of Big Ben. 
Like St. Margaret, the clock which Peter Walsh identifies with Clarissa, Clarissa as a 
hostess maintains a pace, a rhythm of her own and is yet "reluctant to inflict [her] 
individuality" (MD 54). However, by bestowing upon her the image of a clock, 
though with a tempo of her own, Woolf suggests that Clarissa nonetheless bows to 
patriarchal authority. For Septimus, as a man and soldier, there is no escape, no relief, 
from the strict and exacting command of patriarchal authority. Individuality and 
subjectivity could not be attained unless by death itself. In pure duration, according to 
Henri Bergson, no unit of time is distinguishable: each moment succeeds and is bound 
up with other moments. With each moment merging into another, every moment is 
qualitatively different from another, yet each moment contains and is contained within 
another. Past, present and future are blended into a continual process of becoming, and 
it is within such a process that free will and free acts are possible: "the free act takes 
place in time which is flowing and not in time which has already flown" (Bergson, 
Time 221). To be able to feel and sway with the free flow of time is genuine living. 
But, society forbids it; Big Ben forbids it. 
An incapacity to withdraw from the subjective present within the stream of the 
Diary entry dated 18 February 1922. 
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flowing of time itself, however, would entail that one could never gain an objective 
view of the passage of time. Perhaps the inability to co-relate the different senses of 
time is Septimus's ultimate damnation, like the souls in Dante's Divine Comedy. 
Physically, he is incapable of withdrawing into himself to grasp the units of time 
within time's multiplicity. Within the pure duration of time, all time has become one. 
Without the orientation and the proportion governed by Big Ben, Septimus, losing 
track of time, also loses contact with external reality. As a stream-of-consciousness 
narrative (though the term is much debated) Mrs. Dalloway flows from thought to 
thought, from one character to another, displaying the heterogeneity of variant 
subjective realms as each imparts a reality of its own. With the chiming of Big Ben, a 
more objective reality is introduced. Each subjective realm relates differently to this 
objective voice whilst nevertheless acknowledging its authoritative pronouncement of 
an external reality. But for Septimus, objectivity finds no path in connecting with 
subjective reality. 
In writing Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf stated that she was going to write about "the 
world seen by the sane and the insane side by side" (WD 51). 12 The sanity of Clarissa 
and the insanity of Septimus are discernible in their perception of the present and their 
capacity to differentiate and to co-relate the past to the present-to be able to perceive 
time as a linear sequence. Although both Clarissa and Septimus are subjected to a past 
memory, Clarissa is capable of reliving her past by standing beyond the past itself, 
whilst Septimus is fully encapsulated within the feelings and emotions that are 
suspended through such suppression. All times jumble together within Septimus, 
without any discrete articulation. As for Clarissa, though she feels the intensity of the 
past in the present, and is occasionally driven by her thoughts into a time realm of her 
inner world that seems forever prolonged, the striking of Big Ben still possesses the 
power to recall her to a present time embedded in its chronological context. 
Bergson once proclaimed that memory is the interface of mind and matter, so 
'2 Diary entry dated 14 October 1922. 
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that through memory and the language of memory, a distinguishable `selfhood' is 
formed-whether it is called `soul' or `extended consciousness. ' However, this 
memory, though seemingly an altogether mental property is, ironically, firmly rooted 
in the body. Furthermore, "our perceptions, sensations, emotions and ideas occur 
under two aspects: the one clear and precise, but impersonal; the other confused, ever 
changing, and inexpressible, because language cannot get hold of it without arresting 
its mobility or fit it into its common-place forms without making it into public 
property" (Time 129). In this sense, through a refined depiction of the interaction 
between present perceptions and the mechanism of memory, Mrs. Dalloway comes to 
present the subtle and blurred line between sanity and insanity. 13 
The insanity of Septimus has often been judged as an example of male 
neurosis (or in a more conventional term `shell-shock') as he is continuously held up 
within the moment where life encounters the honors and immediacy of death. Yet, 
being spared of life, unharmed, his mind is still gripped by the moment of contingency 
and unable to account for the fragility and insignificance of individual life., 4 For 
Septimus's condition accords with both our own and early twentieth-century ideas 
about trauma as a condition that cuts across mind and body and was first defined in 
relation to early railway accidents where intense physical shocks seemed to be 
accompanied by an hysterical mental state. Survivors of train collisions and railway 
accidents were left unable to gain relief from their immediate memories of the event. 
They suffered continuously from what were later named "traumatic neurosis. "15 As 
the body that has been spared from injury seems to have been halted in the moment of 
the accident, so the mind also seems to resist further progress and is seemingly held 
persistently within that moment. In the case of neurosis, Freud distinguishes two main 
features: "first that the chief causal factor seemed to lie in the element of surprise, in 
13 Bergson, Matter and Memory: "Memory is just the intersection of mind and matter.. . the classical 
problem of the relations of soul and body, will soon see this problem as centring upon the subject of 
memory" (13). 
14 Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere (Oxford: OUP, 1986) 222. 
Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920; London: Hogarth, 1922) 8. 
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the fright; and secondly that an injury or wound sustained at the same time generally 
tended to prevent the occurrence of the neurosis, " as if the emotion has run its full 
course to a definite conclusion of an injury (Beyond 9). After the First World War, as 
shell-shocked patients remained locked within their horrifying experience on the N,, -ar 
field (as they continuously underwent the frightful experience in dreams) and even 
became aphasic, Sigmund Freud revised his proposal of the pleasure principle and 
started to conceive, in Beyond the Pleasure Principle(whose English translation was 
published by Hogarth Press in 1922), that "the goal of life is death" and within each 
individual there relies `an ego-instinct impelling toward death' (47). 16 
Between life and death, between the resentment about ceasing to be and a 
desire to hold onto the moment, Mrs. Dalloway clearly illustrates that inner conflict 
which Freud had sought to explain in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Freud, from his 
speculation on how a child turns his/her uncomfortable experience such as the absence 
of the mother into a game, suggests that it is by such repetition of lost and found that 
the child hopes to subject the uncontrollable and the unexpected and to bring it under 
his/her domination- to turn passivity into an active position. 17 Corresponding to 
what Freud has sketched, one inevitably comes to wonder whether the suspense one 
constantly feels throughout Mrs. Dalloway is a sort of self-preparation allowing one to 
expect the unexpected, so that the attempts at subduing the fear caused by the war are 
also a preparation for death itself? The repetition of the narration is not just what 
Miller has said to be a "raising of the dead, " but a repetition-compulsion of a 
suppressed sensation as well as a repetition toward self-mastering. Although society is 
determined to suppress its memory of the war and eager to get on with life, it cannot 
eradicate the fright which has been imprinted onto the body as well as on the mind. 
18 
16 The first draft of Mrs. Dalloway is completed on 9 October 1924. It started off as a short story, "Mrs. 
Dalloway in Bond Street, " which Woolf started to write also around 1922. 
17 Freud, Beyond: "We see that children repeat in their play everything that has made a great 
impression on them in actual life, that they thereby abreact the strength of the impression and so to 
speak make themselves masters of the situation" (15). 
1 Freud, Beyond 9. 
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However, through the repetitive narration, the narrative seeks to resolve the learned 
fright and agony of the mind. 
The narrative of Mrs. Dalloway which intends "to criticise the social system, 
and to show it at work, at its most intense" exhibits a dread of uncertainty and the 
unexpected that mirrors the strain of society England in 1923, still recovering from the 
shock of The Great War-the First World War (WD 56). The wake of the war becomes 
an undercurrent partially disguised by the purposeful mood of 
after-war-lightheartedness. As in traumatic neurosis, as described by Freud, what one 
strives most to suppress becomes that which continues to return and haunt; and in this 
case, it is an apprehensive tension over some inconceivable terror that might any 
minute befall the fragile world. Something awful is about to happen. Against which, 
the narrative continues to reaffirm and hypnotise the reader as well as the characters 
that the war is over, easing the psychological trauma caused by the war. Nevertheless, 
a soldier's heart badly wounded by the terror of the war continues to vibrate 
underneath the social rhythms, under all the effort to build up jollity and to overcome 
the memory of the war, the dead, the past. Insisting on getting on with life, the social 
system imposes a sense of proportion worshipped by Sir William Bradshaw and 
maintained through the unrelenting striking of Big Ben on the hour, cutting one's life 
into proportions. 
The war has made the imminence of death so conspicuous that, whilst 
continuing to live, it would be impossible not to think of death. Over-shadowed by the 
war, life has therefore become as capricious and unpredictable as possible. Stepping 
out to buy the flowers herself, Clarissa, with all the feeling of anticipation for her 
party that night and in a mood capturing all the exuberant vitality of London in June, 
still cannot prevent the idea of (or maybe a secret longing for) death from permeating 
her thoughts. Looking into the shop windows of a bookshop, it is the words of 
Cymbeline that catch her eye. The war dead have been buried and forgotten (except 
for the reminder provided through Septimus's consciousness). The world continues on 
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with its own rhythm, indifferently, as if nothing has happened. Even if one's love, 
one's son, is killed in the war, one still carries on, like Lady Bexborough, to open a 
bazaar. 
Inevitably, Clarissa is led to ponder how the world would go on without her; 
how she would inevitably cease to be. "[Doesn't] it become consoling to believe that 
death ended absolutely, " asked Clarissa (MD 9)? However, what does it mean to die? 
Would being forgotten by the world be a death in itself as well-like Septimus who 
has been forsaken by the world and who, like Rhoda in The Waves, has fallen out of 
time and the narrative context of society? Without conforming to the institutional 
structure of society, Septimus and Rhoda are situated permanently as outcasts-which 
means an elimination of identity and therefore the death of the self. Conceivably, 
being recognised and remembered with the affirmation of one's subjectivity could, 
plausibly, be a sort of survival. Thus, if one could not prevent death, one could at least 
create something to be remembered by, like Clarissa's party (which in a sense 
resembles the narrative itself, reviving the past into a communal All Soul's Day) that 
brings people scattered in different part of London together to build up another 
commemorative event-to create life. Clarissa has said, that among "the ebb and flow 
of things, here, there, she survived, Peter survived, lived in each other" (MD 9). 
Coming back from India after five years, Peter Walsh feels this "strangeness of 
standing alone, alive, [yet] unknown" (MD 56). He feels he has escaped. He has 
escaped the cruelty of social constraints. However, despite the fact that Peter is often 
disapproved of by people who know him, his subjectivity and social identity are not 
nullified in contrast to Septimus's status as a ghost of the war. He is there along with 
Clarissa as she walks across London. He has survived, as well as Sally, through the 
memory of Clarissa. And along with the narrative of the party which Clarissa 
contrives and brings about as an offering to life, Peter, Sally, Aunt Helena and even 
Clarissa herself, are revived from the past. 
The past continues to return to the nostalgic mind of the characters. Everyone 
Lin 185 
longs for his/her past-a past that was not meant to change-and desires an escape 
from the dreadful apprehension that something unpredictable is going to happen. The 
days at Bourton, the days of youth, the days of once in May as it is sung by the 
battered woman, stand permanently at every moment afresh in the memory. 
Alternating between a time past and a time present, Mrs. Dalloway imparts the spirit 
of John Keats' "Ode to A Nightingale. " As in the "Ode to A Nightingale, " the speaker 
could merely catch a few glimpses, through visions, through dreams, but eventually 
through life, of the eternal bliss sung by the immortal bird. Although "[he has] been 
half in love with easeful death/ ... 
/To cease upon the midnight with no pain" (and 
perhaps the eternal bliss sung by the immortal bird is nonetheless death itself), to 
embrace death would then make it impossible to appreciate the voice of the 
nightingale anymore (52-56). For "still wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in 
vain-/To thy high requiem become a sod" (59-60). Longing for death, maybe it is not 
the terror of not knowing what is to come (as Hamlet has seen) that prevents one from 
taking eternal rest, but the horror of not being able to feel which Septimus had 
conceived and which makes him seem suspended from time and from existential being. 
The words of Cymbeline are reworked and re-contextualised in Mrs. Dalloway as a 
soothing consolation committing one to live and undergo the intensity of sensation as 
well as the incertitude of being in time. 
Woolf has described in her diary that the novel is as much a story about life as 
about death. Situating life alongside death, time alongside timelessness, Mrs. 
Dalloway brings out that eternal struggle between an instinct that impels toward death 
and that instinct of self-preservation which Freud describes in Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle. In Mrs. Dalloway, life seems to shift between a sense of suspended stillness 
and a sense of constant change and renewal. Characters and readers too are led to feel 
the urge and the excitement of life whilst an impending adversity or calamity threatens 
to bring everything to a halt. Every moment, life is renewed, and yet at the same time, 
from generation to generation, life is traced into an `objective' general pattern. There 
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would always be a time in May and there would always be a story of love. Yet, in life. 
the moment that one has expected to be exalted in its brilliancy eventually lapses 
before one is barely conscious of it. The intrusion of Time continuously betrays and 
steals away the moment of happiness. The commitment to life is therefore a 
commitment to change and incertitude. The moment that seems so complete and 
perfect within itself is accompanied with an apprehension that it will eventually be 
intruded on: "Nothing could be slow enough; nothing last too long" (MD 203). To 
embrace the moment in its fullness is impossible in life as the clock ticks away. 
"There was an embrace in death, " thought Clarissa, contemplating the death of 
Septimus (MD 202). 
The words of Cymbeline link the two parallel characters, a London hostess 
(perchance the `spirit' of London society) and a war veteran (a ghost of the war who 
has returned half-dead and half-alive), in post-war London society. Although they 
never meet, they are gradually drawing nearer and nearer by their shared sympathetic 
feeling for life-for being. 19 Finally, at the party, Clarissa's offering to life, the news 
of Septimus' death comes across her path. "[I]n the middle of [her] party, here's 
death" (MD 201). As an offering to life, Clarissa cannot escape thereafter the 
confrontation with her inner alter-ego that impels towards a sense of perpetuity and 
death itself. However, death has already been there, lurking beneath the narrative from 
the very start and well before it springs to the surface. All along, Septimus has felt that 
he was already dead; all along, Clarissa has been pondering on death and feeling 
herself dissolving into nothingness. Identifying the clock of St. Margaret's with 
Clarissa, Peter Walsh senses the desire buried within Clarissa to disperse, to surrender 
herself to death as "the sound of St. Margaret's glides into the recesses of the heart and 
buries itself in ring after ring of sound, like something alive which wants to confide 
itself, to disperse itself, to be, with a tremor of delight, at rest" (MD 54). 
Miller sees Mrs. Dalloway as a narrative enacting All Soul's Day during ww hich 
19 Briggs, Virginia 130. 
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the buried dead and the past are resurrected into the present. If so, the narrative itself 
has already betrayed the pastness of the characters and therefore of Clarissa. In 
Miller's opinion, the very sentence that asserts Clarissa's being is also the sentence that 
betrayed Clarissa's pastness. With the `was, ' the narrative present is situated later than 
the story it narrates. Yet, the `pastness' is restored and recreated in the present by the 
narrative. And therefore, time and mortality are transcended. Clarissa's offerings to 
life are also her means to combat the triviality and bitterness of real life-to exert 
control over the formlessness of life. Against the diffusiveness of life, the narrative 
continues to collect, to build up, a party, a hat, a story of the past, something that is 
tangible and substantial; something that supplants the absence; something that brings 
out the diversity as well as the reality of all possible subjective worlds. In creation, 
subjectivity sustains itself in an objective context. 
Searching back into the past, the narrative attempts to conjure a substantial 
reality through recurrence. For, "Apart from recurrence, knowledge would be 
impossible; for nothing could be referred to our past experience. Also, apart from 
some regularity of recurrence, measurement would be impossible. In our experience, 
as we gain the idea of exactness, recurrence is fundamental" (Whitehead 40). By 
recurrence, the abstract knowledge of mathematics, of nature, and therefore of life, is 
built. As the former order is shattered by the war, Mrs. Dalloway is driven with an 
anxiousness to re-construct the pattern of life that would expel doubts and 
uncertainties. The narrative moves recursively into the past as an attempt to account 
for the present as well the future. For as captured by the words of Imogen, "since 
doubting things go ill often hurts more/ Than to be sure they do-for certainties/ 
Either are past remedies; or timely knowing, / The remedy then born-(1.6.96-99). 
Still, time and temporality withstand and overthrow the effort of the narrative. 
The tone of the narrative itself, in the manner of an everlasting maternal figure, 
croons of a perpetual reality of life that constantly strains between hope and despair; 
anticipation and apprehension. Despair and anticipation, because of what had once 
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been known and what history has come to suggest (both happiness as well as 
disappointment); hope and apprehension, because the future is susceptible to any 
changes in the flow of time and therefore forever unknown. As the narrative strains 
between these two opposite forces, it illustrates ingeniously the ambiguity of our 
conscious states which, although unfolding in pure duration (and therefore always in 
the act of becoming), are constantly projected into the simultaneity and extension of 
space (as the passage of time is often projected into spatial extension). Thus, within 
the moment, the characters are not forgetful of the temporality of the moment. The 
narrative constantly loops the present moment into a reminiscent narrative of the past 
and, within the present duree, one relives a past recalled through extended 
consciousness. This is suggested in the way that Clarissa often feels, along with her 
memory of Bourton, the unspeakable weight of her present age. In the moment of 
living her life, she simultaneously sees what she has come to make of it. 
According to Bergson, as a result of the habitual tendency to picture time in 
space, one constantly mis-adopts the law of causality in physics and science to one's 
inner psychic state. This leads to a failure to recognise that "there is no perceptible 
difference between foreseeing, seeing, and acting" (Bergson, Time 198). Each 
moment of our psychical state is blended into the entirety of the past and memory and 
what they are made of, the self. For, as Bernard has speculated in The Waves, it is 
impossible to pluck one grain apart from the whole stem, for it is in its totality that it 
is learnt and recognised. 20 However, it is through the concept of space that one 
conceptualises the passing, the passage and the quantity of time. As time is projected 
onto space, each moment instead of succeeding and permeating one another, is 
displayed as discrete points exclusive of one another, juxtaposed side by side-the 
duration of the time is therefore missed out in the discontinuity of spatial displacement 
as in quantum theory. It is along this strand of thought that Russell proposes the idea 
of the monadic discrepancy of time. Such a conception of the quality of time in spatial 
20 W 183 
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quantity leads one to presume that any moment in the past is self-enclosed and 
therefore each moment of the past stands in a permanent stasis. It is an idea derived 
from a conceptualised eternal self who is situated beyond time itself, rather than a 
temporal self living within time. As one lives in time, even the memory of the past 
would be subject to temporality, varied and transformed each moment anew. The 
projection of time onto a homogeneous medium of space produces an illusion that the 
interval of space-time could be reduced and therefore, like astronomy predicting the 
course of the stars, one might be able to predict a conscious state unresolved. 
Moreover, because in the past, acts are already accomplished and naturally displayed 
in the form of discrete moments, one leading to another, in a linear development, one 
is misled to assume and project such linear causality into the future. Yet, "the relation 
of inner causality is purely dynamic, and has no analogy with the relation of two 
external phenomena which condition one another" (Bergson, Time 219). 
The past still transforms itself in accordance with the present and the 
anticipation of the future. The future influences the present as much as the past as 
Friedrich Nietzsche had once asserted, or, in the words of Bergson, "the whole of our 
past psychical life conditions our present state, without being its necessary 
determinant" (Matter 148). A deep nostalgia for an ancient past. It is a past which 
though irretrievable is permanently enclosed within the present life ("In fact, there is 
no perception which is not full of memories"), like the grandiose mansion of Orlando 
that stands and lives upon the deadly bones of his ancestors to which s/he descends 
forlornly in searching for a meaning (a pattern) of life from the buried past (Bergson, 
Matter 33). Nevertheless, the past remembered is never the same as it was once 
experienced, since it is perpetually intermingling with the newly acquired perceptions. 
As in a kaleidoscope, with each newly acquired position in time, a new formation or 
shape is formed from the same elements. 21 Any preceding and memorised moment 
would ferment with new stimuli received by the body, generating new and different 
21 Bergson, Matter 25. 
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sensations. The past is continually `gnawing' into the present and one's present 
perception is inevitably coloured by the bodily remembrance of the past. In Mrs. 22 
Dalloway, the reader is given both forms of time: time as duration as one lives in the 
process of time embracing all time, and a time separated into monads of self-enclosed 
moments as the self stands above time and self-reflects on moments of the past. This 
double aspect of one's consciousness of time enables one to endure time and change 
whilst also retaining a constant selfhood that, though ever changing, is ever the same. 
No future course of our mental state could be presumed to follow the patterns formed 
by the past. 
The passage of time could only be perceived retrospectively. And it is only by 
retrospection that one could possibly map out the turns and changes that 
consciousness has traversed through time. As the past runs parallel with the present, 
the narrative, like the battered woman, sings out an exquisite and eternal love, 
uncorrupted by time. 23 Nonetheless, it is a time of the past. The future to come though 
is still unpredictable and a foreboding feeling inevitably prevails; the course of the 
past seems to pacify the anguish and provide the consolation that there is a firm 
ground among all the hazard and inconsistency of life. Mrs. Dalloway seeks to 
transcend this irreconcilable opposition through its narrative repetition. Through 
repetition, it resurrects the dead, relives the past (as argued by Miller); and also 
through repetition the moment of being seems to be raised beyond the passage of time. 
Immortality (as seen by Orlando) is achieved through words and poetry which is 
based upon the capacity of one's consciousness to withdraw from pure duration. 
24 For 
through words, the inner self establishes a link with the world and through this 
connection, as Clarissa believes, one survives with the world. However, the repetition, 
22 A metaphor used by Henri Bergson in Matter and Memory: "[E]very perception 
is already memory. 
Practically, we perceive only the past, the pure present being the invisible progress of the past gna\t'ing 
into the future" (150). 
23 "Through all ages ... the 
battered woman ... stood singing of 
love" (MD 89). 
24 0 57. Also noted, Bergson's idea of the dual aspect of consciousness coheres to the stratum of 
consciousness drawn by Damasio. 
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both of the narrative itself and what the narrative addresses, also amplifies the 
limitation of words and language. 
Meanings and patterns of life can only be formed retrospectively. And it is in 
the narrative of the past alone that the tempo of time can be manipulated, accelerated 
and decelerated according to one's purpose. Even so, the narrative of the past is still 
subject to the present time and is nonetheless continuously transfigured as one 
moment succeeds another. Thus, as one sees through Mrs. Dalloway, the narrative of 
the past, though seemingly transfixed, is by no means determined. The novel draws to 
no conclusion and ends: "For there she was" (MD 213). With the death of Septimus 
and the resentment of Clarissa at not being able to preserve the precious gift that was 
once bestowed upon her, one learns the impossibility of embracing the moment in 
eternal stasis. As Peter Walsh notably asserts, a past memory will always acquire new 
scent, new taste, new sensation, through different psychic states and to try to preserve 
the moment is futile, even through words: "You were given a sharp, acute, 
uncomfortable grain-the actual meeting; horribly painful as often as not; yet in 
absence, in the most unlikely places, it would flower out, open, shed its scent, let you 
touch, taste, look about you, get the whole feel of it and understanding, after years of 
lying lost" (MD 168). 
No past could be relived as it was, but past feelings and emotions might be 
reinvoked through the living body. Though language and words have the capacity to 
endure through time, the translation of the moment into words is also the loss of its 
original nature. To remember is always to create something new. Even Neville, a poet, 
expresses the impossibility of transcribing moments of being into words. The moment 
eludes preservation. To remain timeless within an enclosed moment of certainty and 
happiness is to attain the status of inanimation and therefore death itself (as suggested 
in Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle). To be capable of feeling, to experience, to 
savour the ecstasy of the moment's happiness, one must remain in being and therefore 
subjected to the temporality of time with its insecurities and agonies of uncertainty. 
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Even if one has generally mistaken the idea of the past as a static image, as Bergson 
suggests, the memory of the past would nevertheless lapse with time and through the 
repetition of reminiscence, for no past can be uncontaminated by present and future 
sensation. For that reason, no two moments are alike. 25 
The self evolves with time and its memory, though seemingly unchangeable, 
has nevertheless escaped through the words attached to it. The inevitability of the 
moment passing leads Clarissa to mourn the bygone past-the moment which could 
never be relived. Septimus has thrown his life away, whereas Clarissa has escaped 
death by leaving the past to die away like "the leaden circles dissolved in the air, " an 
image that is continually repeated with the chiming of Big Ben (MD 204). With the 
dissolving leaden circles, the moment is therefore dispersed. The happiness which she 
once felt is lost forever: "A thing there was that mattered; a thing, wreathed about with 
chatter, defaced, obscured in her own life, let drop every day in corruption, lies, 
chatter" (MD 202). So Septimus is admired: he has preserved the moment. 
Mrs. Dalloway depicts a day and within this day it is a life-time as suggested 
in Stephen Daldry's film The Hours (as Mrs. Dalloway was originally named): "a 
woman's whole life in a single day, just one day, and in that day her whole life. , 26 
The day has brought out her whole life-as each moment of life is superimposed upon 
its preceding one (or rather as moments succeeding one another and melting into one 
another). A lifetime is therefore encapsulated within the moment, reflecting Henri 
Bergson's idea of duree: every unit is a sum of multiplicity ("a qualitative 
multiplicity"); the moment is a unified whole (Time 226). The narrative is stretched 
along a dual time scheme: a chronological time of Big Ben as it strikes along, 
indicating the separateness of each point of time (a time conceptualised through the 
medium of space) but also a time that has been liberated from a linear, patriarchal 
25 Bergson, Time: "deep-seated psychic states are radically heterogeneous to each other, and it is 
impossible that any two of them should be quite alike, since they are two different moments of a 
life-story" (199-200). 
2" The Hours. By Michael Cunningham. Screenplay by David Hare. Dir. Stephen Daldry. Paramount, 
2003. 
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authority and assumes a timelessness of the female cycle delivered from the 
dominating power of Big Ben. The feminine cyclical time seems to subvert the 
paternal authority of the social system employed by Big Ben-the `sanity' of time and 
proportion. It is a "Women's Time" that embodies all time: "a monumental temporality, 
without cleavage or escape, which has so little to do with linear time (which passes) 
that the very word `temporality' hardly fits" (Kristeva 16). 27 It is a time of pure 
duration as each moment interpenetrates another and "each of which represents the 
whole, and cannot be distinguished or isolated from it except by abstract thought" 
(Bergson, Time 101). And therefore, within one single moment, there are numerous 
fragmented thoughts, feelings, past or present, interacting, regenerating, forming and 
taking shape in practical actions. As Woolf has described in Orlando, "the most 
ordinary movement in the world, such as sitting down at a table and pulling the 
inkstand towards one, may agitate a thousand odd, disconnected fragments, now 
bright, now dim, hanging and bobbing and dipping and flaunting" (55). 
Mrs. Dalloway, as the time of a life-span becomes self-contained in a day, in a 
moment, sketches a time within time, as well as a time devoid of temporality, 
reflecting what Bergson has defined as pure duration-a being that is ever the same as 
well as ever changing. 28 The narrative, in the image of Clarissa, gives forth a life as, 
simultaneously, a process of living, as well as a thing formed through time which one 
could behold and contemplate as a whole by standing outside: "For she was a child, 
throwing bread to the ducks, between her parents, and at the same time a grown 
woman coming to her parents who stood by the lake, holding her life in her arms 
which, as she neared them, grew larger and larger in her arms, until it became a whole 
life, a complete life" (MD 46). As Bergson had expounded, it is natural and inevitable 
that man projects the experience of duration of heterogeneous units of time onto a 
homogeneous space in order to distinguish each moment from another and to 
27 Julia Kristeva, "Women's Time, " Signs 7.1 (1981) 13-35. 
28 Bergson, Time 101. 
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construct a chronological linear development. Laying out time upon the London 
landscape, Mrs. Dalloway illustrates the paradoxical relations between subjective time 
as it is lived in pure duration (of which moments melt into one another) and the 
consecutive units of time remembered through spreading out in space: a time of 
quality as well as a time of quantity; a time which is flowing and a time which has 
already flown. 29 Corresponding to Bergson's dual experience of temporality, the 
narrative of Mrs. Dalloway also suggests that one lives in a split consciousness 
mediating between living in pure duration yet at the same time standing outside, 
perceiving a panoramic view where moments are juxtaposed side by side rather than 
interposed as one moment succeeds and develops into another. 30 At one level, one 
lives one's psychic states as a `progress, ' while on another level, one takes what one 
has lived through as a thing: "for the psychic state, when it reaches the end of the 
progress which constitutes its very existence, becomes a thing which one can picture 
to oneself all at once" (Bergson, Time 198). Thus in thinking about life, Clarissa often 
evokes the image of life as a thing that has been bestowed upon one which one needs 
to tend and grow. At the same time, the narrative also captures those moments when 
one retires into the inner self and which Bergson regarded as the moments of living in 
pure duration, disregarding the tempo of an external time. 
Bergson noted the importance of putting into words one's sensations and 
emotions (for we are by nature social beings), and it is through language that these 
ephemeral feelings can plausibly be substantiated. "The influence of language on 
sensation is deeper than is usually thought. Not only does language make us believe in 
the unchangeableness of our sensations, but it will sometimes deceive us as to the 
nature of the sensation felt" (Bergson, Time 131). According to the picture of 
consciousness drawn by Damasio, it is possible to venture that language, based upon 
autobiographical memory, is intrinsically bound up with a consciousness that projects 
"' Bergson, Time 128-9,221. 
30 Bergson, Time 102-3. 
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time onto space. By putting one's subjective sensations and perceptions into wvords, 
one inevitably dissects what is felt as a whole by the body. Words and language 
formulate and conceptualise independent images which (according to Bergson) 
represent "a late and artificial product of the mind" (Matter 165). 31 However, 
language is a means of communication that conveys one's inner being to the world as 
"social life is more practically important to us than our inner and individual existence" 
(Bergson, Time 130). 
Unable to articulate his inner feelings and thoughts, Septimus is destined to be 
left in a vacuum as no narrative of him could be contrived either by himself or by his 
society. Septimus is immersed within his "inner and individual existence, " cut off 
from his material surroundings (Bergson, Time 130). His inability to communicate 
with the outer world is already a symbolic death of the self as a social being. 
Therefore, feeling both dead and yet bound to live, he reaches in an ironic way what 
Clarissa has been thinking about-how there's no death. While Clarissa transcends 
death through memories and relations, through creating life rather than simply being 
dragged through life, Septimus is confronted with death by his unique, untranslatable, 
subjective experience and memory of the war which he is impelled to bury and forget. 
Clarissa has substantiated life through connections, through a narrative of creation: 
"being laid out like a mist between the people she knew best, who lifted her on their 
branches as she had seen the trees lift the mist, but it spread ever so far, her life, 
herself" (MD 10). Her parties that are meant to combine and to bring people together, 
creating communal experience, are truly offerings to life. Dr. Holmes advises 
Septimus to take an interest outside himself But the world outside is the society 
determined to eliminate his subjectivity and what it embodies-a reminder of the war. 
Like Evans and all the dead of the war, Septimus is a ghost that the post-war society is 
anxious to dispel. Incapable of re-connecting with the `real' world, Septimus is lost 
31 Bergson further explained: "psychic facts are bound up with each other, and are always given 
together to immediate consciousness as an undivided whole which reflection alone cuts up into distinct 
fragments" (Matter 166). 
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somewhere in the gap between objective and subjective realities. 
Being a fictional narrative, Mrs. Dalloway is already an attempt at restoring 
time as it attempts to re-establish a narrative, a story, in time, in this case, June 1923.32 
It has already been delivered from the scythe of time and achieved a kind of 
timelessness. Thereby, the dead are resurrected into the present; the `was' becomes 
`is. ' The past is brought forth into the present, yet it is only because that past is already 
a fulfilled process that it can possibly be examined as a whole. "Storytelling, for 
Woolf, is the repetition of the past in memory, both in the memory of the characters 
and in the memory of the narrator, " comments Miller (Fiction 176). The narrator who 
has substantiated the past, the forgotten, the dead, into the present is the very "voice of 
no age or sex" (MD 88). It is an observer standing beyond the passage of time-a pure 
objective voice of collective memory. Beth C. Schwartz takes this voice of no time as 
the voice of the Anon, the great poet of all ages that sings of "the anonymous world 
`still exists in us, deep sunk, savage, primitive, remembered"' (725). Placing Clarissa 
in the role of a hostess, she seems to resemble the characterlessness of the narrative 
voice that, in assuming a non-persona and in denouncing its own personality, brings 
people together, links one life to another, while allowing them full liberty to express 
and be themselves. Critics have argued that Clarissa's capacity to know people is a 
result of her fluidity: "Clarissa's lack of a strong sense of identity has a positive aspect 
as well, in that it makes her particularly sensitive to others' identities... She felt herself 
`everywhere, ' rather than gathered into a unified, well-defined personality, and thus 
able to make contact with the most unlikely people and places" (Johnson 200). 
Lacking a centre, she is compelled to bring herself to a point-a pivot of selfhood. 
Similarly, her parties are her effort to create, to combine, to bring people together, 
building and celebrating life-in the end, a construction by which her internal 
dispersal can be brought to a point reflected through the gaze of her guests. 
32 Miller further explains that "the manipulation of narrative voice in fiction is closely associated with 




As pointed out by Miller, the narrative of Mrs. Dalloway has sketched a triple 
yet simultaneous time zone: the reader's and narrative's present, the day of June when 
Clarissa is going to give a party, and then a further retreat into the past, before the war, 
of the summer days in Bourton, through the characters' memories. Through its 
sophisticated muti-layered time zone, readers are introduced to a time of no time as 
well as a mind's time that defies any effort of the historians and biographers as Woolf 
further explored in Orlando. The time-scheme of Mrs. Dalloway endows a central 
meaning to the novel. Through it, the narrative brings together life and thought which 
are usually taken "as the poles asunder" by conventional novelist and biographers. 33 
As the narrative transcends the traditional social and historical time regulated by Big 
Ben, it becomes capable of denoting time in the process of passing as well as the 
passage which time has taken and, within it, the discrete moments held by the 
characters. Between these two perceptions of time, Woolf brings out Septimus's gain 
in plunging while holding his treasure, and Clarissa's loss as her moment of happiness 
slips away with time. 
Originally entitled The Hours, Mrs. Dalloway is concerned with a time 
experienced by the mind and the body, rather than a time controlled by the authority of 
Big Ben. Liken to a female and London version of Ulysses, Mrs. Dalloway takes the 
form of Woolfs ambition to "Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary 
day... [as] [t]he mind receives a myriad impressions-trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or 
engraved with the sharpness of steel" (CR 1: 149-150). Big Ben and the London 
landscape serve as the only links to an external reality or an external time among 
various, dispersal subjective realities. As time is spread out through a spatial 
arrangement, Woolf juxtaposes side by side the two conceptions of time: the pervasive 
mis-conceptualisation of time through space and a time of pure duree that Bergson had 
presented philosophically in Time and Free Will. 
While writing Mrs. Dalloway, Woolf noted in her diary of her discovery: "how 
33 0184 
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I dig out beautiful caves behind my characters: I think that gives exactly what I want; 
humanity, humour, depth. The idea is that the caves shall connect and each comes to 
daylight at the present moment" (WD 59). 34 Despite the fact that narrative wanders 
from one point of view to another in Mrs. Dalloway, individual consciousness is 
gradually merged into a collective and concurrent flow. 35 And therefore, the narrative 
exemplifies a communal sensation that "[brings] into [the] mind the turbid ebb and 
flow/ Of human miseries" which was likewise heard in a time long ago by Sophocles 
(Arnold 17-18). 36 As each `I' of a distinct subjectivity merges and gathers into a 
collective spirit while retaining its own individuality, an objective world is embodied 
through subjective voices and an external reality is conjectured through various 
view-points. Mrs. Dalloway successfully sketches a world of "Leibnizian monads: 
each is the mirror of the universe" (Bergson, Matter 38). But more importantly, it is 
through the reality of each monadic mirror that the objective reality is sustained and 
substantiated. As she records "the incessant shower of numerous atoms, " by placing 
the body at the centre of the perceptive images and sensations (in Bergson's terms), 
she has spun out the invisible thread that connects and brings together the disjoined 
moments into a confluent wholeness (CR 1: 150). 37 
;' Diary entry of 30 August 1923. 
35 James Naremore, The World Without a Self 83; 86-7. 
36 Matthew Arnold, "Dover Beach". 
37 Bergson wrote in Matter and Memory: "Here is a system of images which I term my perception of 
the universe, and which may be entirely altered by a very slight change in a certain privileged 
image-my body. This image occupies the centre; by it all the others are conditioned; at each of its 
movements everything changes, as though by a turn of a kaleidoscope" (25). William James also adopts 
the metaphor of the kaleidoscope in The Principles of Psychology. 
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V 
"Time Passes": The Time Being in To the Lighthouse 
Only through time time is conquered. 
T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets 
"Time Passes, " as Woolf portrayed through a diagram in the notes that 
accompany her manuscript, is the bridge that pulls together "The Window" and "The 
Lighthouse" of the novel, attempting to unify the moments of existence into a 
universal reality. ' "Time Passes" attempts to represent something beyond the transient 
appearance of the world, to catch a glimpse of an unalterable pattern, the `granite' 
behind the intangible and fleeting `rainbow. ' It signifies the human effort that seeks 
endlessly out of itself to arrive at an objective sublime which is ironically a 
self-obliteration. However, the ego that projects restlessly beyond itself to achieve the 
beauty and perpetuity of a centreless objective (as in "Time Passes") is also bound 
within a corporal being. It is in the living body that self, life and their reality are 
sustained. In its apparent objectivity, "Time Passes" depicts a world situated 
perpetually in the midst of a continuous flow of time and while "words move, music 
moves/ Only in time; but that which is only living/ Could only die" (Eliot, "Burnt 
Norton" 5.1-3). 
Although the subjective world of "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" seems 
transitory, it is in them that real living is realised and sustained. As illustrated in the 
passage when Mrs. Ramsay serves the Boeuf en Daube, she rises above the present 
("hovered like a hawk suspended; like a flag floated in an element of joy which filled 
every nerve of her body fully and sweetly") and reflects that "of such moments.. . the 
thing is made that remains for ever after. This would remain" (TL 114). It would 
remain, because the moment has been lived through and appreciated subjectively and 
at the same time has been detached and abstracted into objectification. The wholeness 
Hermione Lee, introduction, To the Lighthouse (London: Penguin, 1992) xiii-xiv. 
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and the coherency of the moment are apprehended through objective reflection, while 
it is in the body that its monumental importance and stasis is felt as it stands out 
among other moments. Yet, it is through contrasting with and building upon this 
timeless world of "Time Passes" that the ordinary life of "The Window" and "The 
Lighthouse" is enlivened and the moments of being are enshrined. 
The beauty of Mrs. Ramsay, perceived through the `eyes, ' is often stressed in 
"The Window, " which bestows on her an estranged and ethereal quality of being. The 
extreme beauty and splendour that surpass any subjective boundary seem to be 
accompanied by an unspeakable sense of sadness as they enhance the transient nature 
of subjective being with an element of eternal finality. As in a reflection of an earlier 
episode where Lily and Mr. Bankes stand at the edge of the sea musing on its beauty 
and on the sense of the eternal completeness of the world in contrast to human 
mortality: "instead of merriment felt come over them some sadness-because the 
thing was completed partly, and partly because distant views seem to outlast by a 
million years (Lily thought) the gazer to be communing already with a sky which 
beholds an earth entirely at rest" (TL 25). 
Mrs. Ramsay is the human embodiment of this duality and of the contrast 
between eternity and a subjective vitality. "For always, he [Mr. Bankes] thought, there 
was something incongruous to be worked into the harmony of her face" (TL 34). It is 
not until "The Lighthouse, " with the absence of `the real thing, ' that Lily Briscoe can 
achieve the vision which allows her to finish her painting of `the mother and the child' 
sitting at the window. For she reaches beyond the time gap and approaches a 
re-configuration of Mrs. Ramsay through a connection involving subjective feeling 
(rather than an unemotional optical and objective judgement through `the window' of 
her own perspective). It is a vision that offers a compromise between a pure 
objectivity preserved in the completeness of Beauty itself, and the subjectivity that 
(though transient) upholds a factuality of `being. ' The painting can never be finished 
as long as Mrs. Ramsay is continuously perceived from the outside and the intrinsic 
Lin 201 
aspects of feelings and emotions are left unrecognised. To the Lighthouse is not just 
about apprehending and bemoaning the cruelty and the mortality of `life' in general, 
but it aspires to capture the subjective life in its actual process of living and at the 
same time and through it to transcend the mortality of life by attaining the stasis of the 
moment. 
In a sorrowful tone, To the Lighthouse is said to be a form of personal therapy 
that enables Woolf to mourn and appease the ghost of her parents. In her attempt to 
write about the dead, she inevitably confronts a Time that continues to transform the 
moments of stillness that she attempts to encapsulate. 2 The structural design of To the 
Lighthouse, contrasting subjective and objective realities, enhances Woolf's vision of 
something permanent and enduring beyond the transient appearance of the world- 
the reality of a "visionary" and yet "austere" kitchen table which Mr. Ramsay pursues 
endlessly in doubts (TL 170). "Time Passes" is the design formulated to embody the 
insubstantial concept of time and to evince Woolf's aesthetic aim of arresting the 
moment-to combat the temporality of the subjective moment through the timeless 
beauty and truth attained through a work of art. In close resemblance to John Keats' 
"Ode on a Grecian Urn, " "Time Passes" sings out "an unheard" but more "endeared" 
melody of Beauty and Timelessness that ambivalently intensifies the temporality of 
being yet at the same time subdues the agony of time: 
So loveliness reigned and stillness, and together made the shape of 
loveliness itself, a form from which life had parted... Loveliness and 
stillness clasped hands in the bedroom..., rubbing, snuffling, iterating, and 
reiterating their questions-'Will you fade? Will you perish? '-scarcely 
disturbed the peace, the indifference, the air of pure integrity, as if the 
question they asked scarcely needed that they should answer: we remain. 
(TL 141) 
In the still movement of "Time Passes, " beauty and loveliness remain, 
"I meant to write about death, only life came breaking in as usual" Diary entry 17 February 1922. D 
167. 
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encapsulated in a perpetual pattern. Yet, the stillness and loveliness of "Time Passes" 
is unappreciated subjectively and therefore unlived, like the love that is sealed forever 
on the Grecian Urn. In stillness, the lovers not only transcend time but also subjective 
boundaries as they continue to convey the excitement and sensation of love to all 
observers. But, in stillness, the lovers, though raised above time, lose their individual 
subjectivity. They have become objectified symbols of love rather than simply lovers. 
The loveliness and stillness of this timeless world diminishes the weight and 
significance of individual life. The inescapable mortality and sorrow of living is what 
Mrs. Ramsay has felt close to her heart and is further completed through her death in 
"Time Passes. " 
With Mrs. McNab roaming about the semi-uninhabited world, providing a 
subjective but nonetheless detached remorse concerning the changes which spill over 
the Ramsays, the nature of "Time Passes" is traversed with contradictory impulses. 
Being a working class woman and therefore an outsider to the Ramsays' world, Mrs. 
McNab's existence does not jeopardise the pure objective world of "Time Passes"; 
instead the insertion of her conscious differentiation between the past and the present 
increases the contrast between the spatial-temporal privacy occupied by specific 
human subjectivity and an inhuman, timeless and objective reality. There alone in the 
unoccupied present of the house, she can still imagine the old days continuing with the 
children rushing in and out. "Yes, she [Mrs. McNab] could see Mrs. Ramsay as she 
came up the drive with the washing" and as Mrs. Ramsay tends the garden in that grey 
cloak (TL 148). The death of Mrs. Ramsay is only remotely conveyed (through an 
even more distant voice within parenthesis). The detached and depersonalised 
narrative voice renders Mrs. McNab as an `eternality' that continues to exist by itself, 
detached and unaffected. As she lurches and leers and rolls from room to room, 
singing in a voice "of witlessness, humour, persistency itself. . . she seemed to say 
how 
it was one long sorrow and trouble, how it was getting up and going to bed again, and 
bringing things out and putting them away again" (TL 142). In spite of time changes 
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(and the obscured reality of the happening of a war), "Mrs. McNab, [hoarding -within 
her the reality of life], continue[s] to drink and gossip as before, " untouched by the 
`passing of Time' or individual misery (TL 143). As if a maternal guardian of this 
atemporal world, Mrs. McNab (also a perpetual yet unconscious present) `oars about 
like a tropical fish, ' cleaning and sweeping through the `sun-lanced' air (TL 145). 
In featuring the elongated, non-conscious, nights when all lamps are put out, 
"Time Passes" depicts the definite reality of the material world in spite of individual 
consciousness and existence: "whatever else may perish and disappear what lies here 
is steadfast... here you can neither touch nor destroy"-a portrayal of an `eyeless' 
world without a perceiving `I' (TL 138). Yet, through the contrast with the perpetual 
movement of "Time Passes" (where changes of personal circumstances are presented 
as so trivial and inconsequential that they appear only in parenthesis), ordinary, 
everyday, life is uplifted into substantial moments of being, conferring the provisional 
`reality' of a subjective universe. The moment that strikes the core of the sensory 
system shines out and years after, it survives "ringed round, lit up, visible to the last 
detail, with all before it blank and all after it blank, for miles and miles" (TL 186). 
"Time Passes" subverts the significance of this privacy to which each character 
unswervingly clings. The world continues to exist without an `I. ' In "The Window, " 
the urgent desire of each character to conceal his or her subjective privacy is 
manifested: Lily will not risk Charles Tansley or Mr. Ramsay appearing from behind 
to observe her painting, for a part of her is unavoidably revealed on the canvas. But 
the significance of this privacy is deprecated by the eternal universe. "Time Passes" 
presents the view from such a reality, independent of human perceptions and deprived 
of any private consciousness: confounded within the darkness "there was scarcely 
anything left of body or mind by which one could say `This is he' or `This is her"'(TL 
137). In the words of T. S. Eliot, it is a darkness of "deprivation/And destitution of all 
property, /Desiccation of the world of sense, /Evacuation of the world of 
fancy, /Inoperancy of the world of spirit"(`Burnt Norton" 3.28-32). Individual 
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subjectivity is obliterated. Unlike "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" (where there 
is the focus of Mrs. Ramsay) with their achievement of `life' and `the thing itself, ' 
"Time Passes" (resembling Mrs McNab) has its perspective diffusely falling on 
nothing. "Time Passes, " suggests the existence of a pure objective world in the terms 
of Bertrand Russell's `sensibilia'3-the plausibility of sense-data devoid of a 
percipient. Its existence is entirely autonomous, independent of any mental 
consciousness, and therefore sustaining its own `reality. ' The recognition of the 
permanent existence of sensibilia dethrones the egoistic `I' from its central position. 
The self-important idea of subjective idealism that reality resides in the human mind is 
thoroughly overthrown. 
As Ann Banfield suggests, "Time Passes" portrays the world seen without a self. 
It is a world that is outside individual time and space, outside any immediate 
experience that one might imagine-a `real' world that lies beyond ordinary 
conceptions and which the philosophers and scientists endeavour to explore through 
logical reasoning and mathematical calculation. 4 In "Time Passes, " the narrative 
retreats from any human consciousness (especially from the central position of the 
Ramsays) to illustrate the independent existence of a world beyond and outside 
percipients. The narrator of "Time Passes, " in contrast to two other parts, withdraws 
from the personal perspective of the characters. As each character goes to bed, each 
individual lamp that lights the private world is put out, providing the reader with a 
sense of plunging into a profound darkness. The lamps that once lit up individual 
rooms seem to symbolise an internal `I, ' the subjective consciousness of a self, that 
illuminates a subjective sphere, and it is through the illumination of these private 
lamps that readers peer into "The Window" and receive multiple perspectives on Mrs. 
'A term used by Bertrand Russell to depict the existence of the substances unperceived in contrast to 
sense-data, objects perceived. Banfield, Phantom 70-71. 
4 Around 1898, the Cambridge theory of knowledge, with Bertrand Russell, Alfred Whitehead, and G. 
E. Moore as the member of the Cambridge Apostles, starts to turn its focus on philosophical 
Realism-an attempt to reach beyond one's preconceptions and understand the imperceptible world 
through logic and mathematics. 
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Ramsay. 
"[A] downpouring of immense darkness" with each lamp being put out, signifies 
the elimination of any observer `I'-a world of unperceived sensibilia (TL 137). As a 
selfless world, "Time Passes" mirrors Mrs. Ramsay's wedge-shaped core of darkness 
where no boundary can be drawn for it is limitless and unfathomably deep. Thus, day 
passes day, the lighthouse rotates routinely, flowers bloom and fade, even as eyes are 
shut and characters are absent. "Time Passes" showers upon its readers a series of 
plausible but unrealised sensibilia. However, in "Time Passes" a universal Real, 
situated beyond any temporality, is suggested with the thorough obliteration of all 
possible subjective space. Without a clear perspective to define this unseen world, the 
narrative of "Time Passes" seems to disperse without focus, rumbling monotonously 
through an indifferent Nature. Yet, in this indifferent Nature resides the absolute (and 
depersonalised) objectivity, rigidly fixed as a knot in the centre, carrying the human 
projection of the hope for "some absolute good, some crystal of intensity, remote from 
the known pleasures and familiar virtues, something alien to the processes of domestic 
life, single, hard, bright, like a diamond in the sand, which would render the possessor 
secure" (TL 144). 
Through "Time Passes, " with its non-subjective description of the deserted 
house, the reader's senses are taken far beyond his/her surroundings and private 
sensations in order to be made aware of the existence of an unoccupied time and space 
which continues to exist without any actual observer. "Time Passes" is an attempt to 
delineate the underlying design that escapes subjective consciousness. It depicts an 
imperceptible world that is unaltered by the egotistic consciousness which tends to 
project a world rather than to perceive the world as it is. And yet, by placing this 
notion of the existence of an unobserved but persistent world at the centre of the novel. 
Woolf, by contrast, has made her readers more aware of the `subjectivity' of reality 
and its `momentary' nature. As the moments of subjective being are transformed into 
an art work, its subjective quality is objectified and therefore achieves an atemporal 
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world with no self Thus, Mrs. Ramsay feels inclined to take a moment while every 
one withdraws from the dining room, "to stand still after all that chatter, and pick out 
one particular thing; the thing that mattered; to detached it; separate it off; clean it of 
all the emotions and odds and ends of things, and so hold it before her and bring it to 
the tribunal" (TL 122). The inclination shares an affinity with Lily's painting which is 
also an attempt to seize the moment, to "exchang[e] the fluidity of life for the 
concentration of painting [or art], " the making of the subjective moment into a 
detached, objective, eternal entity (TL 173). 
Mrs. Ramsay in her beauty is beheld as the embodiment of an objective 
"Absolute" and "Truth" that defies temporality, as in Keats' phrase: "Beauty is Truth, 
truth beauty. " Passing into non-being, Mrs. Ramsay achieves a final dissolution in 
death and only then does she attain the essentiality of her `atemporal' being as `the 
thing itself. ' She has become an embodiment of the `truth, ' the `knowledge' of life. 
Dying in parenthesis, the beauty, the essential thing, the image, is forever preserved 
within the frame of "The Window" and therefore her essentiality is elevated beyond 
the corruption of temporality. In her beauty there resides the solution and the `Real' 
which Lily has attempted to imagine through `the phantom table. ' After the ten year 
interval, Lily resumes her position in order to attempt to restore the impression left by 
Mrs. Ramsay; to re-approach the treasure of knowledge that Mrs. Ramsay seems to 
carry within her; to reach for the thing itself that surpasses mortality. 5 Gazing into the 
void, there is no longer a focal object that would mirror and reflect any specific 
personal point of view, but rather one that absorbs all projections, eliminating the 
self-projection as well as reflection of the egoistic `I, ' when the urge to question is 
finally abandoned, along with the wilful demand for answers from life. Only then, the 
concealed and unperceived Truth manifests itself. 
The entire section of "Time Passes" reflects the looking-glass which once beheld 
and was beheld through a centre of perception, but now gazes blankly into an 
TL 57. 
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unobserved world (producing a pure reflection of the world uncontaminated by any 
personal perspective or concern). 6 As Avrom Fleishman has suggested, the air moving 
through the house in "Time Passes" should be taken as "a medium of pure 
consciousness" which is not reflected through the mirror of a human mind ("Woolf" 
731). "Time Passes" serves as a voice of the impersonalised air, "sounded as if they 
were floating like flowers on water out there, cut off from them all, as if no one had 
said them, but they had come into existence of themselves, " that underlies the 
immediate experience of the characters (TL 120). By placing an un-experienced world 
of sensibilia at the centre of the subjective moments of "The Window" and "The 
Lighthouse, " a time speculated through an objective stance is set off against a 
subjective time of living. "Time Passes" signifies the imperceptible yet nonetheless 
solid table that artists, as well as mathematicians, strive to imagine, conceptualise and 
embody. It illuminates the personal strain between the estrangement of an objective 
self, perceiving its own temporality, against the atemporal `Real, ' and the inevitable 
envelopment of subjective being. Achieving an ultimate objectivity is the death of the 
self as exemplified through Mrs. Ramsay. 
The time in "Times Passes" is non-subjective-uninvolved with any psychic 
state-and is therefore an `astronomical time' of quantity which, as explained by 
Bergson, could be reduced according to the homogeneous nature of each unit. The 
successive moments of duree present a time of quality in terms of subjective 
involvement. Despite the fact that there is a time-gap of ten years, characters pick up 
immediately what they have left behind ten years ago as if only the dream of a single 
night has intervened. The lapse of time is passed unconsciously. Lily begins painting 
the canvas which she has been working on ten years ago. Her thoughts of where she 
left her paints the previous night also enhance the confusion of the actual amount of 
time that has lapsed through "Time Passes. " Mr. Carmichael resumes his sun-bathing 
position on the lawn. The expected expedition is finally carried out as promised. 
b TL 141. 
Lin 208 
Without "Time Passes, " one can hardly tell that there are ten years in between these 
two days of consecutive motion. With the unreality of "Time Passes, " Mrs. Ramsay 
seems at once genuine and real as well as distant and inaccessible to Lily, as Lily tries 
to reconnect, to reconstruct and rescue her internal images of Mrs. Ramsay that have 
been obscured by her initial subjective interventions and her own personal history of 
the past ten years (which has been left out of the narrative). 
As the narrative voice soars beyond subjective engagement, obliterating personal 
experience and cancelling out private boundaries, "Time Passes" provides a duality of 
connectivity as well as separateness. Between the two (non)consecutive days, an 
emotional gap subsists among the surviving characters beneath the apparent continuity. 
The life of the characters between these ten years is left blank. Although the return to 
the house awakens familiarity, it also prompts an even more poignant awareness of 
how circumstances have definitely changed. The world seems to roll on in all 
forgetfulness of the ten years in between, as if one wakes from a dream with feelings 
from the dream still lingering but the content of the dream obliterated, bestowing a 
double sense of familiarity and estrangement. Feeling lost and disconnected, "as if the 
link that usually bound things together had been cut, and they floated up here, down 
there, off, anyhow, " Lily Briscoe cannot feel genuinely the changes and losses in the 
Ramsay's family as she stands in that house which seems to be the same: "How 
aimless it was, how chaotic, how unreal it was... Mrs. Ramsay dead, Andrew killed; 
Prue dead too-repeat it as she might, it roused no feeling in her" (TL 160). The 
actuality of the real world seems instead dreamy and unreal compared to the concrete 
imagery and feelings of yesterday that still persist in the mind and in the sensory 
nerves of the body. The detached and unconnected familiarity of the scene bestows 
upon one a sense of "extraordinary unreality" (TL 161). 
By contrasting public time and time in the mind (and body), the narrative brings 
forth the nature of life, of the vacillation between objective appraisal and subjective 
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absorption. 7 The opposition between "Time Passes" and the two other sections 
elucidates an ambivalence towards the idea of a universal time and a centreless world 
of a pure objectivity. Yet through such universality, whether "Time Passes" actually 
sets flow the time stream or freezes it becomes controversial. For the fast flowing of a 
universal time deprived of all human consciousness as it continues in a perennial 
course gives the effect of suspended stillness. "Time Passes" endows an infinite world 
which is impassive to human change, as if change only occurs through subjective 
involvement. As Mrs. Ramsay has apprehended, it is through the entirety of the 
moment that stands without further transformations, that the movement and the 
changes of her world are brought out through the contrast: "Her world was changing: 
they were still. The event had given her a sense of movement" (TL 122). 
In a sense, it is through "Time Passes, " the time-interval, that the passing of a 
universal time is made explicit, yet without any real events taking place. Like a dream, 
"Time Passes" presents a world of no time as each temporal moment is identical to 
another. The text seems to convey what Bertrand Russell calls "a pluralistic timeless 
world of Platonic ideas" that exhibits a constant "reality" unsusceptible to change (qtd. 
in Phantom 63). Time units accrue, yet being no different from each other, as the 
objective sense-data seem to remain the same, one simply replaces another in a simple 
accumulation of temporal quantity, instead of quality, that makes one day no different 
from another. 8 As "Time Passes" controversially conveys a sense of the stream of 
time in an eternal stillness, the complexity of time passing within and without 
individual consciousness is simultaneously depicted. With "Time Passes, " the 
narrative manifests the subjective/objective duality of the human mind suggesting that, 
although it is through bodily senses that knowledge is first conceived, an objective, 
7 Ann Banfield, "`Time Passes': Virginia Woolf, Post-Impressionism, and Cambridge Time" Poetics 
Today 24.3 (2003) 479. 
8 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Bergson sees inner duration as qualitative multiplicity 
therefore no any two moments are alike and could be reducible. "Time Passes" seems to resemble the 
astronomy example Bergson has given to illustrate the difference between an inner time experienced 
and a time of the universe whose course is predictable through logic reasoning and therefore the 
extensity of time is reducible. 
Lin 210 
though perhaps intuitive, sense of the world and its reality (that is nonetheless 
stimulated by the sensory input) could still be attained beyond one's immediate 
perceptual experience. 
Ann Banfield, adopting Russell's concept of time passes as `a still sequence of 
timeless positions, ' sees "Time Passes" as that which makes To the Lighthouse a 
Post-Impressionist work rather than an Impressionist one: the design enlivens the still 
moments of "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" by committing them to a temporal 
sequence. Banfield contends that by introducing temporal elements into the 
Impressionist short stories, a three-dimensional effect is therefore effected which is 
closer to Post-Impressionism. Although both Impressionist and Post-Impressionist 
painters attempted to seize the moment, the "Post-Impressionist constructed a 
geometry in Impressionism's sensible world, combining `vision' and `design"' to 
depict not just the moment but the moment within its temporal and subjective context 
("Time" 471). 9 Both the moment's arrest in stasis and the fleeting nature of the 
moments among the stream of time are presented. The moment that is seemingly 
perpetuated through feelings is now endowed with a transitory demeanour. 
As suggested by Banfield, "literature's counterpart to the geometry of spatial 
relations were the temporal relations of Cambridge time philosophy" ("Time" 471). 
With the introduction of temporality, the novel achieves a three-dimensional effect. 
Both "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" signify those specific temporal points 
when time is actually lived, while "Time Passes" represents the link between these 
two moments of being which is substantiated through a contrast to the numerous 
undifferentiated moments of non-being. 1° For, "`Time Passed' (here the exact amount 
could be indicated in bracket) and nothing whatever happens" (0 68). Only Mrs. 
Ramsay's death is announced in parenthesis as if it is an incident that exerts no 
9 Abstract to "Time Passes: Virginia Woolf, Post-Impressionism, and Cambridge Time" 
1" "The moment is random also in being one of an infinite number of possible moments. Separated by 
moments of non-being, like the darkness-encircled lights.. . 
They are collections of sound surrounded by 
silence" (Banfield, Phantom 117). 
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influence on the scale of life or the course of time. If it is a non-existent interval, then 
one is tempted to ask: what is `Time'? Universal time is a time without temporality. 
And also, would there be time without a perceiver? 
The time portrayed in "Time Passes" is not directly experienced, yet it maintains 
an undeniable `reality, ' contrasting with Berkeley's idea that what is, is perceived. The 
character's subjective experience of the passing of time is not directly approached 
until in "The Lighthouse" when Lily starts to reach back in time and mourn for time 
lost. However, with the insertion of "Time Passes, " the narrative strategy also affirms 
that it is not by living through the time-interval itself that the lapsing of time is 
brought to the consciousness of the characters, but through the attempt to reach 
beyond the time-interval (which coheres with Bergson's idea that only by standing 
without time could the linearity of the time's course be perceived or as it is said by 
Eliot, "To be conscious is not to be in time") ("Burnt Norton" 2.40). The time passed 
is carried within the moment and recognised only through its pastness. Therefore, 
"Time Passes, " in depicting a world of sensibilia which exists without a self-a world 
of perpetuation-suggests an un-intervening time which exerts no influence upon the 
presence of the existing sensibilia. Insofar as this is the case, time in "Time Passes" is 
itself an unperceived sensibile and therefore never to be experienced in its immediacy. 
By the exhibition of the trajectory of an imperceptible time in its act of passing, a 
`reality' of time, independent of human consciousness, is conferred. " 
Through the technique of free indirect discourse, Woolf portrays a world 
dissected into variant private universes engrossed with a time and space of their own 
as each character takes up a different point of view in perceiving the world. These 
various perspectives are each a projection of an exclusive private world. Banfield has 
pointed out how private and public opposition is introduced by Russell as a substitute 
In History of English Thought, Leslie Stephen writes: "Unless you can perceive the realities as they 
are not revealed to our perceptive faculties-that is to say, unless you can discover unperceivable 
perceptions-you are not in the presence of facts, but of phantasms" (qtd. in Banfield, Phantom 73). 
See also Banfield, Phantom 40 for sensibilia and sensibile. 
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for as well as a commentary on the nature of subject and object, mind and matter, and 
that, though the dualism remains, it "depsychologises one side, reducing the distance 
from one to the other" (Banfield, Phantom 73). With such division, the private world 
of the mind is no longer an unintelligible and unapproachable world of different 
substance that cannot be speculated through the logic and the concept of the causal 
law of physics and mathematics. For, the variance lies in the difference of the received 
sense-data, and a conjecture of the psychological state, therefore, could be made 
through the recognition and interpretation of the sense-data alone. Again with the 
analogy of `a table, ' Russell suggests that although the table would be perceived 
differently from its variant aspects, a generality of the table could still be inferred 
through `a set' of all those particulars. 
Between physics and psychology, the difference lies in their means of approach: 
"physics treat as a unit the whole system of appearances of a piece of matter, whereas 
psychology is interested in certain of these appearances themselves" (Russell, 
Analysis 83-4). If, as suggested by the idea of neutral monism, there is no substantive 
difference between mind and matter, psychological states could then also be inferred 
by a conditioned accountability and generalisation of a universal regularity as in 
physics. By `depsychologising' (and therefore depersonalising the psychical causal 
law), the difference in psychological states could then be taken as a result of receptive 
differences of outward stimuli rather than as a variance of intrinsic subjective quality. 
Yet, even so, a thorough knowledge of a private, subjective room still remains 
impossible: though we may empathise with another's pain or pleasure, the feelings felt 
are particular to the subject itself. Following the logical conjecture, a real table could 
be attained through a refined collection of all particulars. Lily reflects, with reference 
to Mrs. Ramsay, "One wanted fifty pairs of eyes to see with.. . 
Fifty pairs of eyes were 
not enough to get round that one woman with" (TL 214). Even through the various 
eyes of "The Window, " the subjective realm of Mrs. Ramsay remains unfathomably 
deep. The subjective rooms and private points of view are not simply "a point at 
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which sense-data are gathered and given to an observer" (Banfield, Phantom 72). The 
received sense-data cannot stand as the entire condition of a state of mind, while the 
outward actions are unduly representations of a whole mental realm. 
Although largely influenced by Russell, the privacy which Woolf bestowed upon 
her characters is not solely defined in relation to "observation's purely structural 
position, one already there before an observer arrives" (Banfield, Phantom 72). The 
private world of Woolf is a world where sense-data are received through an immediate 
interaction with the body and therefore prompt a sensation that is intertwined with 
personal memories of past sensations (which Russell did also recognise as he tried to 
examine the impact of the past and memory, although he insisted that there is no 
intrinsic difference between the data of psychology and those of physics). Thus, the 
subject is not simply a passive receiver of sense-data; instead s/he is actively engaged 
in a mutual correspondence of receiving, interpreting, and projecting, and it is this 
process of subjective engagement that constant eludes objective assessment, 
contrasting Russell's idea that "psychology groups together those having the same 
`passive' place"(Analysis 256). The sensation kindled by the sense-data is never 
wholly an objective reaction that could be induced through any formulaic calculation 
but rather a thoroughly subjective, `dynamic' state derived out of the body's memory 
of its personal history. It is a world of private sensations and perceptions which are 
neither simply a mental nor a bodily product, but rather a composite of the two, and it 
is for this reason that the private world often eludes logical reasoning and scientific 
prediction. By dividing sense-data from sensations, Russell makes possible a 
"subjectless subjectivity" by dismissing the factors of the subjective characteristic of 
the observer. 12 While not denying the subjectless subjectivity presented through 
"Time Passes, " it would be inappropriate to consider the `private' experience of time 
12 Banfield, Phantom: "It is this logical possibility of the detachment of sense-data from sensation and, 
a fortiori, from the subject of sensation, which is crucial" (69). Also, "In this extra-mental 
`subjective' 
space, the physical and the subjective are conjoined in `physical subjectivity or 
`physiological 
subjectivity, ' for Berkeley a contradiction but for Russell a logical possibility... . 
The result is a theory of 
knowledge with at its centre the strange notion of a subjectless subjectivity" (70). 
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and time's passing under the context of a physical-psychological state. 
Time passing in a series of `private' moments of stillness is but a time of objective 
stance as conferred through Russell's mathematical approach and elucidated by 
Neville's epic moments, while Bergson's duree is a novelist's recognition of the 
temporal self that is in a perpetual transition from moment to moment but is 
nevertheless fundamental to a sense of selfhood. The continuity of the process itself 
sustains the sense of an eternal stasis as in "Time Passes. " Although Bergson's duree 
is a time lived through subjective engagement, its passage and passing is only 
unconsciously perceived. Russell's numeral line of time passing (as Bergson has 
argued) is but a time known only retrospectively as one stands beyond the moment. As 
Banfield suggests, the moments of being are then less an experience of time than an 
experience of no time. Living within temporality, time is therefore unperceivable as 
the "music heard so deeply/That it is not heard at all" ("The Dry Salvages" 5.27). 
Insofar as the core self is but the momentary feeling of being in existence that varies 
from moment to moment, it is nonetheless often mistaken as a stance of perpetual 
stillness. 
No moment could fully enclose itself as a totality, since every moment is always 
a transition from a past to a future in the changes of bodily conditions. In contrast with 
what Russell has suggested, no moment could be entirely `private' from another, for 
"If all time is eternally present/ All time is unredeemable" ("Burnt Norton" 1.4-5). 
Without the intermingling of an objective sensation with other personal sensations that 
attach to peculiar tastes, sounds or words, the Proustian involuntary memory triggered 
by a madeleine, dipped in the tea, would be impossible. It is through the 
autobiographical memory of the sensory systems that the past and what has been 
forgotten continue to be preserved along with the living being. 
Even with all the effort to pursue a purely objective world, the unexpected would 
still arise from some concealed compartment and forgotten memory within oneself. 
Looking through "The Window, " the constant shift between the perspectives of 
Lin 215 
different characters indicates that these characters hardly share a similar universe and 
each one of them perceives the world differently through a window of his or her own. 
Mrs. Ramsay sitting by the window or at the centre of the table becomes the focal and 
framed object to which each character seeks to relate and define itself in detachment. 
As a woman, Mrs. Ramsay has been objectified, but still her subjective world remains 
impenetrable. Already, like a work of art, in her beauty which, nonetheless, can be 
perceived in its wholeness, Mrs. Ramsay is the human embodiment of the `profundity' 
of Nature and a concealed Truth: 
Was it wisdom? Was it knowledge? Was it, once more, the deceptiveness of 
beauty, so that all one's perceptions, half-way to truth, were tangled in a 
golden mesh? Or did she lock up within her some secret which certainly 
Lily Briscoe believed people must have for the world to go on at all. (TL 
57) 
"The Window" exemplifies a jigsaw puzzle where the achievement of a panorama is 
dependent upon building up all the scattered bits and pieces and, therefore, no 
character situated in the picture could possibly achieve a full view of the self and of 
the world around it unless by elimination of the self. "The Window" delineates a 
Leibnizian monadological universe: each mind mirroring a universe of its own 
reality. 13 In "The Window, " each character carries along with them a personal history 
and as they are absorbed within their memories, they embody a private world 
illuminated by their own intrinsic light. These characters might be placed within the 
same physical time and space; nevertheless, each of them, through the reflection of 
their perspective, sees the world differently. The public time which brings them to sit 
together around the same dining table is never the actual time in which the characters 
are mentally situated. Each of them has the tendency to experience the outer world 
according to his or her preconceptions (built out of past experience and belief). It is 
not until those sudden moments in which they seem to cast off their past, their 
13 Banfield, Phantom 72. 
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preoccupations, and their personal concerns, that living the moment as it is becomes 
possible. 
But physical assemblage does not necessarily lead to mental attunement. Each 
character continues to live, more or less, within a private temporal world of his, "her 
own. While Mrs. Ramsay is serving dinner, she is thinking about her life, about her 
effort to integrate, about her past. Lily, though, seems to be aware of the dinner 
conversation and participates in it, strays away from time to time into her own 
meditations on her painting. She starts with an attempt to understand Mrs. Ramsay's 
profundity, turns to pitying Mr. Bankes, and ends up meditating on the design that she 
should apply to her canvas. Charles Tansley, self-conscious about the baseness of his 
dress, never stops regretting the time he has lost by participating in this "silly, 
superficial, flimsy" dinner party which is merely a waste of time and for which he 
seems so unfit (TL 93). Throughout the entire dinner, he is trying to justify his own 
achievements despite his humble clothing. He is eager to assert himself, driven by the 
obsessive consciousness of his family background. As Mrs. Ramsay has observed, it is 
always the `I' that matters, but with everyone clinging onto `I, ' convergence is 
impossible: intentions are misunderstood. In both "The Window" and "The 
Lighthouse, " events are dissected through the perspectives of different characters. The 
dinner barely holds its guests together. And yet, "Nothing seemed to have merged. 
They all sat separate" (TL 91). Sitting round the dinner table, few are attentive to the 
occasion itself-even the hostess, Mrs. Ramsay herself, feels "being past everything, 
through everything, out of everything" (TL 91). 
The dinner party encloses not just the moment itself, but, resembling Mrs. 
Dalloway, it actually contains the pasts of each individual. All of the past is gathered 
up in that moment. The present is not restricted to its very moment alone, but is rather 
an accumulation of various moments dissected by the various perspectives adopted by 
the characters in responding to different private times and worlds within themselves. 
No present is experienced simply as it is, and Russell's argument of "subjectless 
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subjectivity" is thrust into doubt. Although Russell would have suggested that this is 
because a different person, each time, has taken up a different sense-data and therefore 
a different sensation has arisen, the problem of Russell's explanation would be his 
disregarding of the involvement of the autobiographical memory of bodily 
experiences. The dinner produces differences not simply because each has taken up 
different sense-data, but also because of the impact of their different histories. Perhaps, 
though unperceived, the reality of the sensibilia is undeniable, yet Russell's "physical 
subjectivity" could still not have determined nor substantiated the subjective 
sensations and perceptions of an individual. 
In "Time Passes, " subjective division is thoroughly abolished. Individual 
selfhood has been deprived of brinks and edges. Without the engagement of human 
perspective, "Time Passes" presents a non-human, vegetable world of trees and 
flowers "standing there, looking before them, looking up, yet beholding nothing, 
eyeless, and so terrible" (TL 147). Before "Time Passes, " the sinking into the 
wedged-shape core of darkness already anticipates the eternal present without any 
temporal order. The present can only be sensed as it is when a character is capable of 
reaching down into the core self or soaring above the autobiographical self where no 
personal history nor fixed social identity is there to obscure the present. "Time Passes" 
provides a general account of the world that continues on even if there are no 
beholders. The world comes into a unified wholeness without differentiation. 
As Russell argued: with each different person in the room there would be a 
different universe. 14 Each of these universes might intersect with another, but they are 
never identical. Everyone not only tends to project a world of his or her own which 
is 
private from any other, but also tries to conceal inner feelings and "inventing 
differences, when people, heaven knows, were different enough without that" (TL 
14 Russell, Logic and Knowledge: "[E]ach particular that there is in the world does not in any way 
logically depend upon any other particular. Each one might happen to be the whole universe" (qtd. in 
Banfield, Phantom 112). 
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13). 15 Consequently, it makes it hard for one character to probe into the mind and 
universe of another, and even more impossible for each of them to truly understand 
another. It is impossible, as Lily has observed by watching Mrs. Ramsay sinks into a 
world of her own, to follow her into "that strange no-man's land" (TL 92). Complete 
unity and understanding with one another seems to be impossible, leading Lily to 
wonder: "What device for becoming, like waters poured into one jar. inextricably the 
same, one with the object one adored. . . 
it was not knowledge but unity that she 
desired" (TL 57). 
The voice of the character dominates the narrative, yet the voice of the narrator 
becomes inseparable from those of the characters. Instead of providing an omnipresent 
and omniscient narrator with a voice of its own, who is able to give us an objective 
description of the external circumstances, Woolf has the voice of her characters heard 
directly by the reader, enabling the reader to perceive and think with them. According 
to J. Hillis Miller, what the central narrator in Woolf's novels is able to perceive and 
describe is the same as that perceived by the characters: "The narrator, it appears, is a 
collective consciousness, dependent on the consciousnesses of the various characters 
for its existence. The narrator is without life, personality, opinions, and feelings of its 
own, and yet is doomed to see all the lives, personalities, opinions" (Miller, Tropes 
157). 16 In depicting the individual subjective world, the reader is restricted to each of 
the presented subjective points of view as well as being bombarded with diverse 
judgements and opinions. Every description has its specific point of view. Every 
perception is merely partially true. However, in all Woolf's works, there is always the 
attempt to bring them together in order to create the resonance of a shared perspective 
amongst individuals. By narrating her story through the subjective points of view of 
her characters, Woolf dissects the sphere of her novel into a series of seemingly 
1S The image of projecting a world of one's own is adopted from Thomas Pynchon's The Crying of 
Lot49 (London: Vintage-Random House, 2000). 
16 J. Hillis Miller, Tropes, Parables, Performatives: Essays on Twentieth-Century Literature (New York: 
Havester Wheatsheaf-Simon&Schuster, 1990). 
Lin 219 
separated private worlds which, according to the time-concept of Russell. are private 
from any other time and space-"each monad, rooted in one perspective, has `a room 
of its own"' "in the private `here' and `now"' (Banfield, Phantom 111; 102; 113). 
Through each different perspective, one gets a different impression of the personal 
traits of the characters. There is always that contradictory picturing of each 
character-Mr. Ramsay is a hero, a tyrant, as well as a man struggling against his 
ordinariness; Mrs. Ramsay is both the protecting mother as well as a beautiful 
enchantress who is also "tyrannical, domineering and masterful, " she `whose wishes 
must be obeyed' (TL 65; 32). 
Fleishman has argued that it is through the accumulation of these different 
perceptions that one is able to approach the `real': 
The essential characteristic of the technique represented by Virginia Woolf 
is that we are given not merely one person whose consciousness is rendered, 
but many persons, with frequent shifts from one to the other. . . 
The 
multiplicity of persons suggests that we are here after all confronted with an 
endeavour to investigate an objective reality. (Fleishman, "Woolf' 718) 
Within the general public time, there are numerous private spheres that are 
impenetrable by others. By presenting the inner thoughts of different characters, 
readers are made aware of the conflicts and struggles which exist between the 
characters-how each of them strives to understand the mind and feeling of another 
and how such a desire is often frustrated. Even the narrator seems to fail to grasp the 
first-personal, subjective world of each character. Fleishman adopts McTaggart's 
notion of how the universe consists of selves, and how "an ideal condition in which 
selves will come perfectly to know each other and thereby to love each other.. . will 
become the universal unity in which each individual will have perfect existence" 
(Fleishman, "Woolf' 727). Such a notion bears a similarity to what Clarissa has said: 
"which perhaps was the reward of having cared for people; they came back in the 
middle of St. James's Park on a fine morning" (MD 7). Or, as Lily has questioned 
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similarly: "could loving, as people called it, make her and Mrs. Ramsay one? " (TL 5-). 
Through intimacy and love, Lily seeks for the knowledge to transcend individuality 
and to feel and know the subjective world of others. Yet, as Lily has observed, those 
moments of transcendence, that pass beyond the subjective self so that a unity and 
wholeness is formed, are so ephemeral. For these moments come and go so 
unexpectedly and so quickly that no language or words could be formed in time to 
embody them and what one comes to remember is merely a dim, indistinct, feeling. 
By posing the temporal human perception against the vast eternity of unoccupied 
perception, Woolf suspends time from its incessant flow and creates successfully that 
sense of a `moment of being' (as Russell has argued every moment is self-enclosed 
within its own spatial and temporal state). It is a still moment of being, where a centre, 
a knot, a meaning, is formed in contrast to various moments of non-being. Yet, by 
rendering the narrative of her novel through subjective worlds, the reader is 
introduced to a time within time where all time melts into one and yet no time is 
reducible, echoing that eternal time paradox in Eliot's Four Quartets. The 
accumulation of time is reflected instantly through the flux of feelings and thoughts as 
with the new experience of a new moment a new mergence of the present and past is 
formed. Furthermore, the passing of time is experienced by becoming aware of the 
difference between each time point. But, if time is actually suspended within those 
still moments of being of the characters, then there will not be any agony of the 
intrusion of time, for within each still moment is an atemporal world where no past or 
future is perceptible. For "within, the moment has no temporal order, " there is no past 
or future, but only a complete present (Banfield, Phantom 117). Instead of being 
simply a transition from past to future, every present moment is fully itself. To move 
from one definite private moment to another, like the opening of Mrs. Dalloway, is 
only possible in duree, where all time is carried within each moment, positing a 
continuous transition. 
If time is like the numerical line which is composed by numerous dots, then 
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within a specific moment, it would be impossible for one to perceive time in its linear 
picture, not to mention the impossibility of being conscious of what comes before or 
after. As Lily attempts to retrieve her perceptions of Mrs. Ramsay (wvhom she feels to 
be distant and unapproachable), she is both in the present as well as the past. 
Apparently readers are made aware that the time gap between the two days of "The 
Window" and "The Lighthouse" is in fact a ten years gap, even though each 
character's life within these ten years is absent from the narrative. Nonetheless, the 
disjointed flow of emotions and the ambivalence of distant and familiar feelings 
disclose the present of the veiled feelings and emotions hoarded in the body through 
the absent years. "Time Passes" is instead the readers' experience of the passing of 
time from an external perspective like that of the narrator's, not the direct experience 
of time passing of the characters. For the time of "Time Passes, " as depicted through 
an external point of view, is not the character's experience, but the reader's. By 
condensing all years passed into one night of sleep, a contrastive repercussion is 
created. In a sense, it provides one with a sense of how `unconsciously' time has 
lapsed. The time between these years, like the time passing in one's dream, is not 
experienced by the sleeper, and presumably, the non-experience of time does not exist 
at all. As the apparent stillness of "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" is opposed to 
the indication of time flowing in "Time Passes, " Woolf brings out the two 
simultaneous yet contrasting aspects of time. 
Bergson speculated that it is only through retrospection that time is mistakenly 
seen to be a consecutive sequence of independent moments that could be beheld 
separately: time flown, rather than time passing; a thing rather than a progress. '7 
Russell tried to relate mathematical ideas to the concept of time and insisted that there 
are numeral points or numbers between any two points or numbers. Paradoxically, the 
passing of time may be experienced as duree, or as a series of infinite still moments. 
For as Lily has recognised, ten years later when she tries to retrieve her memory of 
17 Bergson, Time 198. 
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Mrs. Ramsay, there are moments of stillness: "In the midst of chaos there was shape: 
this eternal passing and flowing. . . was struck 
into stability. Life stand[s] still here" (TL 
176). These moments of stillness stand out from the medley of one's memory. Perhaps 
the stillness of the moment is not a result of the nature of time but rather a 
construction of language as it encapsulates the fleeting sensations and feelings into 
stabilised words and meaning. 
According to Russell, time is built through numerous separated atoms rather 
than as an identical spot within which moments succeed and permeate one another and 
bestow the spot with different qualities. However, as Bergson has pointed out, to 
understand time as a chronological extensive line would be the result of mistreating 
time by approaching it through a spatial concept. In stressing the intensity of a 
moment, Woolf never actually aims to show the absolute stillness of the moment as 
argued by Russell. The moment of being, instead of being fully present, is rather a 
moment when past, present, and future are struck into one point and this is how a 
temporary stillness is achieved as a sense of totality-a moment of being enclosed in a 
time of no time as well as all time where no temporal orders could be perceived. 
The debate about whether this is a Bergsonian notion or a Russellian one 
continues. Fleishman, however, seeks to raise the attention of Woolf's readers to 
McTaggart's influence on Woolf, especially his notion of time and the illusion of time. 
According to McTaggart, "there are as many time-series as there are selves who 
perceive things in time... there is, on our theory, no time-series, for nothing is in time. 
There is no series of events, but a timeless series of misperceptions which perceive a 
series of timeless existents as being in time" (qtd. in Fleishman, "Woolf' 729). Woolf, 
in combating the continuous transformation of pure duree, does envision the 
possibility of sinking into oneself, dispersing all subjective quality accumulated 
throughout the years, and being in a state of pure subjective existence-the 
wedge-shaped core of darkness where "there was freedom, there was peace, there was, 
most welcome of all, a summoning together, a resting of a platform of stability. Not as 
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oneself did one find rest ever, in her experience, but as a wedge of darkness" (TL 
69-70). Without presenting and noticing the interval time gap, there is no time at all. 
"Time Passes" specifies how time elapses when characters are still absorbed within 
their own worlds. The universality of "Time Passes" enhances the quality of 
subjective temporality. It is through the two days of "The Window" and "The 
Lighthouse, " where actual events take place, that the actual flow of psychical time is 
narrated; while "Time Passes, " though designed to indicate the enormous time gap 
that exists between two days, is in contrast presented through a monumental Time. 
Unlike the other two sections where time has been spread out as it is lived, within 
"Time Passes, " time is condensed: ten years becomes one night of dream. "Time 
Passes" possesses the characteristic of being one's dream, because during one's dream 
one is unconscious of the passing of physical time. In both "The Window" and "The 
Lighthouse, " there hardly needs be mention of how much time has passed or what 
time it is because there are external elements that provide the context of a public time, 
yet in "Time Passes, " phrases like "night succeeds night, " "day after day" are 
constantly used to indicate the passing of the time. The explicit indication of the 
passing of time makes it reasonable for one to suspect that without these actual 
indications of time passing, there wouldn't be any experience of the passing of time. 
Temporality has ceased as all moments become identical. Within this stillness, one 
experiences eternity as well as death. 
Woolf has said that she intended to write about death, yet life kept intruding into 
the narrative. The attempt to seize the moment which one really lived and to suspend 
it from the incessant flow of the time stream would be Woolf's ultimate objective. 
However, she was also aware of the impossibility of transcending the flow of time; the 
impossibility of inhibiting the stream of thought. She also encountered the frustration 
of trying to withhold these fleeting moments. The irretrievable moments have become 
the lost objects that occur in most of her novels. 18 
18 Banfield, Phantom: "\Voolf's universe is a plurality of occupied and unoccupied perspectives, the 
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If Banfield treats "The Window" and "The Lighthouse" as still pictures of an 
Impressionist portrait, then she must have neglected the fact that time is only 
noticeable with real events and accomplishments. According to Banfield, the idea of 
one's experience of time passing which is employed by Woolf is not what most critics 
have assumed as the duration proposed by Bergson. Instead, she suggests, it should be 
the idea of a series of still moments claimed by Russell and G. E. Moore: "Woolf 
adopted not Henri Bergson's philosophy but G E. Moore and Bertrand Russell's 
realism. Time passes not as duree but as a series of still moments" (Banfield, "Time" 
471). Woolf's portrait of time passing is neither fully a Russellian idea of a series of 
still moments nor, simply, a Bergsonian one of duree. Instead, she depicts a time that 
possesses both characteristics according to one's state of consciousness. Through the 
distinction between public and private time, Woolf discloses the complexity of the 
experience of time as well as a time beyond experience. Within the flux of time, 
nothing seems absolute and defined. If one experiences time not as duree but as a 
series of still moments, even the possibility of returning to scrutinise former moments 
would be utterly ruled out, not to mention the impossibility of withstanding 
temporality from intruding into the moments of being. If each moment is self-enclosed, 
then the autonomy of the thinker to conceive each moment is being reduced, because 
it would not be the thinker who has conceived the moment, but the moment simply 
occurs. And yet, in such a sense, thoughts conceived would not necessarily be 
consecutive, so no nexus between the self and its thoughts is available. On the other 
hand, if the past were stored in a perfect chronological order with clear distinction 
from one moment to another, then when one is transposed into that moment again one 
would be able to re-experience the moment wholly and statically; yet, as Proust has 
shown through his fictional narrative, and as Bergson specified through his theoretical 
arguments, the effort to reconstruct one's experience of the past is always fragmentary. 
objects which fill it are always unobserved by someone. This is the meaning of another set of recurring 
images in the novels: that of lost objects" (134). 
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The past stored within one's mind is never how it had been actually experienced. One 
can never stay completely and perfectly stable within a specific time point. As both 
Lily and Clarissa have experienced, one's mental stream travels from one moment to 
another, from one emotion to another. 
Within each moment, there are indications and residues of other moments. It is 
impossible for one to exhaust the entire moment of the past, because there will always 
be a new stimulation to the senses that continues to transport one from one 
recollection to another. The moment of being can seem to be a stillness (transcending 
the subjectivity of the autobiographical memory as the self dispersed into a core sense 
of feelings) among the actual time flow. Russell suggested that each event is 
self-enclosed and is private from any other time and space, yet the self-enclosedness 
of the private time and space does not necessarily presuppose that time passes in a 
motion of immobility. The moment passed would be irretrievable and therefore private 
to itself. Banfield's adoption of Roger Fry's example of the Chinese painting scroll 
that extends horizontally in length is not adequate to support the argument that each 
perception is a still picture of the moment and one's experience of time is rather as an 
accumulation of still moments not as duree. 19 The unity of the entire painting though 
is achieved finally through individual apprehension of successive segments, yet the 
analogy disregards the continuation of the bodily flow that carries through and unifies 
the seemingly dissected moments. If there were moments when one is struck by a 
vision, or overwhelmed by an immense emotion that seemed to suspend the flowing of 
one's mental time, would one conclude that time is naturally experienced in such 
fashion? Even if one is captivated by momentary visions or perceptions, these visions 
seemingly to freeze in stillness often fade away with time. And often what causes 
them to fade is that our mind has already made a transition from one sensation to 
another. One might still question that the fading of the vision itself is in fact an 
indication of the passing of time in consecutive moments. However, the moment fades 
Roger Fry "An Essay in Aesthetics, " (1909) Vision and Design 35. 
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away gradually, instead of being substituted directly by another perception. The two 
concepts of the passing of time, instead of contradicting each other, are rather two 
different facets of one's experience of time and time passing. Both Bergson and 
Russell are partially right, whilst Woolf is able to highlight, through her narrative 
technique and design, a much more complete but complicated experience of the 
passing of time. 
In resemblance to the creative process of Lily Briscoe, the structure of To the 
Lighthouse takes up the form of a painting. Centred upon Lily's striving for vision, To 
the Lighthouse combines the pursuit of eternal truth and beauty with an everyday 
narrative of family life. Lily attempts to transcribe her perceptual impression of Mrs. 
Ramsay onto the canvas, hoping to capture not only `life' and `the thing itself, ' but 
also her own personal strife and yearnings towards embodying it-to bestow the 
reality of both Mrs. Ramsay's and her own subjectivity on the canvas. The difficulty 
of painting and creating is transformed into a problem of how to compromise between 
the subjective and objective reality that is analogous to an emblematic representation 
of the novel's subject matter: "Subject and object and the nature of reality" (TL 28). 
Occupying a central position, "Time Passes" mirrors the central line that Lily Briscoe 
finally draws down her canvas at the end of To the Lighthouse. Banfield describes this 
as existing to specify that sudden intensity of her temporary vision of the `real' which 
creates a unity composed of the sensory real and material facts. No sooner is a 
candidate for the real proffered, than it is transformed by questioning its reality into 
something strange, unreal, and yet so insistently present one wonders whether its 
strangeness is its reality. As specified by Roger Fry about the unity of a work of art, 
"In a picture this unity is due to a balancing of the attractions of the eye about the 
central line of the picture, " emphasising a subjective, perceptual, unity (Fry 34). By 
the form of a visual artwork, the perceptual moments resulting from "any turn in the 
wheel of sensation" are "crystallised" and "transfixed" in a stasis of a colour, a 
geometry form, which no words can possibly translate (TL 7). 
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Woolf's aesthetic theory and her ideas about artistic presentation are closely 
related to those proposed by Roger Fry, who was introduced to the Bloomsbury group 
in 1910. Both seek to "articulate a theory and practice of art which moves beyond 
Impressionism and conceives of art as a form of knowledge which proceeds beyond 
the limits of sensory perception" (Waugh, "Beyond" 12). However, the knowledge 
which Woolf sought does not depart from sensory reality. It is not a knowledge that 
eliminates feeling and emotion; rather it is a knowledge engendered from personal 
sensory perception and individual feelings and emotions but propelled towards an 
understanding of universal `truth' external to one's immediate experience. The 
irregularity or unnatural positioning of objects, which Cezanne adopts in his pictures, 
endows life and vitality with stillness, bestows irregularity upon commonness, and 
brings forth the fabric hidden behind the apparent image. The compositional 
strangeness de-familiarises ordinary perceptions and opens onto an extra-ordinary yet 
unperceived "reality. " It substantiates the idea of surpassing the limitation of one's 
perception and enabling one to attend to what usually passes unnoticed. By involving 
some irregularity within his painting, Cezanne attempts to challenge conventional 
sensory perception and to visualise the hidden and insensible real. 
Building up her forms and colours upon her canvas, a clearer vision is restored 
to Lily Briscoe as she detaches herself from representational composition: "beneath 
the colour there was the shape. She could see it all so clearly, so commandingly, when 
she looked: it was when she took her brush in hand that the whole thing changed": 
egoistic feelings and emotions intervene, and an impersonal detachment is no longer 
possible (TL 23). Getting beyond the habitual perceptions and attaining to a hidden 
but supporting pattern, one is forced to recognise one's own temporality. For the 
recognition of the objectivity of sense-data involves the apprehension of what Russell 
calls a "subjectless subjectivity, " or "an unborn soul, a soul reft of body" as in Lily's 
term, and therefore the death of the self (TL 173). 
Being surrounded by Cambridge Apostles, Woolf was much accustomed to and 
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influenced by their reading of epistemology-the problem of knowledge. The idea of 
whether there exists an imperceptible but an ever-lasting `real' world that could be 
known was the central focus of their philosophical discussion. The turn to the theory 
of knowledge coincided with the rise of philosophy of science as a discipline in the 
first decades of the century. 20 Russell spoke of "the gulf between the world of physics 
and the world of sense" and the desire to negotiate philosophically "the transition 
from perception to science" (qtd. in Banfield, Phantom 5). While Russell, G. E. Moore 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein tried to reach beyond, towards the imperceptible (that is 
either blocked by the `I' or beyond its perceptional capacity) through philosophical 
arguments and mathematical calculations, Roger Fry, E. M. Forster, and Woolf also 
tried to contemplate through the aesthetic, "the hidden pattern, " and through art to 
convey simultaneously a perceptible world as well as an imperceptible `reality' (MB 
85). 
20 Banfield, Phantom: "Philosophy was then the foundation, strengthened by logic and mathematics. 
Scientific knowledge of the external world was only expressible logically and mathematically" (5). 
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VI 
Self, History and Art: The Cubist Impression of The Years 
for history is a pattern 
Of timeless moments. 
T. S. Eliot, Four Quartets 
The Years, written after Woolf's most experimental novel, The Waves, has often 
been considered as a return to a conventional realist narrative. In fact, The Years, like 
A Room and Orlando, exemplifies and illustrates the limitations of conventional 
realist or `materialist' narrative. Whilst in The Waves an experimental method and 
style of narration has been devised to convey the `soul' or subject-in-process, 
ostensibly The Years re-incorporates individual being into a realist social-historical 
framework. With The Years, Woolf aspired to write an "essay-novel" that is to "take in 
everything, sex, education, life etc. " (WD 183). 1 She intended it to be bold and 
adventurous, a more explicit narration of the sensual female body and its relation to 
feeling and emotion, heretofore prohibited from the public genre of fiction: the 
`special' friendship, for example, between Sally and Nicholas (who likes men instead 
of women) provokes this reaction in Peggy: "a thrill ran down her thigh. . . and that 
thrill she knew meant bitterness" (Y 239). In The Years, thoughts are no longer 
exclusively in the mind alone, but deeply felt in the body. And the feelings in the body 
amplify and initiate further thoughts. 
While composing The Years, Woolf reflected: "Why should the Ps. [The 
Pargiters] make my heart jump; why should Flush stiffen the back of my neck? What 
connection has the brain with the body? Nobody in Harley Street could explain, yet 
the symptoms are purely physical and as distinct as one book is from the other" (WD 
188). 2 It is through the close inspection and narration of the reality of the body in 
feelings and emotions that `truth' is disclosed: Woolf's original aim for the novel, "to 
Diary entry 2 November 1932. 
Diary entry 15 January 1933. 
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give the whole of the present society-nothing less: facts as ,. -ell as the vision" is 
therefore fulfilled (WD 191). 3 In particular, and as observed by Julia Briggs in 
Virginia Woolf: An Inner Life: "She [Woolf] was refining and complicating her 
analysis of cultural change to show how the Victorian idealisation of motherhood had 
also been a source of restraint and oppression, and, in particular, of sexual repression" 
(271). 
"The Years has a somewhat diffuse surface" suggests James Naremore in his 
article "Nature and History in The Years"; "the novel is strikingly unorthodox, and in 
every respect serves to undermine the assumptions of traditional `realist' fiction" (247; 
246). Instead of regenerating past time through passages depicting the years that have 
gone by, the novel is cut into sections of linear time but presented through a Cubist 
technique which suggests the way in which life is compressed into atomic sections of 
memorable events or, in Woolf's own words, moments of being. The Years gives a 
strong impression of the linear chronological passing of time, in its title, structure and 
even its plot. Yet, the tone of the narrative is laden with emotions, and the reader 
encounters a series of pictorial presentations strained with emotions and feelings of 
various kinds. The past recurs constantly through the bodily remembrance of an earlier 
event evoked by a re-encounter with similar objects, sounds, or scenes from the past. 
Although one feels the overwhelming presence of the past, the past still remains 
caught in an obscure vagueness. Yet, `remembering poetically' (in contrast to what 
Soren Kierkegaard has proposed) preserves the memory in an unforgettable, 
unnameable and yet non-deferrable axis of life capable of being related and adopted in 
different circumstances and in different ages. `' Perhaps, it is through this method that 
Woolf achieves her aim, to "get the depth without becoming static" (WD 191). 5 
Resembling Henri Bergson's argument in Matter and Memory, The Years's focus 
3 Diary entry 25 April 1933. 
a Soren Kierkegaard, Either, Or ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1987) 292-293. Also Mark Sandy, "`The Colossal Fabric's Form': Remodelling Memory, History, 
and Forgetting in Baron's Recollections of Ruins" Durham Modelling the Self Lecture Series 2007. 
Diary entry 25 April 1933. 
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is on the subjective perspectives that vary along with the changing of a body 
interposed between the external world of matter and an internal world of images and 
conceptions. In Matter and Memory, Bergson sought to break through the 
irreconcilable dualistic constructions of realism and idealism to conceptualise a new 
understanding of the relation between matter and mind, defined by Hewet in The 
Voyage Out as the entire conception of a novel: "the way one's seen the thing, felt 
about it, made it stand in relation to other things" (204). The conflict between realism 
and idealism is spelled out by Bergson as resting on altered perceptions. On the one 
hand, the notion that what is perceived is a quality of the thing in itself and that "all 
the images unfolding on one and the same plane [are] indefinitely prolonged" as they 
are attuned to a fixed law (Matter 26). Or, on the other hand, the sense that a quality is 
endowed by the mind alone through the system of perceptions. But more importantly, 
Bergson argued in Matter and Memory, "In most cases... memories supplant our 
actual perceptions, of which we then retain only a few hints, thus using them merely 
as `signs' that recall to us former images. . . 
hence also springs every kind of illusion" 
(Matter 33). Such pronouncement fully acknowledges the indelible role of the body in 
constructing a self-history and therefore a subjectivity. As present perceptions 
continue to be modulated by the imagery of the past, the narrative of The Years, 
through a series of perceptions saturated with personal experience and memory, 
continues to dwell on the problem of `subject and object and the nature of reality' 
which has fragmented the world and the self. 6 As Avrom Fleishman has pointed out in 
Virginia Woolf: A Critical Reading, "the essential themes of Woolf's vision of life, " in 
this novel especially, includes "the fragmentariness of human existence under the 
conditions of mortality, the ideal of a life in which the flight of time is filled with 
meaning and brought into formal order, and the impossibility of attaining that 
ideal-the necessity of sinking back into that fragmentariness" (199). 
Instead of representing selves free to weave their way towards a solid 
6 TL 28 
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establishment of subjectivity, the characters in The Years are positioned by their 
appointed role within family and society whilst seeking discontentedly to move 
beyond this social confinement. But still, the memory of the past remains at the centre 
of each personality. `Scraps, orts and fragments' of the past continue to haunt the 
narrative. In The Years, subjectivity is presented as if it is established and 
substantiated through the interpersonal relationships and yet aspects of the characters' 
intrinsic qualities still remain unknown and uncertain: "we do not know ourselves, " 
not only answers the puzzle over the Great War, but also serves as a reminder of the 
disparity and apartness existing between individuals. The impossibility of knowing 
oneself makes it also impossible to understand the minds of others. The Years is thus ' 
a fictional narrative that aspires towards an integral knowledge of the subjective 
apprehension of a self-centred world and an objective reflection on that self's own 
particularity and contingency within a world viewed from outside the centre of self. 
The Grecian wisdom of `know thyself' gradually takes over as a recurring motif 
amidst the multitude and disparity of life. 
Whereas in The Waves, socio-cultural history is barely glimpsed, in The Years, it 
is a foregrounded theme that highlights the struggle between the subjective orientation 
of the self and a consecrated social identity. Despite the fact that the articulation and 
the recognition of `self' is largely bound up within the social-cultural language in The 
Years, still the characters constantly feel obscurely that a definition of self is beyond 
the designation of language and of social context. Numerous revelations in the novel 
emerge out of states of inexplicable feelings. While Peggy fails to convey her vision in 
words, North finally grasps, in the light of a sense of feeling, the meaning which 
Peggy attempts so clumsily to express. A weight of social oppression is felt throughout 
the novel as individual characters strain between a desire to be true to their own 
personal will, whilst also striving to fulfil social and familial obligations. The frame of 
a family saga provides Woolf with the means to depict the intimacy as well as the 
Y 206 
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alienation between individual members within a family. 
The characters themselves ferret through `orts and scraps, ' suggesting endless 
hidden facets which are both indiscernible and inexpressible. They never resort to 
self-explanation or self-justification as in The Waves or Mrs. Dalloway, unravelling 
the path of thoughts and the course of the past. The narrative often leaves matters in 
their folded state (whether it is an act, a phrase, or a sudden reminiscence), sometimes 
because the state exceeds the capacity of the characters' minds to comprehend; 
sometimes because thoughts have wandered off into other directions; while sometimes 
the characters simply refuse to delve into reasons for things. Thus, Eleanor leaves her 
reading of Dante for some other day as if the meaning of the words, "For by so many 
more there are who say `ours'/So much the more of good doth each possess, " could 
only be grasped through a knowledge of the whole and in their integral and compact 
state, the words surpass comprehension (Y 156). However, without being dissected 
and analysed, the words reserve their poetic vision and, therefore, like other objects of 
the past, continue to hover over the mind of Eleanor. Fleishman argues that though 
these words of "medieval organicism" of which "the individual is fulfilled and 
ennobled only insofar as he participates in a community transcending the individual" 
seemingly slip through Eleanor's comprehension, the ideal they encompass 
nevertheless "affects her attitude toward her impending old age" (Vim 186-7). 
In the Cubist mode, the past in The Years does not spring forth in its full picture 
as in Mrs. Dalloway. The Years is full of untold stories, unintelligible emotions that 
subtly reflect a state of being of which nothing is ever fully known; no meaning is 
fully drawn. Although there is often a flicker where one assumes one had understood, 
meaning, seemingly at hand, actually escapes everyone's grasp. Life, like the words of 
Dante which Eleanor tries to read, "did not give out their full meaning, but seemed to 
hold something furled up in the hard shell" of an ancient archaic language, signifying 
an unintelligible wisdom (156). Perhaps, as Edward has suggested, it is the beauty, the 
word itself, not the meaning, that should be appreciated, as he refuses North's request 
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to translate the words of Antigone from Greek into English. Meaning simply flits 
through one's mind with the swiftness of a kingfisher of which one might only catch a 
glimpse of the shadow left behind as it vanishes. As Eleanor closes her copy of Dante 
with the words lingering in her mind, she thinks how she will return to the book, to the 
lines, one of these days. Moments of encounter, with all the sensations and 
impressions thereby initiated, are generally ungraspable, leaving the characters numb. 
Presumably, only by revisiting the moment could its meaning be accommodated to the 
mind. The dead and the lost, as Marcel Proust wrote in Swann's Way, continue to 
loiter in the present, "held captive in some inferior being, in an animal, in a plant, in 
some inanimate object, " awaiting to be recognised (57). The forgotten past and the 
unknown meaning of life (like a half open door, half revealing, partly concealing): one 
could merely envisage the hidden from what is manifested, filling in from the 
suggestive details. 
Unlike the co-responsive inner narrative of the mind(s) as in The Waves (or as in 
Mrs. Dalloway) where individual consciousness appears to be communicative and 
transferable, The Years places its focus upon interpersonal as well as intrapersonal 
privacy and then attempts to recognise and transcend such privacy. In its Cubist 
presentation, The Years, perhaps attempting to represent in narrative form Bertrand 
Russell's private moments, pictures a world constructed out of numerous private 
planes and angles. The narrative exemplifies the sensation of people "trying to express 
completely different views of the world in general at one and the same time" (Y 231). 
While each feeling or sensation retains its unassailable reality, each is somehow 
private and unavailable to the others-other moments of life as well as other people. 
Yet despite the tendency of subjective consciousness to remain enclosed within its 
own private and subjective setting, each consciousness is nevertheless highly aware of 
the existence of other private worlds. In The Years, the image of two people sitting 
in 
a cab together, instead of inspiring the androgynous vision of coordination 
in A Room, 
simultaneously evokes and stresses the sense of affinity as well as 
disparity between 
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individual subjective privacies: "They were two living people, driving across London; 
two sparks of life enclosed in two separate bodies" (Y 245). 
From The Waves to The Years, the reader is given a full drama of the formation 
of the subject from proto-self and core consciousness to a social self embedded «'ithin 
the context of personal extended consciousness as well as the inheritance of national 
and family history. The Years starts off with each character taking up an emblematic 
social role (as a father, a husband, a son, a mother, a wife, a daughter). Each character 
is allocated a place through familial ties and human relationships so that each of them, 
though adhering to his/her social role and maintaining the social honour of the family, 
engenders an inner discontent over the social constraint- contending that they are 
more than the role that is assigned to them. Right from the opening, the characters are 
all waiting for a relief from their familial or social obligation. Everything has to wait. 
But still, as Colonel Pargiter has reflected, even with the death of the wife and the 
mother (the great maternal figure of the Victorian age), he, as a father of a large family, 
would not be free to be himself: "there was the house; then there were the children" 
(Y 5). The self is given no chance of being itself, whatever that is. 
Numerous internal narratives of the subject remain covert, either suppressed by 
social decorum or simply lying inarticulate within the individual mind. With such 
depths of inner conflict, attempts to ease or resolve the issues are inevitably aligned 
with lies and concealment. Jane Marcus has suggested, "They are all `pargetters, "' 
alluding to the name Pargiter (56). "The pargetter may be one who embellishes the 
outside of a house.. . or one who covers up the truth or tells 
lies" (Marcus 57). Lies and 
concealment abound in the novel. Even within the family, they are simply "different 
people.. . 
boxed up together, telling lies" (Y 163). In spite of the yearnings and 
impulses to express and communicate, the fear of failing to spark empathy or achieve 
understanding leads each of them to withhold their tongue (as in Colonel Pargiter's 
frustrated desire to tell Eleanor about his having a mistress; Rose's feeling of a sudden 
urge to share with her cousins all her stories which she has never told). "They're all 
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afraid; afraid of being laughed at; afraid of giving themselves away... We're all afraid 
of each other.. . afraid of what? 
Of criticism; of laughter; of people «who think 
differently" (Y 303). The privacy of the subjective realm that they seek restlessly to 
confide, remains largely intact. And the privacy that persists, withheld in silence, 
continually undermines any possible social and familial solidarity. 
The Years is more of a detached aesthetic presentation of the subject as a social 
being in the world, whereas The Waves enacts the inner subjective narrative of the 
emergence of consciousness and subjectivity. In spite of the discrepancy between The 
Waves as the inner narrative of a subject split in various features and The Years as the 
projection of dispersed subjective perceptions and realisations onto the external 
object-world, both novels reveal, through their depictions of the nature of life, the 
impossibility of a well-planned, organised, life-narrative. Indeed the narrative itself 
self-consciously embodies a sceptical attitude towards the plausibility of a `true' story 
or narrative (such as that promised by Eugenie to her daughters, concerning the `truth' 
about the note in the bouquet): not simply that it is impossible to know about the 
future, but even that the past eludes full comprehension. Self, life and the world are 
rather presented in "orts, scraps and fragments, " caught between a belief in an external 
reality and a transcendental idealism of the perceptive mind (BA 111). But even with 
an objective point of view to stand outside oneself perceiving one's own subjective 
stance, still the objectivity that inescapably depends on the subjective existence of the 
subject remains partial and incomplete. 
8 
Among all these characters, not one story is fully revealed, not even the story of 
Eleanor-"something remain[s] unknown, " although undoubtedly "there's `I' at the 
middle of it... a knot; a centre" (Y 229; 269). The Years, with its narrative structure, 
foreshadows the fragmentary reflection of the present time consummated in Between 
the Acts. So many elements consist of oneself, and within oneself there exist various 
narratives. Even the subject itself is bewildered by its own life and the meaning of 
8 Thomas Nagel. The View from Nowhere (Oxford: OUP, 1986) 208-31. 
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being. The inner, mental, discourse of the subject, as described in Orlando, "is dark, 
mysterious, and undocumented; so that there is no explaining for it. Volumes might be 
written in interpretation of it" (47). The fragmentation and inconsistency among all the 
self-narratives suggests that this central knot is a `luminous halo, ' evolved from 
feeling rather than logical reasoning. Although the subject continues to contrive a 
self-narrative reifying itself, the core self is nevertheless beyond the determination of 
narrative. Bergson proposed a theoretical conception of a pure perception whose 
reality is fully in the perceived object itself, unadulterated by any subjective 
discourses. He therefore ventured to suggest that in the course of life, the subject 
learns to regulate its perceptual stimuli in accordance with its body and therefore 
acquires a subjective propensity which is not available in infancy. 9 Although various 
fallacies lurk in Bergson's argument, still, his conviction of the central position of the 
body and his belief that subjective perceptions arise from the body, shed further light 
on the subject/object relation. The body remains as the kernel ground of subjectivity, 
more often a sense of feeling rather than a narrative of anything definitive. 
The narrative of the mind is engendered from an interaction of the body with the 
external world. Thomas Nagel has argued that our tendency to form an objective 
reflection on our present subjective circumstances greatly affects the original egoistic 
presumption of the subject, conceiving itself as the centre. In mapping its own 
position in the world through an objective point of view, the subject perceives its own 
contingency in a centreless world and therefore is prompted into a pursuit of the 
meaning of its being-in-the-world-the meaning of its life. 
10 But still, this objective 
view is nonetheless part of the subjective self: "The real problem is with the external 
point of view, which cannot remain a mere spectator once the self has expanded to 
accommodate it... The objective self is dragged along by the unavoidable engagement 
of the whole person in the living of a life whose form it recognises as arbitrary" 
9 Bergson, jr Mate46. 
10 Nagel 214. 
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(Nagel 216). Consequently, no integral vista-either of world or of self- could 
possible be formed, but simply a chopped, Cubist patchwork opening on to an 
irreducible exterior reality. The narrative itself resembles the strips of newspaper 
cuttings which Captain Pargiter collects in his old age. Even the credibility of the 
news is undermined and fragmented through individual judgements on it. " 
Besides the fact that `the Real' remains beyond the comprehension of the 
individual human mind as it is enclosed within its own cubical world, the mind's 
intriguing narrative of memory also secludes one moment from another, leaving the 
self with barely the possibility of forming an integrated view of itself. Often, the 
character is overwhelmed with a sudden surge of emotions that coerce them into an 
action which they cannot justify. With an inner urge, Rose comes to introduce herself 
to her cousin Maggie. Even she cannot understand her impulse of wanting to meet 
Maggie and visiting her. While lunching with her cousins, Rose could not explain why 
a fragmented picture of the past springs to her mind: "She saw them sitting round a 
table; and a detail that she had not though of for years came back to her" and curiously 
"Her past seem[s] to be rising above her present (Y 122; 123). 
Coming back to England after a decade of absence, North professes his 
discomfort at the feeling of "half-knowing people and half being known" (Y 229). But 
the fact is they have not truly known even themselves. Like Sally's fragmented 
statements, the narrative continues to contrive and rebuild out of momentary 
impressions. No true report can be expected from Sally who constantly distorts the 
actual incidence or links one with another, so no true narrative of facts can be sought. 
The narrative of The Years serves as an illustration of the impossibility of knowing 
oneself, not to mention the mind of the others, as proposed through Eleanor and 
Nicholas's discussion of the future of the human race and society. The suggestion of 
the existence of other subjective worlds reveals the enclosure of one's subjectivity and 
the awareness that there are worlds beyond subjective understanding. The story told 
'' Y 113. 
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and known is but one among many. The narrative is therefore dispersed among all the 
characters as if to suggest that these are simply a small portion that stand for a vast 
volume of other existing life-narratives that have been shut up in drawers, lost in 
memories, or simply remain `inconceivable' and `imperceptible. ' Yet, though perhaps 
unobserved and unrecognised, they nevertheless continue to exist in a world where no 
`eyes' or `I' could possibly penetrate, positing a world without a self. 
In The Years, Woolf continues to adopt a similar structure to The Waves, as each 
section is introduced by a descriptive yet seemingly neutralised interlude presenting 
an external world that seems indifferent to the strife of each individual life. It is 
against this impersonalised objectivity that the subjective stances and dispositions are 
accentuated. The objective and external world of the interlude (like Percival in The 
Waves) functions as a mirror reflecting all facets of life and allowing each subject to 
connect and identify their own subjective reality differently with the external world. 
'` 
In The Years, an objective universe is pasted into a Cubist presentation of divergent 
subjective space so that an objective reality is suggested through the substantiation of 
each private perspective. Often, in each episode, a few scenes between different 
characters are depicted, yet all of them seem to be constrained by a congenial spirit set 
by the interlude within which "a whole new mood has to be caught, plumb in the 
centre" (WD 246). 13 Thus, in an uncertain spring of 1880, there is the Abercorn 
Terrace waiting, in a maelstrom of evasive emotion, the death of the mother. The 
narrative shifts abruptly to Oxford, where Edward is at the threshold of his life, 
working for his fellowship and falling in love with his cousin Kitty. A similar potency 
is observed with Kitty who is also strained between living a life for herself and 
her 
obligation and social status as an Oxford don's daughter. 
Instead of having the subject substantiated through the determination of its 
surroundings, a real world exists independently by itself and is inferred through an 
12 Harvena Ritcher, Virginia Woolf: The Inward Voyage (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1970) 99. 
13 Diary entry 2 October 1935. 
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induction of each subjective reality which fails individually to encompass the entirety 
of `the Real. ' The existence of others continues to suggest a reality beyond the 
subject's possible perceptions. In other words, a sense of objectivity is achieved in 
The Years not by elimination of the self, but instead through an embrace of all 
subjective worlds, diminishing the significance of each individual existence. With the 
deployment of the interlude, Woolf integrates individual stories into a \v ider 
communal experience of the fragmentariness of being in a temporal world. As 
personal and particular narrative is offset against a neutral discourse of no age and of 
no bodies, particularities are therefore generalised into a universal discourse of life. 
For, with the introductory interlude that precedes the narration of the individual 
characters, readers are provided with the modem cinematic technique of focusing 
down from a general over view of the world to one perspective among others. The 
narrative therefore sustains itself as merely one particular story among many others. 
Eventually the novel ends with philanthropic concerns in a new world, the possibility 
of improving the human race: "when shall we be free" and be able to live differently is 
the question posed by Eleanor, Nicholas and Peggy. (Y 217). By such means is the 
meaninglessness of the contingent individual life partially transcended. 
Life as a product of society is reflected through the socio-cultural settings (and 
as shown through Orlando, it is the epoch that bestows on him/her a certain social 
imago and formulates his/her social identities). The Years is as much a personal and 
family history as a national and social history of Great Britain from 1880 to the early 
1930s. Jane Marcus has commented that The Years resonates around the leitmotif of 
death and rebirth. However, an undying death and a continuously deferred rebirth 
echo throughout the novel. For although with the passing of the ages, new possibilities 
seem to promise themselves, yet the strife of life and the constraints of the 
social-historical background do not seem to be relieved. As `pargetters, ' they "[plaster] 
the cracks in the house of British culture in one way or another, most of them knowing 
full well that it will fall despite their efforts" (Marcus 56). Perhaps, of all the 
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characters, it is Eleanor who is finally reborn into a new life by the burial of the past. 
After dozing off temporarily during Delia's party, the momentary bliss lingering after 
awakening revives her belief (that seems to be at a point of crisis given the impending 
threat of another world war) in life which is, in her words, "a perpetual discovery" as 
well as "a miracle" (Y 280). 
Although lives are not altogether constrained by history, lives are largely shaped 
by it and the novel constantly reminds its readers of the march of history: Irish Home 
Rule, Parnell, the suffrage movement, the threat to civilisation caused by the Great 
War, and the rise of Fascism. For in an age of change and transformation, the 
characters seek a life that might lead them beyond the present context and offer 
anchorage without stagnation. They constantly flout social taboos and with each 
breach of social convention, a shock is roused: "For a second a sharp shiver of 
repugnance [might passes] over [one's] skin as if a knife had sliced it, " but with a 
closer inspection, one realises as Eleanor does, "it touch[es] nothing of importance" 
(Y 217). The delicacy in regarding the bodily related issues is constantly challenged. 
With such sensual description of the body on hearing a social taboo, Woolf exposes 
the social obsession with, as well as the repression of, matters of the body and 
sensuality. With "it touches nothing, " the sentence provides simultaneously a 
connotation of a bodily felt revulsion against the idea of homosexuality but at the 
same time the relief from a sensual apprehensiveness which comes to nothing. For as 
the information about Nicholas's homosexual tendencies touches nothing of 
importance, the premonition of gender orientation is transcended alongside other 
social taboos and cultural profiles. The socio-historical context might be suggestive 
but it does not contain `the life, ' `the thing itself': life constantly eludes human's 
presuppositions about it. The subject is constantly testing its autonomy and capacity 
and expanding the given confinement. With each different context, an alternative facet 
of the subject is elicited. As Woolf has suggested in "Mr. Brown and Mrs. Bennett, " a 
novelist, or any seeker of life and its untold stories, should first look at `the life, ' `the 
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thing itself. ' Liberated from `materialist' confinement, the autonomy of `life' is 
recognised and restored. The subversion of the confining material context is most 
explicitly dramatised in The Years, of all of Woolf's novels. In contrast to the 
`materialist' attempt to encapsulate the `soul' through given historical circumscription, 
the narrative, in recognising the autonomy of `life, ' enables it to live as "it wishes to 
expand; to adventure; to form-new combinations" (Y 216). In The Years, Woolf 
continues to sketch a narrative where it is possible to reflect "what [one is] feeling and 
to express it broadly and simply"-broadly as all facets of life might be encompassed, 
and simply as it might stand as a scaffolding for all life-transcending its individuality 
in a communal apprehension without sacrificing or negating the reality of each 
divergent subjective space (Y 219). 
If The Years is the life story of Eleanor (of the Victorian daughter) then, as 
Eleanor herself asks, what is her life: what is the life of a Victorian daughter? She has 
no life. Her life has been other people's lives, like any other angel in the house. 
Eleanor, in the eyes of her fellow Londoners, is "a well-known type; with a bag; 
philanthropic; well nourished; a spinster; a virgin; like all the women of her class, 
cold" (74). The portrait of Eleanor in The Years is of a life effaced by Victorian family 
conventions, a position jokingly referred to as `housekeeper' by her own father. This is 
the life of the daughters of the Victorian paterfamilias which Woolf analyses in 
explicitly psychoanalytic terms in Three Guineas which, begun on 28 January 1937, 
was written consecutively with The Years. In fact, Woolf had considered writing The 
Years and Three Guineas as one book. 14 Eleanor, resembling Mrs. Ramsay, however, 
is also another prototype of `life. ' She is "the thing itself. " With the death of her father, 
a life of her own may commence: "Sir William was getting into bed next door, his life 
was over; hers was beginning" (Y 156). 
Through a formal cubism that juxtaposes different layers of subjective 
14 "lumping The Years and Three Guineas together as one book-as indeed they are" (\\'D 284). Diary 
entry 3 June 1938. 
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perspectives and apprehensions, The Years presents an objectified history incorporated 
through diverse private spheres-not simply the private subjective sphere between 
individuals but also the private moments that set themselves temporally and spatially 
apart from other moments within an individual life. The collision of variant subjective 
settings inevitably evokes a strong sense of disorientation that continuously recurs 
throughout the text, leaving the subject (and the reader) in a surreal wobbly sense of 
time, space and, above all, its own relation to the world around. The novel begins with 
the dim and oppressive gloom of Victorian family life, where, at the death-bed, time 
seems suspended. The returning question of "where am I? " is first prompted by Mrs. 
Pargiter as she wanders back to the present world, awakes on her sick bed and 
becomes conscious of her bodily presence in a `semi-real' world apart from her dream. 
The recognition of the present does not prevent her mind from wandering across 
temporal orders. Mrs. Pargiter's mental world is feebly presented through her 
fragmented statements as one impression leads to another. Delia, along with the reader, 
could only conjecture at what she has been thinking. While Delia sits by her mother's 
bedside, she too wanders into a fantasy world of her own as she longs for a life that 
might only begin through the death of the mother. 
Gaps between the years, the moments, are left open as if they are the chasms and 
gorges of life cleaved through by the washes of time. Still, memory knits the 
fragmentary impressions into a whole, despite any spatial or temporal segregation. 
Accordingly, a sense of continuity amidst discordance is reconstructed. Most often of 
all in The Years, it is only through these fragmentary moments of life and the bits and 
scraps of ill-connected memories that the invisible threads of the seamstress's art of 
memory is revealed and, along with it, the disclosure of `the spirit'-a more intrinsic 
and continuous aspect of character. With such fragmentation, the linearity of 
chronological time is utterly subverted. A peculiar sense of time is portrayed through 
the cubist fragmentation. Time in The Years seems to consist of a series of moments 
senii-secluded from one another, while each of these moments occupies a certain 
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extensity. It is not what Bergson has described as duree, yet its extensity is beyond 
Russell's monadic moments. As in a Cubist painting, within each cube, there is 
another world and context of its own. 
Instead of linear development, The Years stresses the discontinuity of and 
disparity between individual moments. Gaps are perceived through the transition 
between scenes, feelings and emotions and this produces a sense of disorientation in 
the reading experience. Moments of life, instead of harmonising with a sense of 
successive development, are juxtaposed side by side. The narrative, although it 
conforms to historic-biographical conventions, also discloses the discontinuity of 
thoughts and the disparity of lives, and exposes the inability of the material and public 
settings to account for the spatio-temporal experience in the mind. Time might press 
on, yet feelings and thoughts continue to linger, holding back any real mental 
procession. The prolonged hours or fast-beating tempo of time in the mind continue to 
counteract objective time by the clock. As stated in Orlando: "But Time, unfortunately, 
though it makes animals and vegetables bloom and fade with amazing punctuality, has 
no such simple effect upon the mind of man. The mind of man, moreover, works with 
equal strangeness upon the body of time" (68). 
From moment to moment, swayed in an unbound realm of atemporality, the 
reader is also often disorientated as each character asks incessantly "where am I. " 
Perhaps the question is put to Time itself or temporality, or to the fundamental 
rhythmic pulsations that form the ground of reality and towards which the characters 
might plausibly orient themselves. With an undying death, and with 
feelings stupefied 
and rhythms withheld or halted, there seems to be no true being for the 
lives 
suspended around the death-bed: "It's hopeless... " Delia abruptly utters, spelling out 
their status as women, daughters, in a late Victorian age (15). Even the 
definitive 
ending of death does not seem to be liberating-at least not to the 
Victorian daughters. 
Instead, the entire narrative is conveyed through a sombre, Victorian, mood. Burdened 
with emotions from the past, the narrative of The Years seems unable 
to move on with 
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the passage of time and catch up with the present moment, but is stuck irresolutely in 
a distant past (like the tree that would not stand up and yet refuse to lie down) 
reflecting the plight of all the female characters it addresses. 15 
The effect is of a temporary halting, caught between two worlds, between the 
restraints of conventionality and tradition and the bombardment of new prospects, news 
techniques of a new era in which women are promised a life of their own. Yet, as the 
novel is brought up to the present of its own writing, Peggy, a member of the younger 
generation, still holds relentlessly to a critical view of the advance of science and 
technology. Unlike Eleanor, of the old generation, who looks towards the future and is 
reluctant to remind herself of the oppressive domestic life of the eighties, Peggy, 
instead, beholds "that past of the eighties.. . so 
beautiful in its unreality" (Y 244). The 
future does not pronounce any promising feature as the narrative winds up in a 
condition of diffusion with uncommunicative languages, interrupted conversations and 
speech unfinished. Peggy, being a `professional, ' `new, ' woman, has nevertheless lost 
her faith in the future. Instead, she seeks constantly to enclose herself in the safety of 
past and memory: "She liked getting Eleanor to talk about her past; it seemed to her so 
peaceful and so safe" (Y 238). By telling the individual struggle of the Pargiters 
(especially its daughters of three different generation), balancing their reflected social 
imagos and their intrinsic subjective disposition, The Years becomes the embodiment 
of Woolf's ideal biographical writing that should be "subtle and bold enough to 
present that queer amalgamation of dream and reality, that perpetual marriage of 
granite and rainbow" in transcribing both the personality as well as historic facts (GR 
155). 16 Consequently, the novel ends with Eleanor's vision of a plausible wholeness 
within the present. Through the recognition of the simultaneity and the possibility of 
life here and now, past and future, in the present, the halting between neither-nor is 
surpassed: "she felt that she wanted to enclose the present moment; to make it stay; to 
15 Y55 
16 "The New Biography 
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fill it fuller and fuller, with the past, the present and the future, until it shone, whole, 
bright, deep with understanding" (Y 313). 
In reaction to Edwardian `materialist' techniques, Woolf allows private time to 
dominate her narrative. Public time is mirrored and known through the private time 
within. Thus, the different conceptions and experiences of time and time passing are 
thoroughly interwoven, giving a real, subjective, sense of being in time. In the passage 
where Kitty holds a dinner party in London, the reader is invited into Kitty's 
subjective perception of time. The distinction between the public time of the clock and 
the private experience of time passing is clearly drawn in the terms of Einstein's idea 
of relativity, as Kitty and the reader practically feel the ticking of every second and 
share the anxiety about catching the train on time. Frustrated by the thought of not 
being able to bring the party to an end so that she could retire in time, the ticking of 
the clock, minute by minute, is amplified through Kitty's anxiety and restlessness. 
And with the actual narrative time exceeding the time traversed in the story, time in 
the mind expands and decelerates, making a minute feel more than it actually is. Yet, 
with the decelerating and the prolonging of the moment, the tension of time is 
poignantly characterised. 
However, as the scene changes from London society to the Northern woodland, 
the temporality of time is transformed as the train is transported through space: "She 
seemed to be passing from one world to another" (198). In contrast to the vastness of 
the Northern land, the time of the body and the mind now flowing with the fast pace 
of the train seems to travel beyond actual time. "Past and present [become] jumbled 
together" as she trails through fields and towns toward the north. Scenery changes 
from one place to another rapidly and within so little time. And yet her thoughts and 
emotions still remain at the London Party of which every minute detail seems to 
replay itself. Nevertheless, when she arrives at the great castle estate which appears, 
so enduringly and everlastingly, to transcend time: "A deep murmur sang in her 
ears-the land itself, singing to itself, a chorus, alone. She [Kitty] lay there listening. 
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She was happy, completely. Time had ceased" (Y 203). Time has ceased with the 
diminishing of individuality as the `I' is conglomerated into the general, historic, 
context of the nature. The castle, the wood, nature, "existing by itself, for itself, " 
would forever be passing from one generation to another. As every observer, every 
possessor, is merely a passer-by (Y 203). 
New technology and new territorial expansion impinge on the individual's 
established sense of time and space. With the introduction of public transportation and 
mass communication that links up diverse private spheres disparate in space, the sense 
of time and space are fragmentarily shattered. Spatial and temporal distances and 
apartness are significantly diminished and the sense of simultaneity is greatly 
increased. Instead of linear development, moments of incidents seem to spread out on 
an homogenous spatio-temporal plain. Such change in spatial and temporal 
conceptions culminates with the First World War whose nature, in the opinion of 
Gertrude Stein, is "in fact the composition of cubism" (qtd. in Kern 288). The war 
seems to be everywhere and yet nowhere at all (as its scattered war fronts invaded 
almost every corner of Europe and as it continuously elongated into an inescapable 
apprehension of the present cut off from past and future, standing discontinuously by 
itself). Following Stein's comment, Stephen Kern speculates on how the First World 
War was a Cubist war for "the strange newness and overwhelming force of experience 
clamped the soldier in the present as if bracketed from past and present" (292). The 
Great War remains as an incomprehensible interval resisting adaptation into the 
original context of life. Indeed, David Jones entitled his account of the war, published 
in 1937, In Parenthesis. '? The immensity and the pervasiveness of war has shattered 
the world, leaving behind no way to integrate the war and its horror into a coherent 
stream of temporal experience. 
The movement of modern art from Impressionism, Post-Impressionism, to 
Cubism coincides with the modern experience of time and space as it attempts to 
17 Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space: 1880-1918 (Massachusetts: Harvard UP, 2003) 292. 
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address the re-evaluation and the re-adjusting of human relations, spatial and temporal, 
with the world around. Modern art is no longer about photographic reproduction of a 
material world, but rather how that world is seen and felt through the body and its 
sensations and emotions. The investigation into the unconscious as well as the nervous 
system of modern psychology and neuro-psychology suggests that what one actually 
senses and apprehends of the external world is far from any faithful mimesis (though 
one's experience is seemingly a unified whole and an exact reproduction of what is 
out there). The mind, as Damasio has asserted, hides facts as well as revealing them. 
Foremost, the mind hides the body from our perceptual screen and the influence of 
one's bodily condition on one's perceptions of the world. ' 8 Although concealed from 
conscious awareness, the body provides the frame of reference: "Mv body [author's 
emphasis] is that which stands out as the centre of these perceptions; my personality is 
the being to which these actions must be referred" (Bergson, Matter 47). Moreover, 
what is actually experienced by is always contaminated by pre-experiential or 
post-experiential adjustments. 19 What one perceives is neither panoramic nor 
authentic, but simply focusses various perspectives shaded and contaminated with the 
feelings and emotions provoked by memories, thoughts, or immediate incoming 
stimuli-and therefore no present can be apprehended as itself, while the intensity of 
the internal feelings seemingly prolong the present moment in consciousness. A 
thorough distinction must therefore be made between the present of a material world 
of impersonal sense-data and the present of the internal psychical state of sensation. 
Such a distinction between a subjective apprehension and an objective speculation 
enables one to reach an understanding of how time might be perceived, experienced, 
and depicted through the controversial argument of Bergson's duree and Russell's 
sequence of atomised stillness. The Cubist presentation of temporality in The Years 
18 Damasio, Feelin 28,42. 
19 In Consciousness Explained, Dennett names the post-experiential revision as Orwellian alluding to 
George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty Four and the re\vriting of actual history conducted by the 
Ministry of Truth; the phony instalment as Stalinesque, which "stage[s] show trials, carefully 
scripted ... with simulated evidence"(117). 
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simply reinforces the actuality that to live is to alternate between these two senses of 
Time. 
Time, though, may be experienced in an atomic manner as thoughts and 
emotions trail behind, unconscious and forgetful of the actual bodily present, hoarding 
and savouring an impression or tracing a frail link as one hopes to fish up what one 
seeks. But even then, the actual passing of time prevents one from holding and 
containing any moment. The moments are often intruded on by the passage of time 
breaking up the linkage of thought and leaving behind traces of lost tracks. "The 
popular idea that time is made up of discrete parts as sharply separated as the boxed 
days on a calendar continued to dominate popular thinking about public time, whereas 
the most innovative speculation was that private time was the real time and that its 
texture was fluid" (Kern 33-4). Preserving the atomic feature of the experience of time, 
Woolf, by inserting the sense of Bergsonian duree, created through her narrative an 
effect that these atoms, instead of being completely self-enclosed, are inter-connected 
and inter-penetrable. Thus, one memory flows into another, sensations aroused by 
internal thoughts interchange with external stimuli. For as William James observed, 
quoting J. S. Mill, "If the constitution of consciousness were that of a string of 
bead-like sensations and images, all separate, `we never could have any knowledge 
except that of the present instant.. . 
Each of those momentary states would be our 
whole being"' (1: 605-6). Thus, time is presented and experienced through both 
modes of flux and atom (as if suggesting that time should also be conceived 
in the 
manner of wave-particle duality). Again and again, the characters return to the same 
former experiences, one leaping to another, looping various moments into a perceptive 
whole, endlessly re-constructing the pivotal theme of their lives. The hammering 
voices in Siegfried bring Kitty back to years ago when she went to a 
friend's house, 
having tea with the family, fantasising about a kiss by a young man with wood 
shaving stuck in his hair and loving the fact that the Robson family treat 
her not as an 
Oxford don's daughter but as a young lady who also takes history lessons-a theme of 
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Kitty that continues to return. Even in "Present Day, " she remembers in her old age 
that there is someone whom she has loved once in Oxford. Similarly, Rose cannot 
grow out of her anger and terror of the day when Martin refused to accompany her to 
the Lamley's and she came across the man at the pillarbox who leered at her. As years 
pass, every new episode seems to reify an initial experience already manifested in 
"1880. " 
Each sentence, gesture, impression or memory is suggestive of a prodigious 
volume of obscured and latent context which is only half-revealed through the sensory 
impressions of the characters. As the unvoiced narratives accumulate underneath, 
characters and even readers are often lost within the labyrinth of the silenced, internal 
narrative. "They all had lines cut; phrases ready-made" which bound people as well as 
separate them (Y 226). For ready-made phrases signify a shared context and yet, with 
the convenience of ready-made phrases, people conceal their true feelings and their 
true selves. Right from the start, family jokes are evoked to ease family life, with the 
Pargiters sitting together feeling, differently, unable to share: "That was the worst of 
growing up, she [Eleanor] thought; they couldn't share things as they used to 
talk-about things in general-they always talked about facts-little facts" (Y 25). 
Personal lives are withheld from other family members and perhaps even from one's 
own conscious self as if reflecting the Freudian concept of the unconscious 
suppression of an inner truth. The social conversations and interchanges are taking 
place not simply on the external level but also within, as each consciousness yearns 
and strives for a full knowledge of the others' underlying, unspoken intentions and 
thoughts. The narrative, as it depicts the subtlety of social interaction, enacts the daily 
subjective consciousness that is constantly probing and scrutinising the minds of 
others. Habitually, by extending one's consciousness to another, characters surmise 
each other's unspoken thoughts and as often as not find themselves being misled by 
the unfaithful wordings of others. Convoluted within the intricacies of the hide-and- 
seek of individual consciousness, the Truth is further obscured. 
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Characters, in assuming their roles and identity within the family and society, 
withhold within themselves copious narratives of private and untold stones. On being 
asked by Peggy, years after, what Mrs. Pargiter is like, Eleanor, in answering "Not as I 
remember her, " avoids assigning to her mother the character which she has 
remembered as a daughter (Y 238). Eleanor has recognised the fact that, behind the 
mother figure, she knows there are other subjective identities with which she could not 
possibly be acquainted. Perhaps like the painting, the original feature and the actual 
character of the young girl with the red hair is gradually covered up by the dust of 
everyday family life. A fragmentary impression or memory is, as described, a 
half-open door that suggests a hidden passage into subjective space by means of 
reminiscent narrative. Nothing seems to reveal itself in itself and everything, as one 
thing melts into another, is only partially known-even one's past is irretrievably lost 
among all the inter-knitting of memories. For, "Memory is the seamstress, and a 
capricious one at that. Memory runs her needle in and out, up and down, hither and 
thither. We know not what comes next, or what follows after" (0 55). Peggy is much 
amazed by the talk of elderly people: "Old age must have endless avenues, stretching 
away and away down its darkness, she supposed, and now one door opened and then 
another, " prompted with the ring of a bell (Y 243). The existence of all the probable 
yet unknown and un-narrated narratives is most prominently exposed in The Years. In 
a world full of sounds and noises, the narrative of The Years writes out an impassable 
and unfathomable silence between human relationships. In The Voyage Out, Terence 
Hewet envisages writing a novel of silence. The narrative of The Years, saturated with 
the hubbub of life, ironically bestows an even more conspicuous form to the silence in 
life. 
Through individual memory of the characters' perceptual worlds, a 
socio-cultural history of Britain is delineated. Instead of being her most conventional 
realist novel in its historic form, The Years, with its apparent conventionality, 
ironically subverts the conventions of the historic novel as history and life are 
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expounded through personal and emotional involvement. History has ceased to be a 
clean-cut fact of linear development, and memory is hardly stored in chronological 
order. Contrarily, history and external reality are blurred by tears and excitements. 
Historical events leave their marks on the mind as an undefined bracket involving 
sundry facets that are only vaguely learnt by a circulating yet unintelligible mood. The 
objects of emotions are not always present. Emotion, as expounded by Martha 
Nussbaum, has its own cultural and biographical context. And therefore, though not 
fully told, through the display of a present emotion, a trace of some hidden story or 
inherited past may be detected. Whether expressing anger, joy or sorrow, such 
emotion might prompt a larger wave, swelled with the long forgotten sensation of the 
past. Personal concerns submerge the grandiloquence and significance of historic 
events. The death of Parnell is experienced through Eleanor's anxiety for her sister 
Delia. Similarly, instead of a stately concern, Colonel Abel is more interested in the 
effect of the event on Delia, thinking that it will bring her to her senses. The news of 
Parnell's death continues to hover over the pages, recreating a resonance in the 
London society. Abel brings the news with him on visiting his brother's household. On 
mentioning the news, Abel feels Eugenie's emotion is "out of all proportion to its 
object, " leading Abel as well as the reader to wonder what is linked to this news and 
this emotion (Y 87). Perhaps, the sad story of Parnell and Kitty O'Shea links her own 
story of the note in the bouquet-a story that has never been fully narrated but 
nevertheless leaves its ripples in the minds of the younger generation. 
In The Years, historical facts are felt and transcribed through the characters' 
perspectives. On hearing North setting off to his military service in some regiment in 
1917, "A picture came before her [Eleanor] eyes-the picture of a nice cricketing boy 
smoking a cigar on a terrace"(Y 208). And then another picture formed in hazy 
reminiscence how she learnt about the war when "She was sitting on the same terrace" 
(Y 209). With these mental pictures, a complex emotion toward the «'ar is summoned: 
"Not if I can help it! overcome by an absurd but vehement desire to protect those 
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hills"(Y 209). The siren of air raids wails in the background as Eleanor dines ww ith her 
cousins in the basement, drinking to a New World and a better life that they anticipate 
after the war. Historic and social changes unfold in terms of family life and individual 
activity and circumstance. Patches of thoughts and scraps of memories are all that one 
seems to get out of life. `Self' and personal meanings seem to be a configuration of 
shreds of feelings and emotions. 
In the `realness' of these moments of being, the ordinary, everyday, life comes to 
seem rather unreal. Often after moments of intense reflection, as if one suddenly 
transcends the subjective standpoint and sees through the absurdity of the ordinary life 
which takes its reality for granted, one is thereby bewildered and similarly comes to 
doubt `how real is reality? ' as questioned by Slavoj Zizek. Nothing is for certain real 
or unreal. All seems rather a result of different perceptual viewpoints. Woolf continues 
to trifle with the ambivalence of dream and reality in the scenes of Kitty attending 
different social occasions among different social classes. The tea with the Robsons has 
an affinity with Alice in Wonderland. There she [Kitty] is, large in her figure, attire 
and social status, in this little house of the working class. Kitty feels herself absurd 
and out of place at the tea table of the Robsons, rather like the appalling revelation 
when class distinction is so consciously felt in Katherine Mansfield's "The Garden 
Party" (1922). Seemingly, she has intruded into a `fantasised' world of unreality, yet 
through the encounter of difference she comes to perceive a truer reality. This 
unfamiliar world has revealed and projected back to her the farce of her own world: 
"But for a moment all seemed to her obsolete, frivolous, inane. The usual 
undergraduate in cap and gown with books under his arm looked silly. And the 
portentous old men with their exaggerated features, looked like gargoyles, carved, 
medieval, unreal" (Y 54). Standing upon the threshold, she has forgotten where she is. 
The familiar Oxford is estranged in a whole new perspective. Her sense of reality is 
upset, as she stumbles across a world of others that is as real and undeniable as her 
own. And between this feeling of real and unreal, one could hardly recount what had 
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truly happened. The fact is lost in time; only feelings and emotions abide. 
As the characters carry on with their daily life unconsciously, anything which 
stirs up their emotions with something unexpected, something unusual, might bring up 
a sudden illumination that changes their view of the world to the extent that they no 
longer recognise where they are. "Where am I" is constantly asked as readjustments 
between the private and public world, past and present, are demanded. The delayed 
time and the lingering of emotions often leave characters in a state of confusion, 
unable to relocate themselves in the present circumstance. The Years successfully 
creates all sorts of estrangement and de-familiarisation. "Where am IT' is a question 
that questions the linearity of time and the separateness of the unit of time, as 
emotions and memories seem to lump together different times and spaces. 
Disjunctions and dislocations are even more strongly felt when one stumbles across 
the boundary of classes. 
In The Years, Woolf is also attempting a more fully rounded view of history and 
the experience of history which includes feelings and emotions. If in Orlando, Woolf 
mocks the conventional `factual' recording of the historians and the biographers, in 
The Years she endeavours to realise her ideal of life-writing. Modern art has come to 
contradict the Cartesian culture of ocular-centrism and instead brings to focus how the 
world is never apprehended without the engagement of feelings and emotions. The 
internal turmoil of Van Gogh is fully captured through his paintings; and whereas 
Cezanne endeavoured to combine the transition of multiple perspectives in four 
dimensions into one unified whole, Cubist painters such as Picasso, chopped up the 
surface of the canvas in projecting a pictorial depiction of fragmented perspectives 
and atomised sensations. 20 
When it comes to the value of art, Roger Fry begins his argument by 
distinguishing the two different kinds of life, a double life, that one leads: "one the 
20 Kern 142. 
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actual life, the other the imaginative life" (24). 21 In actual life, one is subjected to 
instinctive reactions that limit perception to the most imminent or threatening aspect 
concerning biological survival or immediate interest. A pure perception is therefore 
only achievable through the imaginative life, where panoramic views are not 
compromised by any imminent need to act and respond-a fully open horizon that 
enables one to engage but with a more contemplative and disinterested detachment, to 
scrutinise the subtle interaction between the world perceived without and the sensation 
that arises within. As Fry continues to argue, in the imaginative life one tends to 
become aware of some details in a kind of cinematographic projection that 
nevertheless escape one's consciousness in actual life. He confers on art the property 
that it provides this experience of pure perception. Art, or graphic art in the case of 
Fry's argument, illuminates those aspects of life of which the individual has always 
been unaware by estranging and detaching the individual from his/her customary 
habits. Thus, a work of art, though it imitates the actual world, nevertheless opens our 
eyes to a world concealed within the actual world that one lives without knowing and 
sees without seeing. Art is the effective agent that cracks one's perceptual habits and 
brings the peripheral perceptions into a focussed experience of apperception. 22 
Roger Fry's view of the merit of art seems to be in close correspondence with 
what Martin Heidegger has defined in "The Origin of the Work of Art": that an 
artwork opens upon a horizon within which it is possible to perceive what has hitherto 
been concealed in nature. Heidegger here quotes a well-known remark of Albrecht 
Dürer: "For in truth, art lies hidden within nature; he who can wrest it from her, has 
it. "(195). 23 Art, in Heidegger's opinion, sets up a world and sets forth earth. It enacts 
the happening of the truth and therefore brings forth unconcealment: "beauty is one 
way in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealment" ("Origin" 181). In other 
words, art demonstrates a world that has been formerly hidden from one's perception 
2' Fry, "An Essay in Aesthetic, " Vision and Design 22-34. 
`` James 1: 89. 
23 Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art" 143-212. 
Lin 256 
and it is by secluding the special elements from its ordinary world and enforcing the 
presence of that which has been hitherto overlooked by its spectator that makes a work 
art. Van Gogh's painting of a pair of peasant's working shoes connotes not simply the 
shoes themselves; being equipment made and used in a special context, the projection 
of the shoes brings forth the entire context of its being. According to Heidegger, 
selecting a pair of shoes and concealing most of the other details within the context of 
the pair of shoes, Van Gogh actually discloses a whole world of being concealed 
behind the shoes. 24 The image of the shoes eclipses other aspects of their context, 
becoming therefore a full embodiment of that context. In short, art brings experience 
to focus by estranging us from the circumstances that one has become so used to that 
one is simply blinded by one's customary habits and daily routine. Art is an attempt to 
wrest the hidden pattern of truth, of life, of being, that Eleanor, the main character of 
The Years, has come to feel as everything seems to repeat itself: if "there [is] a pattern; 
a theme, recurring, like music; half remembered, half foreseen... a gigantic pattern, 
momentarily perceptible? " (Y 270-1). Objects from the past continue to reappear and 
to draw up a particular image, stimulate a stored sensation and bring back what has 
been forgotten. Remaining in the background, each of them stands for a part of the 
past so strongly felt yet vaguely remembered. 
The art of painting should not merely be "an art of imitating solid objects upon a 
flat surface by means of pigment" as Fry redresses the statement of an eminent 
authority (22). And most plausibly, for Woolf, it is through such anti- 
representationalism that modem realism departs from the Edwardian, `materialist' 
realism of John Galsworthy, Arnold Bennett, and H. G. Wells which she had ridiculed 
in "Modem Fiction. " Life, as maintained by Woolf, in its elusiveness and 
insubstantiality, as feelings generated from within, is impossible to approach and 
24 Heidegger "Origin" 180-1: "Setting up a world and setting forth the earth, the work is the instigation 
of the strife in which the unconcealment of beings as a whole, or truth, is won... Truth happens in Van 
Gogh's painting. This does not mean that something at hand is correctly portrayed, but rather that in 
revelation of the equipment being of the shoes beings as a whole-world and earth in their 
counterplay-attain to unconcealment. " 
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delineate directly. For material appearance does not necessarily epitomise life and the 
feeling of living. In order to present life, Woolf required a method that engenders life 
and a structure enabling life to stand breathing and flowing. Woolf, though often taken 
as a writer who is more interested in the inner world of the characters than the outer 
material and social world, aspired to paint through words not simply an ekphrastically 
regenerated presentation of the social world of Britain, but rather a world engaged 
with personal feelings and emotions-a world of life and self in living. What Woolf's 
narrative manifests is an attempt to capture life in its transient and ephemeral qualities. 
Her aim is not simply to transcribe the world into words but to transmit the pulsing of 
life, both its feelings and emotions. And therefore one could say it is a world felt and 
experienced through the body. 25 The narrative of The Years, given the form of a 
historical novel or, as Woolf originally planned, an `essay-novel, ' has come to paint a 
history, not of recorded facts, but of personal memory. As Wilhelm Dilthey once said, 
"All understanding is historical because man is a historical being": the historic and 
social context that lurks beneath is lifted into the reader's consciousness through 
indirect methods of presentation (qtd. in Kern 45). The history is embodied through 
the characters and their consciousness of living. 
Characters in The Years are endlessly searching for a clarification of what they 
come to feel, but the narrative always touches on and then abandons the moment, 
leaving its reader to the emotion that is simply suggested and never fully defined. 
Sentences are left unfinished, words unspoken. And yet, the unfinished sentences hook 
into one's curiosity with their vagueness and `stick' in the mind in an eternal pose. 26 
Even more perplexing are those speeches which Nicholas has scarcely begun uttering 
and which are always being interrupted by others' conjectures about what he is about 
to say. The speech is never delivered. Characters long to communicate what they have 
25 Richard C. McCleary, Preface, Signs xvii: "only my body provides me with a way between the 
possible and the necessary toward the real. " 
°As it is exemplified by Eleanor saying "'D'you know the feeling when one's been on the point of 
saying something, and been interrupted; how it seems to stick here, ' she tapped her forehead, 'so that it 
stops everything else? "'(Y 239). 
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thought, but all the while are baffled by social conventions, personal relations and by 
the failure of words and language to communicate. Conversations, thoughts, all are 
fragmented and in their fragmentations, return interminably. Nothing is fully conveyed. 
All understanding, even those between family, friends and relatives, seems to have 
been derived from a vaguely known stock impression. For all the years that pass, 
Eleanor still perceives in North that brown-eyed cricketing boy smoking a cigar on a 
terrace. Still, Rose has always been perceived as a "firebrand" embodying vehement 
emotions: "Rose of the flaming heart; Rose of the burning breast; Rose of the weary 
world-red, red Rose" (Y 121). 
Fragmented memories recur. Every scene and people's sayings tend to repeat 
themselves, giving a perpetual present of the past. Each fragment as it encapsulates a 
story of the past is a path, a door, a tunnel, "stretching away and away down its 
darkness" (Y 243). The Years draws on the techniques of Cubism as fragmentary 
impressions and sensations are pasted and imposed upon one another; it is through 
these fragments that the reader, for the first time, is able to pore over what has been 
taken for granted and to inspect what has long been unconscious, like Sara's broken, 
repetitious, but suggestive phrases and songs that subvert any original structural and 
textualised significance. Sara is often compared by critics to the role of a fool in a 
Shakespeare play who in all his/her silliness hides a wisdom that transcends 
superficiality. The abruptness of Sara's remarks echoes the Cubist structure of the 
narrative. She seems to sing out the links to that theme and pattern of life which 
Eleanor has sought. If meanings are hidden beneath the camouflage of an arbitrarily 
arranged coherent appearance, then it is by breaking through the apparent coherence 
could the concealed, obliterated, meanings be unearthed. 
Roger Fry had long been frustrated by the taste of the British who seemed 
obstinately unaware of what he sees as the kind of beauty and art revealed in 
Post-Impressionist paintings. He argued furiously against the common desire always 
to view art interwoven with its historical context: the idea that it is the history that tells 
Lin 2ý, 9 
the viewers what is art, rather than the pictures themselves. The first 
Post-Impressionist exhibition of 1910 had shocked the public, yet it seemed only 
through shattering the original conception that one could possibly come to see the 
deficiency and shortcomings of the institutional conception. Post-Impressionist 
paintings challenge not only the conception of art and beauty of the Victorian and 
Edwardian society, but also the attempt to enclose motion, movement and time on a 
two-dimensional canvas. In producing a three-dimensional effect on a 
two-dimensional surface, a structure that would introduce the experience of time is 
required. Post-Impressionism is a re-construction of experience like Sara's abrupt 
behaviours and utterances. 
In The Years, there is a sense of worlds within this world. Unlike her previous 
novels that give light and shade to the different worlds experienced by different 
characters, in The Years (rather like Jorge Luis Borges' The Garden of Forking Paths 
(1941)) Woolf portrays worlds behind worlds as one passage through to the past leads 
to another. Readers, like characters, ferret through the `criss-crossed' passage of 
thoughts . 
27 There seem to be endless doors that open up to different pasts within 
Eleanor, observed Peggy. As years pass, innumerable sensations seem to store up 
within one. The sensations, as they topple down upon one another, break up the 
chronological orders of their happening. As one sensation leaps to another, a past, a 
stored image, is brought back to mind accompanied with all the emotions that were 
then felt. Nevertheless, The Years stands out amongst Woolf's other novels, because it 
attempts not only to represent the worlds within the world of memory and the various 
perspectives on the world seen through different characters, but it also explores how 
the world appears to be so different to the same person at the same moment simply 
through a different suffusion of feelings and emotions. It is as if the person exists 
simultaneously in different times and spaces at the same moment, as suddenly dawns 
upon Rose when she is having luncheon with Maggie and Sara, or as Eleanor suspects, 
27 Y 263. 
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"there must be another life.. . 
here and now... in this room"(Y 313). 28 Woolf's 
tunnelling process has come to dig out not simply the individual honeycomb, but 
absolute turns and bends within that always remain half-revealed until the character is 
startled by a hidden memory as it springs to consciousness. 
Disguised in its fictional form, The Years bears a strong resemblance to A Room 
as the fictional yet realist technique ironically subverts the reality of social 
conventions. The Years was written around the time that Woolf was composing Three 
Guineas, but although Woolf aims at exposing the flaws in the social system, she was 
dubious about the value of didactic writing. By simply exhibiting and transposing her 
readers into the position of her characters, she leaves the judgements and conclusions 
for readers to draw themselves. Although the real material and social world is not 
directly portrayed in the works of Woolf (compared to those of the Edwardian 
`materialists'), nevertheless, the social material world is often embedded within her 
narrative and felt through her characters. Classes and financial circumstances 
preoccupy Woolf. They are the crucial elements and themes that make up her 
characters and stories; they are her stories. Yet, "she tried to find a way of writing 
fiction that would allow her, [her voices, her ideas, even her judgements], to be 
present without seeming to be. Her most ambitious attempt to solve this problem was 
The Years" (Zwerdling 45). By bringing to focus the particulars instead of the general 
and the superficial, Woolf's narrative presents us with a sense of detachment; the 
narrative provides frames without enclosing one's point of view, and continually 
exposes the unrecognised. Woolf's narrative has a multi-layered structure of 
reflections upon reflections as if there always is another over-layer of consciousness. 
The narrative cleaves through the interwoven context of personal as well as 
socio-cultural history and creates an open space to reveal and suggest what has been 
hitherto concealed within customs and familiarisation. 
28 "it made her feel that she was two different people at the same time; that she was living at two 
different times at the same moment"(Y 123). 
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Conclusion: Between the Acts of Feelings and Thought 
Thoughts are the shadows of our sensations 
-always darker, emptier, simpler. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science 
Woolf's writings are primarily ontological narrative experiments concerning the 
understanding and presentation of states of being. Imbued with the philosophical ideas 
of the British empiricist tradition's inquest into the nature of reality, Woolf refined her 
own empirical pursuit of the co-relations between narrative and the formation of 
subjectivity, since self-meaning and self-history are configured in narrative forms 
whilst "knowledge is literary" (Russell, Knowledge 15). Woolf founded her 
life-writing on a transcription of feelings and emotions and how these feelings and 
emotions conjugate into a self-knowing state of being-in-the-world. Against the 
prevailing Western convention of glorifying a logical and rhetorical mind capable of 
abstract reasoning, Woolf continued throughout her career to readjust what she saw as 
the skewed masculine concept of reason in order to emphasise that the feelings of the 
body are often persistent, undeniable and greatly influential on beliefs, attitudes and 
behaviours. Perhaps Bernard, the novelist in The Waves, has failed to achieve a final 
`refrigeration' that perpetuates and concretises the flickering of momentary vision, yet 
in his improvised spontaneity, a real sense of life is fully conveyed. The feelings of the 
body underpin verbal thoughts; conversely verbal thoughts come to fortify and 
substantiate the internal flux of the body into a concentric flow of self-understanding 
and self-definition. Greek philosophy once strove to conjoin both the mystic instinct 
of inspiration and the logical reasoning of the sceptical examination, the elenchus, 
which aimed to rectify the unchecked errors of intuitions: "Instinct, intuition, or 
insight is what first leads to the beliefs which subsequent reason confirms or 
confutes... Reason is a harmonising, controlling force rather than a creative one 
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(Russell, Knowledge 31). In fictional narratives, Woolf persisted in trying to display 
the adversarial nature as well as the complementarity of reason and feeling. To attain 
the Truth and to create genuine lives, Woolf, like Bernard, (though they are both 
consistently threatened by the fastidious masculine gaze that disapproves of the fuzzy 
fringe of unregulated selfhood and sentiments), proclaimed "the double capacity to 
feel, to reason" (W 57). In order to preserve her inner fountain of creativity, Woolf 
resisted a psychoanalytic therapy that might institute the rule of a stringent and 
impervious reason that throttles and inhibits creative flow. In Between the Acts, Judith 
L. Johnston observes that the Oliver men continue to serve as the source of patriarchal 
judgement and suppressive power over the Oliver women: "Father and Son embody 
the principle of mastery justified by reason. With self-confidence, they ridicule 
sentiment, passion and poetic expression in the Oliver women" (261). With one 
curtain fallen and another rising, the novel imparts not desolation, but an envisioned 
`utopian' rationality achieved not so much by suppressing Nature as by 
acknowledging the human as a sentient being. 
In satirising the inequality between men and women, Woolf drew on social 
discourses as well as scientific precepts about knowledge of the human mind and 
character that continued to ignore or underplay the importance of the body. For despite 
some acknowledgement of the significance of intuitive inspiration in conducting 
reasoning, science and philosophy have continued to view the world of the senses and 
feeling as an illusory world that the pursuer of truth must avoid through the imposition 
of a strict and rigorous logic. In the works of Henri Bergson, G. E. Moore and 
Bertrand Russell, one perceives that modem scientific pursuit of a philosophical 
understanding of the world that is anchored in the problem of the realist/ idealist 
dichotomy and of the mind/body split. Following the British empirical tradition 
stretching back to David Hume, as well as the Cambridge epistemological movement 
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in the twentieth century, Woolf proposed through her narrative experiments that both 
ontology (the understanding of being) and epistemology (the understanding of the 
external world) should begin with the fundamental problem of the mind/body relation 
and should simultaneously challenge their gendered reconfiguration and appropriation. 
Through the imaginative world of the novel, Woolf sought to expose the fictional 
nature of narrative, propelling a paradigm shift in the presupposed hierarchy between 
mind and body; men and women; culture and nature. 
The world is learnt and conceptualised through the body and its innate concern 
with its own survival. The human mind's propensity to be both susceptible to the 
influence of the body and capable of surging beyond its organic confinement towards 
a self-abolishing objective stance fascinated Woolf. Presumably, in her illness, Woolf 
was given the opportunity to experience this extraordinary capacity of the mind (to be 
simultaneously bounded by the body and yet free to roam beyond any circumference 
of the bodily present) which she had found hard to circumscribe in any given literal 
expression. Thus, like her `mad' but `insightful' heroines (e. g. Isa in Between the 
Acts), she continued to violate the law-of-the father (that institutes life rather than 
allowing the free flow of living) and to break through the masculine sentence. Like, 
Isa, Woolf also fragmented sequence in order to encapsulate the poetical flow and the 
sense of being as it flickers through the mind in response to the feelings of the body. 
' 
With the proposition that bodily feelings underpin a sensible mind, Woolf not only 
contested the injustices of patriarchal society and redeemed women from their 
submissive status as sacrificial, self-obliterating objects who simply support and 
amplify male megalomania, but she also provided a new conceptualisation of the 
understanding of consciousness and the making of the subject. 
1 See also Rachel Blau DuPlessis, Writing beyond the Ending: Narrative Strategies of 
Twentieth-Century Women Writers (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1985) 31-46. 
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Lacking a poetic maternal figure among the cultural history of literature to look 
back and think through, Woolf planned to read all the great English literary works 
chronologically, not in order to admire the grandiosity of the patriarchal `canons' of 
the British cultural and literary history, but rather in an attempt to discover the veiled 
common voice of Anon, the voice of no age, of no particular civilisation. ` Although 
eclipsed by the resounding authoritative voice of the patriarchal and the imperial 
culture of aggressiveness, the silenced voice of Anon is a voice that transcends all 
crisis and threads throughout history with ballads and folk-songs, crooning a 
collective memory of life that extols the bodily pulsings and feelings and justifies its 
essentiality in life. Although, as in Claire Kahane's opinion, the Woolfian narrative 
voice "weaves a network of language through [the] stranded subjectivity" of each 
individual who fidgets at the idea of his or her affinity with other human beings, the 
Woolfian narrative never seeks to erase subjective differences as it strives after a 
congenial ground of being (224). When contemplating another new piece of work, 
Woolf noted in her diary: "Why not Povntzet Hall [which became Between the Acts]: 
a centre: all literature discussed in connection with real little incongruous living 
humour: and anything that comes into my head; but `I' rejected: `We' substituted: to 
whom at the end there shall be an invocation? `We' ... the composed of many 
different 
things.. . we all 
life, all art, all waifs and strays-a rambling capricious but somehow 
unified whole-the present state of my mind? " (WD 279). 3 Such an aspiration 
reminds the reader of the honeycomb image of an apparent disparity and inherent 
connectivity which successfully contrived in Mrs. Dalloway. Past and present are 
compressed into one day and people of all ages and all backgrounds congregate in 
Between the Acts. Inter-subjective similarities and differences are therefore intensified: 
2 See Brenda R. Silver, " 'Anon' and 'The Reader': Virginia Woolf's Last Essays, " Twentieth Century 
Literatur 25.3-4 (1979): 356-441. 
Diary entry 26 April 1938. 
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"Their minds and bodies were too close, yet not close enough. We aren't free, each 
one of them felt separately, to feel or think separately, nor yet to fall asleep. We're too 
close; but not close enough" (BA 41). The jerking and uncomfortable intimacy makes 
the audience of the pageant fidget as they sit together. For, each is so similar, yet each 
desires to withhold its own subjectivity despite the attraction of a consoling communal 
unity. In contrast to James Joyce, who sought ironically through the archetypal 
symbols of culture for the means to reclaim his own egoistic identity as Author, Woolf 
sought in the bodily unconscious a dissolution of the egoistic `I' and an invocation of 
the feminine Muses outgrown from the bodily feelings to retrieve a truer state of being 
that incorporates the mind in the body. 4 And through the `restoration' and 
acknowledgement of this shared subjective state of being, a true communal 
inter-subjective being (instead of an impassive conformity demanded by the 
civilisation) might possibly be attained. 
Presumably, the voice of No Age that collects individual existence into a 
communal experience is the silent voice of Nature as well as the bodily voice of life 
within each individual that slips through the nets of the logical and objective rhetoric 
of science. Even when Nature is finally captured within the abstract symbols and 
mathematic tables of science, still the scientific means remains inefficient in 
conveying the subjective appraisal of Nature and of life-the most fundamental 
phenomenon of being. It is a voice that transcends all historical narrative and 
discourses of linear development that aims at an ending and definitive encapsulation. 
The advocacy of Behaviourism (that refutes the subjective property of consciousness) 
would simply be the reductionism of the historians and biographers (as depicted in 
Orlando) who take only the accounts of the external, observable, facts and deny the 
° Judith L. Johnston identifies the two nurses as the `comical disguises' of Proust and Joyce. See 
Johnston 260. 
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subjective life within the mind to which no objective measurement can be applied. So 
although Woolf showed affinities with the Cambridge epistemological project, her 
understanding of knowledge is finally separate from that of logical atomism and 
logical positivism and Bertrand Russell's scientific philosophy that concerned only 
with well-attested facts and seeking to eliminate whatever cannot be reasonably 
justified or scientifically proved. Woolf did not altogether denounce the idea of 
objective truth; on the contrary, she was seeking an equivalent means through `art' to 
resolve the lasting conflict between objectivity and subjectivity. She was drawn 
towards Roger Fry's idea that objective Truth is also attained and conceived through 
the subjective pulsation of the body. Although Beauty and aesthetic harmony are 
perceived subjectively, objective transcription of such beauty and aesthetic harmony 
are achievable through a work of art. 
The silent voice and beauty of Nature might only be subjectively felt and 
apprehended through the poetic means of unbound `senses' and liberated `sensibility. ' 
When Neville in The Waves is captivated by the sudden disclosure of beauty, he is 
compelled to leave it in blankness and emptiness in order to protect it from being 
altered or contaminated by the inadequacy of Logos: "Let it exist, this blank, this 
beauty, and I, for one instant, steeped in pleasure" (W 60). The arresting poetic 
moment is also a most subjective moment. Or, as Mrs. Swithin of Between the Acts 
has construed while beholding the beauty of the landscape: "We haven't the 
words-we haven't the words. . . 
Behind the eyes; not on the lips; that's all" (BA 35). 
Perhaps, inevitably one doubts as Bart (who is a personification of a rationalist and 
often derides his sister's religious and superstitious belief), "Thoughts without 
words,.. . 
Can that be? "(BA 35). Still, one has to acknowledge the unreliable nature of 
narrative texture. Words and narrative as means of transcription will always construct 
a `simulacrum' of the Real. 
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In a style of the Grecian tragedy that adheres to the three unities of time, mode 
and place, Between the Acts dramatises the impassable fate of the human race under 
the majestic power of `Mother Nature. ' The Freudian return of the repressed is but a 
return of Nature herself that humiliates the egoistic pride of the human being viewing 
itself as a rational, autonomous and self-created Nietzschian `superman' or Freudian 
`prosthetic God'-an insane wilfulness of obstinate belief in the capacities of science 
and human rationality. The great civilisation built upon human intelligence is utterly 
disrupted by the warfare brought about by human discontent with the ways that his 
sovereign freedom seems compromised within a socially bounded civilisation. 
Between the acts of the two world wars, the hubris of human intelligence that has long 
regarded Nature with contempt, is now thoroughly deflated. The pageant-play, with all 
its uncertainties, stands as an inner subversion of the outward `uniform' of Between 
the Acts, echoing an undertone of the narrative that alternates between the suppressed 
love and hatred for the socio-familial confinements of civilisation. The reader feels 
with Isa the predicament of the married woman within the marriage institution. Her 
attachment to her husband now is solely founded upon a family relation as he is the 
father, the protector, of her children. Corresponding to what Freud has argued in 
"Civilisation and Its Discontents" (1930), Between the Acts illustrates the intrinsic 
antagonism between the fundamental drive to secure oneself through culture and 
civilisation from a precarious Nature, and the desire to seek pleasure with no restraints. 
Familial comfort and distress fluctuate within the Olivers. The passion which Isa feels 
for the gentleman farmer can only be savoured in the tacit rhythm of the body. With 
all the resentment against the infidelity of her husband, still she needs to comply and 
adhere to her role as a wife, mother and hostess of the Pointz Hall. The sanctified 
familial space of the drawing room is not only derided by Isa's unfaithful passion for 
Mr. Haines but also by their talk of the cesspool. In the recurring undertone of a sexual 
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injustice imposed upon women (either through the reported rape corresponding to a 
factual instance, or the allusion to the legend of Procne and Philomela that violates 
familial taboos), Between the Acts is not just a satire of patriarchal civilisation, but 
also a tacit protest against the essential injustice of the female role as a sexual object 
or nonentity in a patriarchal family. 
With a further glance through each `act' in history, the contingency of life is 
exposed through the pageant-play. Johnston observes Woolf's effort to retrieve 
"alternative cultural roots" of the native Anglo-Saxon civilisation in contrast to the 
Apollonian culture of Athenian Greece (262). "Miss La Trobe's historical pageant[, ] 
recapitulating British literary and imperial history[, ] challenge[s] the myth perpetuated 
by Cambridge; that is, the humanist myth of a continuous cultural lineage from Greek 
to Roman to Norman to British empires" (Johnston 259-260). Oppressive masculine 
violence and imperial forces, like the imminent eruption of another war, remain as a 
consistent undercurrent to the apparent merriment of the pageant. Although Johnston 
sees the `bossy' Miss La Trobe as an `energetic leader' resembling Hitler, who 
"impose[s] her vision on others, " Miss La Trobe's pageant-play is rather an extension 
of a fragmented feminine writing whose words induce subjective connections and 
responses and repel a set, uniform, meaning: "They all looked at the play; Isa, Giles, 
Mr. Oliver. Each of course saw something different" (Johnston 264; BA 126). Without 
a definite meaning, the play preserves its integrity without being depreciated by the 
insufficiency of the signifiers. In its wholeness, it continues to hang in one's mind. 
Instead of `imposing her own vision, ' Miss La Trobe aspires to evoke and encourage 
the individual subjectivity that has been long buried in the conformity of the 
socio-cultural context. 
In an ironic contrast to the masculine `madness' in science, rationality and the 
imperial force to `create a better world, ' all the main female characters (Isabella, Mrs. 
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Swithin, Mrs. Manresa, and even Miss La Trobe, an emblematic advocator of illusions 
and imaginations) in Between the Acts have a touch of wildness or perhaps of 
madness, with their shared and spontaneous responses to the rhythm and feelings of 
the body (adhering to the conventional image of an `insightful' madness capable of 
perceiving the unseen and knowing the unbeknown plan of the supernatural as 
expounded by Michel Foucault). They are bodily and earthly bounded as they are 
more susceptible to momentary feelings and emotions. Unlike the men of science and 
reason who venture to subjugate Nature with abstract tables and formulas, they 
resonate in body and feelings with Nature and through them is revealed a hoarded 
`Truth' of Nature which is yet inexpressible in words. They are the children of Nature, 
of superstitions, of wildness. To Nature, they implore support and illumination; and to 
Nature, they attribute the reality of life and their `senses' and `sensibility' of `reality. ' 
The dispersal of the subjective space is brought together into a communal 
experience by the supreme Nature herself. In an attempt to "try ten mins. of present 
time,... She wanted to expose them, as it were, to douche them, with present-time 
reality" (BA 107). Yet, Miss La Trobe continues to feel threatened by the audience who 
are relentless in retaining their distancing, objective, position and resist giving up their 
subjective privacy to become interwoven into the narrative acts of her play. 
Each of 
them strives obstinately to protect their own individuality and defies the 
generalisations of theatrical contrivance which would make them 
into the stock 
characters of their age. Instead of being woven into the dramatic narrative, the 
audience forces disillusionment upon Miss La Trobe: "`Reality too strong, 
' she 
muttered. `Curs'em! ' She felt everything they felt. Audiences were the 
devil" (BA 
107). Eventually, the illusion which Miss La Trobe has conceived but failed to 
transcribe through her theatrical deployment is bridged and attuned by Nature. 
The 
outpouring of the sudden shower engenders within each 
individual a subjective as well 
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as communal engagement with `the present' and through it, the dream-world of the 
play cleaves perfectly to the reality of the audiences. Now the audience is brought into 
the play itself as its enacted present is also framed by the theatrical context of the 
pageant. They are made to be simultaneously subjectively involved as ýv'ell as 
consciously aware of their subjective present. In short, they have become the spectator 
of their own present. In Nature, a harmony is restored. Rigorous rationality, in 
debarring nature and denying feelings, creates the split within the self and the ultimate 
breach with others and the Real. In recognising a Nature beyond the mastery of the 
human, a harmonised unity is therefore achieved as the egoistic imposed differences 
are resolved. As Mrs. Swithin gazes vaguely into nature, she construes: "Sheep, cows, 
grass, trees, ourselves-all are one. If discordant, producing harmony-if not to us, to 
a gigantic ear attached to a gigantic head ... we reach the conclusion that all is harmony, 
could we hear it" (BA 104). 
Feelings and sensations are themselves the theme of Between the Acts, mirroring 
Isa's aspiration that it is the mood not the plot that the artistic narrative form is 
conveying. Although Kahane suggests that "in the foreground of this novel are `acts', " 
it is the moods straining between the acts that the narrative is contriving and 
communicating (224). With a dab of Cubist multiple points-of-view, the novel, though 
diffusive and without any central character or a central and well-knitted plot, is 
constrained by moods-undefined but dominating moods of love and hate; of being 
bounded and being free; of security and uncertainty, that portend the essential state of 
being in a world where one exerts no control. Even the pageant-play itself is 
repeatedly disturbed by the incontestable reality as an amateur outdoor production: 
words are either unheard or even forgotten by the young actors; real scenery intrudes 
into the fictional settings; and the gramophone stutters, estranging the audience from 
the dramatic illusions. Yet, "Did the plot matter, " wonders Isa as the words of the 
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actors fail to reach her, "The plot was only there to beget emotion. There were only 
two emotions: love; and hate. There was no need to puzzle out the plot" (BA 56). In 
the stream of feelings and emotions, one thing leads to another as if a life is built in 
contingency without the intervention of the subject's intentionality. One thought 
jumps to another; one scene cuts abruptly to another. Everything is in a flow of 
continual formation, while nothing seems to be consecutive. As if mirroring the 
factual anticipation of another war, the moods continue to amass in silence towards 
the forthcoming outbreak of the suppressed reality, alluding to both the confrontation 
between the husband and wife (Giles and Isa) and the war to come. Even the novel 
itself ends symbolically with one curtain fallen on the past and present and another 
rising, placing itself as a transitory stage towards a forthcoming future. As Nature 
continues to intrude into the narrative, nothing seems to be certain and yet, in its 
precariousness, a general pattern of life is nevertheless drawn: "all were circled" like 
the recurring questions in the muddling thoughts of Mrs. Swithin (BA 17). Between 
the acts, there is a suspension of moods in time which comprise a `Truth' of Nature 
and of `Being. ' 
Instead of denying the illusory world of the subjective imagination as in The 
Voyage Out, Woolf's last novel is a literary tribute to a subjective reality that 
underpins objective apprehension. The narrative, with its monotonous repetition, as of 
a lullaby crooned to put to rest one's egoistic consciousness, carries its characters as 
well as readers as it digs and delves deeper and deeper into a collective consciousness 
of a pacified subjective emotional world. Separations and distinctions are but a result 
of the self-absorbed, egoistic, `I' who, in its attempt to subjugate Nature, is unable to 
resonate with the Real and the Other outside. This `I' sustains itself by delineating 
boundaries and excluding `the Other. ' Whilst deep down in the `wedge-shaped core of 
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darkness' within, it is `limitless' and `unfathomable. '5 The full embrace of the inner 
void pacifies ontological anxiety about nothingness. There is no fret, nor worries, 
lying at the bottom of the sea. Self-attainment follows the sweeping dissolution of `I. ' 
Through the subjective impressions of the female characters, the narrative constantly 
achieves the silent but suggestive voice of Nature. In silence, the trees, the swallows, 
the nature "[dance], like the Russians, only not to music, but to the unheard rhythm of 
their own wild hearts" (BA 41). Music, as pure and abstracted symbols deprived of all 
literal meaning, becomes the only possible means to imbricate the intrinsic subjective 
flow. In its abstractness, music stirs up our feelings. "Music wakes us. Music makes us 
see the hidden, join the broken" (BA 73). In the silenced Nature, the fragmented 
narrative is united and the rhythm of the heart made perceptible. 
As the nurse who murmurs to the children, rolling words on her lips, murmuring 
fragments of a sentence: "not shaping pellets of information or handing ideas from 
one to another, but rolling words, like sweets on their tongues; which, as they thinned 
to transparency, gave off pink, green, and sweetness, " Isa has also been playing with 
and musing on words all along (9). Not in searching for a meaning, but instead with 
sounds, rhythms, imagery, she is building up a sensation, a feeling which will live 
(although, in the fashion of all feminine writings, it might be bounded up among the 
sheets of paper which she disguises as her accounting book). Meanings inhere not in 
the words themselves. It is the inner stream of feeling and emotion that bestows 
meaning on words. Thus, the rhythm of the words prompts a feeling and the feeling in 
return furnishes the words with meaning. 
By playing with the "words" and acting out instabilities and controversies, Miss 
La Trobe has broken through the stringency of the symbolic order. She stirs in the 
audiences their unacted parts as in the words of Mrs. Swithin: "What a small part I've 
5 TL 69-70. 
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had to play! But you've made me feel I could have played... Cleopatra" (92). Words 
no longer designate identity, alternatively, in free associations, they fish up buried 
sensations and hidden selves. As words are stripped of their signification in Between 
the Acts, meanings, instead of being conveyed as irrefutable and fixed through verbal 
signifiers, are construed through the rhythms of nature in its silence and emptiness. 
Combining with Nature, the deferral of the signifier is transcended: what is signified is 
now fully imbricated within the signifier itself. The meaning that is self-contained 
within pure symbols is a meaning unfathomable, and every word as it exists in its own 
totality should be appreciated as it is-"Words without meaning-wonderful words, " 
for they are infinite and perpetual; they are the pure poetic form (BA 125). Woolf 
achieves an ultimate breakthough of the sentence and sequence of the masculine order. 
In Between the Acts, words which are cut loose from their contexts become pure 
symbols of their own, embracing a wide range of possibilities and bewildering their 
beholders. No longer could the words be truthful and faithful to their employer, and 
meanings are only attained through the exchange between individual interpreters and 
their own appropriation of the symbols and words. "Thank the actors, not the 
author... Or ourselves, the audience, " recalls Roland Barthes' famous declaration of 
the death of the author as the signifiers seem to spring free, assuming an autonomous 
spirit of their own (BA 120). What Miss La Trobe appears to aim for in her theatrical 
narrative is, in fact, an obliteration of authorship. Like Woolf, she contrives a narrative 
space which, instead of being constricting, is liberating. As the audience is invited into 
the creative process, the fictitious nature of narrative is fully fulfilled. For as the idea 
is embodied through the pageant-play in Between the Acts, there are numerous 
unexpectednesses added to the formation of the play as it is played out-the 
malfunctioning of the gramophone, the unplanned act of nature itself, and above all 
the introduction of a real village idiot as the court jester-blending the real world into 
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the illusion of the play and subverting the boundary between the real and the unreal as 
in a postmodern Disney World. 6 Without a definite boundary between the real and the 
unreal, the illusionary effects of the play become unassailable and carry further 
beyond the play and its narrative. It has transcended its own unreal foregrounding. The 
outdoor production, with the meagreness of the facilities, brings also to the forefront 
the backstage that is supposed to be hidden from its audiences. Therefore, actors seem 
to carry along their original identities into the play, as well as retaining their symbolic 
meanings when the play is supposed to be over: 
Was that the end? The actors were reluctant to go. They lingered; they 
mingled. There was Budge the policeman talking to old Queen Bess. And 
the Age of Reason hobnobbed with the foreparts of the donkey. And Mrs. 
Hardcastle patted out the folds of her crinoline. And little England, still a 
child, sucked a peppermint drop out of a bag. Each still acted the unacted 
part conferred on them by their clothes. (BA 116) 
Thus, unexpected effects are added to the production and the play starts to assume a 
life of its own, free from the domination of its author and director. 
Miss La Trobe feels frustrated, as Woolf often felt, since her creation 
continuously eludes her original layout-"Her vision escaped her" (BA 60). When 
they are attempting to transcribe the dead, life intrudes. Words have lost their supreme 
power to locate and signify and meanings are woven and formed through the course of 
interaction. As a psychoanalyst might put it, personal meaning is created by the 
playing out of object-relations. Therefore, nothing is definite or conclusive, not even 
one's subjectivity; not even a planned plot. For, real life backfires as satirised by the 
controversial allusions of Where there's a Will there's a way, the Restoration comedy 
within the pageant-play. As a result of the inconclusive nature of being in the world, 
b Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra and Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria Glaser (Ann Arbor: U Michigan P, 
1994). 
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there is always novelty to enjoy as well as uncertainty to fear. And yet, a stream of 
feelings and emotions seem to collect the dispersed experiences, reveries, thoughts, 
perceptions and knit out a continuous story of the self. At the end of the day, no 
meaning has been grasped and no understanding has been achieved. 
Within the solid structure of the three unities, Between the Acts is presented in a 
series of loosely connected scenes, fragmented conversations, and segmented feelings 
but as if, underneath this apparent dispersal, there is a pattern, a granite-like order that 
connects and solidifies (whether it is Nature or man-made institutions). The refrain 
that indicates an interval, "dispersed are we, " seems to point simultaneously to how 
one is separated from another as well as how dispersed and disjoint one is within 
oneself (59). Yet, although a split is registered, the Woolfian subject is by no means 
identical with the Lacanian concept. Unified subjectivity cannot be expected through 
the law-of-the-father. Instead, unified subjectivity is sundered with the primary 
acquisition of language as the subject attempts to distinguish the `I' from the Other in 
an objective reflection upon itself. The self-reflexive characteristic of language is the 
fundamental infringement on the subjective unity of mind/body. The Lacanian 
mirror-reflection that creates a split between an outward unity and the inner disparity 
is actually an upshot of an already existing self-reflexive mind alienated from the 
bodily ground concealed from consciousness. Thus, Woolfian narrative suggests a 
prior unity which exists underneath the apparent disparagement of a linguistically 
formulated consciousness. It seeks to attain, through the dissolution of the `I, ' either a 
complete immersion in core consciousness or a creative liberation and transcendence 
from the linguistically formative `I. ' The `shilling' spot at the back of one's head (an 
image often adopted by Woolf) will always subvert any unified, panoramic, view of 
oneself from a self-reflexive perspective, but an inner felt unity is nevertheless 
sustained through an integral flow of feelings. Miss La Trobe does not re-present the 
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present selves of the audience by holding up a perfect mirror. Instead, she "smash[es] 
to atoms what was whole, " by having the imagery of the audience reflected through 
cracked mirrors, tin cans, old jars (BA 109). In "Scraps , orts and 
fragments, " one 
becomes aware of the superficial unity fictionalised through the linguistic context. 
With the distortion of the symbolically constructed texture of consciousness, a more 
truthful presentation and apprehension of the subjective entity could finally be 
attainable (BA 112). Beneath the "scraps, orts and fragments" which all one can 
perceive of oneself, there is an underpinning sense of the feeling providing a 
pre-reflexive and pre-verbal unity. 
Words have lost their definition. Yet, even though they can only represent the 
bits and scraps of what one seeks to express, it is only through words and their 
formulation that a subject might achieve a substantial understanding of itself. Verbal 
representations may not be necessary to the core consciousness of a subjective being, 
yet without verbal representations, it would be impossible to achieve the personal 
meaning of a self and a life. 7 Between the Acts, though, is filled with unexpressed 
emotions and inexplicable feelings. A search for meanings, for a reason and cause, is 
constantly at work. The emptiness at the heart of life which Clarissa has commented 
upon is amplified by the failure of the symbolic language; the subject is unable to 
create a personal meaning to form a solid self-identity. The void at the centre is often 
supplied with verbal interpretations and images. Although emotions and feelings 
always elude any possible apprehension of words in their abstractness, without words, 
emotions and feelings seem entirely ungraspable. And as emotions and 
feelings 
continue to pile up, the silence of the inexplicable becomes even more 
dominant. 
Nonetheless, with an affirmation of the importance of language in the formation of 
7 Nancy Chodorow writes in The Power of Feelings, "Psychoanalysis is a theory about how we create 




self and personal meanings, there also rises anguish for the differentiations and 
divisions brought along by the adaptation of verbal language. Enchanted by words, 
Isabella (Isa) never tries to pin down the meaning of her fragmented phrases. She 
keeps them afloat, leaving them as they are. She is therefore capable of achieving a 
similar inner equilibrium and self-dispersal as Mrs. Ramsay's wedged-shape core of 
darkness: "In some harvestless dim field where no evening lets fall her mantle; nor 
sun rises. All's equal there. Unblowing, ungrowing are the roses there. Change is not; 
nor the mutable and lovable; nor greetings nor partings; nor furtive findings and 
feelings, where hand seeks hand and eye seeks shelter from the eye" (BA 93). This 
self-annihilation of female subjectivity (as Elaine Showalter has called it) is in fact an 
embrace of an unlimited self. 
But to surge beyond the texture of language and to embrace the essential state of 
one's being which is, in fact, nothingness, is a self-threatening posture. Even the 
acknowledgement of the intrinsic void will rouse a threat to the existing 
(linguistic-structured) ego. The history of Western philosophy is itself a reflection of 
the ontological struggle between the recognition of an inner void and the primal desire 
to invent and fabricate substantial meanings and definitions. Terry Eagleton 
summarily writes: "In Hegel's eyes, pure being is utterly indeterminate, and so 
indistinguishable from nothingness. For Schopenhauer, the self is a `bottomeless 
void. ' For the anarchist Max Stirrer, humanity is a kind of `creative nothing. ' For 
Martin Heidegger, to live authentically is to embrace our own nothingness, accepting 
the fact that our existence is contingent, ungrounded and unchosen" (209-10). The 
subject is forever transforming and adjusting itself to its object-relations in the world, 
but still the transformation circulates around a concentric yet unnameable core. Both 
Orlando and Between the Acts are narratives of history which seek a definition of life 
as they come to address the transience of subjective life in contrast with the 
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monumental time of no time. Nature is protean as well as perennial. Its "repetition [i]s 
senseless, hideous, stupefying, " for "if there is nothing unforeseen, no invention or 
creation in the universe, time is useless again" (BA 42; Russell, Knowledge 24). 
However, in a historical narrative, a pattern is formed, a plausible meaning takes 
shape. 
Time passes; things change. Still, Orlando remains intrinsically the same 
Orlando who waved a sword against the head of the Moor in an Elizabethan attic 
room, the same Orlando who needed to attach him/her self to the oak tree in an 
Elizabethan aristocratic estate. It is by enduring these alterations of social conventions 
and by exhausting the protean nature of the `self, ' that Orlando is led to distinguish the 
very basis of him/her `self. ' Orlando longs for a firm root to attach him/herself, yet 
s/he is also fascinated by the endless possibility of the self as if it could take up any 
shape. The tendency of the self to camouflage itself underneath social codes is fully 
exhibited and the changes in social climate (as well as the weather) allow hidden 
features of the `self' to reveal themselves. The world is subjected to change as well as 
what one identifies as one's `self, ' yet through all the variations, Orlando still holds 
his/her belief in the oak tree that distinguishes itself by underpinning the processes of 
temporality: "Nature, who has played so many queer tricks upon us, making us so 
unequally of clay and diamonds, of rainbow and granite, and stuffed them 
into a case, 
often of the most incongruous" (0 55). Once again in Orlando, Woolf is struggling 
against the transient nature of the rainbow-like `fact' which appears to be so real 
but 
inconsistent, and the firm and reliable yet unattainable base of a granite-hard `Truth. ' 
With the publication of the poem "The Oak Tree, " an assertion is made about an 
ontological Truth only arrested, poetically, through aesthetic achievement. 
The affinity between Orlando and this posthumous work is also observed by 
Gillian Beer in her essay "Between the Acts: Resisting the End. " The absurdity of life 
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and the precariousness of nature are greatly magnified by their light-heartedness as in 
a black comedy. The apparent fictional framework inverts the original concept of 
fiction and fact as it exposes the fictitious nature of any narrative. And yet the 
pre-supposed fictional nature of the narrative protects it from being self-negated and 
self-subverted. All historic discourses are but a fictional narrative constructed out of 
nothingness. In digging and delving, Woolf goes beyond the personal struggle 
between the ego and id, groping, like C. G. Jung, for a deeper root that grounds 
creative life and subjective consciousness as well as the diverse manifestations of the 
individual. She probes deeper into the realm of sub-consciousness where words and 
languages are no longer the appropriators of one's feelings and thoughts. 
Particularities are oftentimes generalised and with such generalisation the 
subject is solidified by a sustainable general law. 8 Generalisation is a primal attempt 
to understand the world and its ways. Though one pageant is different from another, 
each year a similar chord strikes and on hearing "the first peal of a chime of bells,... 
you hear the second; as the second peals, you hear the third" (BA 16). One thing leads 
to another and before one realises it, a shape is taken up, a pattern woven and a life 
formed, leaving the subject feeling trapped and unable to exert any power of control. 
The song of the chorus in the play within the play of Between the Acts, echoes the 
battered woman in Mrs. Dalloway, singing out the recurring nature of the world which 
is on the edge of being disrupted by the war: "Digging and delving (they sang), 
hedging and ditching, we pass ... 
Summer and winter, autumn and spring return ... 
All 
passes but we, all changes. . . 
but we remain forever the same" (BA 84). 
One is constantly searching for patterns to follow, for a general concept to 
x "As Nietzsche long ago said, a species that refused to overgeneralise, investigating each particular 
object precisely before any generalisation would probably have perished long since. And even in 
contemporary terms, it appears that a firm and overgeneral bounding off of the self from the disgusting 
servers to reassure the self about its own solidarity and power" (Nussbaum 204). 
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understand the world. And still, no matter what understanding the individual has 
grasped, s/he is often betrayed by the treacherous of life, cheated out of life, out of 
meaning, by its failure to conform to the pattern imposed on it. Different traditions of 
superstitions and religions jostle each other in the pages of Between the Acts: as if in a 
transitory stage of uncertainty one could only rely on belief and faith to reassure one 
of order and regularities. Such beliefs coalesce into interpretations for the mystery of 
life. But although the subject is constantly readjusting itself to the uncertainty of the 
external world, a core sense of its being (in association with memory and especially 
the memory of the body) which is impregnable yet intangible, persists and upholds a 
consistent selfhood that might lead one from one note to another. Random as the 
external stimuli are, the individual mind picks up separate impressions in response. 
This particular day of a village pageant of Between the Acts shares a similar spirit 
with Mrs. Dalloway as past and future are brought together as well as people from 
various parts of society. The present day of the pageant and its audience are interlaced 
with the rest of the history that is presented. The pageant connects and creates a 
communal experience among its audiences: they may not meet again, yet the 
experience they have shared will allow each to live on within the other. A thread is 
formed among them. 
In all its playfulness, however, silence oppresses throughout the novel. Perhaps 
this really is the novel of silence envisioned by Hewet in The Voyage Out. Instead of 
verbal communication, the novel is built upon the vibrations of the body and its 
immediate interaction with sense-objects. The narrative mimes the sensual and 
emotional ripples of the body in resonance with received stimuli. Although the present 
is burdened with the past and the future, it is enlivened by the body. Isa feels herself 
trapped within her current circumstances, unable to love and hate fully, but all of a 
sudden this feeling subsides and what is substituted for it is an acute consciousness of 
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her bodily need for water. Words seem to reach an ultimate abstraction, no word has a 
definite meaning, yet each word stimulates the inner circulation of sensations. 
"Ah, but she was not merely a twitcher of individual strings; she was one who 
seethes wandering bodies and floating voices in a cauldron, and makes rise up from its 
amorphous mass a re-created world" (BA 92). The inner voice of the creative producer 
of the pageant, Miss La Trobe, in Between the Acts is no less applicable to Woolf 
herself-the ultimate creator behind the scene. She too, like, Miss La Trobe, 
endeavours to bestow upon her reader the sense that "Glory possessed her [or him]"; 
that "her[/his] moment was on her[/him]-her[/his] glory" (BA 92). In `scraps, orts 
fragments, ' she endeavours to project onto her reader a reflection of their real present 
being, contrived out of an elaborated narrative. There, both Woolf and Miss La 
Trobe's stories of life are rather performed and enacted not only through the 
prescribed characters and settings, but rather through the temporality and the reality of 
the actual living of their readers or audience. It is in the real life of the reader and the 
audience that the liveliness of the story resides. Although still writing in words, Woolf 
has gradually moved beyond the meaning of words in Between the Acts. In its 
fragmentation, Between the Acts, which was published posthumously, has achieved a 
poetic stasis out of which a Truth of life which no neatly formed narrative could 
possibly delineate, might emerge. 
As an educated man's daughter, Woolf had enjoyed a free-access to her father's 
library. Although university education was still out of her reach, she was, like 
Katharine in Night and Day, furnished with the privilege of being born and brought up 
in a family of well-established literary and writing traditions. However, within such a 
traditional family, the restraints of the patriarchal institution on woman were even 
more conspicuous. In the image of Mr. and Mrs. Ramsay, her father was always 
demanding sympathy and sacrifice from the Stephen women, whilst her mother 
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acquiesced in the patriarchal institution and conformed in sheer virtue to the image of 
`angel in the house. ' In narrative, Woolf started to invent a new subjective space that 
might bequeath to women a new identity and therefore new possibilities. Resisting 
compliance with masculine versions of rationality and patriarchal bias against the 
emotionality of women, Woolf insists on the co-relation of the body and the mind. The 
material body continues to serve as the fundamental ground for the mind and, as she 
attested in A Room, a well-nourished body is indispensable to a `sensible' and creative 
mind. Both Woolf's ontological pursuit and feminist claims are therefore strengthened 
through the re-conceptualised mindibody relation. Pre-empting the contemporary 
neurological stance, Woolf professed through her narrative experiment that feelings 
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